




Brit
551-6


Wellesley



BIBLIOTHECA
REGIA
MONACENSIS.

THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
FROM
1799 TO 1818.

"Monumentum ære perennius."



THE DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD-MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

IN

INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW

COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,

FROM

DURING 1799 TO 1818.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

VOLUME THE SIXTH.

A NEW EDITION.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCLXXXIII.



THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
IN
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,
FROM
1799 TO 1818.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

VOLUME THE SIXTH.

A NEW EDITION.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCCXXXVIII.

52.D.

must have appeared extraordinary to the Commander in Chief, and must have given him as much concern as it has to me. Till lately, desertion from a British army on service was a crime almost unknown; and I am concerned to add, that I have reason to believe that many of those who have deserted have been guilty of the worst description of that offence, and have gone over to the enemy.

I attribute the prevalence of this crime in a great measure to the bad description of men, of which many of the regiments are composed almost entirely, and who have been received principally from the Irish militia. A sufficient time has not elapsed, since these men have entered the regiments of the line, to form their habits to regularity and discipline; the non-commissioned officers, in the second battalions principally, are very bad; and I am sorry to add that the subaltern officers are not of the best description; and that I do not think so much attention has been given by them as might have been expected, to form either the non-commissioned officers or the soldiers to those habits of regularity

LONDON:

Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES and SONS,
Stamford Street.

I attribute the description of the army likewise, in some degree, to the irregular and predatory habits which those soldiers had acquired, who, having straggled from their regiments during the late service under the command of Sir John Moore, were some of them taken prisoners by the French, and have since escaped from them, and others, after having wandered in different parts of Portugal and Spain, have returned to the army. All these men have shifted for themselves in the country, by rapine and plunder, since they quitted their regiments in 1808; and they have introduced others of their modes of proceeding, and have instilled a desire in others to follow their example, and live in the same mode, and by the same means, free from the restraints of discipline and regularity.

I can assure the Commander in Chief that I know of no cause for the desertion of the soldiers from this army, excepting those to which I have above alluded. They have, in general, but little duty, and very little notion of fatigue or fatigue. Their quarters are without exception good, and abundant in the country, and they are not only free from any

THE
DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
IN
THE PENINSULA,
IN
1810.

To Brigadier General Cox, Governor of Almeida.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 1st April, 1810.

‘I request you to pay Señor Echevarria all the expenses which he has incurred for the encouragement of desertion from the French army, and for the support of deserters, and to tell him that I request him to encourage desertion by the following measures. Let him send trusty persons to assure soldiers in the French army, induced to desert, that they shall be received here and treated in every respect as British soldiers; that their arms and horses, if they should bring them, shall be bought from them and paid for; that they shall have their option of enlisting into the British service or not; that if they choose to enlist they shall receive a bounty and shall have the choice of enlisting into any of the Foreign Corps with this army, or in England; and that, if they do not choose to enlist, measures shall be taken to send them out of the Peninsula, and to facilitate their return to their own country.

‘I request that all deserters may be sent to the head quarters of the army, and all expenses incurred on their account shall be paid.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General Cox.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Viseu, 1st April, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st March. The War Office appoint the agents of the corps called Foreign Corps, of which I believe your’s is one. Ferguson contested this point with the War Office, respecting the Sicilian regiment, of which he is Colonel, and he could not succeed. I recommend to you therefore to submit, and ask for your augmentation.

‘ No less than forty-six deserters have come in since you left this.

‘ Sherbrooke knows something on the subject of the agency of foreign corps, and I will speak to him upon your letter, if I should see him this morning. In the mean time, you might write to your agent to desire him to inquire whether your regiment is called a foreign corps.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. A. Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have spoken to General Sherbrooke, who agrees with me; he says that he has been informed that some Colonels of foreign corps, being British subjects, have appointed their own agents, but he did not find out an instance, and he submitted in the case of the Sicilian regiment: the question is, is yours a foreign corps? We think it is not, as Greenwood was the agent; Disney is the agent for foreign corps.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 1st April, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th March. We have not more cavalry than is required for the service of the British army, and I cannot allow it to be employed separately from the other troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 1st April, 1810.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 25th March.

‘The alteration of the arrangement for the command at Cadiz, and the orders given by Government to send to Lisbon all the transports, which in my opinion they might as well have left to us, render it impossible to draw any part of the corps from thence, whatever may be our necessities.

‘I do not find that the Government have sent any hospital ships, notwithstanding my request; and I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will allow the fitting up of the number you mention (six) to be continued.

‘I have not yet heard from Colonel Fletcher about the telegraph, since he spoke to you. I am much obliged to you for the plan for the Portuguese troops. It will be very useful to them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 1st April, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 28th of March.

‘In respect to the Patriarch’s proposal to divide the kingdom into districts, it is my opinion that the kingdom is already divided in a very convenient manner; the magistrates are fully sufficient for the performance of the duty required of them; the laws and regulations are excellent; and all that is required is to put the whole in motion, and to carry the laws into execution.

‘I can have no objection to give Beresford any power; on the contrary, the greater the power he has, the better it will be for the public service: but, for his own sake, I should think it better to leave the execution of the laws in the hands of the ordinary magistrates. Settle it, however, in any way you think best.

‘I agree with you respecting the existing disposition of the inhabitants of Lisbon. In fact, all they wish for is to be saved from the French: they were riotous last winter, because they imagined, and with some reason, that we intended to abandon them; and they became quiet as soon as they found that a different system was adopted, and about to be acted upon.

‘ These facts would however lead to a conclusion that they would become riotous if they saw the enemy on the left of the Tagus, and heard of him at no great distance on the right of that river, knowing that we had made all our arrangements to embark. The riots and insurrections of the town of Lisbon can never do us any good; and I am therefore anxious that the system which I had proposed to you should be organized.

‘ I have desired that you may have half the money come from England. The arrangement made by Government for the command of Cadiz will totally ruin us in the way of money.

‘ Has Lord Wellesley written to you respecting preparations to be made by the Government for embarking?

‘ I shall send off the messenger with the letters for England to-morrow evening, and he will be at Lisbon in the evening or early in the night of Wednesday. I enclose a letter from Colonel —.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 2nd April, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 30th March. The enemy’s detachment which had moved through the Puerto de Baños has retired again into Castille; and I am convinced that the only object of its movement into Estremadura was to oblige General Carrera to withdraw from Coria, which he did.

‘ I cannot understand what advantage the French can derive from the possession of Alcantara, the bridge over the Tagus being irreparably destroyed. It is the worst ferry on the river; I do not believe a gun could get to the boat on either side, which boat is very small, and could not contain two horses.

‘ The reports which you have on the Portuguese frontier, south of the Tagus, will show you that, the bridge of Alcantara being destroyed, the enemy could not pitch upon a more inconvenient place than that from whence to make their movements; and it is the worst position that they could

take for any other purpose : a small corps could not retreat from it.

‘ My opinion is, that they have taken their position at Caceres because they could get no provisions at Truxillo, and because they found they could do so without inconvenience and in safety, as the Marques de la Romana had detached a part of his corps to the Sierra Morena.

‘ My opinion therefore is, that the position of the enemy at Caceres has nothing to say to yours or to the Portuguese frontier. It is possible, however, as the Marques de la Romana says, that the position of the enemy at Caceres may annoy the town of Badajoz, in the safety of which we are much interested, and the position of the corps under his command.

‘ If you should find this to be really the case, I have no objection to your showing yourself beyond the Sierra, if you should be of opinion that your doing so will be of any advantage to them, and will not be inconvenient to your own troops.

‘ You see what the opinion of people in England is of affairs here. My instructions so far concur with the general sentiment as to forbid any risk, or any unnecessary loss ; and you will attend to that in any movement which you may make.

‘ In respect to the relief of Colonel Wilson, General Beresford found it necessary to bring the Lusitanian legion, of which Colonel Wilson is the commanding officer, out of the mountains, with a view to their discipline ; and they are replaced by another regiment ; and Colonel Le Cor now commands in that part. You will find him equally active and intelligent with Colonel Wilson ; but you must write to him in French. Communicate with him as soon as you can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General Hill.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Viseu, 2nd April, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th March, and I am much obliged to you for the consideration you have given to

our situation in this country, and your discussion of the subject.

‘The great disadvantage under which I labor is, that Sir John Moore, who was here before me, gave an opinion that this country could not be defended by the army under his command; and, although it is obvious that the country was in a very different situation at that time from what it is at present; that I am in a very different situation from that in which he found himself; and that, moreover, it can be proved, from the marches and operations of the army under Sir John Moore, and his dispatches, that little was known of Portugal at that time; yet persons, who ought to be acquainted with these facts, entertain a prejudice against the adoption of any plans for opposing the enemy, of which Portugal is to be the theatre, or its means the instrument, and will not even consider them.

‘I have as much respect as any man can have for the opinion and judgment of Sir John Moore; and I should mistrust my own, if opposed to his, in a case which he had had an opportunity of knowing and considering. But he positively knew nothing of Portugal, and could know nothing of its existing state. Besides this prejudice, founded on Sir John Moore’s opinion, there is another very general prejudice against any military operation in the Peninsula.

‘My opinion is, that as long as we shall remain in a state of activity in Portugal, the contest must continue in Spain; that the French are most desirous that we should withdraw from the country, but know that they must employ a very large force indeed in the operations which will render it necessary for us to go away; and I doubt whether they can bring that force to bear upon Portugal without abandoning other objects, and exposing their whole fabric in Spain to great risk. If they should be able to invade it, and should not succeed in obliging us to evacuate the country, they will be in a very dangerous situation; and the longer we can oppose them, and delay their success, the more likely are they to suffer materially in Spain.

‘All the preparations for embarking and carrying away the army, and every thing belonging to it, are already made, and my intention is to embark it, as soon as I find that a military necessity exists for so doing. I shall delay the

embarkation as long as it is in my power, and shall do every thing in my power to avert the necessity of embarking at all.

‘If the enemy should invade this country with a force less than that which I should think so superior to ours as to create the necessity for embarking, I shall fight a battle to save the country, for which I have made the preparations; and if the result should not be successful, of which I have no doubt, I shall still be able to retire and embark the army.

‘In short, the whole of my conduct shall be guided by a fair and cool view of the circumstances of our situation at the moment, and a reference to your Lordship’s instructions of the 27th February (A).

‘I had considered that a doubt might exist of the policy of bringing matters to extremities in this country, and I had brought that subject under the view of the King’s Government in my dispatches of the 31st January and 9th February, to which your Lordship’s answer of 27th February is clear and distinct; and I understand from that letter, that if there exists a military necessity for it, I am to evacuate the country; and if there does not exist a military necessity for it, I am not to evacuate the country: in which last understanding is included of course the other understanding, that I am not to be frightened away by a force which I shall not consider to be superior to that which I shall have under my command.

‘Your Lordship will observe that, in this plan, there is no intention or desire to attempt a desperate resistance. Am I right in understanding that I am not to quit the country, unless pressed by a force which I shall consider superior to that which I shall have to oppose to the enemy? If I am right, I may be obliged to bring matters to extremities; and I shall now show you, that whatever may be the nature of our operations, or the mode or period at which we shall evacuate Portugal, I have not mistaken the place of embarkation.

‘Upon reference to the enclosures in my dispatch of 14th November, your Lordship will find a discussion on the relative advantage and disadvantage of embarking the army at different places in Portugal, in a letter to Admiral Berkeley; and you will see that it is distinctly stated that the contest for Lisbon and the Tagus cannot be brought to

extremities, without giving up all thoughts of embarking at Peniche. I might have said that, connected with an embarkation at Peniche, it cannot be brought to extremities at all with any advantage, as it is obvious that the battle would be fought after Lisbon and the Tagus would be lost—the heart of the country, that alone which is an object to either party, the only point by which we could communicate with England as an army, or the Portuguese with the Brazils as a nation.

‘ If I am to bring the question of evacuation to extremities at all, it is, therefore obvious that I must preserve the communication with Lisbon, and must give up all thoughts of embarking at Peniche. But I think I am not wrong in my choice of St. Julian, even though I ought not to bring matters to extremities. The Government may determine that not bringing matters to extremities, I shall embark at an early period; or that I shall stay as long as I can, going at last, when the enemy shall move into the country with a force which I shall think so superior to that under my command as to oblige me to evacuate.

‘ In the first case there is no question; all places are alike, St. Julian is as good as Peniche and Oporto, the Mondego and Setuval as good as either. In the second case I must observe, that your Lordship is misinformed of the nature of the position of St. Julian; and I think you have received your information upon the relative strength of these places, and their relative advantage as places of embarkation, from some of those persons who have never considered the subject, and probably have never even looked at either place.

‘ If the weather should prevent the army from embarking at St. Julian, the troops will be in a position from whence nothing could force them. They could withdraw from it the rear guard to the last man, being protected by the works which have been constructed, which are of a strength not to be taken, except by a regular attack.

‘ St. Julian, however, is not so strong as Peniche; but the difference in the relative strength of these positions is not sufficient to compensate for other disadvantages in adopting Peniche as a place of embarkation.

‘ In the first place; whether matters are to be brought to extremities or not, we must have our stores and our hospital

at Lisbon, and all our communication with Lisbon to the last moment. Peniche has neither the means of giving cover to what we have, nor of providing transports for their removal to the army when wanted; nor are the communications with Peniche sufficiently good to answer the purposes of the constant supply of the army. If we could find cover for all that we have at Peniche, the removal of our stores from Lisbon to that place would soon discover our object, the effect of which discovery would be felt in the conduct of friends as well as of enemies.

‘Secondly; if Peniche is to be used as the place of embarkation for the whole army at the last moment, it must immediately be stored with provisions to provide for the contingency of the weather not suffering the army to quit the place, which is, I assure you, at least as probable at Peniche as it is in the Tagus.

‘Thirdly; adverting to the necessity of keeping a corps upon the Tagus during all our operations, we might experience some inconvenience in forming a junction with that corps, Peniche being the place of embarkation, owing to local circumstances, of which the discussion would be too long at the end of this long letter.

‘Fourthly; when we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go, like gentlemen, out of the hall door, particularly after the preparations which I have made to enable us to do so, and not out of the back door, or by the area.

‘I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of Portugal, under your Lordship’s instructions of the 27th February. Depend upon it, whatever people may tell you, I am not so desirous as they imagine of fighting desperate battles; if I was, I might fight one any day I please. But I have kept the army for six months in two positions, notwithstanding their own desire, and that of the allies, that I should take advantage of many opportunities which the enemy apparently offered of striking a blow against them; in some of which the single operation would certainly have been successful. But I have looked to the great result of our maintaining our position on the Peninsula; and have not allowed myself to be diverted from it by the wishes of the allies, and probably of some of our own army, that I should interfere more actively in some partial affairs; or by

the opinion of others, that we ought to quit the country prematurely ; and I have not harassed my troops by marches and counter-marches, in conformity to the enemy's movements. I believe that the world in the Peninsula begin to believe that I am right.

‘ I am convinced that, if the Spaniards had followed my advice, Spain would now have been out of danger, and that the conduct which I have pursued has given us at this moment an efficient army, which is the only hope of the Peninsula. I am perfectly aware of the risks which I incur personally, whatever may be the result of the operations in Portugal. All I beg is, that if I am to be responsible, I may be left to the exercise of my own judgment ; and I ask for the fair confidence of Government upon the measures which I am to adopt.

‘ If Government take the opinions of others upon the situation of affairs here, and entertain doubts upon the measures which I propose to adopt, then let them give me their instructions in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution. I may venture, however, to assure you, that, with the exception of Marshal Beresford, who I believe concurs entirely in all my opinions respecting the state of the contest, and the measures to be adopted here, there is no man in the army who has taken half the pains upon the subject that I have.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, Commanding Royal Engineer.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 3rd April, 1810.*

‘ The intention of Government in sending out the officers of Engineers lately arrived, is to enable us to give some security to Setuval, Palmella, and principally to Peniche. The object in respect to the two first, is to be able to hold them some time as places of refuge for the inhabitants of the country, who might wish, or to whom it might be desirable to evacuate the country. The object in occupying and improving the last mentioned place, is the same ; but I think it not impossible that Government may be disposed to go a step farther in respect to Peniche, and to make an arrangement for occupying it permanently.

‘ In respect to Peniche, it appears to me that the works which it would be desirable to execute there are :

‘ First. Something in the way of a counterscarp to cover the existing line wall.

‘ Secondly. To build up the breach in the existing wall.

‘ Thirdly. To make the parapets of a proper height throughout, to fill up the rampart in the bastions, and to make a good rampart communication from each.

‘ Fourthly. To secure effectually the breach on the left of the line, either by a stockade or the completion of the wall.

‘ Fifthly. The construction of a redoubt upon the high ground in the rear of the left of the line, which, by crossing its fire with the citadel on the right, would prevent the storm of the line, even though it should be breached.

‘ If Government should determine to do any thing permanent at Peniche, these measures will have been a commencement of them ; and I request you to employ one or more of the officers under your command upon them, without loss of time.

‘ If it should occur to you that any thing else ought to be done at either of these places, in the view which I have taken of them, of course I expect to receive from you any suggestion that you may think will be useful.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 3rd April, 1810.

‘ I am much indebted to you for the letter of the 31st. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send home a transport or transports with the 300 German deserters now at Lisbon ; but as I expect many more, I shall be obliged to you if you will send them to England, from time to time, in proportion as they shall arrive at Lisbon. If they should at any time amount to such numbers as that it would be inconvenient to the ships of war to receive them, I will then request you to send home a transport with them.

‘ I shall be very glad to see the *chevaux de frise*. Your nephew is here, and dines with me this day.

‘ I have good accounts from General Murray, of the 10th instant, of our Oporto claims, and it appears to me that all

is going on as we could wish. I enclose an extract of his letter to me of the 10th, from which you will see that, although against his opinion and contrary to his wishes, he makes no opposition to the claim of the ships employed in the blockade of the Douro, which of course includes yours. I conclude, that the property being once condemned as prize, or for salvage, there can be no dispute between us about it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
‘ *the Hon. G. Berkeley.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Viseu, 4th April, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 1st, which ought to have reached me on the evening of the 2nd.

‘ The enemy’s corps south of the Tagus have occupied Caceres, and extended themselves along the Salor in front of Hill’s corps. I suspect that they have occupied this position only because Caceres is the part of Estremadura which has been least exhausted since the last harvest, and that they can find subsistence there; and they are in tolerable security, as it is not easy to attack them. It must be observed, however, that this is the position which they would take with the corps in Estremadura, if they intended to undertake any operation on this side, and were desirous of preventing us from availing ourselves of the assistance of Hill’s corps. However, I believe that they have very little communication between one of their corps and the others, less intelligence of our strength and situation, and no combination.

‘ The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great movement on the continent for the present. Still, I do not despair of seeing at some time or other a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent transactions in Holland show that it is all hollow within, and that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and even the existence of civilized society, that he cannot trust even his brothers to carry it into execution.

‘ If the Spaniards had acted with common prudence, we should be in a very different situation in the Peninsula, but I fear there are now no hopes. The Government are terribly

weak, and I think it probable will be beaten upon the Walcheren question. It is impossible to say what will be the consequence. I think the King may be able to form a government without having recourse to Lord Grenville; but there will be no strength in that government, and the members will have no satisfaction in conducting public affairs.

‘As General Cox sends information to the Portuguese Government, as well as to me, I beg you to send him Ruman’s letters, and any others that may go through your hands addressed to him or to me. I write to him not to delay the departure of the dragoon with your communication.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

‘I informed you yesterday of the position the French had taken up on the Salor; I have now to inform you that they quitted it again on the 31st. These people are in motion perpetually! They marched towards Merida, probably because the Marques de la Romana had taken the position in the Conventual at Merida, which I recommended to him to seize, by which the communication between the French corps in Lower Estremadura was cut off with the corps on the other side of the Guadiana.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘SIR,

‘Viseu, 5th April, 1810.’

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd April, and I am much obliged to you for the report which it contains. I beg that the 3rd batt. of the Royals, the 1st batt. of the 9th, and 2nd batt. of the 38th regiment, may be equipped in the usual manner, and prepared to march when orders shall be dispatched from head quarters for that purpose.

‘These corps are in the mean time to be quartered either in barracks, or in convents, or encamped in the most healthy

situations in the town or the neighbourhood of Lisbon; and the commanding and other officers of regiments must adopt all means to prevent irregularities, which will only tend to augment the number of sick, and aggravate the disorders of those already sick, or in a state of convalescence.

‘ Great care must be taken to prevent the ophthalmia from spreading, from which disorder the army in Portugal has hitherto been quite free.

‘ It is impossible for me to allow any men to join the army without arms and accoutrements. It is very proper that the officers commanding regiments should fix upon those men to be officers’ servants and bât men who are least capable of bearing the ordinary fatigues of the service; but they must all have their arms, and all obey the standing orders of the army upon this subject.

‘ After all, I believe it will be found, that if attention be paid by the officers to the food of the soldiers; if they prevented them from straggling from their corps on a march, or from their quarters or camp, in search of wine or plunder after the march is made; and if the soldiers are regularly organized and told off into the several parties to be sent for those articles of food, fuel, &c., which they require; and that the officers superintend the execution of these duties, it will be found that but few soldiers are so young, and still fewer so old and infirm, that they cannot make those marches and perform those duties which the service requires from them.

‘ I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, and four corporals belonging to the three other squadrons of the same regiment, with their horses, &c., may be embarked to go to Cadiz, as soon as the Agent of Transports shall have prepared vessels to receive them. The four corporals must be good horsemen, and men well acquainted with the sword exercise; and these men, on their arrival at Cadiz, are to be put under the direction of Major General Whittingham. The three other squadrons of the 13th light dragoons are to be equipped, and in readiness to take the field, but are to remain at Lisbon till further orders.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

‘Having occasion to send to Cadiz one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, with their horses, and four corporals of the same regiment, with their horses, belonging to the other three squadrons of the same regiment, which will remain at Lisbon, I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct the Agent of Transports to provide transports for their conveyance, and if you will send them to Cadiz under convoy as soon as they shall be embarked.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘SIR,

‘Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

‘Although I have received intimation from England that Lieut. General Graham has been appointed to command the troops at Cadiz, I continue to address myself to you, as I have not heard of his arrival; and you will of course deliver this letter to him, if he should have arrived.

‘According to your desire, I have directed that one squadron of the 13th light dragoons may proceed to Cadiz. With this squadron, I have directed that four corporals, belonging to the other three squadrons of the same regiment remaining in Portugal, and selected for their skill in horsemanship and in the sword exercise, may be sent, with their horses, &c., according to the request of Major General Whittingham, to assist him in forming the Spanish cavalry of the army of the Duque de Alburquerque.

‘I beg that these four men may be put under the direction of Major General Whittingham.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. W. Stewart.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 2nd, and I am glad to find that the Government intend to issue a proclamation, as

well as circulate the letter which you before sent me; as the inhabitants and inferior order of magistrates and officers require to be reminded of their duties, as well as their superiors.

‘I do not believe the estimate of August, 1809, is the first estimate which was sent home to the British Government, and which I saw in the Secretary of State’s Office. It was framed either in January or February, shortly after Mr. Villiers arrived in Portugal.

‘The 30,000 stand of arms and Picton’s rifles, &c., are for the Portuguese troops, and I have given them over to Marshal Beresford. I only hope that we shall get them issued in time.

‘I enclose a letter from Mr. O’Meara to the Commissary General, regarding pay for the Portuguese troops in Cadiz. The best mode of settling for this pay would be for me to order the issue monthly to the commanding officer of the regiment, and the sum issued would be so much paid to you by the Commissary General, and to the Portuguese Government by you; and so much subtracted from the amount of their subsidy, and from your demand upon the Commissary General for the two sevenths. The commanding officer of the regiment would then settle his accounts for the sum he received in the usual manner with the Portuguese Government.

‘Let me know if this mode of settlement will suit you and the Portuguese Government, and I will give directions accordingly.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘SIR,

‘Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 2nd of March, relative to the desertion in the 2nd battalion — the regiment, appearing on the return of that regiment, to the 25th of January; and I enclose the reports which I have received from Major General Picton and Major Young upon that subject.

‘The desertion from nearly all the regiments in this army

must have appeared extraordinary to the Commander in Chief, and must have given him as much concern as it has to me. Till lately, desertion from a British army on service was a crime almost unknown ; and I am concerned to add, that I have reason to believe that many of those who have deserted have been guilty of the worst description of that offence, and have gone over to the enemy.

‘I attribute the prevalence of this crime in a great measure to the bad description of men, of which many of the regiments are composed almost entirely, and who have been received principally from the Irish militia. A sufficient time has not elapsed, since these men have entered the regiments of the line, to form their habits to regularity and discipline ; the non-commissioned officers, in the second battalions principally, are very bad ; and I am sorry to add that the subaltern officers are not of the best description ; and that I do not think so much attention has been given by them as might have been expected, to form either the non-commissioned officers or the soldiers to those habits of regularity which a soldier ought to have.

‘I attribute the desertion from this army likewise, in some degree, to the irregular and predatory habits which those soldiers had acquired, who, having straggled from their regiments during the late service under the command of Sir John Moore, were some of them taken prisoners by the French, and have since escaped from them ; and others, after having wandered in different parts of Portugal and Spain, have returned to the army. All these men have shifted for themselves in the country, by rapine and plunder, since they quitted their regiments in 1808 ; and they have informed others of their modes of proceeding, and have instilled a desire in others to follow their example, and live in the same mode and by the same means, free from the restraints of discipline and regularity.

‘I can assure the Commander in Chief that I know of no cause for the desertion of the soldiers from this army, excepting those to which I have above referred. They have in general but little duty, and since the month of August no fatigue. Their quarters are, without exception, good ; the inhabitants of the country are invariably kind to them ; and not only has there been no distress for provisions since the

month of August, but I really believe that there is not a soldier in the army who is not as well fed, and does not receive his food as regularly as he could in barracks in England.

‘ Their pay is also regularly given to them, and their accounts regularly settled, and the balances paid, although one month later than the period fixed by His Majesty’s regulations, on account of the difficulty of procuring money in this country for the army.

‘ While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform the Commander in Chief, that desertion is not the only crime of which the soldiers of this army have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer (which rarely happens), that a murder or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is not committed by the British soldiers composing it. They have killed eight people since the army returned to Portugal in December; and I am sorry to add that a convoy has seldom arrived with money that the chests have not been broken open, and some of the money stolen by the soldiers in whose charge it was placed, although invariably under the command of an officer; and they have never brought up either shoes or other necessities which could be of use to them, or which they could sell, that they have not stolen some of the articles committed to their charge.

‘ The orders to the army, and the Provost’s establishment, which is larger than was ever known with any British army, will show the pains which the General Officers, the commanding officers of regiments, and I, have taken to prevent the commission of these crimes, which indeed are not very frequent at the regiments, although they are committed sometimes even there: and the General Courts Martial which have been assembled, and sitting almost constantly while the army has been halted, and sometimes as many as three sitting at the same time in the different cantonments of the army, will show the pains which have been taken to convict and punish those who have been guilty of these crimes. But the inhabitants of the country have such a respect and affection for the British nation, and particularly for the military qualities of the soldier, (who presumes upon

his military reputation to commit many of the crimes of which he is guilty,) that it is most difficult to prevail upon the inhabitants to give testimony of the injuries they have received, and they will rarely point out the person who has committed the offence; and the soldiers themselves will rarely tell the truth before a Court Martial. The sentences of the Courts Martial are also carried into execution; so that every thing that precaution and discipline could do to prevent crimes, and that trial and execution of sentences could do to punish those who have been guilty of them, has been done, but hitherto without much success.

‘ I am concerned to be obliged to make to the Commander in Chief so unfavorable a report of an army which has shown that it possesses many excellent qualities; but it contains facts which ought not to be concealed from his knowledge.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adjutant General
of the Forces.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

‘ I enclose letters which I have received from the Commanding Officers of the 3rd batt. of the Royals, and of the 1st batt. of the 9th Foot, relative to the subsistence of their regiments to the 25th of April.

‘ It is impossible for me either to order the issue of subsistence to those regiments for the months for which they have already received it, or to direct the Commissary General to discount the private bills of the Paymasters of the regiments drawn upon the Regimental Agents; nor would it be convenient to encourage the negotiation of these bills in the market at Lisbon, by allowing the Paymasters of the regiments to charge the discount upon their bills upon the Regimental Agents in their accounts.

‘ The only mode which occurs to me of settling this business is, that the agents should send out to these regiments respectively the balances of their bât and forage and subsistence to the 25th of April, in cash, if possible; if not possible, that the balances should be sent out in bank notes, which I will then direct the Commissary General to exchange for cash; or that the whole of the subsistence and bât and forage

advanced to these regiments in England should be returned to the Pay Office; and that it should be paid to them by the Paymaster General in this country.

‘ I beg that your Lordship will give the directions which you may think proper on this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 6th of February, in answer to mine of the 17th of December, respecting the subsistence of officers and soldiers of this army who have been prisoners, and have made their escape from the French, from which I understand that His Majesty’s Government intend that the Officers, as well as the soldiers, shall receive their subsistence during the period they were prisoners.

‘ A question has arisen respecting the latter, including the non-commissioned officers, which is founded on the letter from the late Secretary at War of the 5th of December, 1798, to the Commanding Officers of regiments, whether that which the non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to receive is the full subsistence allowed them by His Majesty’s regulations, or their net subsistence, after deducting 6d. per diem for each man for his rations.

‘ I am inclined to believe that it was intended to give the soldiers their full subsistence, as I have not heard that any arrangement had been made with the French Government during this war for the support of prisoners. But I am desirous of having the directions of His Majesty’s Government upon this point.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

‘ No material alteration has been made in the enemy’s positions since I addressed you on the 28th of March.

‘ The corps of Marshal Mortier was followed through the

passes as far as Ronquillo, by the divisions of the Marques de la Romana's corps, under General Ballesteros, which by the last accounts were still there.

'The corps of Soult under General Regnier, which had retired to Truxillo, advanced again in the end of March to Caceres, and had their posts upon the Salor, in front of the left of the Marques de la Romana's corps, and of the troops under Lieut. General Hill.

'The Marques de la Romana moved a detachment on the 30th, from Badajoz to Merida, which however did not arrive in time to establish itself there; and Soult's corps again broke up from the Salor on the 31st, and marched to Merida, which place it reached on the 1st instant, and the Spanish detachment retired again to Badajoz.

'The delay in the occupation of Merida, and this movement by the French, have placed General Ballesteros's corps in a state of risk, unless he should have moved out of the passes in the mountains in time.

'A detachment from the corps of Ney also moved in the end of the month of March, by the pass of Baños into Estremadura, but returned again immediately. The object of this movement was probably to oblige General Carrera's division to retire from Coria, and to confine Ciudad Rodrigo on that side.

'Nothing of importance had occurred at Astorga as late as the 24th of March.

'I have had no accounts from Cadiz since the 17th of last month.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Viseu, 7th April, 1810.

'I am much obliged to you for fitting up the hospital ships. It will be a great convenience to us if you will be so kind as to send the smallest occasionally to Figueira. That which you sent there last got in and out of the Mondego with tolerable facility; and as we may soon expect settled weather, I should hope that we might use that harbour with certainty.

I have not yet returned you an answer respecting the distribution of the troops in the transports; there is no doubt a very material error, which shall be rectified, and I will take care that Lieut. Fleetwood shall get such a return as will answer pretty nearly for an embarkation state at any time, notwithstanding that the exact numbers of each regiment in the army are varying every day.

‘ We have very nearly as many rank and file fit for duty as have been stated to Lieut. Fleetwood as the whole number to be embarked. The troops are becoming again very healthy and very strong, and the army is more efficient than it has ever been yet.

‘ The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get them, and myself, into a scrape. But what can be expected from men who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a week? A great deal might be done now, if there existed in England less party, and more public sentiment, and if there was any Government.

‘ The Duke* will like the command in Ireland, which I am sure has been given to him (as it was always intended), if Lord Harrington has relinquished it. But I should have thought that Lord Harrington, who has always kept clear of politics, would not have meddled with them in these troublesome times, and that the Duke would have gone to the Ordnance, which he would have liked also.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Vice Admiral

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

‘ I sent you a warrant for £150, for bounty for your recruits, three or four days ago; but are you aware that your recruiting officer takes men (Frenchmen) from the prisons, who were made prisoners of war, some of them under a capitulation? No wonder that he has enlisted 150 men, and that Colonel Peacocke has approved of them. This positively must not be done. I write by this post to Colonel

* The Duke of Richmond.

Peacocke upon the subject, and I beg you to lose no time in writing to the officer whom you employ.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. A. Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 21st and 26th of March, for which I am much obliged to you. I had already received from Lord Liverpool a copy of his instructions to you of the 19th of February ; from which I doubted whether the corps at Cadiz was intended to form part of this army.

‘ The instructions from the Commander in Chief, of the 21st February, would show that it was not so intended. If it is not so intended, you will of course put such officers as you think proper at the head of the several departments ; if it is so intended, Colonel Macdonald*, and Major Cathcart †, and Mr. —, should be taken upon the strength of the departments of the Adjutant, and of the Quarter Master General, and of the Commissary General with this army, and shall be at the head of those departments with the corps under your command ; and in either case I shall be happy to give you any other assistance of any description which this army can afford.

‘ I am happy to find that you approve of the measures and arrangements of Major General the Hon. W. Stewart, with whom I have had every reason to be satisfied.

‘ At this distance from the scene of action, and having but a general knowledge of Cadiz and the Isla de Leon, it is impossible for me to do more than to give you my opinion very generally upon the measures to be adopted. I beg leave to refer you to my several letters to Major General Stewart, and those to Mr. Frere, to which he was referred for my sentiments on the several points to which they relate.

‘ I am convinced that the enemy cannot at present make a serious attack upon Cadiz : indeed their force is so much separated that, until it is concentrated, they cannot make

* Major General Sir J. Macdonald, K.C.B., Adjutant General.

† Major General Lord Greenock.

an effectual effort any where ; and I do not think it probable that they will begin by assembling in Andalusia such an army as they must have, in order to make any impression on your position at Cadiz.

‘ I have no doubt, however, that they will take and secure possession of the peninsula of Trocadero, by which they will cut off the communication between the outer and inner harbour, and will probably affect, to a certain degree, the anchorage in the outer harbour, and a part of the town. I fear that this cannot be avoided ; and the only measure to be adopted is to place at once in the inner harbour the boats and vessels which may be deemed necessary for the naval operations to be eventually carried on there ; and to secure, as far as may be possible, the landing places between Puntales and the town ; and to form a communication with the Isla, from the right of the Cortadura, and along the right of the existing road.

‘ I observe that the Secretary of State has referred to your consideration the measures to be adopted for the supply of Cadiz with water and provisions : water will not be scarce, I believe, so long as the Isla can be held. When the French, however, have it in their power to direct all their efforts against Cadiz, the state of the provisions will be a subject of serious consideration.

‘ Malta could supply all the grain that would be required for Cadiz ; and the coast of Barbary, cattle. For the former, ready money will be required, and victuallers.

‘ His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz will have to exert his influence with the Spanish Government, to induce them to consider well the nature of their situation ; to prepare beforehand for the serious attack which will be made upon them, and for the difficulties which will then exist ; and to make the advances of money which will be necessary to purchase at Malta the grain which will be required. The King’s Minister at Cadiz should also apply to the Ministers in England to have victuallers sent to Cadiz to import grain from Malta.

‘ The influence of the King’s Minister, indeed probably that of His Majesty’s Government, must be exerted to prevail upon the Barbary States to allow the purchase of cattle for the supply of Cadiz. For this purpose also, the Regency

will have to advance and disburse large sums of money. If they should not have vessels fit to bring over the cattle which they have purchased, I believe that I shall be able to give them the use of some horse transports.

‘It does not occur to me that there is any other point in your instructions on which it can be of any use to you to be assisted with any further opinions from me, than what are contained in my letters to General Stewart and Mr. Frere, to which I have referred you.

‘You will always find me disposed to assist you with my opinions upon any subject which you may think proper to refer to me; and in any other manner that may be in my power.

‘I beg leave to refer you to my letter to my brother of this date for an account of the state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. Lord Liverpool has mentioned to me his apprehensions that the Spanish troops and people would not agree with the Portuguese regiment which I have sent to Cadiz. I entertain no such apprehensions; and so I have informed his Lordship. But if you should have reason to think that any inconvenience will result from their remaining at Cadiz, I beg you to send them back to Lisbon. I can easily reconcile their return to the Portuguese Regency, who had voluntarily offered them for this service.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 5th. I was aware that the Patriarch and Forjaz hated each other; but I did not think it possible that either of them could imagine that you, or I, or Villiers, had any thing to say to any of the intrigues of Sr de Souza in London, or those of his brother at the Brazils against them. I think that the line of conduct you have adopted is most judicious and proper.

‘The Patriarch and Forjaz have their faults as well as other men, but I am convinced that we cannot change either

excepting for the worse ; and if you should have any opportunity, I shall be obliged to you if you will assure either or both, not only that I will not be any party to the promotion of any change in the Government, but that I shall do every thing in my power to prevent it, and to support their authority and the continuance of the Government in their hands.

‘ I think, however, for the reasons stated to you in my former letters, that the Marquez das Minas having withdrawn himself from the Regency, his place ought to be filled up by the appointment of another person by the Prince Regent.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 27th and 28th March.

‘ You may depend upon it that your opinion of the —— is a very correct one, and that the defence of Cadiz has sustained no loss by his appointment to the embassy in —— . I am apprehensive, however, that the credit he acquired by being the first to relieve the people of Cadiz from their fears, and his intrigues, have driven Venegas from his office, for which I believe him to be better qualified than any officer in the Spanish service.

‘ I am sorry that Blake has been called from the command of his army, where he might be of great use. The Marques de la Romana is an honest, honorable man, and the ablest and most to be trusted of any that I have seen in Spain. His letter to Mr. Frere is a most curious instance of the propensity of the Spaniards to pervert the facts upon the events of the war ; and he very cleverly lays the perversion to the door of the French. The fact is, that they did not lose 300, instead of 3000 men, and that they were in no manner distressed, and were not obliged to withdraw from Estremadura by any occurrence on this side of Sierra Morena.

‘ Ballesteros followed Mortier through the Sierra Morena

to Ronquillo, and the French had their outposts on the Huelva by the last accounts. The 2nd corps (called Soult's), under the command of Regnier, which retired from Merida to Truxillo when Mortier retired upon Seville, advanced again in the end of the month to Caceres, and occupied the right of the Salor, in front of the Spanish division at Albuquerque, and of Lieut. General Hill's corps. They broke up again on the 31st, and marched to Merida, which town I had recommended to the Marques de la Romana to occupy, and fortify the Conventual, which commands the passage of the Guadiana; but he had not done it in time, and the Spanish troops were obliged to retire again to Badajoz. The French were in Merida the 1st and 2nd of April; and on the 3rd, the last I heard of them, they marched to Villa Nueva de la Serena. I was apprehensive that they were going upon Ballesteros at Ronquillo, who would thus have been between two corps, and could have retired with difficulty; but it is now supposed there is some serious insurrection in La Mancha.

‘ I hear from all quarters that a corps of 5000 men, under Bassecourt, had surprised a French post of cavalry at Aranjuez, and had carried away a magazine of arms. It is impossible, however, to say whether any thing of this kind is true or false.

‘ All is quiet in this part of Spain. Astorga has not been seriously attacked; and no movement of importance has been made by the troops in our front. I do not think the French are yet in a state to make a serious attack upon Cadiz, or indeed to do any thing of importance in any quarter. They have separated their forces in too great a degree, and they must unite them to oblige us to withdraw from the north bank of the Tagus, before they can effect any thing. In the mean time, the insurrection is again in a state of organization, and the *partidas* are beginning again to be active.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

‘I have a letter from Ruman of the 4th, in which he says that the enemy have again occupied Baños and the neighbouring villages in strength. He supposes their detachment there may be 5000 men; and it is obvious that they may pass into Estremadura when they please. These rains, however, will have rendered it quite impossible to make any progress in your back, if that should be their intention. Do you communicate with Le Cor?

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I am going to send Lieut. Colonel Rooke* of the Guards to you, to be at the head of the Adjutant General’s department. You will find him a most steady, serviceable man, and he will be very useful to you I do not doubt.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

‘I received your letter of the 5th, regarding the Portuguese battalions of caçadores, which it is obvious are not in the state in which I expected that you would find them, from what I saw of them in December last. Bad troops in the rear of the army may do well enough; but it will not answer, obviously, to put those in the front who are likely to do more harm than good.

‘Since you have joined the army, I have always wished that you should command our outposts, for many reasons into which it is unnecessary to enter; and I was in hopes that I had made up for you a corps which would answer tolerably well, of which I could give you the command without interfering with the claims of others. But the state of these corps disappoints me much; and I can devise no means of accomplishing what I wish. Elder’s† corps, which is better than the others, was kept in the rear to be an example to others, and to assist in their formation; for in

* Colonel Rooke was afterwards killed in the south of France, in the attack of the Nivelle, in November, 1813.

† The late Major General Sir G. Elder, K.C.B.

the happy situation in which I am placed, I am obliged to be ready to meet the enemy in front, at the same time that the formation and organization of the young troops, and all the elementary arrangements, are to be provided for in the rear.

‘ I have ordered forward Elder’s battalion, and when that arrives, the two others must return. But still Elder’s battalion does not add sufficiently to your strength; and I doubt whether its services in front will compensate for the disadvantages of its advance from the rear, and the want of its example in the formation of the others.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 7th, so that I hope the communication is now tolerably certain.

‘ It appears to me that the enemy are in a better state of preparation at Salamanca than they were; but if the rain of the last two days has been general, they will not be able to move for some days.

‘ The corps which left Caceres on the 31st went to Merida, and from thence on the night of the 2nd to Villa Nueva de la Serena. It is supposed they are going into Lower La Mancha, where it is said that the people are in a state of insurrection.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ *My DEAR SIR,*

‘ Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

‘ Twenty seamen, who had belonged to an Irish regiment in the French service, and had deserted, have lately come in here, and I shall forward them to Lisbon, to be delivered over to your orders, as soon as the weather shall clear up a little. They all wish to enter the navy.

‘ Marshal Beresford wishes to send 10,000 of the 30,000 stand of arms, recently arrived from England, to Oporto by sea, and will apply to you to send up a ship of war with them. I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to comply with his request.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR, ‘ Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Colonel Trant, and its enclosures, regarding certain Danish vessels which were at Oporto at the time the enemy were driven from that town in the month of May last.

‘ I have to request that the Government will signify their orders to me, for Colonel Trant’s information, upon this subject; and if they should not think proper to allow the vessels to be taken away by the Admiral commanding His Majesty’s ships, I recommend to them to signify the same to him through His Majesty’s Minister resident at Lisbon.

‘ I write to you, and forward these letters in English, for Dom Miguel Forjaz, as my Portuguese translator is at present absent from head quarters.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Viseu, 10th April, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 8th, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ I now enclose a letter for Colonel Le Cor at Castello Branco, which I request you to forward.

‘ The enemy have certainly a large force in Old Castille. No individual who sends intelligence *knows* of more than those of whom he sends an account. But those who see all the accounts must see clearly that the whole force is very large.

‘ At the same time, some of these last, forgetting what they have read, and what has certainly at times made an impression upon them, are of opinion upon some occasions that the enemy are not in strength in Castille. I cannot state their number exactly; but from Astorga to Valladolid, and thence to Baños, they have four *corps d’armée*. This is no inconsiderable force at any time; and I believe they are not very incomplete in numbers, as we know that every town and village in the country is full.

‘ Captain Grant must be paid, while employed by you, three dollars per diem.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General

the Hon. L. Cole.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

‘ The enemy appear to be getting on with their preparations for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of Almeida, which I intend to endeavor to prevent, if it should be in my power. It would add considerably to my power if I could have the assistance of some of your cavalry, viz., General Slade’s brigade; and I request you either to place that brigade at and in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, or the whole of it in different cantonments within one march of Villa Velha, according as you may find it most convenient for forage for them, as long as the enemy’s position in Estremadura does not render their services necessary any nearer to your own corps.

‘ If you should fix upon the cantonments within one march of Villa Velha for these corps, it will be necessary that they should have in their cantonments, at all times, three or four days’ corn, and as much bread, which the regiments might carry with them when they should march to join me; as by the route they would come they would find nothing but green forage. If you should send them to Abrantes they will come by a more plentiful country, and one better prepared.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General Hill.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I am about to move my head quarters to Cea, in the valley of the Mondego, where I shall be nearer the head of the army; and not farther removed from you.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

‘ I am about to move my head quarters to Cea, in the valley of the Mondego, in order to be nearer the head of the army; at the same time that I shall not be more distant from the rear.

'If you will direct your letters, which you will send by the post, to the care of the postmaster at Thomar or at Coimbra, I shall get them by the daily communications which I have with those places.

'I request you to let the Admiral know of this alteration of my head quarters, and of the manner in which he is to direct to me.

'Believe me, &c.

'Charles Stuart, Esq.

'WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

'SIR,

'Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

'I enclose letters which I have received from Mr. Pratt, in answer to inquiries made to him on the subject of the complaints from the superintendent of transport at Elvas, which you had received from the minister.

'You will observe that there is no foundation whatever for these complaints; and that the officers of the Government had conducted themselves very improperly. I request you particularly to draw the notice of the minister to the demand of money by the superintendent of transport for the performance of the duties imposed upon him and his officers; and to request that the governors of the kingdom will signify to the officers of the Government their pleasure upon this subject.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Charles Stuart, Esq.

'WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

'MY DEAR LORD,

'Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

'I enclose the state of the army on the 1st instant, and likewise the distribution of the sick, absent on the same day. From this paper you will see that the hospital at Talavera and the men at Plasencia amount now to only 852. I have always reckoned them 1500, and some have certainly escaped from the enemy. But that number was not originally left, and so I thought; although I stated them as 1500, as the reports which were the nearest, and official, so stated them.

'It is difficult to make the military return of sick agree with that received from the medical department, because in

the former are included all men absent from the regiment at the hospital stations, whether convalescents or others; whereas the medical return includes only those on the books of the hospitals.

‘ I enclose the Inspector General’s returns of the 1st of April, from which you will see the number actually sick, of those on the military returns “sick absent.” The others are either convalescent, out of the hospitals, or on the road to join, and your Lordship will be glad to observe how efficient and healthy the army is becoming. Indeed it would now be an excellent army, if the soldiers did not plunder.

‘ Several have lately been convicted before General Courts Martial, and have been executed, an example which I hope will have effect, as well upon the officers as the men. Upon the former I hope it will operate to induce them to take more pains to keep their men in order, and support the authority of the non-commissioned officers, and to instil into them a proper sense of their situation and duty; and I hope it will convince the latter that I possess the power, and am determined to exert it, to punish those who are guilty of those disgraceful outrages. I am still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget every thing when plunder or wine is within their reach.

‘ We are still much distressed for money, and I shall not be able to pay the troops on the 24th of this month. We owe for every thing we have had lately from the country, as well as for the means of transport employed in moving our supplies from our own magazines. The disorders committed by the troops aggravate these inconveniences, for we are obliged to employ them in pressing provisions and carriages; and they never go out without an officer, and seldom under the command of an officer, that they do not commit some outrage. I do not know what we are to do if we cannot get some money.

‘ By the orders from the Commander in Chief to General Graham, and by those from the Commissary General in Chief to Mr. Deputy Commissary ———, I see that it was not intended that the corps at Cadiz should form part of this army. However, I have stated my doubts upon the

subject to General Graham, and left him to decide it as he may think best.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Visen, 11th April, 1810.

‘ The enemy appear by the last accounts to have collected some heavy ordnance and stores at Salamanca; and the corps of Ney is concentrated in that neighbourhood and at Ledesma. The enemy have likewise moved a detachment of 4000 or 5000 men to the neighbourhood of Bejar and Baños. Although these circumstances would show an intention of attacking either Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida at an early period, it does not appear that the enemy have withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Astorga; and by the last accounts which I have from Chaves, of the 3rd of this month, the Spanish troops in Galicia, and the parties which have always remained upon the frontier, were to make an effort to relieve Astorga in the last days of March.

‘ The corps of Soult, commanded by Regnier, moved from Merida on the night of the 2nd to Medellin, and occupied Don Benito, Villa Nueva de la Serena, and the villages in that neighbourhood. General O'Donnell, with the left of the Marques de la Romana's corps, had his advanced guard at Merida; and General Ballesteros, who had been at Ronquillo, quitted the high road from Merida to Seville as soon as he heard that General Regnier had crossed the Guadiana at Merida, and went to Talavera Real; by which town there is another communication between the provinces of Estremadura and Andalusia, through the Sierra Morena.

‘ I have received accounts from Cadiz to as late a date as the 28th of last month. Lieut. General Graham had arrived on the 24th, and had taken the command of His Majesty's troops. Nothing of any importance had occurred there, and the enemy were occupied in endeavoring to establish and secure their positions on the peninsula, and the island of Trocadero.

‘The accounts which I receive from all quarters mention the great activity of the parties of guerrillas throughout the country. Some of these accounts are certainly exaggerated, but I have no doubt that there is some foundation for them, as I observe that the enemy mention the operations of these parties in the Gazettes published at Madrid, and in other places under their authority.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Viseu, 13th April, 1810.

‘I request you to give directions to the officer commanding the 20th Portuguese regiment, to draw from time to time from the Assistant Commissary in charge of the Commissariat at Cadiz, for such sums as may be necessary for the monthly pay of the officers and soldiers under his command; and to inform him that he is to give credit for the sums which he will thus receive in his accounts with the Paymaster General of the Portuguese Army.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘SIR,

‘Viseu, 13th April, 1810.

‘I request you to give directions to the Assistant Commissary in charge of the department in Cadiz, to pay to the officer commanding the 20th Portuguese regiment, such sums as he may require monthly for the pay of the officers and soldiers under his command; for which such officer is to give his receipts.

‘These receipts are to be transmitted to you, and you will be so kind as to transmit them to His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, and to settle with him for the amount thus advanced to the Portuguese regiment at Cadiz, in the same manner as for sums paid into the hands of Mr. Bell, from time to time, for Portuguese services.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*J. Murray, Esq.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

'SIR,

'Viseu, 13th April, 1810.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, containing copies of two notes received from the Portuguese Minister, one relating to provisions for the garrison of Almeida, the other relating to the want of forage for the Portuguese army.

'I have given directions to the Commissary General of this army, to carry into execution, without loss of time, the second article of the Commissariat arrangement of the 10th of June, 1809, in all parts of the country in which the Portuguese and British troops may both be stationed, particularly in the neighbourhood of Almeida.

'I have also desired him to hand over to the Junta de Viveres 50,000 rations, of ten pounds each, of forage corn at Lisbon, of which two thirds will be Indian corn, and one third barley. They will pay for this magazine according to the stipulation in the sixth article of the Commissariat arrangement.

'The Portuguese Government having some time ago stated the supply of provisions to the British troops at Barquinha as the excuse for the want by the Portuguese troops in the Alentejo, I have the honor to inclose a return of the total quantity of provisions supplied by the agents of the Junta de Viveres at Barquinha to the British troops between the 1st of December, 1809, and the 24th of March, 1810.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

Charles Stuart, Esq.

WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

'MY DEAR GENERAL,

'Cea, 15th April, 1810.

'I have moved the head quarters here, principally with a view to the communication with the advanced divisions; but I am much afraid that there is such want of stabling, that I shall be obliged to move them back again.

'The Adjutant General will send you an order, by this occasion, regarding our communications in future; and I shall be obliged to you if you will have your letters for me at Almeida, either before the gates shall be shut at night, or

at five in the morning, when they will open, so that the *parte* may bring them off.

‘Your feeling respecting your command is exactly what it ought to be, and what might be expected from you. As long as I could make up a division of the proper strength for the service, with your brigade, and Portuguese troops and cavalry, nobody would have had reason to complain; but a Lieutenant General, and the senior Major General of the army, recently arrived, are without commands, and it would not answer to throw more English troops into your division, leaving them unemployed. You may depend upon it, however, that whatever may be the arrangement which I shall make, I wish your brigade to be in the advanced guard.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Cea, 15th April, 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 31st March and the 4th instant (Nos. 2 and 3).

‘I am desirous of adhering to the conditions on which I first detached the troops to Cadiz, for reasons, some of which are stated in my letter to Major General the Hon. W. Stewart of the 27th of February. At the same time I must inform you that it is impossible to maintain an army in the Peninsula, and to perform the engagements into which the King has entered with the Portuguese Government, without the assistance of the money to be procured at Cadiz and Gibraltar for bills upon England. If this money is to be employed either in forming a magazine for the British troops in Cadiz, or, under the instructions of the Secretary of State to yourself, in the purchase of provisions for the general consumption at Cadiz, it is obvious that other means must be devised for providing for the other services to which that money is now applied; and I apprehend that the scarcity of specie is so great in England, that the Government cannot provide for these services by any export from thence. Indeed they have not been able to send the money which I informed them six months ago would be necessary, in addition to the supplies which could be procured at all places

within my reach for bills upon England ; and we are consequently in considerable distress for want of money.

‘ The instructions of the Secretary of State were written before he had received my report that the troops had been detached to Cadiz, and the copy of my letter to Mr. Frere of the 5th of February, containing the conditions on which I had detached them. I had already adverted to the variation between his instructions to you and those conditions, and I have requested an explanation, which I conclude he will give immediately.

‘ In the mean time you will observe from my letter to Major General Stewart, of the 27th February, that I contemplated the probable necessity that he would be obliged to purchase fresh meat, and gave him authority for so doing ; and you will of course give directions for the purchase of fresh meat for the British and Portuguese troops, if you should find it necessary.

‘ You are acquainted with the political and financial grounds on which I am desirous that that condition should be adhered to. You, however, must be the best judge of its operation at Cadiz ; and if you should find it prejudicial or inconvenient to the British interests, you have my full consent to depart from it.

‘ If you should depart from it, I will send you from Portugal a large proportion of the magazine of salt provisions which we have here.

‘ I have read with great interest your dispatch to the Secretary of State, of the 30th March, and your letter to me of the 4th instant, No. 3 ; and I am happy to find that the opinions regarding the defence of the Isla, which I had given generally to Major General Stewart, are confirmed by such good authority.

‘ My notion of the defences required for the Isla is founded upon the species of attack which the enemy will probably make upon it. My opinion is that they will make roads across, and establish themselves upon the salt marsh, in order to force the passage of the river. I had not sufficient information to be certain whether there were not some points in which they could attempt to effect this object with greater advantage than in others ; but my idea was generally that the line of the river, with the Caraccas on its left (which is a

point of separate and distinct consideration), was the best for defence.

‘I considered that this line ought to be taken up generally by a chain of works, closed in the rear by a weak profile connected by a line; and strengthened in those parts in which it might be deemed that the enemy might make his attack with the greatest advantage.

‘Within that interior line, I considered that it might be advantageous to intrench one or more positions, and other points for the preservation of the communication between the Isla and the Cortadura, and the body of the place of Cadiz.

‘The Torre Gorda, in particular, mentioned by you, occurred to me as an advantageous point to take up for the last mentioned object, in the cursory view which I was enabled to take of the Isla.

‘I mention these ideas only in confirmation of your own. I had but little opportunity of forming a correct judgment upon the subject; and if you should entertain an opinion different from mine in any part of this general outline, I am convinced that you must be right.

‘I have given directions that camp equipage complete for 5000 men may be sent to Cadiz, of which, as well as of that already at Cadiz, you will give the use to the Spanish troops, if you think proper. I entirely agree with you that it is best to keep the British troops in barracks or quarters; and I will increase still further the quantity of camp equipage at Cadiz, if you should desire it.

‘I have already sent to Cadiz one brigade of field ordnance, which is, I hope, arrived, and I will send another brigade. I beg to know from you if you should want more, or of smaller calibres than a 6 pounder.

‘I beg to refer you to my letter to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs here.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Cea, 15th April, 1810.

‘I am desirous of sending to Cadiz camp equipage for 5000 men, which the Assistant Quarter Master General at

Lisbon has directions to embark in such vessel as the Agent of Transports may allot to receive it, and to request you to give directions that a vessel may be appointed to receive this camp equipage, and may sail with it with convoy by the first favorable opportunity.

I have the honor to be, &c.

by *Vice Admiral* and *eventual* and *dismantled* and *WELLINGTON*!

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Astoria and those at Salamanca; and it is reported that

To the Right Honorable Henry Wellesley.—

'MY DEAR HENRY. 'Cea, 15th April, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 2nd, for which I am much obliged to you; and I am delighted to find that we had agreed so far in the measures to be adopted, as that you had adopted them at Cadiz before you had received my suggestions upon them.

I am glad that you have sent the prisoners home. Send them all home if you have the means, making a strong representation of the danger of keeping them at Cadiz, at the Balearic islands, or in the Canaries, and say that I advised you to send them to England.

‘I think we shall secure Minorca; and I see that you and I concur exactly in the measures to be adopted for the security of those islands, and the advantage to be derived from that possession. I have written to the Marques de la Romana upon this subject; but he has given me no answer, and has requested me to meet him at Niza, which I cannot do at present.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 8th, the French corps commanded by Regnier has broken up from Villa Nueva de la Serena, &c., and moved towards Cabeza del Buey, with an intention of entering Andalusia by Cordova, or of passing into La Mancha by the road along the bottom of the hills which goes to Ciudad Real. Either they found it impossible to move by that road at present, on account of the swelling of the torrents, or they are not wanted in Andalusia, for they returned to Villa Nueva, Medellin, &c., on the night of the 9th instant.

‘Nothing of importance has occurred elsewhere. Ney has got together at Salamanca a large quantity of heavy ordnance, and the greater part of his troops. Astorga is

invested, but has not been vigorously attacked; and General Mahy was about to attempt to relieve the place in the beginning of this month with all the troops he could collect in Galicia, in concert with the *partidas*, and others under Echevarria on this side of Alcañizas and Puebla de Sanabria. I think, however, that the French are not in earnest in this plan; they have dismantled and evacuated Zamora, by which they risk the communication between the troops at Astorga and those at Salamanca; and it is reported that General — has withdrawn from Oviedo and the Asturias. If this be the case, the corps in Leon will soon cross the Duero again and join Ney. Indeed, without this reinforcement, he is scarcely strong enough for his object.

‘I have written fully both to you and to General Graham about provisions for the town of Cadiz. They may get any quantity of cattle they please from the coast of Africa: but you must use the influence of the British Government, and probably the Government must bribe a little, and the Admiral must threaten, to induce the Barbaresque powers to allow the export: they, like others, are confoundedly afraid of the French; and their fears have not been lessened since the successes of the French in Spain have made the parties such near neighbours.

‘The best mode of transporting the cattle will be in the boats of the country; but if the Spanish Government cannot command any, I will lend them some horse transports. Grain of all kinds can be procured at Malta. I do not think that Portugal can supply you with any quantity of provisions.

‘I am very desirous that the Spanish Government should not only defray the expense of these provisions, but that they should continue to supply our troops with provisions, under the conditions which I made when I detached them from Portugal.

‘You are aware of the great difficulties existing in England in procuring specie. We are in the greatest distress for money in this country; and if we should lose the supplies of money which we receive from Gibraltar and Cadiz, we should very soon be obliged to quit the Peninsula for want of money to subsist in it. If we are to pay the expense of these provisions from Cadiz, or even if the condi-

tions are departed from, and we are to defray the expense of forming magazines for our own troops, a great part, if not the whole of the money procured at Cadiz and Gibraltar for bills upon England, must be diverted from the purpose to which it is at present applied.

‘I am also of opinion, that we should endeavor to make the Spaniards believe we feel it to be their interest that our troops should remain at Cadiz, and that we consider we have conferred an obligation upon them by going there. As long as they entertain this belief, they will treat us well; as soon as they lose it, I know them well enough to be certain that there is no enormity that they will not commit in order to get rid of us. They are much more likely to continue in this belief, if we insist upon the performance of the conditions on which I allowed the troops to go to Cadiz at all; and indeed I drew those conditions with that view.

‘I can easily conceive, however, that the health of our troops, and other circumstances may occur, which may require the expenditure of money by us, for the supply, particularly of fresh meat. I had given authority to General Stewart for this purpose, which General Graham has equally; but even in this case I wish the conditions should be adhered to, as far as may be possible, and that payment may be demanded for the provisions purchased.

‘I had written to Mr. Duff respecting Mr. Reid’s money. I shall be glad if he is allowed to bring it away.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,
‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley?* WELLINGTON.

‘Although I think that a person who has an itch for taking purses is not a fit person to be a Deputy Commissary General, in charge of the baggage, I should not have men-

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘Cea, 17th April, 1810.

‘This place is so inconvenient that I am obliged to move the head quarters back to Visu. I propose, however, to order the *parte* to leave Almeida every evening, at as late an hour as General Cox can leave the gates open, and I shall get the reports on the following morning at Visu. I shall be obliged to you if you will have your letters at Almeida at seven in the evening, so as to come off with the *parte*. Carrera mentions in his letter of the 11th, “des

documents qui pourront interresser, &c.," and I shall be obliged to you if you will send them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Cea, 17th April, 1810.

‘I am afraid that Mr. —, who is gone to Cadiz at the head of the Commissariat, is a man very little to be trusted. If I am not mistaken, he was in the military service of the East India Company, on the establishment of Fort St. George. If he was, he was dismissed from the service under the following circumstances:—

‘An officer of the army accused him of having robbed him; that is to say, he literally stole his purse from him. The officer in question (whose name I do not recollect) was brought to trial before a General Court Martial for defamation, and was acquitted.

‘I understand that the Commander in Chief, General Stuart, wanted to bring Mr. — to trial, on a charge to be framed against him, on the accusation of the officer who had been acquitted of defamation; but Mr. — declined to stand his trial, and was dismissed from the service.

‘When he was dismissed from the service, other persons recollected having lost their purses when in company with him; and I understood that he had once been accused of taking a purse out of an officer’s writing box, but that the accusation was deemed so improbable that it was scouted.

‘Although I think that a person who has an itch for taking purses is not a fit person to be a Deputy Commissary General, in charge of the department, I should not have mentioned this subject to you upon my own recollection of these facts, if I could not point out to you the means of ascertaining them precisely.

‘Lieut. General Stuart, who was the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George at the time to which I refer, and Colonel Agnew, who was the Adjutant General, are both in London. The former lives in Charles Street, and the latter in Harley Street; and either, but particularly the latter, will be able to give you an accurate and authentic account of the causes

and manner of Mr. —'s quitting the service of the East India Company.

'If Mr. Commissary — is the *cut purse*, it is difficult to account for his becoming an officer of the Commissariat; but being one, I can easily account for his being promoted, and for his having given satisfaction to his superiors, as I recollect having him under my command in charge of a post, as an officer, and I never knew one more active, or more intelligent.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Gordon. WELLINGTON.

'I have thought it proper to put the Commissary General and General Graham on their guard respecting Mr. —, till your answer shall be received to this letter.'

To Lieut. General Graham.

'SIR, Cea, 17th April, 1810.
'Lieut. General Payne has expressed a desire to have the services of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby*, as Assistant Adjutant General with the cavalry in this country, as he is no longer at the head of the department at Cadiz; and if you can spare his services I shall be obliged to you if you will allow him to come to Portugal.

'I beg you to let me know if you should wish to have any additional assistance in the Adjutant General's department at Cadiz, whether you retain Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby, or send him to this country.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Graham. WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

'SIR, Cea, 17th April, 1810.
'There is a man, by the name of —, who had deserted from the 4th dragoons, now in charge of the Provost Marshal at Lisbon, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you will receive him into one of His Majesty's ships, if he should be discharged from the service. He is a stout man,

* The late Major General the Hon. Sir Frederick Ponsonby, K.C.B.

and has not been guilty of any crime which renders him infamous.

‘I shall be much obliged to you if you will send to England, by the first opportunity, one officer, four serjeants, and fifty privates of the 23rd light dragoons, respecting whose passage the Assistant Quarter Master General will apply to the Agent of Transports.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Vice Admiral

WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To the Right Honorable Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Cea, 17th April, 1810.

I enclose you a letter which I have received from General O’Donoju, and I shall be obliged if you will show him any civility in your power on his arrival at Cadiz, and if you will recommend him to General Castaños.

‘I know nothing of the crimes with which he is charged. From his former conduct in the Spanish army, and from what I saw of him, I should not suppose that he was guilty of them. However, whether guilty or not, it is only fair that he should be tried at an early period. General Castaños himself is an instance of the injustice which can be done to officers by these protracted trials; and I hope that he will see justice done to General O’Donoju, who, I must say, is one of the most intelligent I have seen of the officers of the Spanish army.

‘Nothing new since I wrote to you the other day. It is said that something has happened at Madrid.

‘Ever yours most affectionately, &c.

‘The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.’

WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 13th, and I will send you immediately our probable embarkation return, made out as you suggest.

‘I enclose you the conditions on which I detached the troops originally to Cadiz, to which I still adhere; although the Secretary of State has, in a very unguarded manner,

authorized a departure from them, so far as to allow of the purchase of provisions not for the British troops, but for the garrison.

‘From these conditions you will observe, that all provisions sent to Cadiz ought to be paid for by the Spanish Government; and accordingly, although I have authorized the purchase of bullocks in Africa, in order to give the British troops fresh meat occasionally, I have ordered that payment for the meat imported may be demanded.

‘Portugal can certainly supply nothing in the way of provisions without great inconvenience, but I have told Mr. Wellesley and General Graham where every thing they require can be got.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

‘I think it would be desirable to define with precision our ideas respecting the establishment of military law, before we determine to alter the established law of the country in any case.

‘The following questions are worth consideration and decision on this topic. What is military law? Military law as applied to any persons, excepting the officers, soldiers, and followers of the army, for whose government there are particular provisions of law in all well regulated countries, is neither more nor less than the will of the General of the army. He punishes, either with or without trial, for crimes either declared to be so, or not so declared by any existing law, or by his own orders. This is the plain and common meaning of the term military law. Besides the mode of proceeding above described, laws have been made in different countries at different times to establish and legalize a description of military constitution.

‘The Commander in Chief, or the Government, has been authorized to proceed by military process, that is, by Court Martial or Council of War, against persons offending against certain laws, or against their own orders, issued generally for the security of the army, or for the establish-

ment of a certain government or constitution odious to the people among whom it is established. Of both descriptions of military law there are numerous instances in the history of the operations of the French army during the Revolution; and there is an instance of the existence both of the first mentioned description and of the last mentioned in Ireland during the rebellion of 1798, when the people were in insurrection against the Government, and were to be restrained by force.

‘The next question which is worth our consideration, is, for what object is military law of either description to be established in Portugal? Upon this point I would observe, that I believe there is no instance in history of the establishment of military law, excepting with a view to restrain the people. We have no such object in Portugal.

‘What we want is:

‘1st. To make the magistrates do their duty. We may try them by Court Martial or Council of War for neglect of duty; but what punishment would a Court Martial inflict upon them for neglect of duty, however criminal, except dismissal from office? and that punishment can be inflicted by the Government at any time without trial.

‘2ndly. We want to induce the people to perform the duties, and to supply the articles required from them by the law, and by the orders of Government. The law which imposes these duties, and requires these supplies and assistance for the armies, furnishes the means of its own execution, and imposes the penalties of non-performance of its provisions; and it is the duty of the inferior magistrate to inflict the penalty of the law for its breach.

‘We are mistaken, if we suppose that a peasant who has deserted from the militia or the line, or who has avoided to give his grain, or his straw, or his bullocks, or to supply his cart when called for, will attend the General to receive the notification of his will regarding his punishment, or the sentence of a council of war. Inferior officers and persons must seek for him. If military law is to supersede every other authority, the troops must be the executive officers of the law; they must be employed to seek and bring forward the criminal; and probably at the period when the enemy may be in the province governed by this law, the troops

may be employed in the civil government, instead of in opposing the enemy.

I wish these points to be maturely considered before we go farther.

Let us define our notions; and, depend upon it, we shall find that the establishment of military law will only increase our difficulties.

Believe me, &c.

Charles Stuart, Esq.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

My Lord,

Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

No change of any importance has been made in the positions of the enemy in Leon and Old Castille since I addressed you on the 11th instant; excepting that it has been reported that a division of infantry has been moved from the eastern side of that province to Madrid, as it is supposed that that capital was in a state of insurrection against the French authority. I have received no authentic accounts of this circumstance; but I have no doubt that the spirit of resistance to the French is general throughout all the provinces; that it breaks out into open acts of violence whenever an opportunity offers; that instances of its existence have been frequent lately; and that the confidence of the Spaniards, and of the people of Portugal, in the final success of their exertions, has lately become greater than it had been.

This effect is partly to be attributed to the recent failure of the French corps under General Suchet before Valencia (of which His Majesty's Government will have received the accounts from His Majesty's Minister at Cadiz); to the active continuance of the contest in Catalonia; to the continued, and in some instances renewed, active existence of the war of the partisans throughout all the provinces of Spain; and to the failure of the French in every operation they have undertaken, since they passed the Sierra Morena in January last.

The corps under the command of General Regnier, which, when I wrote last, I reported to be in the neighbourhood of Medellin, made a movement on the 5th instant to Cabeza del Buey, with an intention to pass the Sierra to Cordova, or to

move along the foot of the mountains to Ciudad Real, in La Mancha. It returned, however, to Medellin on the 9th, and on the 14th a small body of dragoons belonging to this corps entered Merida.

General Ballesteros was attacked at Talavera Real on the 13th; and General Contreras, whom he had left on the high road from Seville into Estremadura with a brigade of infantry, was attacked near Ronquillo on the same day. General Ballesteros maintained his ground, but General Contreras was obliged to retreat, and a part of his corps and the *Escopeteros* (a description of armed peasantry of the Sierra Morena), some of whom were attached to General Contreras' brigade, dispersed.

The last accounts which I received from Cadiz were of the 4th instant, at which time nothing of importance had occurred, and all the reinforcements expected from England had arrived.

I have sent there one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, for which Major General Stewart had called, to which I will add still further when I shall think it necessary, and that the horses can be fed there.

I have also sent to Cadiz a brigade of 6 pounder field ordnance, and I propose to send another brigade, which I observe that Lieut. General Graham requires.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

In consequence of a regulation of the War Office, dated 7th September, 1809, directing that the water decks of the cavalry be furnished in future by the public, in the same manner with other articles of camp necessaries, I have to request that 4000 water decks may be sent out from England for the use of the cavalry in this country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool.

WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Viseu, 20th April, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 18th, which I would not answer immediately, that I might give to your proposition all the attention which it deserves.

‘ The consequence of the attack which you propose would be to commence a description of warfare upon our outposts, in which we should certainly sustain some loss of men; and I should be obliged to bring up the army to the front, than which nothing can be more inconvenient, and eventually injurious to us.

‘ I do not know whether the state of tranquillity in which affairs have been for some time is advantageous to the French, but I know that it is highly so to us. The British army is increasing in strength daily, and a continuance of the tranquillity in which we have been, for a short time longer, will add considerably to our numbers. The discipline and equipment of the Portuguese troops is improving daily. The equipment in particular, which is not very defective, will in a short time be complete, as all the articles for it are arrived from England. The sick of this army are also coming out of hospital fast.

‘ The arms for the militia have lately arrived, but some time must elapse before they can be transported to the points at which they can be issued to the different corps. All these services must necessarily be impeded, if not entirely stopped, by the necessity of being in a state of preparation in front, which the existence of *la petite guerre* would undoubtedly occasion, and these objects are most essential to this country if we are to be attacked, and to the perfection of our army, if circumstances should enable us to make a forward movement.

‘ I am not insensible of the advantages which we should derive from the successful issue of an expedition, such as you have proposed, particularly on the state of the war in Spain. But I think that the Spaniards begin to be sensible of the advantages which they derive from our position in this country, and are aware that circumstances do not allow us to interfere with more activity, at present, in the operations of the war. Upon the whole, I prefer not to undertake this expedition.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 17th, I will only tell you that it has excited any feeling in my mind excepting anger. I have already told you that I shall regret exceedingly the existence of a necessity to place in other hands the command of our advanced guard; and I shall regret it particularly if it should deprive me of your assistance altogether.

‘ I expect Marshal Beresford here in a day or two, when I shall be able to make arrangements that may enable me to leave you in the command of your division, which I am very anxious to do. In the mean time, you have the three battalions of Caçadores, as I do not mean to withdraw the 1st and 2nd till I shall see the Marshal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have omitted to tell you that, if you have any thing to communicate which would require greater certainty and celerity than your hussars or the *parte* could give, there are post mules on the road between this and Almeida.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Visau, 21st April, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th, and return your Proclamation, which I think very good. I have made an addition of one paragraph, just to point out that every individual in the country has duties to perform, and that he will be punished if he omits to perform them. However, omit it, if you think it will make the Proclamation too long, or alter it if you think proper.

‘ The state of opinion in England is very unfavorable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public, or as the Opposition pretend to be; and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle which is to answer no purpose.

‘ Their private letters are in some degree at variance with their public instructions, and I have called for an explanation of the former, which, when it arrives, will show me more clearly what they intend.

‘ The instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them; although they throw upon me the whole responsibility of bringing away the army in safety, after

staying in the Peninsula till it shall be necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer in these times to receive private hints and opinions from ministers, which, if attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, and even to the letter, of the public instructions; at the same time that, if not attended to, the danger of the responsibility imposed by the public instructions is increased tenfold.

‘I have for some time turned over in my mind the expediency of making an attempt upon the magazine at Salamanca at least, with a most anxious desire to carry it into execution. The fact is, however, that, according to the accounts we have of the enemy’s strength, it is probable that I should not be able to accomplish any thing, excepting probably the relief of Astorga, which I do not conceive of such importance as to induce me to incur the risk and inconvenience of moving my troops out of the strong country into the plains.

‘We have immediately in our front, at Salamanca and Ledesma, and on the Tormes, the corps of Ney and of Loison, which I do not think can be reckoned less than 30,000. Without breaking up my arrangements on the Tagus and south of the Tagus, I could not collect so many men in this quarter. I will suppose, however, that I should be able to oblige Ney to withdraw across the Tormes; there is no doubt that, with a force much inferior to mine, he would be able to prevent me from crossing that river to obtain possession of Salamanca, at least for the number of days which would be necessary to bring to his support the corps commanded by Kellermann, which is in the eastern parts of Castille; and, if necessary, that commanded by Junot, engaged in the blockade of Astorga. I should then be obliged to retire again into Portugal, having effected nothing excepting the momentary relief of Astorga, which place, if Ney should find himself sufficiently strong without the assistance of Junot’s corps, would not be relieved by this operation.

‘I do not think the possession of Astorga, by the enemy, to be an object of very great importance in the existing situation of affairs. It is better they should not have it undoubtedly; but it is not an object of such importance as to induce me to incur the risks and submit to the inconveniences

of a forward movement at present. Those risks are obvious. The inconveniences are the delay in the complete equipment of the Portuguese troops, and the interruption in their discipline which must be the consequence of any forward movement. Both armies are becoming stronger and more efficient every day, and more likely to be able to effect the great object for which they are kept in this country; and I do not think I should be justified in interrupting the course of measures which are tending to their improvement and perfection, by an operation of doubtful result; and which, even if successful, would not accomplish an object of any great importance to the war.

To these objections, add those to which you have adverted; viz., the complaints which would be made in England, when it should be known that the army had retired, even after it should have accomplished that which is certainly an object, the destruction of the enemy's magazines, which are evidently formed for an attack upon this country and its defences; and it will appear that it is not advisable to undertake the operation at present.

I have my attention, however, steadily fixed upon that object; and if I find that the operations in the war, in other parts of Spain, should induce the enemy to weaken himself to such a degree in Castille, as to render it probable that I should succeed in destroying the magazines at Salamanca, I shall attempt it, whatever may be the inconvenience of moving the troops, or whatever may be the consequences in England.

It would be very desirable to establish the channel of information which you propose, and I strongly recommend you to establish it. We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that we know is the movement of the troops at the moment, or probably after it is made. The French, however, keep their plans and designs, if they have any formed, so secret, that it would be almost impossible to obtain intelligence of them, even though there were not the difficulties in the way which at present exist.

Believe me, &c.
Charles Stuart, Esq. WELLINGTON.

‘ I have written a letter to the Prince Regent, which I propose to send to the Regency to be forwarded. I shall send you a copy of it. I have praised the existing Government, and held up all they have done.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Viseu, 22nd April, 1809.

‘ I enclose the most accurate account that we can at present make out of our strength for embarkation, and a letter from the Quarter Master General to Captain Mackenzie explanatory of it. This return will show how erroneous the last was. Indeed it did not include some of the corps lately arrived, nor many of the sick absent, who it is understood will be able to embark with their corps.

‘ I should recommend that, if it should be possible, arrangements should be made for the reception in hospital ships for more than the number of men stated in the enclosed paper. If we should come to blows with the French, we shall certainly have some wounded, whom it will be necessary to put in hospital ships. It might be expedient therefore most probably that all the spare tonnage, not required for the 35,000 men, should be fitted up in this manner.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Viseu, 23rd April, 1810.

‘ I have just received your two letters of the 22nd. I am concerned to find that mine of the 20th had not reached you, which contained an answer to yours of the 18th; I now enclose a duplicate of it. If Ruman’s report of the 20th turns out to be correct, I shall attempt something on a larger scale, if I can.

‘ I wrote my letter to Ciudad Rodrigo merely to draw from the Junta the explanation which they are about to give. The Spaniards I believe think it necessary to our existence to assist and protect them; and I have more than once been obliged to remind different authorities with which I have been in communication, that their protection is their

own concern; and that if they expect that we should assist them, they must give us every assistance of provisions and supplies which the country can afford.

‘The letter, to which the deputation from Ciudad Rodrigo is bringing the answer, was written in consequence of an intimation, in not very civil terms, that the small supplies which you receive from the country in which you are stationed, and for which I believe you pay ready money, could no longer be afforded.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Messrs. Bulkeley & Son.

‘GENTLEMEN,

‘Viseu, 23rd April, 1810.

‘I received only last night your letter of the 14th instant, which I imagine that you had transmitted by some private hand.

‘I am much concerned that Mr. Livingstone has suffered by his connexion with Mr. Philips. All that is known here of that gentleman is, that he was encouraged by the late Secretary of State and by the present Commissary in Chief, to purchase in the ports in the Mediterranean grain for the use of the armies in the Peninsula; and I authorized the purchase by the Commissary General of this army of that which was brought to Portugal, at the cheapest rate at which the same kind of grain was to be sold at Lisbon. It was not in my power to authorise the purchase of the grain at any other than the cheapest rate; nor is it now in my power to authorise the Commissary General to give any advance of price for the last cargoes of grain beyond that which was settled; although I should be happy to do any thing in my power for the relief of Mr. Livingstone.

‘The purchase from Mr. Philips was further recommended by his taking payment for the grain in bills upon the Lords of the Treasury, which was a convenience in the great scarcity of specie in Portugal.

‘If you wish it, I will forward your letter of the 14th April to be laid before the Lords of the Treasury, to endeavor to prevail upon their Lordships to make some allowance to Mr. Livingstone for the losses he has sustained, in

consequence of his connexion with Mr. Philips, and his perseverance to serve the public, notwithstanding the loss which he had first sustained. This representation in favor of Mr. Livingstone will come in aid of one which I had already made to their Lordships in favor of Mr. Philips, when I conceived that the grain imported really belonged to him, to induce their Lordships to consent to an abatement of the amount of the demand on account of the public for the freight of the grain.

‘Mr. Livingstone will be entitled to the full amount of the benefit which may be derived from this application, in respect of the freight for the cargoes last arrived in Portugal.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Messrs. Bulkeley & Son.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Viscu, 24th April, 1810.

‘I received yesterday evening your letter of the 20th. It is very desirable that your cavalry should be kept complete. But as long as the enemy will allow us to remain in a state of tranquillity, which at present they do not seem disposed to interrupt, it is desirable that we should keep the Portuguese troops in those stations in which they will be disciplined, and can be equipped. It is desirable therefore that the brigade in question should be allowed to remain at Salvaterra, and I shall take care to order it forward in time. It is also desirable that the four squadrons of different regiments which you have had with you hitherto, instead of the brigade to which I have above referred, should be allowed to go to the stations which Marshal Beresford will have appointed for them, in order that they likewise may be equipped and got into order.

‘I shall take care that you shall have a due proportion of British and Portuguese cavalry, when you shall be likely to come in contact with the enemy.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

'SIR,

'Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

'Lieutenant General Sir John Sherbrooke, being disabled by bad health from continuing to serve with the army in the Peninsula, is about to return to England, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will make arrangements to have him, and the officers of his suite, conveyed to England in a ship of war. He is desirous, if possible, to be landed at Portsmouth, in order to avoid the long journey to London from the Western ports, to which he is not equal in his present state of health. Sir John Sherbrooke will be at Lisbon about the 5th or 6th of May.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Vice Admiral

'WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.'

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

'I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 21st, and I anxiously hope that the news of the desertion of the Italian troops at Cadiz may be confirmed.

'The embarkation returns sent do not include General, or Commissariat, or Medical Staff. But Captain Mackenzie has a list of the whole, and has been directed to give the agent of transports an accurate return of them.

'I am much obliged to you for the telegraph books.

'Believe me, &c.

'Vice Admiral

'WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.'

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

'SIR,

'Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

'I am sorry to inform you that Lieut. —, of the 2nd batt. 66th regiment was shot in a duel a few days ago, as is supposed, by Lieut. — of the same regiment.

'I enclose letters from Lieut. General Hill, Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and from three officers of the 66th regiment, and the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry into the circumstances which occasioned the duel. Lieut. — is under arrest, and if the Government of the country think proper to order that he and the other officers concerned should be tried by the

tribunal of the country, they shall be given up; if not, I shall give directions that they be tried by a General Court Martial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 24th April, 1810.*

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st instant regarding the Danish ships at Oporto.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to the Secretary of State of the Portuguese Government upon this subject, when I transmitted the report of the Commandant of Oporto regarding the conduct of the Captain of His Majesty’s ship Growler.

‘ As I was the commander of the army by which Oporto was liberated from the enemy, I have always refrained from interfering, in any manner, respecting the disposal of those Danish vessels, and have only pointed out to the Portuguese Government the steps which they ought to take, if they did not think proper that these vessels should be removed by order of Vice Admiral Berkeley from Oporto.

‘ I never saw the orders given by His Majesty respecting the Danish ships found in the Tagus when the French were removed from Portugal in September 1808; but I can easily conceive that the principal of those orders would not apply to the Danish vessels found in the Douro when the French were removed from Oporto in May, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ *Viseu, 26th April, 1810.*

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter, and its enclosure, received from Lieut. General Payne; and I beg leave to recommend that you will give such directions as you may think proper, regarding the cleansing of all the horse transports at Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Viseu, 26th April, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Prince Regent, which I trust may have the effect of strengthening the hands of Government here, and of aiding any representations you may make upon the subject through Lord Strangford.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Viseu, 26th April, 1810.

‘ The head quarters of the corps of Regnier were moved on the 16th from Villa Nueva de la Serena to Merida; and after sending detachments on the left of the Guadiana as far as Los Santos and Zafra, probably to embarrass the movements of the Spanish troops under the command of Generals Ballesteros and Contreras, they collected their troops at Merida on the 20th.

‘ They attacked the advanced guard of O'Donnell's division at La Roca, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 21st, and destroyed some companies of his light infantry; and on the 22nd manifested an intention of attacking his position at Alburquerque. General O'Donnell had however been joined by General Mendizabal's division from Campo Mayor; and Lieut. General Hill informs me, on the 23rd, that he intended to move his corps through the Sierra de San Mamed and across the frontier, which movement was likely to relieve General O'Donnell effectually, and it is probable that the enemy will have retired.

‘ General Contreras was with his brigade at Xerez de los Cavalleros, and General Ballesteros with his division at Aroche, by the last accounts. The communication of both with Badajoz appeared to be secure.

‘ Marshal Mortier had the advanced guard of his corps in the Sierra Morena, since the Spanish troops of Ballesteros and Contreras had been obliged to retire; and the main body of the corps is on the right of the Guadalquivir, not far from Seville.

‘ There has been no movement of any consequence in Leon or Old Castille ; and I have had no accounts from Cadiz of a later date than the 4th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *My Dear General Hill.* ‘ *Viscu, 27th April, 1810. 6 A.M.*

‘ The enemy are in motion on this part of the frontier, and apparently intend to invest Ciudad Rodrigo ; near which place some of their troops were on the evening of the 25th. I have put our troops in motion ; and I am just setting out for Celorico, where I shall be this afternoon.

‘ I wish that you would put General Slade’s brigade in motion, by Villa Velha, Castello Branco, &c., Belmonte to Guarda. Let them move by regiments if possible ; if not, by three, or two squadrons. Let the Portuguese brigade of cavalry at Salvaterra be moved up to their situation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ *My Dear Sir,* ‘ *Viscu, 27th April, 1810. 6 A.M.*

‘ Since I sent off the courier yesterday, I have received accounts of the enemy being in motion on the frontier, apparently with an intention of investing Ciudad Rodrigo ; near to which place some of their troops were on the evening of the 25th.

‘ I have not heard of their having raised the siege of Astorga, and I do not think they have force for both operations ; but as they have for some time been preparing for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and as their movements certainly demonstrate an intention to invest that place, I have put our troops in motion, and am just setting out for Celorico, where I shall be this evening.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, Celorico, 27th April, 1810. 9 P.M.

‘Your letter of the 25th at night, which I received last night, coupled with the accounts which I before received of the preparations of the enemy at Salamanca for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, induced me to put the army in motion for this point, and I arrived here this afternoon. The first division will be here, and in this neighbourhood, to-morrow, and the cavalry and the Portuguese troops on the succeeding days.

‘I still doubt, however, the intention to make a serious attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I do not think the enemy is sufficiently strong for that operation without calling in Junot's corps; and I understand that the attack upon Astorga still continues. However, interested as we are to preserve Ciudad Rodrigo, and particularly not to allow that place to fall into the enemy's hands, without making an effort to save it, I should not have been justified if I had taken no notice of the movements made since the 23rd, connected with other recent preparations, notwithstanding the inconvenience which this movement is to us.

‘I shall stay here to-morrow to arrange the stations of the troops, and to look about me a little, unless I should receive this night any intelligence which may make it desirable that I should be nearer to you.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR, Celorico, 28th April, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 23rd, and I shall communicate my opinion on the plan for establishing martial law in the country when you send it to me.

‘The courier to whom you refer as having been too late for the packet, left Viseu on Thursday the 19th, at about half-past four in the afternoon: he did not arrive in Coimbra, thirteen leagues distant, till Friday the 20th, at a quarter past three in the afternoon. Beresford did not detain

him one minute: he had no letters to send by him, but finding him so late, he had the courier warned of the danger of longer delay, and the hour of his departure from Coimbra, half-past three, was marked upon his passport, with a warning by the Adjutant General of the Portuguese army not to delay. Coimbra being thirty three leagues from Lisbon, he ought still to have been at Lisbon in thirty hours, which would have brought him to half-past nine on Saturday night, and he would then have been in time for the packet.

‘ If this courier, whose name is José Gregorio, is not punished, it is in vain to expect the Portuguese Government will punish any body, or will ever be well served.

‘ The packet ought to sail, according to the former rule, by the earliest tide on Sunday morning. I do not wish it at any time to be delayed for my letters beyond the afternoon’s tide of Sunday.

‘ The enemy have given no further indication of their intentions since I wrote to you yesterday. They are not in any very great numbers before Ciudad Rodrigo. Our movement continues.

‘ Direct to me in future to the care of the Postmaster at Coimbra or of Thomar. I think I shall get your letters soonest by Thomar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 28th April, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant, relative to the removal of the Conde de Redondo from his office.

‘ I have already given you my opinion upon that subject, and I have written upon it this day a letter to Dom Miguel Forjaz, which it is probable that the Government will communicate to you.

‘ I should recommend that the Regency should not make any arrangement for filling the vacancy in their body, occasioned by the secession of the Marquez das Minas.

‘ The principal strength of the Regency consists in the regularity and legality of their appointment by the Prince Regent; and I know of no person in Portugal whose assist-

ance, as a colleague in the Government, would compensate for the loss of this advantage, by their making any addition or alteration in their body by their own assumed and illegal authority.

‘As the secession of the Marquez das Minas from the deliberations of the Regency may be attributed to an intrigue among the Fidalgos, it is certain that the whole of that body would object to the new appointment, and would thereby increase the difficulties of Government.

‘The party of the Fidalgos, and of the Marquez das Minas at the Court of the Brazils, would most probably also succeed in prevailing upon the Prince Regent to disapprove of and annul this new appointment; and thus a fresh blow would be given to the authority and credit of the Government, on a point on which they would have exceeded their powers, and would have acted illegally.

‘I recommend, therefore, that the Government should not appoint a new member to the Regency.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

‘I received in the night your letter of yesterday. I wish that Carrera had mentioned his reasons for doubting the enemy’s intention to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. I have doubted it, because I do not think they have sufficient force for all they are undertaking at present, even allowing Ney’s force, with Loison’s, to be 30,000 men, which nobody but myself has ever estimated it.

‘I have a report which states that King Joseph has returned to Seville. If this be true, it is not likely that the enemy will undertake any thing serious in this quarter. Did the muleteers, who mentioned the heavy artillery to Cornet Tuite, see it in motion, or at Salamanca?

‘I have accounts from Cadiz to the 16th instant—nothing extraordinary.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 25th, and the arrangement for the embarkation of the army, which I received this morning.

‘ I am concerned to learn that ——— has given you cause to be dissatisfied with him. I know nothing of him excepting upon the service, in which he was very active, and gave great satisfaction to Captain Malcolm, as well as to the officers of the Navy.

‘ Mr. Stuart will have informed you of our movement, and its causes. I still doubt, however, the intentions of the French to attack Ciudad Rodrigo at present.

‘ I have given directions that 400,000 lbs. of salt provisions may be sent from the Tagus to Cadiz, and shall be obliged to you if you will allow them to sail.

‘ I am also anxious to have in the Mondego four of the heavy guns, with their travelling carriages and ammunition, in case circumstances should enable me to make a dash at the magazine at Salamanca, that I may not be disappointed in my object, by the want of ordnance, to breach a convent which the French have fortified there. The commanding officer of the artillery has given his directions to Colonel Fisher. The whole that is required will be in one ship, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send her to the Mondego.

Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ I conclude that your son has set off.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 29th April. 1810.

‘ I received only yesterday your letter of the 6th instant; and I have given orders that 400,000 lbs. of salt provisions may be sent from the Tagus to Cadiz without loss of time.

‘ I consider you fully justified by our instructions in granting warrants on the officer at the head of the Commissariat at Cadiz, for the issue of money to the officer at the head of the pay department.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

MY DEAR SIR,

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 16th instant.

All questions relating to bät and forage are decided according to the Regulations suggested by a Board, of which General Sir Thomas Trigge was President; which Regulations have been adopted by the Commander in Chief; and orders have been given that they should be invariably adhered to.

I enclose a letter which I wrote to the Commander in Chief in June last, and his answer, relative to the rank of British officers holding Portuguese commissions; which you will observe contains a positive decision on the question which you have referred for my consideration in regard to Colonel Bushe.

The principle of the decision of the Commander in Chief on the relative rank between officers of the British army and British officers serving with Portuguese troops, would apply to British officers receiving rank from the Spanish Government; and when British officers serving with the Spanish troops, meet with British officers serving with the British troops, they must rank according to the seniority of their respective Spanish and British commissions.

When British officers are serving with British troops only, there can be no doubt that they must rank according to the seniority of their several commissions from His Majesty.

Being sensible, as you will observe from my letter of the 7th June to the Commander in Chief, of the inconvenience and complaints which would be occasioned by the grant of this advanced rank to British officers by foreign powers, while His Majesty's troops might be serving with the armies of those powers, I have repeatedly requested the Spanish Government not to grant these commissions without reference to His Majesty's Minister; by whom applications for rank in the Spanish army made by officers holding His Majesty's commission have been occasionally referred to me. It is advisable that you should urge His Majesty's Minister to communicate with the Spanish Government upon this subject.

‘ No officer ought to accept a commission from any foreign power without His Majesty’s permission ; I received his permission to accept the commissions which I hold in the Spanish and Portuguese services ; and I have been the channel of applying for the permission of His Majesty for several officers to accept this distinction from the Spanish Government.

‘ I conclude that Major General Stewart has applied to His Majesty for leave to accept the rank conferred upon him by the Regency.

‘ When British officers have received His Majesty’s permission to accept rank from the Spanish Government, and have accepted it, I conceive that there is no objection to their wearing, particularly in a Spanish garrison, the distinctive marks of the rank which has been conferred upon them ; although it would undoubtedly be more regular to wear with His Majesty’s uniform only what is prescribed by His Majesty’s Regulations.

‘ I refer you to my letter of this date to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 5th and 16th instant.

‘ In answer to the first, relating to the supply of provisions, you and General Graham are aware of the motives which induced me to desire that the British troops at Cadiz should be fed by the Spanish Government, as one of the conditions on which I consented to detach them ; and you and he must decide upon the propriety or necessity of departing from that condition.

‘ I trust that the Government at home will have it in their power to supply the money which will be deficient for the support of the army, and for the performance of the King’s engagements in this country, in consequence of the diversion of the money raised at Cadiz from those objects, to the payment for supplies, and for the formation of British magazines at that place.

‘ I have long known of the dissatisfaction existing in the French army, but they still continue to march and to fight. It would be advisable for the Regency to offer a reward for every Frenchman, or soldier in the French service, brought in alive to any post occupied by any of the allied troops. This measure was adopted with some success by General Cuesta. The peasants refrained from the murder of the French soldiers, and many consequently deserted.

‘ I have perused your dispatch of the 15th (No. 19) to the Secretary of State with great interest. Sr de Souza’s conduct is extraordinary ; for if I recollect rightly, I recommended to him not to urge the claim of his Government to Olivença at the present moment. I know that I had a conversation with Lord Wellesley upon that subject, and we agreed that it was best for the Portuguese Government to refrain from urging the claim, and I think I communicated this opinion to Sr de Souza. Although the war which ended in the cession of Olivença was unjust, and the Spanish Regency, and all those seriously opposed to the French and their political system, may be disposed to acknowledge it, I doubt whether the Regency, or any other Spanish Ministers, would or could cede that possession, merely as an act of grace and justice to the Portuguese Government, or to induce the Portuguese Government to agree to carry into execution an article of an old treaty regarding disputed boundaries in America.

‘ The acknowledgment of the right of succession in the Princess of Brazil is stated to be an object to both governments, and I shall state presently where I conceive our interest is involved in this article of the proposed treaty. I suspect, however, that the first article of the treaty is the motive for its execution, at least by the Spanish Ministers.

‘ I do not know whether you have observed the difference in the statements made by Don E. de Bardaxi and Sr de Souza, of the nature of this proposed treaty. The former states it to be a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance ; the latter of defensive alliance. Both powers being engaged in a war with France for their existence, this difference would not much signify, if it were not connected with opinions regarding the conduct and operations of the war, which are very important. The fact is, that the Spanish

Government and officers have always entertained, or have pretended to entertain an opinion, that the Portuguese nation have not done their duty in the war ; and they have wished to involve the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, more actively in its operations, as they term it, but, as I should say, to induce them to carry it on in their manner, which would have put the French in possession of the Peninsula about six months ago.

‘ I do not know whether the Portuguese Ministers have entertained the same opinions, or have really participated in these wishes of the Spanish Government, regarding the operations of the war ; but I have, upon more than one occasion, been obliged to refuse my consent to carry on certain operations with the Portuguese troops, proposed, and even urged, by the Portuguese Government, at the suggestion of the Spanish Ministers.

‘ The conduct of the Portuguese Government, in these instances, was possibly occasioned by their desire to conciliate the Spanish Government, and thus to procure a decision in favor of the right of the Princess of Brazil to the succession ; or they might seriously believe that what was proposed to them was really an advisable measure.

‘ The Spanish Government now seeing the total destruction of their own army, and means of carrying on the contest with activity, are desirous by means of this treaty of bringing the Portuguese army forward ; or of persuading people that the Portuguese army will be more active in future, in consideration of the sacrifices which have been made to the Portuguese nation ; and thus gain for themselves a momentary popularity.

‘ The truth is that the Portuguese army, which is hardly made yet, has been active in proportion to its means. Portugal has done as much, and will do more, in the contest than any province in Spain of the same extent and population.

‘ It has defended itself ; and with our assistance will continue to defend itself, unless attacked by very superior forces ; and in this manner its defence must be an useful diversion to Spain. What province of Spain, with all the assistance of money from America, and of arms and clothing from England, has been able to send and maintain an army beyond its limits, or even to defend itself, if attacked by

20,000 men? Three times that number will not obtain possession of Portugal, or possibly four times.

‘But then, it will be asked, cannot Portugal and Great Britain do more? I answer, certainly not, as long as there is no army on foot in Spain.

‘In drawing this first article of the treaty, therefore, I conceive that it will be very desirable to avoid giving the Spanish Government any more influence than they have at present upon the operations of the Portuguese army.

‘If this point is provided for, I doubt whether the Spanish Ministers will execute the treaty; and it remains to be considered whether any thing of importance will in consequence be lost. Olivença is an object of vanity to the Portuguese, for, strange to say, it is the only territory their government has ever ceded. The settlement of boundaries in America is of no importance to either party.

‘The acknowledgment of the right of succession in the Princess of Brazil is, I think, an object to us, if we should fail in the contest in the Peninsula, greater than it would be if we should succeed. If it should suit Buonaparte’s purpose to murder Ferdinand, he will not be prevented from executing it, by knowing that the right of the Princess of Brazil to succeed to the crown is acknowledged.

‘The object of the treaty in recognising the succession of La Carlotta is nugatory, unless Buonaparte should put Ferdinand to death.

‘As I believe there is no doubt but that, by law, Carlotta cannot be Regent, if she is the declared successor to the crown, the object of the Portuguese Government, in acceding to this article of the treaty, will be equally disappointed. I do not believe that either party looks farther than the Peninsula in this arrangement, but we ought to view it in another light.

‘First; if the allies should succeed in obliging the French to evacuate the Peninsula, which is not a very probable event at present; and Secondly; if the allies should fail, and the French should obtain possession of the Peninsula;—

‘In either case, but particularly in the last, it is most probable that Ferdinand and his brother would be murdered. I do not conceive that it would be a desirable arrangement for Great Britain, that the whole Peninsula and South

America should be in the hands of one Sovereign. However, that is not a very probable event at present ; and even if we could succeed in obliging the French to evacuate the Peninsula, I think that the Portuguese would take care that the King of Spain should never be King of Portugal.

‘ The second hypothesis is, I am sorry to say, the most probable ; and in the view of this event, I do consider the acknowledgment of the right of Carlotta to be very important to us. It provides a legal government for all the colonies of Spain ; and if our government should manage the evacuation of Portugal, as they ought, when we shall be obliged to evacuate this country, we shall carry away an army capable of establishing and maintaining her authority and that of her race in those countries.

‘ The interests of the Spanish and Portuguese governments are equally involved with those of Great Britain in this view of the question ; and I acknowledge that I think it very important that this article of the treaty should be executed in some formal manner or other.

‘ You have now got my opinion upon this subject, which I will communicate to the King’s Ministers in some shape or other, or you may send it to Lord Wellesley if you choose.

‘ Since I wrote last, Ballesteros and Contreras have both been attacked in the Sierra Morena, and have both been obliged to retire with some loss. Contreras’ brigade was at Xerez le los Caballeros, and the division of Ballesteros at Aroche, when I received the last accounts from Badajoz of the 25th.

‘ Regnier’s corps has again crossed the Guadiana at Merida, and attacked the advanced guard of the left division of the Marques de la Romana’s corps at La Roca on the 21st, when they destroyed some light infantry. General O’Donnell, who commanded this division, was joined at Alburquerque by General Mendizabal from Campo Mayor ; and Regnier was moving to attack them, when he heard of a movement made by General Hill with his corps through the Sierra de San Mamed, when he retired again to Merida.

‘ By the last accounts of the 16th, the French had not made any impression upon Astorga ; nor had the Spaniards under General Mahy, &c., made any effort to relieve the place.

‘The French have received considerable reinforcements in the Asturias, and are again in possession of Oviedo.

‘On the 24th, the enemy made a general movement on the Tormes towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and since the 25th, they have had a small corps of infantry near that place, and have invested it, with their cavalry on the right of the Agueda. I doubt their intention to attack the place at present, as I do not think them sufficiently strong. But the British and Portuguese armies are in motion, to attempt its relief if they should.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

‘I am much obliged to you for the perusal of your dispatch (No. 50) to Lord Wellesley regarding the right of the Princess of Brazil to succeed Ferdinand.

‘I enclose the extract of a letter which I have written to my brother Henry upon that subject, which you may send to Lord Wellesley if you think proper.

‘The accounts of yesterday do not make the enemy’s designs more clear than they were. If it is true, as they say from Badajoz, that Joseph has returned to Seville, it is almost certain that they have no serious intention upon Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 15th instant, relative to the claim of the merchants of the factory at Lisbon to be exempt from military billets and other burthens thrown upon all the inhabitants of Portugal, in the existing circumstances of the country.

‘I have not by me copies of the treaties under which these gentlemen claim their exemptions; but I should conclude that all that was intended by the treaties was to place the British merchants, residing at Lisbon for the purposes of

their trade, in the same situation with the other inhabitants of that city. I know that till the late invasion and usurpation by the French it was not the practice to billet the officers and soldiers of the army upon the inhabitants of Lisbon; and many persons, whose property consisted in the rent of houses, have been seriously injured in their circumstances by the continuance of the practice, first adopted by the French and continued since the restoration, of quartering the officers by billets upon the inhabitants.

‘ If my notion is correct that British subjects resident at Lisbon cannot claim exemptions of this description, under existing treaties, not enjoyed by the inhabitants of the country, it follows that as long as the system of billeting the army upon the inhabitants of Lisbon continues, the gentlemen of the factory must be equally liable to them. If however it should be decided that these gentlemen are to enjoy this privilege, I do not see on what grounds I can object to the abolition of the system of granting billets upon the native inhabitants of Lisbon. The officers of the army will thus be put to considerable inconvenience, and the public to some expense for lodging-money.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I cannot but observe that the moment for claiming this privilege is not happily chosen by the gentlemen of the factory.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 30th April, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday evening your letter of yesterday morning from Gallegos.

‘ You have done quite right to keep the Caçadores. The order for their return was given before we knew of the enemy’s movements upon the frontier.

‘ It is impossible to draft men from one regiment to another, or from a regiment to another branch of the service in Portugal. The men are all raised by requisition on the provinces, and each province has a certain number of battalions allotted to it, to be kept complete. A province whose regiment should be drafted would have reason to complain

although none of the men were discharged as being unfit for service. Mr. Downie's sickness is unfortunate at this moment, but I will desire the Commissary General to send you somebody else.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have a report from Colonel Grant at Serradilla in Estremadura, that the enemy are reinforcing Regnier's corps with about 7000 men drawn from Castille, from Madrid and Toledo. There is also a report from Lamego that the siege of Astorga is raised, but I doubt its truth.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th April. Senhor — has returned the horse he stole. I have not yet seen Senhor —, but he shall likewise make a restitution.

‘ Alas! Astorga surrendered on the 22nd April, and it is obvious that the enemy knew of its fall before they marched on the 24th from the Tormes.

‘ The question is, what they will now do, and what we ought to do. I do not think that Junot will push into Galicia. If he does they are not equal to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; if he does not, we are not equal to its relief.

‘ They have not yet moved the heavy guns from Salamanca, and the rain must, for the present, stop their operations, as well as ours. All the troops are halted in the situations with which you are acquainted.

‘ You had better not move to Foz Daõ more than 500,000 rations, keeping up that quantity. We have great difficulties about the carts to move forward the magazines only fourteen leagues. We have on the Douro and Mondego not less than a million of rations.

‘ I shall settle about the deserters.

‘ I enclose a letter which I received last night from the Duke of Cambridge. Have you any inclination to receive these gentlemen?

‘ Charles Stewart is arrived: he left London on the 13th: all in great tranquillity: Burdett safe in the Tower. They

are terribly alarmed in England about our situation, and I am advised on all hands to risk nothing. How do you find yourself?

‘I have not answered you about your Colonels on the Staff, because I want to talk to you upon that subject. I like to adhere to principles and general rules, whatever may be the consequences.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Cox.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

‘I received last night your letter, announcing the fall of Astorga, and, during the night, that enclosing the letter of yesterday from the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘The fall of Astorga is an event of great consequence at the present moment, and it is obvious that it is the cause of all the late movements of the enemy.

‘They are increasing their force also in Estremadura. However, we are in a state of preparation for all events, and I shall act according to circumstances.

‘If the force near Ciudad Rodrigo is only 4000 men, and the Governor wishes to remove them, he is surely able to effect that operation himself. Why are the English to undertake it? If he is not able to effect that object, I am sure it will answer no purpose for us to relieve him, when he shall be more seriously pressed.

‘General Charles Stewart is arrived at Lisbon, having left London on the 13th of April. Tranquillity was re-established in London, Sir Francis Burdett being safely lodged in the Tower.

‘I beg you to communicate this letter to General Craufurd, as I have not time to write to him before the *parte* sets out.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Brig. General Cox.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

‘I enclose you the copy of a dispatch which I have received from the Secretary of State, relative to Peniche.

‘The reports which you have already made to the late Commander of the Forces and me, and the directions which I gave you in my letter of the 3rd of April, show the existing and probable early state of Peniche as a place of embarkation for the army; and I have transmitted copies of these papers to the Secretary of State by this opportunity.

‘I request you now to consider of Peniche in the view mentioned in the second instance by the Secretary of State in the enclosed dispatch, viz., as a post to be permanently occupied by His Majesty’s troops; and I request you to report to me your opinion what improvements and additions it would be desirable, and would be practicable, to make to the existing works, and their expense; and what ordnance and stores the place would require in its improved state.

‘I conceive that a garrison of 5000 men, of which 2000, including artillery, should be British troops, would be fully sufficient for this place. I beg you to let me know whether you concur in this opinion.

‘It will be desirable that these troops should be in barracks, the expense and means of constructing which, in a permanent and a temporary way, I request you likewise to consider.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from the Secretary of State, relative to Peniche.

‘Your letter to me of the 26th October, 1809, of which His Majesty’s Government have a copy, contains your opinion of Peniche as a place of embarkation for the army; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will communicate your opinion to me, or to the Secretary of State, in

respect to the permanent occupation of that post, in the view stated by the Earl of Liverpool.

‘There appears no doubt that communication could at all times be held with the shipping from the north or the south side of the Peninsula, excepting during the prevalence of the gales from the westward; and the points for consideration would appear to be the anchorage; the influence of the Berlingas upon the anchorage; or the protection which these islands could afford in the event of a gale from the westward; the possibility of anchoring under the shelter of the Peninsula, either north or south of it, out of reach of the enemy’s fire.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*
‘*the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

‘I am concerned to be obliged to make complaints of the Magistrates and people of this part of the country, of whose loyalty to their Prince, and zeal for his cause I have no doubt; but the contest has now come to that state, and the frontiers of the country are so seriously menaced, that something more than mere professions and goodwill are required on the part of the Magistrates and people; and either the Government must come forward and punish with rigor those who withhold the assistance they have it in their power to give to the armies, or my duty to the King will oblige me to withdraw his troops from the country, stating to the world my reasons for adopting this measure.

‘The enemy’s movements upon the frontier have induced me to concentrate the allied armies in a greater degree than they had been hitherto; and of course the subsistence of the troops, in a country already in some degree exhausted, becomes a subject of some difficulty and arrangement.

‘This difficulty is easily to be overcome, in consequence of the measures which had been previously adopted. There are not less than one million of rations belonging to the British army, and 300,000 belonging to the Portuguese army, on the Douro and the Mondego, within 14 leagues of the

army. There are not less than 40,000 carts, with bullocks, in the different districts of this part of Beira; and yet a sufficient number cannot be got for the public service upon this emergency, to move up the magazines to the army.

‘I enclose a letter which the Commissary General has received from the Magistrate at Lamego upon this subject. The Magistrate at Trancoso, mentioned in this letter, has already given me cause of dissatisfaction with him.

‘I beg you to communicate this letter to the Portuguese Government, and to inform them that if the troops cannot be subsisted in advance, I shall withdraw them to the magazines, and that eventually I shall withdraw them from the country altogether.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 6th April; and I now enclose a report made by Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, to the late Commander of the Forces, and a plan of Peniche. I likewise enclose an extract of a letter which I had written on the 3rd of April to Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, directing him to proceed to put that place in a state of defence; and his report to me of the 16th of April, in answer to that communication.

‘These papers will show your Lordship the state in which that place is at present, and in which it will be as a place of embarkation for the army; and the letter from Admiral Berkeley to me, of the 26th of October, 1809, enclosed in my dispatch to your Lordship of the 14th of November, 1809, will show the Admiral’s opinion upon Peniche in the same point of view.

‘Lieut. Colonel Fletcher’s report to Sir John Cradock states the number of men that would be required, as a rear guard to an army embarking at Peniche, to be 2000. It also states the common resources of the place; in addition to which I have directed that 100,000 rations of provisions might be deposited there, as a resource for the garrison which it might be deemed expedient to fix at Peniche, and

for the inhabitants and troops of Portugal whom it might be expedient to place there, till means could be provided for their removal.

‘From the perusal of these papers, His Majesty’s Government will be able to form some judgment of the existing and probable state of Peniche as a place of embarkation.

‘If this place is to be occupied permanently, it is probable that it would require, and might be capable of receiving, some further improvements than those which I have directed should be made to it. Upon this point I have called for a further report from Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, as well as for the accounts of the ordnance and stores which will be required for the permanent occupation of this post. The garrison for this post ought to be 5000 men, of which it would be advantageous that 2000, including artillery and engineers, should be British troops; and there ought to be a store of three months’ provisions, at least, for 5000 men, in the place, adverting to the impossibility of approaching the coast of Portugal with victuallers during the prevalence of the westerly winds.

‘Your Lordship will observe, from Lieut. Colonel Fletcher’s report, that if ships can approach the coast at all, they could always communicate with the land, on the north or on the south side of the Peninsula, according to the state of the wind, which communication might probably be deemed sufficient for the ordinary purposes of the garrison.

‘I propose, however, to request the Admiral to give a further opinion upon Peniche, in reference to the anchorage off the peninsula or the Berlingas.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, ‘Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

‘I have received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 5th of April.

‘I enclose a copy of the letter which I wrote on the 1st of April to Brigadier General Cox, containing the terms on which I was disposed to receive deserters from the French army. I have been particularly cautious respecting the enlistment of persons of this description in the corps of this

army; and none are taken who, or their families, are not known to some of the officers, non-commissioned officers, or privates already in the different corps.

‘The others of the German nation are sent to the depôt of the Hanoverian legion at Lymington; and the Italians, Swiss, Russians, Poles, &c., have been allowed to enlist into the York light infantry volunteers, at the request of Brigadier General Alexander Campbell, he being Colonel of that corps.

‘Some deserters, Germans as well as of other nations, have declined altogether to enlist into the King’s service; and these have been sent to England, with a letter to the Commandant of the depôt, stating that I had promised that means should be facilitated to them for their return to their own countries. In the mean time, till these means shall be found, your Lordship will observe that they are to be paid, and in every respect treated as British soldiers.

‘The great impediment to desertion is the danger of being murdered, which all soldiers of the French army incur in Spain, when they wander from their quarters, and are found singly, or in small bodies, by the inhabitants of the country. This impediment was in some degree removed in the last year, by the offer of a reward, by General Cuesta, for every soldier of the French army brought in by the peasantry; and it is probable that the same measure would produce the same effects at present. The reward, however, must be offered by some person whose character is known in the country, and in whom the people have confidence; but unfortunately there are none of that description in this part of Spain.

‘The desertion, however, from the foreign corps in the French army is considerable at present; and I understand that many join the guerrillas in the country, and therefore that we cannot be aware of its exact amount. The loss of the enemy in this manner might certainly be increased by judicious measures adopted by active agents, belonging to the same countries with these soldiers, in the way of communication with them, and conveying to them information of the terms on which they will be received, and of the different routes by which they might move to a place of safety, when they could escape from the French.

‘ But this is a service of serious danger to the person who undertakes it. I do not think the employment of officers in the manner proposed by your Lordship would answer, as the enemy would immediately discover their stations, and would cut off all communication between their foreign corps and the stations in which these agents should have fixed themselves.

‘ It is best that the deserters should be received wherever they can reach a post of the allied armies, and be conveyed from thence to the sea coast, which is the mode at present arranged for the conduct of this business.

‘ I have requested Admiral Berkeley to forward to your Lordship an account of the vessels in the Tagus, as required by your Lordship’s dispatch of the 5th instant, as I have not the information to enable me to forward it. I understand, however, that there is transport tonnage sufficient to embark the whole British army, with its ordnance and stores, and 2000 horses, besides the men of war in the river.

‘ I have already informed your Lordship that there are several Portuguese vessels in the Tagus which might be employed in the embarkation either of individuals of the Portuguese nation, if His Majesty’s Government should think it proper to encourage a general emigration, or the Portuguese army. It is necessary, however, that these vessels should be previously prepared, in whatever way it may be deemed proper to employ them; and it is desirable that His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon should be instructed upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 2nd May, 1810.

‘ I received in the night your letter of the 1st.

‘ There is no doubt that we might now raise the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo; but the success of the operation would answer no purpose. The enemy’s artillery and means for the siege are still at Salamanca, and the question whether we should be able to get possession of them is the same as it was a fortnight ago. I am convinced that we should not be able to pass the Tormes before Ney could

bring upon us a much larger force than I have ; particularly now that the siege of Astorga is finished.

‘ I send you the return of Victor’s corps of last year, in which you will see the organization of a French corps. It is, in fact, an army composed of divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions, with its cavalry, staff, commissariat, artillery, engineers, &c., complete. You will also observe that the cavalry forms a complete division in the corps ; and although, for purposes of operation, parts of the cavalry may be attached at times to divisions of infantry, the division of infantry has no cavalry belonging to it.

‘ Of these corps there are in our front Ney’s, which was the third corps of the army in Spain ; Loison’s, which consists, with very few exceptions, of foreign troops ; Kellermann’s, which is the old sixth corps of the army in Spain, and was Bessières’ : this had in it in 1808 and the beginning of 1809, the Imperial Guards ; these were withdrawn early last year, and it had not been reinforced in infantry, unless by some of the conscripts lately arrived ; and Junot’s, or the eighth corps of the army in Spain, in Leon, and part of it at Valladolid. This corps has arrived since the beginning of the year.

‘ The corps complete is nearly 40,000 men. I should think that if these corps are averaged at about 15,000 or 16,000, it is the most they have. I should think Ney has 20,000, Loison had 14,000 : I reckon these two about 30,000. Junot brought into Spain 23,000, and I reckon his corps and Kellermann’s about 30,000 more.

‘ I have heard from Cadiz to the 23rd ; we have lost the Matagorda Fort, but the French have certainly weakened their force in front of Cadiz, and have reinforced their corps in Estremadura.

‘ Is the Agueda filled again by the rains ?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 2nd May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th of April, and I am much concerned that ———— should have dis-

pleased you. He has not made any application to me, but has written to me a letter stating what had happened to him, to which I have written him a short answer, to express my regret that he should have incurred your displeasure.

‘If he had applied to me I should have told him what is perfectly true, that I have nothing to do with him. I recommended him on public grounds only, because he was very active and useful, and gave great satisfaction to Captain Malcolm and Captain Bligh, as well as to the officers of the army when it landed in Portugal. But he can be of no use now if he does not give you satisfaction.

‘The loss of Matagorda is certainly a misfortune in a variety of ways. If, however, care has been taken to assemble within the inner harbour a sufficient quantity of craft to establish and secure the naval superiority there, it will not be of so much importance. If that has not been done, the Isla de Leon may be attacked in the rear as well as the front, and the whole line of communication will be open to attack, and I am afraid they will not be able to hold it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 2nd May, 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 27th and 28th ultimo. I agree entirely with you about the alterations in the Proclamation. Let us have it out soon. I hope it will be of use to us. You see that the plot is thickening about us; and if the affairs on the eastern side of the Peninsula do not excite a diversion in our favor, we shall soon have much upon our hands. You will see how matters stand in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of this date.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Celorico, 2nd May, 1810.

‘The movement which I informed your Lordship in my last dispatch of the 26th of April, that Lieut. General Hill

intended to make through the Sierra de San Mamed, had the desired effect of relieving General O'Donnell from the attack with which his position at Albuquerque was threatened. The enemy retired to his position at Merida, and General Hill returned on the 25th and 26th to Portalegre.

It appears that since that time General Regnier has received a reinforcement, said to be 4000 men, from Toledo, by the bridge of Arzobispo; and 4000 men arrived at Merida on the 26th of April, detached from Mortier's corps in Andalusia. They reconnoitred Badajoz, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 27th. The divisions of Generals Ballesteros and Contreras, of the Marques de la Romano's corps, are in the same positions at Aroche, and near Xerez de los Caballeros.

By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz it appears that the enemy have obtained possession of Fort Matagorda, having been able to bring upon that post a very heavy fire. I conclude that your Lordship will have received the detailed account of this event from Lieut. General Graham. I understand that the loss sustained in the attack of the enemy made upon this post was 15 rank and file killed, and 45 wounded. Lieut. Colonel Lefevre* was unfortunately killed by a cannon shot at the moment the post was evacuated.

The accounts from Cadiz tend to confirm the reports that the enemy have detached troops from Andalusia into Estremadura.

I received accounts on the night of the 26th of April, some hours after I had dispatched the courier with my last letter to your Lordship, that the enemy had broken up from the Tormes, and had approached Ciudad Rodrigo on the 25th, which place has been since invested on the right of the Agueda. As soon as I received those accounts, I gave directions for the movement of that part of the army which was in the rear to this place, and I arrived here on the 27th. General Slade's brigade of cavalry, which was on the south of the Tagus, has also been moved to Belmonte. The object of these movements is to enable me to collect a sufficient force in this quarter to attempt the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, if I should deem it expedient.

* Of the Royal Engineers.

‘ The enemy, probably prevented by the rain which has fallen since the 26th, has not made any movement of importance since that day. They have not invested Ciudad Rodrigo on the left of the Agueda, nor have they moved from Salamanca any of the ordnance or other equipments which they had been for some time collecting at that place for this siege.

‘ Since my arrival here I have learnt that Astorga had surrendered on the 22nd; and this event, which renders disposable the corps which had been employed in the attack of Astorga, was probably the immediate cause of the movement of the enemy to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ His Majesty’s Government will have received from the King’s Minister at Cadiz the accounts of the successes of the Spaniards on the eastern side of the Peninsula, which have ended in the relief of Tarragona, and the retreat of Augereau’s corps, with the loss of some detachments, upon Barcelona.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters to the 30th of April. The plot seems to thicken on us in some degree, but, with prudent management and decision, I do not doubt that we shall get through our difficulties.

‘ I have read over all my letters to you, and it does not occur to me that it is necessary to give you any further instructions. If any point occurs to you on which you think you are not fully instructed, or you entertain any doubts, let me know it, and I will communicate to you my opinion immediately; and if you are obliged to act in any manner without waiting for my opinion, do so with confidence that I have every disposition to approve of every thing you do.

‘ I consider all the letters which I have written to you, although in a private form, to convey official instructions and authority upon every point to which they relate.

‘ I think that you will have Mortier’s corps in Estremadura immediately. Even with this reinforcement they cannot take

any of the strong places, nor touch you, till they shall have destroyed the Marques de la Romana; nor do I think they can turn your right flank.

‘I entirely approve of your movement to aid General O'Donnell, and I shall approve of any thing of the same kind upon a future occasion. Recollect, however, that your cavalry is not the best, and do not adventure too much in the plains. I shall order the 13th light dragoons, however, to join you.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd April, enclosing the copy of that which you had written on the 20th to the Secretary of State.

‘My opinion is, that the Government and the Commander in Chief did not intend that the corps stationed at Cadiz should be considered as an integral part of this army, although it was placed under my general directions by the Secretary of State. This is probable from several articles in the instructions you received from the Secretary of State; and quite clear from those which you received from the Commander in Chief. I also think it probable that Government intended to leave to your discretion to act according to the instructions I had given to Major General Stewart, and to adhere to the conditions which I had made when I detached a British corps to Cadiz, or not, as you might think proper; as, although they must have received copies of all those papers before you left England, the instructions to you were not altered, nor, I believe, were copies of the papers received from me transmitted to you.

‘From all this I conclude that Government intended to leave to the decision of the general officer on the spot all those matters referred to in your instructions. Under these circumstances, and particularly having made known to the Secretary of State my doubts whether the corps at Cadiz was to be considered part of this army, before I had seen the instructions you received from the Commander in Chief, I cannot take upon me to decide that it is a part of this army,

and that its details are to be conducted in a particular manner, different from that in which it appears it was intended in England that they should be conducted.

‘ After all, I do not think it signifies much in what way they are conducted, excepting as the decision on this question involves another point to which I shall refer presently, viz., your own situation in this army.

‘ Whatever might be the degree of the control and responsibility which the Government and Commander in Chief might think it proper I should have in the affairs at Cadiz, I should always have thought it proper to give you my opinion upon any thing on which I thought it desirable you should have it ; and, on the other hand, if the corps at Cadiz had been part of this army, I should have hesitated long, before I should have adopted my own opinion in preference to yours.

‘ The question then comes to be a mere matter of form, upon which an early decision is not necessary ; and it is as well that the authorities in England should decide as that I should.

‘ The decision is important only in view to your own situation in this army. I have certainly long wished that you should be employed with this army ; at the same time that a regard to the feelings of Sir John Sherbrooke, whose situation you would fill, and a sense of justice to that officer, with whose conduct I had every reason to be satisfied, induced me to wish that you should not arrive in Portugal till the time beyond which he had stated that his health would not allow him to remain, and at which he had settled to go home. Your appointment to Cadiz has interfered with this arrangement ; and the decision which separates the corps at Cadiz from the army in Portugal separates you from it likewise, and would prevent you from taking your station in this army if the service should offer prospects more agreeable to you, or opportunities in which you could serve the public of greater moment than those which the situation of affairs at Cadiz should offer.

‘ That is the only reason for which I think it desirable that the corps at Cadiz should be an integral part of this army.

‘ In respect to the other point adverted to in your letter

to the Secretary of State, viz., whether you should continue at Cadiz or join the army in Portugal, supposing the corps at Cadiz were considered part of the army in Portugal, I think it depends much upon your own feelings, and upon the situation of affairs at Cadiz. I do not think the service in this country is likely to hold out a prospect of any thing very brilliant: I must maintain myself on the Peninsula till it is necessary to withdraw from it; and when it is necessary to withdraw, I must carry off the army without disgrace, and without loss, if possible.

‘In the war in which we are engaged, no man can pretend to say how long it will last, or what may be its events and circumstances; or in what manner they may influence the share and interest which Great Britain has in the contest.

‘On the other hand, the state of affairs at Cadiz is highly interesting, not only to the Peninsula, but to Great Britain and to the world. You may render the most important services there; and to withdraw you from that place might shake the confidence and damp the spirits of the Spanish Government and of the people of the town, upon whose exertions the defence and ultimate safety of the place must in a great measure depend. However desirable, therefore, it might be to me that you should be in Portugal, I cannot but think that it would be most advantageous to the public interests that you should remain at Cadiz, at least as long as that place is seriously threatened by the enemy.

‘I beg to refer you to my letter to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Doyle.

‘SIR, ‘Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 24th February, 1st and 3rd of March, and Mr. Wellesley has also sent me a copy of your letter of the 12th of April. I hope you have received Lieut. Fitz Roy Somerset’s letter of the 27th February, regarding deserters from the enemy, and I beg to know how many you have sent, and to what places you have sent them, under the directions contained in that letter.

‘I have received an answer to the reference which I had made to the Secretary of State on the subject of your raising a regiment from the deserters of the French army; and his Lordship not only objects to your proposal, but objects to admitting deserters into the British service in any manner or upon any terms. However, any engagements into which you may have entered, under any former orders, shall be carried into execution, and the men shall be treated as British soldiers, shall be sent to England, and, if then discharged from the service, they shall have the means facilitated to them of returning to their own countries.

‘I enclose the copy of my letter to General Cox, on the terms to be held out to deserters; and I desire that you will in future hold out the same terms. You may provide clothing and necessaries to any that may require these articles for their voyage to Gibraltar, Lisbon, or England; and I request that you will send me an account of all the expenses you may incur on this account, which shall be paid.

‘Astorga surrendered on the 22nd, for want of ammunition, and the enemy are in possession of the Asturias. They have collected a train of artillery at Salamanca for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and since the fall of Astorga they have invested Ciudad Rodrigo on the right of the Agueda, but the place is still open on the left of that river.

‘I have collected the British army in this quarter, in order to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should be possible.

‘The corps of Ney, Loison, and Kellermann, are in Old Castille, and that of Junot in Leon. Mortier and Regnier (who commands Soult’s corps) are in Estremadura. The Marques de la Romana has his head quarters at Badajoz, and his army, about 14,000 men, has its right in the Sierra Morena, at Aroche, and its left at Alburquerque; and Lieut. General Hill, with a British and Portuguese corps, is at Portalegre.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Doyle.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY, ‘Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 23rd instant, and I now return those which you had received from Colonel

Doyle, and were desirous of having again. One fact appears tolerably certain, and that is, the retreat of the enemy on Barcelona. It is to be hoped that this event may induce them to detach from this quarter, where they are collecting an enormous force.

Since I wrote to you on the 29th I have heard of the surrender of Astorga on the 22nd, for want of ammunition. This event was obviously the immediate cause of the movement of the 24th and 25th on Ciudad Rodrigo, and it is probable that Junot's corps, as well as Ney's, and Loison's, and Kellermann's, will be upon our hands.

The enemy had not collected any larger force near Ciudad Rodrigo as late as yesterday, and the heavy artillery had not been moved from Salamanca. The enemy have received reinforcements in Estremadura. A corps of about 4000 men have entered that province by the bridge of Arzobispo from Toledo, and 4000 men of Mortier's corps have come through the Sierra Morena from Seville.

As the corps before Cadiz is weakened, I conclude that the whole of Mortier's corps will be in Estremadura, and that part of the corps hitherto before Cadiz will be stationed at Seville. I have had accounts from the Marques de la Romana of the state of the garrisons in Estremadura, and of his own army. He also tells me that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23rd, which cannot be true.

Ever yours most affectionately,

The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley. WELLINGTON.

I am not certain that _____ will not make a good Governor of the Balearic Islands, only that he will keep us out of them entirely. He is not unlikely to make them an independent sovereignty for himself.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Celorico, 5th May, 1810.

I delayed answering your letter of the 2nd, till I should have an opportunity of communicating with Marshal Beresford, upon the proposition which it contains for an augmentation of the ration to the Portuguese troops.

You have been misinformed regarding the price paid for meat by the Portuguese Government. Their contract price is 120 reas per pound, instead of 40 reas, as you suppose it

is; and of course the soldier will be unable to pay 60 reas a day for an extra half pound of meat, even on those days on which he receives 20 reas from the Government instead of wine.

‘ Knowing, as I do, the distresses of the Portuguese Government, and the difficulties under which they have labored in forming this meat contract, at a price so much exceeding the natural price of the country, and that which we pay, I cannot think of urging them to incur any additional expense on this head.

‘ I know, likewise, that whatever we may think of their ration, the people of this country deem half a pound of meat as much as a man ought to eat; and the majority of the people of the country, even of those who do eat meat, do not eat so much.

‘ However, the situation of the Portuguese troops may be such, at times, as to require a larger allowance than their ration, to which it is certainly understood that an addition is to be made by the soldier, by purchases of his own in the market; and Marshal Beresford and I have settled an arrangement which will give the soldier this additional allowance, at an expense which he can afford to pay, without any increase of expense to the Government.

‘ It is the Marshal’s opinion, in which I concur, that when the Portuguese troops receive their wine in any situation, three quarters of a pound of meat are sufficient for each man; when they do not receive their wine, they may require, and may have, a pound of meat; and in that case they will be able to pay for the additional half pound.

‘ They will have to pay for a quarter of a pound of meat three halfpence, or something more than 20 reas, and for half a pound of meat three pence. The sum they will pay for the quarter of a pound may be supposed to be about equal to what they would lay out in the market, if they had a market to resort to; and when they do not receive wine, they have an allowance nearly equal to what they will have to pay for the second quarter of a pound of meat.

‘ Thus this object will be accomplished: Marshal Beresford will send directions to the Commissaries and the Commanding Officers of the corps upon this subject.

‘ Mr. Murray has communicated to me a letter of the 1st

instant from Mr. Shaw*, your aide de camp, to Mr. Downie, directing that the Portuguese Commissaries attached to the Portuguese battalions should no longer be employed with the battalions to which they are attached, but in the general Commissariat business of the division.

I have no doubt whatever that the whole of the Commissariat arrangements of both the British and the Portuguese army might be very much improved; and one of the improvements would doubtless be to place the whole under one regulation, and an unity of superintendence. Unfortunately, however, the orders of our own Government, and various other considerations,—some political, others military, and others financial,—do not allow of this amalgamation. All that can be done is, that we should assist each other as much, and clash as little, as possible: and arrangements have been made by me to provide for those objects, and directions have been given by the Commissary General to his deputies and assistants to carry those arrangements into execution.

Nothing can be more advantageous to me, or can give me more satisfaction, than to receive the assistance of your opinion upon any subject; but you may depend upon it there are few of the general arrangements of the army which have not been maturely considered by me; and that, although some inconveniences may attend some of them, they are the smallest that, after full consideration, it was found would attend any arrangement of the subjects to which those arrangements relate. I request, therefore, that whenever you see reason to wish to make any alteration, you will let me know it; but do not make the alteration without reference to me.

Believe me, &c.

Brig. General R. Craufurd. WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

MY DEAR BERESFORD, Celorico, 5th May, 1810.

I enclose the letter which I have written to General Craufurd, and which I beg of you to return to me, so that it may go off to Almeida by the *parte* to-morrow.

* Lieutenant Colonel Shaw Kennedy, then Lieutenant of the 43rd Light Infantry.

‘ The way in which this will be arranged will be as follows: You will direct your Commissaries to make requisitions upon ours for as many half pounds or pounds as they will require to make this extra issue of meat, for which the Portuguese Government will have to pay at the rate of 6d. per lb.

‘ You will settle the mode in which the Government are to recover from the troops the sums which they will have to pay for their quarter of a pound of meat.

‘ I think that you should not give this allowance to all the troops. First, those ought to have it who have no market to resort to; Secondly, on days of march; Thirdly, on days of action, or of active employment against the enemy. Those in their quarters, who have a market to resort to, ought not to receive an extra allowance, whether they receive wine or not.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I send the copy instead of the original letter, which you can return at any time to-morrow.’

To the Secretary of the Treasury.

‘ SIR, Celorico, 5th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copies of a correspondence which I have had with Messrs. John Bulkeley and Son, regarding some transactions between Mr. Francis Charles Philips, a person in whose favor I addressed you on the 12th of March, and a Mr. Livingstone, of Malta, relating to certain quantities of grain purchased for the use of the army.

‘ In case their Lordships should have complied with the recommendation contained in my letter of the 12th of March, in favor of Mr. Philips, and should have answered me accordingly, I shall defer taking any steps regarding it till I shall have received their decision upon the papers now enclosed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of the Treasury?* WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR, Celorico, 6th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2nd.

I concur entirely in the idea of your paper, on the embarkation of those who are to embark. It is well calculated to give order to what would naturally be very confused. I think, however, that the arrangements which it proposes should be carried into execution at different periods. First, the ships in the river should be prepared for the reception of passengers, with water, provisions, &c. Secondly, the stations for each of them in the river should be fixed. Thirdly, the number of boats attached to each ship should be fixed, and what boats. All the boats in the river are already numbered and registered for other objects. All these arrangements are preparatory, and their object might be kept secret. Then comes the execution. First, to order the vessels to their stations; Secondly, to give the orders for passage to those obliged or inclined to depart from the country.

The other objects of your paper are relative to police, and are highly desirable.

I doubt the communication with the Berlingas; but this is a naval point, upon which we shall have more light soon, in consequence of some communication which I have lately had with the Admiral.

When I went to Setuval, it was a dark and foggy day, and the reconnaissance which I was able to make of the place was very imperfect. Fletcher has since looked at it, and he does not think he could make it a secure place of embarkation without much work, which it would require 10,000 men to occupy. These could not be spared. Setuval is the best harbour in Portugal for small vessels, and for an unmolested embarkation; but the difficulty of protecting the embarkation, and the subsequent egress of the ships, would render it impossible to use this harbour as I had proposed.

In respect to military law, the subjection of the country to that system of rule is a consideration of a very different description from that of the improvements suggested by Beresford for the proceedings for the military jurisprudence of the country. There is no doubt of the evil of which he complains. The remedy is not quite so clear. I am not well

acquainted with the subject; but it appears to me that the proceedings of the Courts Martial are conducted on the principles of the civil law courts; that the documents are very voluminous; there is seldom any oral testimony in court; and the court decide upon a perusal of the documents and of the testimony which has generally been taken, not before the court, but by the Judge Advocate.

‘It is difficult to point out a remedy for these defects. The proceedings of a Court Martial must be founded on, in a great measure, and analogous to, the proceedings of the other courts of law; and I certainly do not understand the subject sufficiently, nor have I leisure to give my attention to understand it sufficiently, to suggest a remedy for the evil which certainly exists.

‘There is no news. The French have made no movements, and have certainly been prevented by the rains. Part of Junot’s corps, it is said, is gone towards Valladolid.

‘I am much afraid that we shall be in serious distress for provisions. The carts are not yet come forward; and we have nearly eat up what we brought up with us.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 6th May, 1810.

‘I think it will be very desirable to send some person to Algiers; but it ought to be a Portuguese, and I do not know any one whom I could recommend to you. It will also be well to send Mr. Casamajor with a letter from you, and both in a King’s ship. The Government at home must, however, interfere in this business with a very strong hand.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Don Andres Herrasti, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.*

(EXTRACT.)

‘Celorico, 7th May, 1810.

‘I shall always be happy to have it in my power to render your Excellency and the city of Ciudad Rodrigo assistance;

* The original draft of this letter is missing from the Duke of Wellington’s papers;—this extract was sent to the Secretary of State, from whose office it has been copied.

and the allied army under my command is at present in a situation from which it can move to the aid of Ciudad Rodrigo, if circumstances should permit me to do so. Your Excellency must, however, be aware that the protection of that place is not the only object intrusted to me, and that I must use the means which I have in my power with that prudence and circumspection which the situation of affairs requires.

‘Don Andres Herrasti.’ WELLINGTON.

To His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.

SIR, Celorico, 7th May, 1810.

‘I had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness’s letter of the 30th March; and although I had not heard of the arrival in the Peninsula of Major —, Captain —, and —, I immediately endeavored to find the means of giving them employment when they should arrive.

‘A very general prejudice against German officers and troops prevails throughout the Peninsula; and I think it very doubtful whether I shall be able to prevail upon any of the Spanish authorities to employ these officers; and if I should, I fear that the officers will have but too much reason to complain of the treatment which they will receive. I therefore considered it advisable to endeavor in the first instance to employ them in the Portuguese service, and I communicated with Marshal Beresford upon the subject, and I now enclose his answer. I must add to it, that I am perfectly aware of the objections to which he refers, in giving employment to any foreign officers in the Portuguese service; and I have already been obliged to send some back to England.

Your Royal Highness may depend upon my doing every thing in my power to prevail upon the Spanish Government to employ these officers, and to make their situation as advantageous and agreeable to them as circumstances will admit.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.’ WELLINGTON.

The original draft of this letter is missing from the Duke of Wellington's papers;—this extract was sent in the Secretary of State, from whose office it has been copied.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday’s date, to which I will send an answer as soon as I shall have seen the Commissary General.

‘ Regnier has again withdrawn towards Truxillo, and Mortier’s corps has fallen back upon Monasterio and the Sierra Morena.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I beg you to send the enclosed to Captain Jenkinson.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have seen the Commissary General, who will be glad to see and will consider the regulations which you had proposed to adopt for the commissariat duties with the British troops under your command.

‘ The commissariat duties of the Portuguese troops must be conducted by the Portuguese commissaries; and if you employ these gentlemen upon other more extensive duties, it is obvious that their duty with the Portuguese troops must be done by British commissaries or others.

‘ An arrangement has been made under which all clashing of the two commissariats can be avoided, and we can give them the assistance of our magazines, which they must from time to time require; and the Commissary General has directed his commissaries to carry this arrangement into execution.

‘ I believe there will be no difficulty in executing this arrangement, if the orders given are strictly obeyed; and none in providing the troops, if there is money on the spot to pay for their provisions. No regulation or activity can make up for the deficiency of money.

‘ I am perfectly aware of the quantities of papers and vouchers required by the Auditors of accounts. This difficulty comes in my way at every step; and I declare it to be my opinion that no one department of the service is formed for an extended system of operations abroad. But unfortunately I must adhere to rules and regulations formed

by my superiors, and a great part of my time is spent in endeavors to discover expedients for carrying on the service in a manner that is consistent with the rules and regulations.

I have no doubt also that there is great inexperience, and many faults in the execution of the detail of their duty by the officers of the commissariat: it cannot be otherwise. But adverting to the mode in which it is necessary at times to divide the component parts of a division,—I should doubt the expediency of the division of the duties among the officers of the commissariat, attached to such a body of troops, in the manner proposed by you, in every instance. However, I shall peruse what you propose with all the attention it deserves, and you may depend upon it that I am not prejudiced on the subject.

Believe me, &c.

Brig. General

WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Lieut. General Hill.

MY DEAR HILL,

Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

I enclose a paper which I have just received from Colonel Framingham. Of course I can have no objection to any increase of ammunition with your division which you may think necessary; but I am afraid that you will find yourself crippled for provisions, if you employ so many mules in the carriage of ammunition. The principle on which I have regulated this branch of the service lately has been to move with the brigade of artillery attached to each division a certain proportion; and to have a reserve in some fixed depôt.

I considered the depôt at Elvas and the Portuguese ammunition at Abrantes as the reserves for your corps; and of course, if you were likely to have occasion to consume any ammunition, you would order a part of the reserve from one of those places to be put in motion, and you would communicate with it by means of your mules, which would go quicker than the cars. If you do not think the Portuguese ammunition in Abrantes sufficient for you, I can easily have a reserve of British ammunition placed there for you.

Believe me, &c.

Lieut. General Hill.

WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

‘ I received only this morning your letter of the 2nd May, and I am very sensible of the confidence you have reposed in me, in communicating to me the offer made to you of the command at Plymouth, and of the kindness towards me, which has induced you to decline to accept of it. I only hope that it may not prove injurious to your interests.

‘ I assure you that I am perfectly satisfied with all the arrangements for the embarkation of the army. Every thing is prepared for us either to go or stay; and I have no doubt that if we should be obliged or ordered to quit, the embarkation will be made with the utmost order, and with requisite celerity.

‘ I am obliged to you for placing the Herring at Figueira. I do not see any immediate prospect of having to send an officer to England.

‘ The French are in the same positions. But I imagine that their inactivity is to be attributed to the rains, which have fallen very generally, and swelled the rivers and destroyed the roads in Castille.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Bunbury, Under Secretary of State.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 9th May, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of articles applied for by the Quarter Master General at the periods therein stated, and I request that they may be sent out to this country with as little delay as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bunbury.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 9th May, 1810.

‘ The enemy have continued in their position in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo without any material alteration till yesterday morning, when they moved from thence to the northward, to Val de Carros. I have not

heard yet whether they continued their movement to the northward, or resumed their position near Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ The rain continued till within the last two days, and the rivers were still full by the last accounts; and the enemy had not moved the heavy cannon from Salamanca.

‘ The French destroyed the works of Astorga after that place had surrendered; and it does not appear that they have endeavored to make any further progress in Galicia.

‘ A part of the corps of Junot, which was employed in the siege of Astorga, has moved into the Asturias, and it is reported that the larger part have returned into Old Castille.

‘ The enemy’s corps which had arrived in Estremadura from Andalusia, have again retired upon Monasterio and to the Sierra Morena, in the beginning of this month; and General Regnier remained, with that part of the troops which were under his immediate command, in the neighbourhood of Merida. Some of the cavalry had been thrown back upon Truxillo.

‘ The allied troops on both sides of the Tagus are in the same positions as when I addressed you on the 2nd.

‘ I have not heard from Cadiz since the 23rd of last month.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, Celorico, 9th May, 1810.

‘ I addressed you on the 20th of October, 1809, regarding Colonel Trant, and received a letter from your Lordship in reply to mine above referred to, dated the 14th of November, 1809, from which I had understood that it was the intention of the Commander in Chief that this officer should continue to hold his situation on the Staff, while employed in Portugal.

‘ He is a permanent assistant in the office of the Quarter Master General, from which situation I am informed that it is the intention of the Quarter Master General to remove him, if he should not relinquish his situation in Portugal.

‘ I beg to refer your Lordship to my former letters in favor of Colonel Trant. Since that time, having been nearer the place at which Colonel Trant is stationed, I must

add that there is no officer the loss of whose services in this country would be more sensibly felt by the Government and the people, and Marshal Beresford and myself, than those of Colonel Trant.

‘Your Lordship is aware of the uncertainty of the tenure of his employment here, and you must be sensible how severe it would be upon him to require that he alone, of all the British officers allowed by His Majesty to serve the Prince Regent, should be called upon now to make an option between his employment in England, and the situation which he holds in Portugal.

‘I therefore request your Lordship’s further protection of Colonel Trant, that he may not lose his commission of permanent Assistant in the Quarter Master General’s department.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

‘On my return from Pinhel last night, I received your letter of the 10th, and I shall be glad to see you, as there are two or three points upon which I wish to speak to you.

‘Bring over my letter regarding the increase of pay, and it shall be altered as you desire.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 6th. I write to let you know that I have desired Fane to go into the Alentejo to take the command of the English and Portuguese cavalry in that province, which arrangement will, I hope, be agreeable to you.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘There is nothing new in this quarter.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your dispatch (No. 7) of the 25th, and those marked Nos. 8, 9, and separate, of the 28th of April.

‘ The existence of the difficulties in making any exertion or arrangement at Cadiz, for the security of the place to which you refer, is very distressing; and I am concerned that you meet with them. But the character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war: they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy, by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people among them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and, instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations, which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will, at last, become fatigued with the succession of their disasters, which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.

‘ It is a curious circumstance, that the same post which brought your letters (which I am now acknowledging) brought one from General Castaños to a gentleman here, in which he states that he has no doubt that the enemy will soon retire from the Peninsula!

‘ I am convinced that the enemy will, by this time, have tried the effect of the bombardment of Cadiz from the Trocadero, or that he will try that measure very shortly; and unless the Government should be very firm, the surprise which it will occasion among the people, who have not been taught to expect it, may have the worst effects.

‘ I concur entirely in your detaining Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby.

‘ I was sorry to be obliged to call away so many officers

and men of the 87th regiment ; but it was upon the trial of an officer upon a charge of forcing a sentry, and I could not refuse to call those as evidences whom he thought necessary for his defence. He has certainly availed himself of the indulgence which I might be disposed to extend to a person in his unfortunate situation, by calling persons from England, as well as from all parts of the Peninsula, including Mr. Villiers, the King's late Minister at Lisbon, and myself, who could have no knowledge of any facts connected with his alleged offence. He is now sick ; but if he should not recover at an early period, so as to enable the Court Martial to proceed with the trial, I shall send the witnesses back, and defer the trial to some future opportunity.

‘ I beg leave to refer you to my letter to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the situation of affairs here.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th. I observe that the Minister, Dom Miguel Forjaz, considers the inconveniencies on which I had the honor of addressing you as of ordinary occurrence ; and he entertains no doubt that inconveniencies of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require.

‘ It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food ; and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it ; and whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused, or been unable to remove to the army.

‘ This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country ; and however trifling the difficulty may be

deemed by the Regency and the ministers, I conceive a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position, or to make any movement, in which the food of the troops is not secured.

‘ I have no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the Government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties, rather than to their private interests in this time of trial.

‘ I have written this same sentiment to the Government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty; and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times.

‘ Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is in vain to expect any serious or continued exertions in the country; and the Regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of His Majesty’s Government, which I have communicated to them, that the continuance of His Majesty’s assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause.

‘ I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties that I had stated to exist were noticed by Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘ I have to mention, however, that since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary.

‘ I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a Special Commission to attend the head quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay.

‘ I enclose a Proclamation I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes merely the crimes, or rather the omissions of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follows :—

‘ First; Refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen when required.

‘ Secondly; Refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy.

‘ Thirdly; Disobedience of the orders of the magistrates, to proceed to and remain at any station, with carriages, boats, &c.

‘ Fourthly; Desertion from the service, either with or without carriages, &c.

‘ Fifthly; Embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport.

‘ The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows :—

‘ First; Disobedience of the orders of their superiors.

‘ Secondly; Inactivity in the execution of them.

‘ Thirdly; Receiving bribes to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Quartier Général, à Valladolid, le 12 Mai, 1810.
To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 24th April, which I imagine came by the Comus.

‘ I believe that there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at Madrid. The French have, however, certainly met with a check on the eastern side of the Peninsula. On this side, affairs remain nearly in the same situation since I wrote to you last. The weather has been very bad, and the French have been unable either to move their guns from Salamanca, to Ciudad Rodrigo, or to cross the Agueda so as to invest the place, and they have rather weakened their force in front of it than otherwise.

‘ A great part of Junot’s corps, it is said, is gone to Valladolid. It is reported at Valladolid that Massena is com-

ing to command the army to be employed against this country, and that a General La Martinière is coming with 20,000 more men. The same desultory operations are going on in Estremadura; and I think that the French intend to make an attack upon the right divisions of the Marques de la Romana's corps at Xerez de los Caballeros, &c.

'I should be very glad, at any time, to see Alava, who is a very good fellow. I do not know, however, in what manner I could employ him. General Castaños might wish to have him here to send intelligence to the Spanish Government, to which I could have no objection, though we have an officer here still (Colonel O'Lalor) who was employed by Cuesta, I believe, for the same purpose.

'Ever yours most affectionately,

'*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Cox.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Celorico, 12th May, 1810*.

'I am much concerned that the post does not arrive in proper time at Almeida, which is entirely owing to the negligence of the boys who carry it.

'It leaves this place at eleven precisely; the distance is

* 'ORDRE DU JOUR.

'Quartier Général, à Valladolid, le 12 Mai, 1810.

'Le 2^e, 6^e, et 8^e corps sont prévenus que Monsieur le Maréchal Masséna, Duc de Rivoli, Prince d'Essling, en prend le Commandement en Chef, par décret impérial du 17 Avril dernier, sous le nom d'Armée de Portugal.

'Le Prince a aussi le commandement des provinces du Nord de l'Espagne; savoir la Vieille Castille, la province de Soria, la province de Santander, les Asturies, la province de Leon et celle de Valladolid, Palencia, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca, et Avila.

'Le Général de division Fririon est nommé Chef de l'état Major Général, et le Général de division, Eblé, du Commandement de l'Artillerie de l'Armée, par décret impérial du 21 du même mois. Le Quartier Général de M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling est provisoirement établi à Valladolid.

'Le Général de division, Chef de l'Etat Major Général,

'FRIRION.

'SOLDATS!—Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, en me confiant le commandement de son Armée de Portugal, a voulu m'associer à la gloire que vous allez acquérir dans la nouvelle expedition pour laquelle vous êtes destinés. Vous savez, Soldats, que la discipline et l'obeissance sont les premiers garants de la victoire; quels obstacles résisteront à votre valeur, quand une subordination rigoureuse aura préparé vos succès! Vous trouverez toujours dans ma conduite, et dans mes camarades, vos Chefs, l'exemple de la perseverance dans les difficultés. Vos

not eight leagues, and it might reasonably be expected that it would reach Almeida before eight in the evening.

‘ I have desired the Postmaster to give positive directions upon this subject, which shall be enforced by punishment, if necessary. It would be inconvenient to alter the hour of departure from hence, as the *poste* now carries to General Picton and General Craufurd all the orders of the day, which he could not do if he were to go at an earlier hour. If he cannot arrive in time by starting at eleven, it is better that he should leave this at night, and arrive at Almeida early in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 12th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, directing that certain horse transports may be sent to Falmouth, and certain infantry transports to Portsmouth; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will direct that the orders of the Secretary of State may be carried into execution.

‘ It is desirable that the Agent, in selecting the ships to be sent on this service, may send those in which none of the baggage belonging to the troops is embarked.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 12th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received this day from the Secretary of State, and I beg to be favored with your opinion, whether the retention of the Bugio, supposing that it should be practicable to put that fort in a state to be retained by a British force, would be useful to

fatigues, vos privations, et vos perils nous seront communs, ainsi que le résultat glorieux que S. M. attend du devouement de ses braves de l’Armée de Portugal.

‘ Le Maréchal Duc de Rivoli, Commandant en Chef l’Armée de Portugal.

‘ MASSÉNA.

the British navy, or detrimental to the enemy in the event of his obtaining possession of the Tagus.

‘ In view to a retention and relief of the fort, it would be desirable to have your opinion on the practicability of communicating with it from the vessels, which, it is supposed, would be employed in the blockade of the Tagus.

‘ You will observe, that His Majesty’s Government have adverted to the occupation of the Bayona islands, and I propose to forward, by the first opportunity, to the Secretary of State, the letters which I have received from you on that subject. I also write to the chief engineer, to ascertain whether he has any officer who could be spared from other services to examine those islands, and to determine upon their capacity for defence. If he should be able to detach one upon this service, I shall request you to send him to Vigo in a ship of war, accompanied by any officer of the navy whom you might think proper to select to co-operate in his labors.

‘ I also request to know from you, whether you have any information on any of the islands off Faro.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose a return of the provisions and stores in Ciudad Rodrigo, and a letter from the Junta.

‘ What they want principally is lead for musket balls; and I believe that there is a great quantity which is useless at Almeida, and it might as well be sent to them. Will you send orders on the subject?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Marshal Beresford.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Sir N. Trant.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

‘ We are likely to suffer the greatest inconvenience from your having seized Mr. Patton at Agueda, who was making purchases there for the Commissary General. As I was so near, I think that it might have been as well if I had been

informed of the cause of complaint against Mr. Patton before he was seized.

‘ I beg that you will release this person, unless you have some very good cause to justify his detention, which you will state.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. General

Sir N. Trant;

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received letters and dispatches from England, which declare the intention of the King’s Government that the force at Cadiz should be considered as part of this army; and I request you to give directions to the heads of the several departments there, to report their proceedings to the heads of the departments in Portugal, and to correspond with them constantly.

‘ It will also be necessary that the warrants for the extraordinaries incurred at Cadiz should be signed by me; but in all other respects I request you to continue to carry on all matters as you have done hitherto, and to proceed with your arrangements in the same manner as if I had nothing to say to Cadiz, in the perfect confidence that I shall concur in them all.

‘ I enclose you an extract of a private letter from Lord Liverpool, in reference to your situation in this army; and I am happy to find that I had anticipated the wishes of Government in the consideration which I gave to this subject in my letter to you of the 3rd instant.

‘ I likewise enclose copies of letters received by Dr. Frank*. I apprehend that when the hot weather shall set in, and in the crowded state of Cadiz and the Isla, you will find the troops unhealthy, and possibly you may experience some difficulty in fixing upon a healthy situation for an hospital. I beg, therefore, to suggest for your consideration the expediency of fixing your principal hospital at Ceuta, which I am informed is a very healthy station, particularly during the great heats of the summer at Cadiz. If you should, upon consideration, adopt this suggestion, I can send you

* Inspector of Hospitals, and head of the Medical Department.

from the Tagus some hospital ships, to enable you to transport the sick and wounded from Cadiz to Ceuta.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th.

‘ I shall urge the early publication of the proclamation, when I shall receive Dom Miguel Forjaz’s letter upon that subject.

‘ It is very distressing to be obliged to give harsh answers to a person so highly respectable in himself, and for whom I entertain so much respect as I do for Dom Miguel Forjaz. But I must say that his note of the 8th, contained in your letter of the 9th, is neither more nor less than a falsehood. It is not true that the British troops in the neighbourhood of Almeida have drawn provisions from any Portuguese magazines. Let the Junta de Viveres name the magazine from which the provisions have been drawn. Nay, more, it is not true that Almeida is in want of provisions. By a return given to me no longer ago than yesterday, by Marshal Beresford, it appears there are provisions in that garrison (besides my magazine) for three months; and these provisions have been thrown in, in consequence of arrangements made by the Commissary General by my directions.

‘ The Portuguese Commissaries have experienced the same difficulty as we have experienced in the removal of their magazines upon the Mondego; but as the carts have now begun to come in, an arrangement has been made to give them their first share of them; and till the Portuguese troops can be supplied by their own Commissaries, they are to be supplied by ours.

‘ I have frequently represented to the Government the insufficiency of the Junta de Viveres. I suspect that they are not honest; and I have never yet seen a statement from them which did not contain a direct falsehood or a subterfuge. It is really distressing, that in addition to other difficulties we should have to contend with and refute the false reports of their useless establishments, which the Go-

vernment will support, notwithstanding every thing that has been urged against them.

‘ By a letter received from the Secretary of State of the 24th, it appears that it is intended to give the Portuguese Government £40,000 per mensem in addition to the £80,000. However, I conclude that you will hear from England upon this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.
‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose the letter and copy of the proclamation which I have received from Dom Miguel Forjaz, which is certainly very different from that which you had drawn and recommended to his consideration. I do not think it signifies much at what period that paper is published, as I am convinced it will have no effect.

‘ In my opinion, the fault of all these proclamations in the Peninsula has been, that the writers of them have followed the example of those published by the French during the revolution; and they have invariably flattered and deceived the people. What we want is: First, an exposition of their danger. Secondly, a reference to the existing means of resistance. Thirdly, an exposition of their own duties. Fourthly, an exhortation to perform them: and lastly, a declaration by the Government, that those who should not perform their duty would be punished without distinction of persons.

‘ This ought to be stated in plain language, without bombast, and ought, above all, to be short. But these “*Corir sobre os nossos Inimigos*” will only tend to increase the existing evils. Every man in Portugal is sufficiently alive to the danger, and is very anxious to avert it: there is plenty of enthusiasm; there are cries of “*Viva*” and illuminations, and patriotic songs and feasts every where: but that which is wanting, is the plain simple performance of his duty, each in his station, and obedience to order.

‘ These are my general objections to this paper. But besides these, I entertain objections to some of the phrases. In the first place, the abuse of the French in the first

paragraph is unbecoming in a proclamation published by a regular authority, such as the Regency, although it would do well enough for a Spanish Junta. Indeed, the whole paper is too much in imitation of those of the Junta. Then the term "*systema continental*" is ambiguous, and a term of that kind ought never to be used in a paper of this description. The continental system as contra-distinguished from the insular system, that is, preventing England from interfering in the continental politics, may be a very fit system of politics to be followed by the Portuguese nation; at all events, it may be a question. The continental system, as meant by Buonaparte, and as forced upon all Europe, means the destruction of all commerce excepting that which is carried on for the benefit of France. That cannot be a fit system for Portugal. But my objection to the expression is, that the meaning assigned to it by the writer of the proclamation may be misconstrued wilfully or otherwise, and misunderstood by those who shall read it.

'I send you these papers because I think you have not seen them before; and it may be desirable that you should have some discussion upon them with Dom Miguel Forjaz. If you have seen them, and think the proclamation is the best that they can produce, I shall answer the letter, stating that I think they ought to publish something of this description as soon as possible.

'Believe me, &c.

'Charles Stuart, Esq.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

'MY DEAR BERESFORD,

'Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

'I have just received your letter of the 13th. It is difficult to manage ——— in any respect, but particularly so in respect to the means of supplying his troops with provisions on the spot, where we cannot for the want of carriages supply him sufficiently from the rear. However, I shall write to him upon the subject of ———'s letter.

'I shall inquire respecting the complaints of the Corregidor of Viseu. I dare say that they are exaggerated. It is not impossible but that some money may be due at Viseu, but there cannot be much due. Indeed, considering all the

calls upon us, I do not see how we can get on in respect to money.

‘I enclose to you a report received from Guimaraens, from which it appears not only that every thing in the neighbourhood is embargoed for the use of the Portuguese army, but that an arrangement which I had declined to adopt has been circulated throughout the country as ordered; and the consequence is that my Commissaries can get nothing. I shall be obliged to you if you can set this matter right.

‘I also enclose to you a letter from General Cox, received this morning, with its enclosure, which I beg you to return. If the contents of this paper be true, the enemy have plenty of men for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and every thing else. I have, however, sent for this Mr. Jackson, to see him, and hear his story myself.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘All the ammunition and balls in Ciudad Rodrigo would scarcely give the inhabitants and garrison 100 rounds per man, which is not sufficient for any, much less a Spanish garrison in a state of siege.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you would send me a nominal list of the British officers serving with the Portuguese army, specifying the regiments to which they belong, and the periods from which they have been respectively paid from the chest of the “aids.” Upon referring again to ———’s complaint in favor of the districts of Castello Bom, &c., I observe that it contains some most unfair and unwarrantable expressions, which I must observe upon in the notice I am about to take of the complaint itself.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

‘The officer to be exchanged for Lieut. Gaynor is arrived here, but I acknowledge that unless you are very anxious for Gaynor’s exchange, I think it very doubtful whether it is expedient to allow of his going into the French posts just at present. He will certainly be able to report the exact state

of affairs between the Agueda and the Coa, and in respect to other matters his reports may be favorable or otherwise to us, according to what he has seen. I am rather inclined therefore to send him back, unless you are very anxious to have Gaynor exchanged; and to say the truth I think it very doubtful whether sending him in here will get Gaynor released; it would be still worse to send him in from any post in which we should not be strong, and I am sure the Marques de la Romana will not allow him to go in by Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Let me have your answer to this as soon as possible, as, if he does go, he must go to-morrow morning.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose you a letter to Brigadier General Cox from the magistrates of Castello Bom, &c. &c., and I request that if you should have reason to believe that the complaints are well founded, and the people cannot supply Mr. Downie’s requisitions, you will refrain from enforcing them, and rather draw from Almeida.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Cox, Governor of Almeida.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter which I request you to forward to — — —; and I likewise enclose a copy or extract of the letter which you wrote to Marshal Beresford, when you forwarded the complaint which I have enclosed to — — —.

‘ I can have no objection to an officer in your situation forwarding any complaint which comes into his hands; but I think if he takes any view of the subject, particularly in an official paper which may become a public document, it ought to be liberal towards others.

‘ I wish that before you had stated “these complaints to be founded upon justice and reason” you had adverted to the difficulties of subsisting the army in advance of the magazines, owing to the unwillingness of these same people,

and their countrymen, to supply the carts they have at command to move forward the magazines; and that before you had termed the requisitions of ———— for the British troops “the adoption of an unnecessary system of vexation and terror amongst a willing and obedient people,” you had adverted more pointedly to the fact, that these last requisitions are not the only cause of these “reasonable and just complaints;” but those heretofore made and enforced by the same system for provisions and supplies to the Portuguese and Spanish troops, which have not been and probably never will be paid for; whereas it is certain that those supplied to the British troops will be paid for, probably immediately; and undoubtedly at no very remote period.

‘ War is a terrible evil, particularly to those who reside in those parts of the country which are the seat of the operations of hostile armies; but I believe it will be found upon inquiry, and will be acknowledged by the people of Portugal, that it is inflicted in a less degree by the British troops than by the others; and that eventually all they get from the country is paid for, and that they require only what is necessary.

‘ In our present situation it is necessary that the people of Portugal should furnish the troops with carriages to move our magazines, or that they should feed the troops in the advanced stations, or the troops must be withdrawn.

‘ This may be a disagreeable alternative, but it cannot be avoided; and I am convinced that if you had taken this, which is the fair and true view of the subject, your regard for these same people would have induced you to urge them to make an effort to supply what was required, rather than to give harsh terms to requisitions, made upon them by necessity rather than by choice.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th, and you will see by my letter of yesterday, that I concur entirely in your opinion of the proclamation sent to me by Dom Miguel Forjaz. I beg you to communicate to him or not, as you

may think proper, my sentiments on the proclamation as communicated to you yesterday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th. I doubt the existence of open insurrection in La Mancha and Andalusia to the degree stated in your accounts, but I have no doubt of general discontent ready to break forth into open insurrection whenever the weakness of the French should offer opportunities, and there should exist in the country means of resistance, such as arms, &c. &c.

‘ There is so far a foundation for the report of O'Donnell's action, as that it appears that Suchet's advanced guard was at Lerida on the 11th April. It is doubtful, however, according to my experience in Spanish reports, whether O'Donnell was beaten or gained a victory.

‘ Affairs remain in this quarter nearly in the same situation in which they have been for the last fortnight. The bad weather still renders any more active preparation for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo impracticable. The place was summoned by Mermet on the 12th, with a declaration that if not surrendered immediately the whole garrison should be put to the sword. The Governor answered that his determination had been already communicated to Ney, and that he should fire upon all flags in future.

‘ I have a report that a reinforcement of 21 battalions of infantry, and three regiments of cavalry arrived at Valladolid from the neighbourhood of Vittoria, on the 27th and 28th April, under General La Martinière.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *Rt. Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 9th April, and I assure your Royal Highness that I shall be happy to do every thing in my power to add

to the numbers and efficiency of the corps composing the King's German Legion.

'I propose to call upon Brigadier General Low to state what are the contingent expenses attending the recruiting from deserters from the French army; and I shall adopt measures to provide for the payment of those which ought to be a charge upon the public, in addition to the bounty to the men enlisted.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*His Royal Highness
the Duke of Cambridge.*

'WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

'MY LORD,

'Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

'I enclose an extract of a letter of the 29th of April, which I have received from Major General the Hon. William Stewart, in which he has informed me that the Regency of Spain had offered him the rank of Lieutenant General in the Spanish army, and to Captains Owen and Landmann the rank of Colonel in the Spanish army, in testimony of their satisfaction with the conduct of the Major General while he commanded the British troops at Cadiz, and with that of Captains Owen and Landmann while in command of the royal artillery and engineers of the same place.

'I beg your Lordship to lay this letter before the King, and to request His Majesty's permission for Major General the Hon. William Stewart, Captains Owen and Landmann, to accept the rank in the Spanish army offered to them by the Regency of Spain.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*

'WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

'MY DEAR LORD,

'Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

'I hope that you will have written to Lieut. General Payne, which will be the best means of reconciling his feelings to his recall; and I shall not say any thing to him upon the subject, till the last moment, in order to give you time to do so after you shall have received this letter if you should not have written to him before.

'I am convinced that General Brownrigg is mistaken respecting General Payne's inclination to return to Eng-

land. However, that is a point into which it is not necessary to enter. You may depend upon it that I shall do every thing in my power to reconcile him to his recall, if he should not receive a letter from you before it will be necessary for me to announce it to him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

‘I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 25th April, and I assure you that nothing can be more satisfactory to me than the King’s approbation, which I labor incessantly to deserve. I am obliged to your Lordship for your account of Lady Wellington and my children.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. George Canning.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 15th May, 1810.

‘Your relation arrived here about three weeks ago, and Colonel Stopford having required that he should be allowed to do duty with the 3rd regiment of Guards, in consequence of an intimation from the Duke of Gloucester that if he wanted officers he was to call upon me to allow those on the staff to return to do their duty with the regiment, I have not thought it proper to refuse my consent to allow him to join.

‘The Duke of Gloucester might prevent Captain Canning* from being on the staff, if he should think it proper. I do not think that I should do him any good by contesting this point with the Duke of Gloucester.

‘I have, however, still kept him in my family, and he will continue to receive his pay and allowances as usual, in the same manner as another officer did during the whole campaign who was doing duty with the Coldstream. I have a perfect right to do this, and there is no increase of expense to the public, as the aides de camp are paid by myself:

* Afterwards killed at Waterloo.

there are always some supernumeraries, and I can give the pay to which of them I please.

‘ I mention this to you because I do not think that Captain Canning is convinced that I have decided for the best on this occasion. He thinks himself aggrieved by the Duke of Gloucester, and would have the point contested, which I do not think desirable.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

G. Canning.’

‘ *To Major General Campbell, or Officer Commanding at Gibraltar.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose copies of some letters which I have received from Colonel Doyle, stating that he had sent to Gibraltar certain deserters from the French service whom he had enlisted into His Majesty’s service under instructions from me.

‘ I request that if possible you will send these men to the Foreign dépôt in England: if you shall not be able to send them to England, I request you to send them to Lisbon, from whence I shall endeavor to find means of sending them to England.

‘ I beg you to send with these men all papers, rolls, &c., which Colonel Doyle may transmit to Gibraltar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell,
Gibraltar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General Cox.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 15th. I concur very much in opinion with you respecting Mr. Jackson’s reports. He says that these troops of General La Martinière belonged to the 2nd corps. This is Soult’s, now commanded by Regnier, and on the Guadiana, and I suspect that they are dépôts of corps, convalescents, &c., about to join the 2nd *corps d’armée*.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 6th and 9th instant, marked Nos. 10 and 11. I beg to refer you to my letters to Major General the Hon. W. Stewart, of the 27th of February, and request you to adopt the mode therein pointed out for the purchase and payment for beef, and in respect to the demand for repayment from the Spanish Government, in the purchase of any other articles which you may think it desirable should be supplied by the British Commissaries for the British troops, and in the payment of any demands for supplies furnished, or services performed for them.

‘It is most desirable that all discussions respecting money in particular should be avoided between the subordinate officers of the army and the inferior Spanish authorities. His Majesty’s instructions upon this subject are well calculated to preserve harmony; and His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz will be the best judge of the expediency of enforcing payment of His Majesty’s demands upon the Spanish Government for the supplies for his troops, which they ought to furnish under the conditions on which the troops were detached.

‘Notwithstanding that the wants of the troops at Cadiz induce me to consent to the disbursement of money at that place for the supplies required, the letters recently received from England leave no doubt in my mind that we shall be obliged to evacuate the Peninsula for the want of money to defray the expenses of the army, and to perform the King’s engagements.

‘There is nothing new in this quarter. Affairs remain exactly as they were when I wrote last.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 9th instant, relative to the desire of Major General the Hon. William Stewart to be removed to this army.

‘I had already received a private letter from Major General Stewart of the 29th of April, expressing his wish to be employed in Portugal, to which I wrote an answer, of which I enclose the extract upon that subject*; and you may depend upon it that I shall not make any alteration in the Staff at Cadiz without your concurrence.

‘I wrote to you on the 3rd instant, and on the 13th, respecting your situation in this army.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

‘The enemy have continued nearly in the same positions in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo since I last addressed you on the 9th instant, and the rain has continued, and the Agueda is still impassable.

‘General Mermet summoned the place on the 12th, and received an answer from the Governor stating his determination not to surrender it, and his intention to fire upon any flags of truce which might be sent in in future.

‘The enemy have not made any movements of importance on the side of Astorga; but it appears that the troops which they have left in that quarter are more numerous than was at first reported.

‘I have reports from Valladolid, that Massena is expected there to take the command of the army in this quarter; and that a reinforcement of about 11,000 men was on its march to that town, which had been drawn from the neighbourhood of Vitoria: both these reports, however, require confirmation.

‘The enemy reconnoitred Badajoz, on the left of the Guadiana, on the 12th instant, the day on which they summoned Ciudad Rodrigo.

* *Extract of a Letter to Major General the Hon. William Stewart, dated May 14, 1810.*

‘I am much flattered by your desire to be removed to this army, which I shall certainly bear in mind; but, under present circumstances, I do not think that it would be proper to remove you from Cadiz, or indeed that the service in Portugal would offer you better opportunities of distinguishing yourself?’

‘The allied troops on both sides the Tagus continue in the same positions.

‘The last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatches of the 12th and 24th April (marked B), regarding the supplies of money for this army, and I am concerned to observe that your Lordship relies upon the hopes of being able to procure specie in the Peninsula for bills upon England, to support an expenditure estimated to amount to £300,000 per mensem.

‘Your Lordship may rely upon it, that if a vessel is sent with a bill to get together every sum of money that is to be procured in that manner, in any part of the Peninsula, which has been the practice lately, you will not get more than half the sum, and the remainder must be made good by remittances from England.

‘The Government is mistaken in supposing that large sums can be procured at Cadiz for bills upon England, when bullion arrives in large quantities from South America. The bullion which arrives is generally on account of the Spanish Government, none of which can be got; and the average monthly sum procured for bills at Cadiz and Gibraltar has been £55,000. In this period, many millions of dollars have been imported from South America, but, with but small exceptions, on account of the Government.

‘If circumstances do not permit the Government to make the remittances required regularly from England, it is my duty to inform your Lordship that it is impossible for the army to continue in this country on the scale on which we have been hitherto, or on which we ought to be, to have it in our power to do any good. Every day’s experience proves that the army cannot be maintained in the Peninsula without money to pay for every thing that is received; and the result of an attempt to remain with inadequate funds would probably be a failure in some important branch of the service

at a critical moment. Deficiency in the funds to pay and support the Portuguese army, which must be the consequence of the continued delays in the performance of His Majesty's engagements to the Portuguese Government, and of the growing accumulation of the debt due to that Government on account of the subsidy, will be attended by the same bad consequences.

‘By the next packet, I hope to be able to transmit to your Lordship an estimate of the expenses in this country, which will show the adequacy of the sum of £300,000 to defray the charges of the army in Portugal, of the troops at Cadiz, and to provide for a subsidy to Portugal of £120,000 per mensem.

‘I shall also be able by that time to send your Lordship a more detailed reply to the observations contained in Mr. Harrison's letter to Lieut. Colonel Bunbury of the 24th April.

‘I must now observe upon this letter, that Mr. Harrison has referred to a document transmitted in a private letter to Lord Castlereagh, instead of to the official estimate from which that document was extracted. If he had referred to that official estimate, he would have seen that it was of the expenses of the army for the months of September, October, and November; and I believe I shall be able to show that it was as accurate an estimate, both of the expenses and of the existing means of defraying them for those three months, as could be framed.

‘Your Lordship is aware that these estimates are framed by the officers at the head of the several departments, to the best of their judgment, according to the information which they possess. Neither they nor I can be responsible that the expenditure shall correspond exactly with the sum which it had been estimated each head should cost. A small variation in price, or alteration in the system, or the seat of the operations, or the necessity of sending to a greater distance for any necessary article, would occasion an alteration of expense under one or all the heads of charge in the extraordinaries; and neither the officers who frame the estimates, nor I, could be deemed responsible, or could control, in any manner, the alteration. All that we can do is, to keep down all expenses as much as possible; and upon that subject every thing is done that is in our power.

‘ In the month of December a material alteration was made in the position of the army, which occasioned some increase of expense under the heads of transports and forage. There was an increase in the ordinaries beyond the estimate of September, 1809, and in the hospitals; and your Lordship will recollect that I stated in my letter of the 13th of December, that money would be required from England to cover the deficiency of the funds to be found in the Peninsula to defray the expenses of the army.

‘ The reasoning in Mr. Harrison’s letter, to show that the army could not be in want of money, notwithstanding my letter of the 13th of December, founded on the amount of the bills drawn, and the sums supplied from England since the date of the estimate of September, 1809, must be erroneous. He has omitted to subtract from the amount paid for bills at the Treasury, above 10 per cent., which specie procured by bills costs in the Peninsula; and he has included in the amount of supplies received in this country, two sums of 164,000 and 400,000 dollars, neither of which had arrived at Lisbon, and the latter of which had not sailed from England at the date of his letter.

‘ There are also some erroneous statements and conclusions respecting the expenditure, particularly on the amount of old debts paid, and sums supplied to the Portuguese Government in the period under discussion, all of which are to be attributed to Mr. Harrison’s having considered the estimate of September, 1809, as one to answer for all times and all circumstances, instead of being one for the three months specified.

‘ I have now directed the Commissary General to furnish me with an estimate of the expenditure every month, which shall be transmitted to your Lordship; and by the next packet I hope to be able to transmit to your Lordship an accurate account of the sums received in each month at Lisbon, Oporto, Coruña, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for bills upon the Treasury.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill,

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 14th, and I am convinced that whatever you decide upon will be right.

‘ I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the Marques de la Romana and all the Spanish officers. It is obvious that there is nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations, which could lead to no advantage, and might end in the loss of every thing. This is evident, both from the letters of the Marques himself, and from the false reports made to Lieut. Heathcote of the firing heard from Badajoz at Alburquerque.

‘ I do not understand either the nature or the objects of the position taken up by the Marques de la Romana with his right, or the movements by which he proposes to protect it, or those by which you are to assist him in protecting it. If we are to be involved in these operations, we must not only thoroughly understand them, but we must direct them.

‘ You will of course proceed with great caution; and recollect that, if you are once involved in this desultory system of operations, you cannot withdraw from them without doing those whom you intend to assist more injury, when you leave them to return to your position, than you can do them good by involving yourself in them.

‘ The assistance which you give them should be instantaneous, should have a precise object, and should be decisive; and you should then return to your position at Portalegre. I have heard that General La Martinière arrived at Valladolid in the end of last month and beginning of this, in command of a division of troops, of which I enclose the list, which are said to belong to the 2nd corps, that now commanded by Regnier. I have not yet heard of their passing Valladolid, and it is possible that these troops may be destined for this quarter; but I beg you to desire Colonel Grant, who is on the Tagus, and any body you may have in your front, to watch all movements from the Puerto de Baños, or the Puerto del Pico, towards Arzobispo or Almaraz. I shall take care

to apprise you of any further movements I may hear of this division.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

‘ I wish to mention to you that neither I, nor any other officer of the British army, have the power of confining or punishing the magistrates or others in authority in Portugal. All that can be done, in case they do not exert themselves to comply with your requisitions, is to report them to me, stating specifically their offence, which is, I imagine, generally, one of omission of duty; and I shall order them to head quarters, and thence to Lisbon, to be punished by the Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

‘ I have had some conversation with Mr. Jackson, and I think his account is very loose and unsatisfactory. He says that the troops in La Martinière's division belong to the 2nd corps d'armée; and he says that the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps are in Castille and Leon; and that these troops are on their way to join the 2nd corps, which he supposes in Castille. The 2nd corps is certainly on the Guadiana, and the 1st at Cadiz; the 6th and 8th in Castille and Leon.

‘ From all this I think it most probable that this division is on its march into Estremadura, and that it will pass by Congosto, &c., and to Arzobispo or Almaraz.

‘ The enemy reconnoitred Badajoz on the left of the Guadiana on the 12th, and it was supposed that they intended to attempt to assault the place. This is not very probable. But Hill moved on the 15th towards Elvas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Brigadier General Cox.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday’s date. The statement of a fact is very different, and has an effect more powerful, than a general reflection. Neither I, nor any other officer in the British service, has the power of confining and punishing a magistrate, whatever may be the nature of his crime; and I certainly shall not permit such a practice. I beg to know the office of the civil magistrate of Castello Bom, who received corporal punishment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Cox.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 17th May, 1810.’

‘ I do not recollect whether you ever informed me of the size and capacity of the mortars which the Junta of Ciudad Rodrigo have desired to have, and I have not time to look over my papers before the post goes out.

‘ If they are of very large size, and capable of throwing shells to a great distance, I should think it advisable not to send them, as they may eventually be used against yourself. Let me know by the *parte* of this night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 18th May, 1810.

‘ There is a report here that Captain Cotton, who is employed by you at Badajoz, has been ill treated by the people of the town; I conclude, because you did not move to protect their cattle, &c., from the enemy: as if that was not their business, instead of ours.

‘ This is a part of the system on which all the Spanish authorities have been acting to induce us to take a part in the desultory operations which they are carrying on.

‘ False reports and deceptions of every description are tried, and then popular insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct. However, nothing of this kind

shall make me take one step either way, which is not dictated by my sense of what is best for the cause.

‘I shall not, however, allow any officer under my command to be insulted; and, if this report be founded, I beg you to recall Captain Cotton from Badajoz, and not allow any British officer to return there.

‘Colonel Carroll is employed by Government at the headquarters of the Marques de la Romana; and he, I dare say, will give you all the intelligence, &c., which you might expect to receive from the employment of Captain Cotton at Badajoz; and I conclude that the Marques de la Romana’s respect for the British Government, and his regard for Colonel Carroll, will induce him to protect him from the insults which it is said that the people were allowed to show to Captain Cotton, supposing the people to be equally inclined to insult Colonel Carroll.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Celorico, 18th May, 1810.

‘I enclose you all the correspondence which has passed between Lieut. General Payne and me regarding your batman, which at last has come to this point, that I must decide whether an order given by Lieut. General Payne, which has been carried into execution in respect to every body, should be carried into execution in respect to you.

‘It appears to me that there is one very easy mode of settling the business, which is for you to communicate with General Payne, and state that you understood he had given an order upon the subject, and request to know whether there is any inconvenience in your retention of the man.

‘If you have any reason for wishing not to take this step, I must take up the question on its public grounds only, and decide upon it.

‘There is no news this morning. Have you adopted any measures to have the four old women removed from the convent at Gouveia?

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Marshal Beresford.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 19th May, 1810.

‘ The enemy have within these few days again threatened Badajoz, and the right of the Marques de la Romana’s corps stationed on the left of the Guadiana. But they had retired again, according to the last accounts of the 16th, and General Hill, who had moved, has resumed his positions at Portalegre.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Cox.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 19th May, 1810.

‘ I think it advisable not to send the mortars to Ciudad Rodrigo. You had best write, that I have given no positive answer on the subject, and refer the Governor to me.

‘ You did not enclose the letter from the Capitaõ Mor of Castello Bom.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 19th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose the intelligence received this morning from both front and right. I doubt that it is so certain that Massena has arrived at Salamanca, as that he is appointed to the command. If he had arrived at Salamanca, I think we should have heard of it from our intelligence people.

‘ I do not understand this *second* corps. Ney’s was always the 3rd, and Kellermann’s the 6th, and the 2nd was Soult’s, and is now commanded by Regnier, on the Guadiana.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Return the enclosed papers.’

To Lieut. Colonel Carroll.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

‘I have seen in the Badajoz papers a copy of a letter from Madame Bonet to her husband, which it is supposed has been intercepted, and which letter I consider to be highly interesting.

‘I recommend to you to ask the Marques de la Romana to allow you to see and take a copy of the original letter and that you should transmit it to the King’s minister at Lisbon, to be forwarded to His Majesty’s Government.

‘I understand that the deserters who were sent from Badajoz to Elvas have never arrived at Lisbon.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Carroll.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

‘I enclose returns and letters which I have received from General Cole, regarding the equipments in Colonel Harvey’s brigade.

‘Send back the correspondence. I intended it only as a private communication. I shall take up the business and decide upon it on public grounds. Nothing new this day.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Marshal Beresford.’

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. I have just received the correspondence.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

‘I have perused with great attention, and have considered the proposed regulations for the conduct of the Commissariat department with the Light division, and I return them, together with a memorandum upon them.

‘What is stated in that memorandum will show you how difficult it is for any General Officer to frame a code of regulations for the conduct of this, or indeed any other department, connected with the particular body of troops under his command. In respect to this particular department, the duties of the officers employed in it are so various, and must

be performed in a manner so different in different parts of the country, and depend so much upon the regular supply of money, and other circumstances, that I consider it a more difficult task to frame a code of regulations for the performance of active duties, which shall be applicable to this department, than I should find it for any other branch of the service.

‘After all, the regulations would be confined almost exclusively to the information to be transmitted periodically to the Commissary General, in order that he might provide for the deficiencies in the country to supply the troops. Every thing else must depend upon the intelligent activity of the Commissary upon the spot, which no general regulation can provide for, and upon money.

‘While writing upon this subject, I beg to draw your attention to the enclosed copy of a Division Order, put into my hands by the Commissary General, which I request you to reconsider. I do not think that the return, which is therein directed to be made, is calculated to give the officers of the commissariat additional leisure for the performance of their duties; nor do I think that, supposing the officers of the commissariat require some check upon the misuse of their time, this order is calculated to produce that reform of this abuse which you would wish. I am therefore very desirous that you should countermand it; and if you have reason to believe that these persons do misspend their time, let me know it, and I will take care that it shall be properly noticed.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*Memorandum on Brigadier General R. Craufurd's proposed
Commissariat Regulations.*

‘Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

‘It would be highly desirable to effect the principal object of the Regulations for the conduct of the Commissariat, proposed by General Craufurd, viz., a separation of the duties among the Commissaries attached to each division of the troops. It is apprehended, however, that this object cannot be effected in any division of the army, excepting in that

under the immediate command of General Craufurd, and probably not in that division for any great length of time.

‘The establishment of the Commissariat, as settled by the Treasury, usually allowed, is one Assistant Commissary to each brigade of infantry; and in this army there has been one allowed to each regiment of cavalry, one to the artillery, and one to head quarters. It might be convenient to attach a Deputy Commissary to each division of troops, to superintend the duties, and perform those of a higher description which would fall to him in a separation of the duties; but unfortunately the state of the establishment, owing to the sickness of many, and the variety of employment for the officers in the higher ranks of the commissariat, have never enabled me to carry that arrangement into execution.

‘But even if I had been able to execute that arrangement, the separation of duties would have been impracticable in any division of the army since it has gone into cantonments, excepting, probably, the Light division. In Portugal troops cannot find cantonments or food for more than one brigade in one place. The nearest brigade will generally be at the distance of three or four leagues, and it would be impossible for any commissary to perform either the duties of the senior or the duties of the junior commissary to two brigades, as laid down in these regulations.

‘In the same manner on a march in ordinary circumstances only one brigade can find cover and food in a place, and in this case also the separation of duties could not be carried into execution.

‘When the army is assembled for a general operation, the supplies must be received generally from the magazine, and then the duty of the commissary with each brigade would be that of the junior, as stated in these regulations; but even in this case the separation of the duties might be inconvenient, as one or two brigades might be stationed in places where articles of supply might be purchased with advantage, of which the commissaries might not be able to take advantage, if the purchasing commissary attached to the division to which the brigade should belong did not happen to be on the spot.

‘I should consider any arrangement to be desirable which relieved the officers of the commissariat from the enormous

weight of responsibility by which they are borne down, and which would give them more time for the performance of the active duties of their employment. But I should doubt whether the separation of the duties, as proposed, would have this effect. It would relieve the senior commissary of the division from the most complicated and embarrassing of the accounts, viz., the store account, and would throw an increased proportion of it upon the junior. It is this account alone which embarrasses any of the commissaries; they find no difficulty in settling their money account, but the store account cannot be settled. Upon the whole, therefore, this part of the regulations cannot generally be adopted in the army.

‘ In order to render more clear the observations which I have to make upon the remaining parts of the regulations, it is necessary that I should advert generally to the state of the commissariat service of Great Britain.

‘ A regular commissariat establishment is quite new in the British service. It is not required within Great Britain, and when an army serves abroad, the particular services to be performed by the officers of the commissariat are as little known to the military officers of the army, as the mode of performing them is to the officers of the commissariat. Even the little experience which some of those officers have of service, on little maritime expeditions to some foreign colony or island, is entirely inapplicable to the larger scale of operations to be carried on upon a continent by a large army in the field. I have also to observe that the mode of performing these duties, and the different objects to be attended to in supplying the troops, vary, not only in the different countries in which the British troops may be employed, but vary very materially in the different parts in which they may be employed in the same country.

‘ From these circumstances, particularly from that first mentioned, the regulations for the conduct of the commissariat in the instructions from the Treasury are very inadequate to the duties required from the commissaries; and from the jealousy of all persons in England regarding every description of military expenditure, they are confined principally to the mode of settling the accounts.

‘ Under these regulations the Commissary General is re-

sponsible for every article of store in his charge; that it is not issued excepting under due authority, or without the required vouchers, the nature of which is stated in the instructions. In regard to purchases, he must be able to prove in every instance that the article has been purchased at the lowest price; that the purchase money has been paid, &c. And in respect to contracts, besides many other formalities of advertisement, &c., they must in every instance have the approbation of the Commander in Chief of the army.

‘The Commissary General is forbidden to give money in lieu of rations, to give back rations, &c. &c. This is the general tenor of the instructions to the Commissary General; and the great business of the Commander in Chief of the army is to discover a mode of carrying on the business of this important department, as much in conformity with the instructions to the Commissary General as is possible. I fear that many of the regulations now before me are entirely inconsistent with these instructions, and therefore cannot be adopted in any part of the army; others of them are inconsistent with the General Orders issued for the general conduct of this department; others enter into details, which are either already the subject of regulation by the Commissary General, or are the common practice, or would be more properly the subject of regulation by the Commissary General.

‘Regulation upon many of these points is very difficult, and might be attended by many inconveniencies to the troops.

‘I shall now consider these regulations, article by article, as I find them before me.

ART. 1.

‘Separation of duties.

ART. 2.

‘Nos. 1 and 2, regarding communications with Commissary General on supplies.

ART. 1.

‘I have already pointed out the inconvenience of the general application of the regulation in this article.

ART. 2.

‘Nos. 1 and 2 prescribe the duties which are now or ought to be performed by every commis-

‘ No. 3. Commissaries to submit contracts to Commanding Officer of division.

‘ No. 4. To pay for supplies in cash or bills.

‘ No. 5. To take charge of distant depôts.

‘ No. 6. To make reports to Commanding Officer of division.

‘ No. 7. To regulate duties of commissariat.

ART. 3.

‘ Nos. 1 and 2. The duties of commissaries and their clerks.

‘ No. 3. The commissary

sary attached to a brigade or regiment in the army.

‘ No. 3 is contrary to the instructions from the Treasury : no junior commissary can enter into a contract without orders from the Commissary General, and every contract must be approved by the Commander in Chief.

‘ No. 4 is already directed by the General Orders.

‘ No. 5 is referrible to the division of duties. There must be a storekeeper of course to every depôt, whether formed for a division or a brigade, or the whole army.

‘ No. 6. The Officer commanding a division can have this information from any commissary attached to any body of troops in his division.

‘ No. 7 depends principally upon the adoption of the division of duties ; but in ordinary cases it is the duty of the Commissary General to give such directions, from time to time, as will provide for the performance of the duties of the commissariat, and will prevent the clashing of the several commissaries.

ART. 3.

‘ Nos. 1 and 2 prescribe duties either already performed, or which ought to be performed by the commissaries of brigades or their clerks.

‘ No. 3. The principle of this

or his clerk to attend the delivery of each article of supply.

‘No. 4. The commissary to be informed by the Quarter Master General of the cantonments of the troops.

‘No. 5. Commissary to ascertain supplies in each village.

‘No. 6. To ascertain whether deficiency can be made up from neighbouring villages.

‘No. 7 directs a state of supplies in the district to be made by the assistant commissary.

regulation is already the order of the army.

‘The order referred to in this article is perfectly proper, when there is not a clerk or officer of the commissariat to superintend the issue of each article of provisions.

‘No. 4. The regulation in No. 4 is the ordinary practice.

‘No. 5. The regulation in No. 5 is the duty of every commissary of a brigade.

‘No. 6 prescribes conduct practised by every commissary of a brigade.

‘No. 7 prescribes a duty which I fear it would be difficult, if not impossible, to perform. First, it would take up a great length of time to make up the return; secondly, when the return would be made up the whole state of the supplies in the district would probably have altered.

‘The state of the supplies in one village depends upon a store, and the supplies to be drawn from that store depend upon its contents, and the common consumption of the village.

‘The supplies of other villages would depend upon a market. It would not be easy for a commissary to make a statement which would be true for one week, of the state of the supplies in any village, much less in a dis-

strict. The fact is, that the state of the supplies in any district where supplies are found in markets depends upon money.

‘No. 8 directs two days’ supply for the troops in each of the villages in which they are cantoned.

‘No. 8. The directions contained in No. 8 are provided for by the orders to the Commissary General, requiring that six days’ bread and as much meat, and three days’ forage, should be at all times in the cantonments of all the troops.

‘No. 9 directs that the commissary shall have a return of supplies from other villages occupied by the troops.

‘No. 9. The commissary with each brigade must of course have a return at stated periods, from each of the persons employed in the supply of and delivery to any portions of the brigade detached in any neighbouring villages. The form of the return is of course fixed by the Commissary General.

‘No. 10. Receipts for supplies at Head Quarters to be signed by Quarter Masters.

‘No. 10. I apprehend that the directions in this number are not consistent with the instructions from the Treasury to the Commissary General. Whatever these instructions direct must be done in respect to the signing officer of requisition upon the commissary, and of receipts for articles delivered.

‘Nos. 11, 12, 13, and 14 contain regulations for the grant of receipts by officers to magistrates for supplies.

‘The directions in Nos. 11, 12, 13, and 14 are referrible to receipts for supplies delivered to the troops without the intervention of an officer of the commissariat. The instructions from the Treasury do not allow of any money being paid for articles furnished to any but an officer of the

commissariat, and that only upon regular vouchers and certificates. Whenever, therefore, the service requires that supplies should be taken for the troops from the country, without the intervention of an officer of the commissariat, the Commander of the Forces is obliged to give a special authority for the payment for those supplies. When I was at Badajoz, I considered and passed an authority on each of nearly 4000 irregular receipts of this description, given by officers for supplies in the preceding part of the campaign in Portugal. This circumstance shows how necessary it is that officers should attend to the General Orders upon this subject. These forbid any officers to give a receipt to a magistrate, or person furnishing supplies, excepting in a case of necessity, and those only in the regular form; and the granting of this receipt, and the necessity for it to be reported to the Officer commanding the division, who will communicate the existence of this receipt to the commissary, in order that it may be taken up.

‘ I do not think the regulations in these numbers can be substituted for the General Orders.

‘ The regulations in No. 15 must of course be practised by every commissary.

‘ No. 15 directs that a contractor who is to deliver supplies shall have a note of introduction.

‘ No. 16 directs that one receipt only for all the ar-

‘ No. 16. This regulation appears conformable to the General

ticles supplied in each village shall be given on each day.

‘ No. 17 directs that the Assistant Commissary shall, once a week, take up all receipts given by regimental Quarter Masters, and give one general receipt for all articles received.

ART. 5.

‘ Prescribes a form in which Quarter Masters of regiments and Commissaries are to keep accounts of issues to the troops.

ART. 6.

‘ Refers to supplies for General Officers and Staff.

‘ No. 1. They are to receive supplies from Commissary.

‘ No. 2. The aide de camp to draw for them.

‘ No. 3. Staff Officers draw for themselves.

‘ Nos. 4 and 5. General Officers and Staff Officers may pay for their rations,

Orders, if all articles of supply in the same village are received from the same person, and that person the magistrate. But if they are not, particularly if any are received from contractors, it would expose proprietors of supplies to great injustice from magistrates.

‘ No. 17. I doubt whether this regulation is consistent with the instructions from the Treasury. It would be impossible to execute it without authority from the Commander of the Forces ; and unless the receipts passed by the troops are strictly in conformity to form, &c., for the exact quantities of articles to which they are entitled by the regulations.

ART. 5.

‘ The whole of the regulations in article 5th are inconsistent with the instructions of the Treasury, and cannot be carried into execution.

ART. 6.

‘ The instructions from the Treasury, and the General Order, are applicable to the supplies for General and Staff Officers, as well as for the rest of the army.

‘ No. 1 is the order of the army.

‘ No. 2 is the general practice.

‘ No. 3 ditto ditto.

‘ Nos. 4 and 5 are inconsistent with the instructions from the Treasury.

and are to receive the amount of their bills.

‘ No. 6 directs that a clerk may keep an account of issues to General and Staff Officers, as under article 5th.

ART. 7.

‘ Goes to give the commanding officer of division information of supplies, prices, &c., through other channels besides the Commissary.

‘ No. 6 directs prices to be reported and sanctioned by General Officer commanding division.

‘ The Commissary General cannot pay bills of any officers for supplies paid for by those officers, without the authority of the Commander of the Forces.

‘ No. 6 refers to the regulations of article 5, which are entirely inconsistent with the instructions of the Treasury.

ART. 7.

‘ The first five numbers of article 7 tend to establish a control over the officers of the Commissariat, in the commanding officers of regiments. This is a question of military policy and propriety, rather than of Commissariat regulation. These orders may do very well, and may be well executed by the officers commanding regiments in the Light division; but I am very certain that they cannot become a general regulation for this or any other army.

‘ No. 6. The commanding officer of the division cannot sanction any price, under the instructions of the Treasury, although his sanction of it would certainly guide the judgment of the Commander of the Forces upon the subject. The price paid for every article must be certified by the magistrate of the village to be the lowest, and this is sufficient to pass the accounts.

‘ I should apprehend that making officers the judges and reporters on prices would embarrass, if

‘ No. 7 directs a loaf to be sent to General Officer of division.

‘ No. 8 directs that weight of corn, by *alquier*, shall be published in orders.

‘ No. 9 directs information to be furnished of weight of an *alquier* of corn.

‘ No. 10 directs reports to Commissary of receipts.

‘ Nos. 11 and 12 authorize officers to purchase supplies.

not render impossible, the settlement of any account.

‘ No. 7. I imagine the Commissary and all officers have the same ration loaf with the soldiers.

‘ No. 8. This I believe is a fit subject for regulation and occasional order by commanding officers of divisions.

‘ No. 9 is desirable to enable the commanding officer to issue the order of No. 8.

‘ No. 10. Not exactly consistent with the General Orders.

‘ Nos. 11 and 12. Contrary to the instructions of the Treasury.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your several letters of the 16th.

‘ Beresford spoke to me the other day about General Clarke's nephew*. I rather wish that he should be sent to England by sea. He must have a letter for the Commissioners of Transports, to inform them that he has been liberated by the Spanish Government, and that he is to be sent to Morlaix by the first opportunity. They will send him without fail. I cannot well allow him to pass through our ports.

‘ I shall speak to Marshal Beresford respecting his objections to the Special Commission. I believe they are founded on the slowness and voluminous nature of all law proceedings in Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

* The nephew of General Clarke, Duc de Feltre, in the service of France, had been taken prisoner.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 21st May, 1810.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 20th. Whenever you name to me the corps and their stations to which you wish the beef should be issued by our commissaries, I will order the issue in any quantities you please. You will, however, advert to the necessity of the regiments which receive this meat being stationed near our troops.

‘ I am concerned to see the state of your magazines. Rice, however, is not a bad substitute for bread, and whenever you are distressed I must supply you.

‘ There is nothing new this morning. Have you seen the enclosed paper? I have desired Colonel Carroll to see and send home a true copy of the original, for I suspect that the parts which I have marked have been altered.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 21st May, 1810.

‘ We have at last got a fine day, and we may expect that the weather will settle and that the rivers will fall. I think that it would be advisable to desire Bacellar to direct the ordenanza who are destined to guard the fords of the Coa below Pinhel, to repair to their posts.

‘ I enclose the letter on the French Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 22nd May, 1810.

‘ There are two or three subjects upon which I want to have a little conversation with you. The mail goes to England to-morrow, and I am afraid that I shall not be able to go to Fornos. Could you come over here? Come by the high road, and, if I can, I will meet you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Joint Paymasters General.

‘ MY LORD AND SIR,

‘ Celorico, 22nd May, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st of May; and I will endeavor to have the duty of the pay department performed with the assistance which, you informed me, has been added to it, in consequence of the late representations of the Deputy Paymasters General.

‘ Although the department appears larger than has been usually attached to a body of troops, of the numbers at present under my command, I have to observe to you that it is not larger than the service requires.

‘ The troops at Cadiz being a part of this army, it is divided into three corps, one north, the other south of the Tagus, and the detachment at Cadiz. A considerable portion of the pay department is necessarily attached to each of these corps; and a great part of it is stationed at Lisbon, for the conduct of the extensive business which is transacted there.

‘ It is also frequently necessary to send officers of the pay department to distant parts of the country, to pay the troops stationed at a distance from the head quarters of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Joint Paymasters General.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Celorico, 22nd May, 1810.

‘ The Government are desirous that we should occupy the Bayona Islands, off Vigo, in case it should be necessary for us to evacuate Portugal; but it will be desirable at an early period to send officers of the engineers, and the navy, to survey those Islands, and to form some notion of their defence, and of their capacity in other respects. These officers cannot be sent to those Islands, to any useful purpose, without the consent of the Regency, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will apply for it.

‘ Affairs remain here in the same state in which they were when I wrote to you last. Massena has arrived at Salamanca, to command the army in our front.

‘ The French troops in Estremadura reconnoitred Badajoz

on the left of the Guadiana on the 12th, the same day they summoned Ciudad Rodrigo. This reconnaissance was connected with other movements which indicated an intention to attack Ballesteros; but General Hill moved, and their plan was frustrated; and by the last accounts from Badajoz of the 18th, the French were on the defensive at Almendralejo. General Hill has resumed his position.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 22nd May, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter received from Mr. Assistant Commissary — at Cadiz, from which it appears that the connexion of that department at Cadiz with the commissariat of this army is not yet understood.

‘ I also enclose a letter from the Paymasters General in England, to their deputy Mr. Boys, in this country, from which it appears that the Paymasters General do not understand that the troops at Cadiz are a part of this army, and that all the departments at Cadiz are branches of the departments with this army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 22nd May, 1810.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 4th instant, regarding the wish of Colonel — to return to the service of Portugal.

‘ I beg to refer your Lordship to my dispatch of the 20th October, with its enclosures, and to your Lordship’s reply of the 7th November; and the enclosed extract of a letter from Marshal Beresford to me of the 8th September, and the enclosed copy of a letter from me to the Marquis Wellesley of the 12th September, for an account of the conduct of this gentleman, and of the opinions entertained here of him; and to show your Lordship how impossible it is that Marshal Beresford or I should ever recommend that he should be sent to Portugal again.

‘ I wait only for the report of the Commissary of Accounts on the accounts of the ———, to reply to your Lordship’s dispatch of the 5th of January; but I cannot avoid expressing my astonishment that ——— should so far have forgotten his former complaints of ———, as to recommend that he should be re-admitted into the service of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 23rd May, 1810.

‘ I have received your several letters of the 12th, 16th, and 17th instant, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ I am convinced that the sea voyage from Figueira to Lisbon is of service to the sick; and although the army is very healthy, and we have but few to send from Coimbra, I am desirous of having at all times the means of sending them by sea rather than by land. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will keep the hospital ships plying between Figueira and Lisbon, particularly the small ones, which can pass the bar of the Mondego without waiting for the spring tides. It is necessary to attend to this circumstance, as the enemy’s operations on our right flank might oblige us to quit the Mondego, in which case we should incur the risk of losing those ships which could not pass the bar at the usual high water.

‘ It would be very desirable to have stationed at the mouth of the Mondego an intelligent officer with whom I could communicate from time to time.

‘ The use of the Mondego also for the conveyance of recruits and convalescents to join the army, will be a great convenience in many respects. But before I fully adopt this plan I must make some arrangements for the supply of those people on their march, without which these gentry will destroy the country; indeed their passage through it, under the best arrangements, cannot be deemed an advantage. It will be however, a relief to the other road. I shall write to Colonel Peacocke as soon as I shall be prepared for them.

‘ I do not believe that Government have written to my brother respecting the Bayona islands. I have, however.

‘ Captain Goldfinch is the officer fixed upon by Colonel Fletcher to be sent there, and if you should be of opinion that he might go without having an order from the Spanish Government, to be permitted to look at the islands, I will instruct him and he shall go directly; but if you should think the order from the Spanish Government necessary, he must wait for it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 23rd May, 1810.

‘ Upon the receipt of your Lordship’s dispatch of the 24th April (C), I wrote to Admiral Berkeley, to request that transports might be sent to England according to your Lordship’s orders; and I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Admiral, in which he states the manner in which he has carried those orders into execution.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 23rd May, 1810.

‘ Marshal Massena arrived at Salamanca on the 15th instant, and took the command of the troops composing what is called the Army of Portugal, in which are included, I conclude, the troops in Leon, Old Castille and Estremadura.

‘ The enemy have, however, made no movement of any importance in this quarter or in Leon, since I addressed you on the 16th instant.

‘ The reconnoissance of Badajoz on the 12th, which I reported to you in that letter, appears to have been connected with a plan for attacking General Ballesteros and the right of the Marques de la Romana’s corps, in the neighbourhood of Xerez de los Caballeros. Lieut. General Hill moved, however, from his cantonments on the 15th, by which he disengaged not only General Ballesteros, but the town

of Badajoz ; and he has since returned to his cantonments. The enemy now occupy the high road from Merida towards Seville, as far as the Sierra ; still keeping possession of Merida.

‘ I have no news from Cadiz of a later date than the 9th.

‘ I understand that the enemy have lately levied a very heavy contribution in all parts of the country occupied by their troops ; and that the complaints of the people of their oppression are louder than usual.

‘ The guerrillas likewise continue their depredations upon their communications, &c. ; but I have to add that I have received an account that a detachment, consisting of 2000 men, raised in Andalusia, called *Juramentados*, from their having taken the oath of allegiance to King Joseph, are employed against the guerrillas in La Mancha.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Celorico, 23rd May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th, and I assure you that the appointment of General Spencer to this army is very satisfactory to me.

‘ I shall persevere in the plan which I communicated to you in my last letter, of not making known this arrangement to Lieut. General Payne till he shall have heard from you, or till I shall find it necessary from other circumstances. I have always been upon the best terms with General Payne, and indeed with every officer of the army ; but I am sorry to say that I understand that I have not given him satisfaction. However, I should not have desired his removal on that or any other account ; and I am desirous of making it as little hurtful to Lieut. General Payne as possible.

‘ I enclose the last weekly state. I likewise enclose some copies of a curious paper which has been printed at Badajoz.

have desired Colonel Carroll to see and take correct copies of the originals in the possession of the Marques de la Romana, and to forward them to the King’s Government.

‘ I am not yet able to send you our financial statement, on account of the necessity of a reference to Lisbon for some information. But you may depend upon it the result is

what I stated in my last dispatch. If you cannot supply us with money, you ought to withdraw us. We are reduced to the greatest distress. To-morrow is the day for paying the troops one month in arrears, and we have nothing to give them, and, what is worse, there is no money on the road, and none at Lisbon, and it takes at least twenty days in this weather for a convoy with money to travel from Lisbon. We owe the Portuguese Government a large sum: they are in the greatest distress, and we cannot relieve them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 24th May, 1810.

‘ If this evening should be fair, I shall go to Almeida to-morrow. I shall send a horse off early in the morning to Alverca, and I shall stay at Almeida and forward one day, and return here the next. I shall take with me only one aide de camp.

‘ You had better send your horse here this day, and I will send him off with mine in the morning, if I should go, which I will let you know this evening.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 24th May, 1810.

‘ Upon conversing with the Commissary General regarding the beef arrangement, he finds that he cannot carry it into execution for five or six days. In the mean time I enclose a letter which I had written to you, of which the Commissary General shall have a copy, specifying the several places at which the beef for each body of troops would be received according to the existing distribution of the army, and the arrangement according to which the plan would be executed.

‘ Upon referring to your numbers and your letter, it would appear that you intend we should give you a pound of meat a day for your full numbers. I do not think that was our original idea. However, it is only necessary that

we should know how many pounds a week, upon an average, you will require in the whole; and the detail can easily be arranged.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 24th May, 1810.

‘ Such numbers of rations of beef as may be required on any day will be supplied on the following day, as stated hereafter; not exceeding at any place the number of pounds stated opposite the name of each place on any one day.

	lbs.	
For the troops at Gouveia	2814	at Linhares.
Freixedas	1330	Pinhel.
Alverca	1330	Celorico.
Sandomil	2057	Cea and St. Iago.
Açores	2728	{ Pinou; the Commissary of Gen. Campbell's brigade.
In front of Almeida }	1734	{ Commissary of General Crau- furd's division.
St ^a Marinha, &c.	1146	Cea and St. Iago.
Sampayo	237	Cea and St. Iago.
Alverca and Baraçal }	390	Celorico.

‘ The Portuguese Commissaries are to send to the quarters above stated for the beef on the day following that on which they make the requisition for it, and they are to give a receipt for the number of pounds which will be delivered to them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Memorandum for Brigadier General Cox, Governor of Almeida,
for Fort Concepcion.*

‘ Celorico, 27th May, 1810.

‘ Four Portuguese 6 pounders, ready to go from Almeida immediately.

‘ Four Spanish 8 pounders, }
‘ Eight Spanish 4 pounders, } carriages to be prepared.

‘ Two howitzers, ready to go from Almeida immediately.

‘ All to have ammunition for 100 rounds per gun.

‘ The engineers of Almeida to be employed as soon as possible in building up the breach, first in the body of the place, secondly in the ravelin at Concepcion.

‘ Nothing more will be required than to build up the wall in any masonry with the materials on the spot; to clear away the rubbish from the ditches; and to stockade the ditches in front of the parts breached and to be built up.

‘ The gates of the covered ways and communications to be likewise repaired. The magistrates in Spain and Portugal to be required to give the assistance of labourers for this and other works; and they are to be regularly paid. A sum of money for this purpose will be sent to Almeida.

‘ The Assistant Quarter Master General of General Picton’s division will be sent to Concepcion to have the casemates cleaned out, aired, &c., for the reception of the troops, and he will require the assistance of some labourers for this purpose; and orders will be given to the Commissary General to provide for the subsistence of the troops when stationed there.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

Memorandum for Major Generals Picton and Cole, and Brig. General Craufurd.

‘ Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘ Brigadier General Craufurd is requested to direct his posts of hussars at Barba de Puerco, Villa de Ciervo, Villa da Yegua, and any others he may have on the lower parts of the Agueda, to communicate with the officer in command of the troops belonging to the 3rd division at Aldea del Obispo and Val de la Mula, destined for the occupation of the fort of La Concepcion, and he will communicate with that officer himself.

‘ In case the enemy should cross the Agueda in force, Major General Picton’s division, with the exception of the troops at La Concepcion, are to be collected at Pinhel; and Major General Picton will observe the ford of Porto de Vide, as well as the bridge over the Coa, under Pinhel; and Major General Cole will move his division forward from Guarda, and occupy the villages behind the Coa, towards Ponte de Sequeiros, Castello Mendo, and Castello Bom, so as to be able to observe and guard those passages over the river.

‘ If the enemy should cross the Agueda in superior force, it will be necessary that Brigadier General Craufurd should retire, and I wish that he should retire upon La Concepcion

and Almeida, if it should be possible. This must, however, depend in a great measure upon the strength and disposition of the enemy, and if he should retire upon any of the upper passages of the Coa, he will apprize Major General Cole of his doing so, who will in that case detach a brigade from the left of his division to Almeida.

‘WELLINGTON.’

*To the Officer Commanding the Troops destined to occupy the
Fort of La Concepcion.*

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘You are to communicate with the posts of hussars placed by Brigadier General Craufurd at Barba de Puerco, Villa da Yegua, and Villa de Ciervo, and with the General himself; and as soon as you shall find that the enemy have crossed the Agueda, you will move the troops under your command from the villages of Aldea del Obispo and Val de la Mula, into the fort of La Concepcion.

‘The engineer at Almeida has orders to repair the breaches in the fort, and the Assistant Quarter Master General of the 3rd division has directions to have the casemates cleaned out and aired. You will give them every assistance in your power in effecting these objects.

‘The Governor of Almeida has directions to send to Concepcion four Spanish 8 pounders, eight Spanish 4 pounders, four 6 pounders, and two howitzers, with ammunition; and you will give him the assistance of the mules attached to the brigade of artillery with you, to remove these guns and stores to Concepcion. As soon as these guns shall have arrived there, the brigade of artillery with you is to be sent back to Almeida with its mules, &c.

‘The Commissary General of the British army has orders to place in store at La Concepcion 12,000 rations of bread, meat, rum, and wood, for the use of the troops under your command, in case they should remove into the fort; and the Commissary of the Ordnance at Almeida has orders to lodge in the fort 100,000 rounds of musket ammunition.

‘In case you should be attacked, you will defend the place to the last extremity, and you may be certain that you will be relieved.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Officer Commanding
at Fort Concepcion.*

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Brigadier General Cox.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘ I shall send off to you, to-morrow morning, £500 to discharge our expenses at La Concepcion, and to cover any others that you may incur.

‘ Let the engineer employed there keep an accurate account of his disbursements, and send it to me.

‘ Be so kind as to supply the Assistant Quarter Master General of the 3rd division with any money he may require to defray the expenses of clearing out and airing the casemates, with which he is charged.

‘ I have ordered the brigade of artillery in the first instance to La Concepcion, in case they should be attacked there before you can send in the artillery.

‘ As soon as the ordnance, &c., shall come from Almeida, the brigade of artillery, with its mules, &c., are to be sent back to Almeida.

‘ I have desired the Commissary General to send to La Concepcion 12,000 rations from our store at Almeida, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire the person in charge of our ordnance stores to send to La Concepcion 100,000 rounds of musket ammunition.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *29th May.*—The letter to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo goes to you this day. I wish your 6 pounders and howitzers to go, as well as the Spanish ordnance, according to the memorandum. Let the howitzers have 100 shells for each, and let there be 20 rounds of case for each gun. The sooner the ordnance goes the better. The troops will be moved as soon as the weather holds up; probably, this day.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘ We hear of many troops moving to Madrid from Old Castille, which, if it be true, may be to reinforce Regnier’s corps in Estremadura. It is possible that they may be to reinforce the enemy’s corps on the other side of the Peninsula; but I mention these reports that you may attend particularly to what is going on in your front.

‘I am sorry to find that General O’Donnell and his staff, and the officers of his corps, are so much dissatisfied with us. Lieut. Heathcote, however, should not allow these reproaches to pass unnoticed. He might observe to them, that General O’Donnell himself, upon one occasion, and General Ballesteros again, lately, had the advantage of your assistance, and were thereby saved from being destroyed by the enemy. He might ask whether, in case you were to move forward into Estremadura, the General, or the Junta of Estremadura, would insure for you even one day’s subsistence, or forage, or any means of transport to communicate with your magazines. He might also call upon those who criticise your operations, to state what advantage the common cause would derive from your obliging Regnier to withdraw from Estremadura. If Regnier should be reinforced, you would be obliged to withdraw in your turn; and then Badajoz and the province would be lost; at the same time, that the diversion which would thus be made in favor of that part of the country, from which the reinforcement would be drawn, would not produce any good for the general cause. We must not allow the Spanish officers in any case to reproach us, without showing them the real situation of their affairs; and that their cause is lost from their own inability to manage it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘I enclose a letter from your Commissary General. Surely you do not allow carts to carry baggage for the troops?

‘There is as little precision in this paper as I have ever seen. Pray let him write something more precise and in the way of business.

‘I shall speak to the Commissary General about supplying you with forage corn.

‘I enclose General Cole’s report on the 12th regiment which I request you to let me have again. Could not the deficiencies of this corps be made good, so as to allow us to make use of it?

‘I have ordered the brigade of artillery to return to Almeida from Concepcion, as soon as the ordnance shall have been brought from Almeida to that place. It will be necessary, however, that Cox should send from Almeida to Concepcion, at the same time, about 120 artillerymen, upon which subject I request you to write to him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Payne.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘I enclose a letter and its enclosure, which I received the day before yesterday from the Commander in Chief. The arrangement contained in these letters had some days before been communicated to me in a private form by Lord Liverpool, as one likely to be carried into execution; but as it was not determined upon, and as I thought it probable his Lordship would write to you upon it, I did not think it necessary to mention it, till I should hear that you had received intimation of it from Lord Liverpool, or that Sir Brent Spencer had arrived in Portugal.

‘When Sir John Sherbrooke first declared that his state of health would not allow him to remain in Portugal beyond the beginning of May, it had been settled that General Graham was to succeed to his situation in this army. This arrangement was destroyed by his appointment to Cadiz; and when Lord Liverpool received a letter from me written in the middle of March, in which I requested that General Graham should be sent to Portugal, so as to arrive at Lisbon in the beginning of May, he made the arrangement which I now announce to you. From communications that Lord Liverpool has had with some friends of yours in England, he appears to think that you are not disinclined to return home; and at all events, he has expressed the greatest anxiety that the arrangement should be reconciled to your feelings as much as possible.

‘The ground of the preference of Sir Brent Spencer to yourself to fill the situation of Sir John Sherbrooke in this army during the absence of General Graham, appears to have been that your service has been generally confined to

the cavalry, which arm it was probable would not have the prominent part in the operations to be carried on in this country. Whether you will be disinclined, or otherwise, to return to England, or whether you will consider what I have just stated as a sufficient reason for this arrangement, I can only assure you, from all that Lord Liverpool has written to me, that it has not proceeded from any diminution of his regard for you. I shall be obliged to you if you will apprise me of your motions, that I may make my arrangements accordingly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Payne.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘ I have received Mr. Dunmore’s communication of the 23rd instant, and I have to inform you, that if Mr. — should have been one week counting 200,000 dollars in his office to the person appointed to take charge of that sum, I shall recommend to the Paymaster General that he may be dismissed from his office, as a person incapable of performing its duties on occasions of emergency, or desirous of throwing impediments in the way of the execution of the service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,
Commissary General.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 23rd and 25th.

‘ The objects of the jurisdiction of the Commission should be much more numerous than are stated in the decree. However, it is well to make a beginning, and we can soon extend the jurisdiction. I am only afraid that Leite, who is appointed to be the head of the Commission, has already more to do than he can perform.

‘ It is impossible for Portugal to aid in feeding Cadiz. We have neither money nor provisions in this country; and the measures which they are adopting to feed the people there, will positively oblige us to evacuate this country for

want of money to support the army, and to perform the King's engagements, unless the Government in England should enable us to remain by sending out large and regular supplies of specie. I have written fully to Government on this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

‘ I am really concerned that you should believe I had any such feeling as disapprobation towards you in consequence of our late discussions upon commissariat concerns. You and I necessarily take a different view of these questions ; I must view them in all their relations, with all the different parts of the army, with the persons concerned in carrying them on, and with the Government and departments at home ; your view of them is naturally confined to their relation with your own immediate command.

‘ In discussing them with you, in the manner and form in which I did discuss them, I considered that the subject was fairly before us, and that the discussion was to be carried on, as if neither had any concern in the situation of things as they stood. I therefore made my remarks with perfect freedom on the different regulations as they came before me, without taking much trouble to choose the terms in which I was to make them ; but there was no feeling of disapprobation during the discussion, and none has been felt since.

‘ I conceive that a part of my business, and perhaps not the most easy part, is to prevent discussions and disputes between the officers who may happen to serve under my command ; and I therefore did not send you the extract of a letter from General Cox to General Beresford, to which you refer ; nor do I now know the reason for which he sent it. The observations which I made upon the letter would show you what I felt upon the case in question.

‘ But it is really better to drop the whole of this subject ; and I hope that this letter may reach you in time to induce you to refrain from sending me the paper which you inform me you have written.

‘ I am convinced that in all that you have done you have

been actuated solely by a desire to forward the service; and to force those, who are more interested than we in the success of our operations, to do their duty by their country and by us.

‘ I enclose a memorandum, and a copy of the instructions which I have given to the commanding officer at La Concepcion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General
R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

‘ By the enclosed return I see that General Cox has taken nearly the whole of our salt provisions at Almeida, leaving us only 5 barrels out of 263. That which I promised the Government was to give them one million pounds, being two thirds of all that we had in all parts of Portugal. Will you give orders that he may return one third of 263 barrels, or that he may feed the troops to be stationed at Concepcion?

‘ Mr. Murray will be prepared to issue beef to the Portuguese troops on the 1st June.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Secretary to the Treasury.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

‘ I have received a letter from Captain Sir George Collier, of His Majesty’s ship *Surveillante*, in which he has requested that I will endeavor to prevail upon their Lordships to grant him the usual per centage on carrying a sum of money between Lisbon and Cadiz, for the service of the army under my command.

‘ I have no hesitation in declaring that Captain Sir George Collier gave all the care in his power to this sum of the public money; and that I have no doubt that, if the ships of war were not employed on the service of transporting money from one part to the other of the Peninsula, and if the officers of the Navy are deprived of the advantage which they have always derived from their ships being employed in this

manner, this service, upon which so much depends, will be but ill performed, and the public interests will be exposed to great loss.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secretary to the Treasury.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 4th instant (marked A).

‘ Your Lordship will observe, from Marshal Beresford’s letter to me of the 24th March, and its enclosure, transmitted in mine of the 28th March, that the Portuguese troops are entitled to certain articles of clothing and necessaries, as therein specified, at certain stated periods.

‘ The troops are not to pay for these articles any more than the British troops are to pay for the clothing issued to them, or the necessaries supplied to them by the Colonel, under His Majesty’s regulations.

‘ If the Portuguese troops should require at any time any of these articles, not allowed, or beyond the quantity allowed by the regulations of the Portuguese Government, they would have to pay for them in the same manner as His Majesty’s troops pay for the necessaries which they require, beyond the quantities supplied by the Colonel, by stoppages from their daily subsistence.

‘ The arrangement under which His Majesty engaged to subsidize a body of Portuguese troops was made before I was appointed to command in this country, and I have not got the particulars of it, which I conclude are contained in the dispatches from the Minister at Lisbon, or from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

‘ I understand, however, that it was settled that the clothing, arms, and accoutrements for that portion of the army subsidized by His Majesty should be furnished by Great Britain ; and I enclose a statement of the clothing and necessaries which His Majesty is bound to furnish to the body of troops subsidized by him, according to the Portuguese regulations. All the clothing and necessaries supplied to Portugal, beyond that quantity, ought to be a charge against the Government of Portugal. These articles are either

issued to the troops maintained by Portugal, beyond the number subsidized by His Majesty, or are issued to the troops subsidized by His Majesty beyond the quantities to which they are entitled under the regulations of the Government, and must become a charge against their subsistence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

‘ think the 12th regiment in a very fair state for service, but it is impossible to connect it in operations with British troops, till the men shall have their blankets, and shall be properly clothed. It is therefore better that it should remain under the command of Le Cor.

‘ If you wish it, you shall have back the 2nd regiment of Caçadores.

‘ Am I to understand that the Commissary General of the Portuguese army does not require one third of the carts supplied by the magistrates south of the Mondego? He can surely state, with some degree of precision, what number of carriages will be required to move the sick of the different regiments.

‘ We must have something better than the truly Portuguese letter which he wrote to Mr. Murray; I mean that which I enclosed to you.

‘ There is no news, excepting that the cavalry were trying the fords of the Agueda yesterday, which were quite impassable.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have ordered provisions for ten days for the troops to be lodged at Concepcion.’

To Major General Campbell, or Officer commanding at Gibraltar.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I received yesterday from the Secretary of State, on the subject of the deserters from the French service, enlisted by Colonel Doyle, under instructions from me. It will be proper that these men

should be detained at Gibraltar till you shall receive further instructions respecting them from the Secretary of State.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell,
Gibraltar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 25th, and I am very happy to find that you were able to send a supply of provisions to Cadiz. I cannot afford them any from my stores.

‘ I am much obliged to you for apprizing me of your plans for the Talbot. General Payne is going to England, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give him a passage in her. He quits the army on Saturday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose some observations drawn up by the Commissary General, Mr. Murray, on the statement contained in Mr. Harrison’s letter of the 24th of April, transmitted in your Lordship’s dispatch of the same date. From this paper your Lordship will be enabled to see our financial state at the date to which Mr. Harrison’s letter refers.

‘ I likewise enclose your Lordship a statement drawn up by Mr. Murray, of the receipt and expenditure from the 25th of August to the 24th of November, 1809, from which your Lordship will observe, that as far as it has been possible to ascertain the point, the expenditure in those months exceeded the estimate but very little; and that the excess of expense was principally in the ordinaries, and in the hospitals, which could not be controlled.

‘ Your Lordship will also, by a reference to the first mentioned paper, observe how erroneous the statements in Mr. Harrison’s letter have been, in consequence of his applying to an expenditure for eight months, an estimate framed for an expenditure for three months. The excess of the

rate for the ordinaries in the eight months, over the rate of that estimate, has been £209,000; and for the hospitals, £46,000; and debts have been paid beyond the amount stated by Mr. Harrison, to the amount of £100,000.

‘The alteration of the position of the army, which was made in December; the improvement in its equipments; the increase which it has been necessary to make to its means of transport; the increase of the cavalry, and the increase in price of all articles of provision and forage; and the necessity of sending to a greater distance for all that is required, are the causes of the increase of the expenditure under the other heads of the estimate in the last five months. I can assure your Lordship that the utmost attention is paid to prevent an unnecessary expenditure by all the officers at the heads of the several departments; and by those in whose power it may be to check the increase of expense.

‘It has been impossible for the Commissary General to frame an estimate of the monthly expenses of the army, which will be satisfactory to himself, since I received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 24th April; but as I consider it desirable that your Lordship should, at an early period, have some notion of the expenditure in Portugal and Spain, I enclose a probable estimate which I have drawn from the receipt and expenditure of the last eight months; which I also enclose.

‘From this, your Lordship will observe that the monthly expenditure will be £376,120; and that the monthly produce of bills drawn upon the Treasury, calculated upon the average produce of the last eight months, from August to April, will be £219,528; leaving a monthly deficiency of £156,592, which must be made good by the remittance of specie from Great Britain.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Celorico, May 30th, 1810.

‘The weather has continued so unfavorable, since I had the honor of addressing you on the 20th instant, that

the enemy have been unable to make any movements, and they remain nearly in the same situation as at that time.

‘ Marshal Massena returned to Valladolid after having been at Salamanca ; and I have not yet heard of his return to Salamanca. King Joseph arrived at Madrid on the 13th instant.

‘ During the time that General Regnier was employed in his operations against General Ballesteros’s division on the south of the Guadiana, General O’Donnell, who had advanced from Alburquerque to Caceres, made an attempt to surprise Truxillo, where the French hospital was stationed, but he failed in the attempt. He has since returned to Alburquerque.

‘ I have no late accounts of the operations at Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, May 30th, 1810.

‘ I sent a reply on the 1st instant to your Lordship’s dispatch of the 6th of April, as far as the means in my power enabled me ; and I now enclose No. 1, a correspondence which I have had with Admiral Berkeley ; and No. 2, a correspondence with Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, upon the subject of Peniche.

‘ From the opinion delivered by the latter in his report of the 23rd May, it would not appear desirable to undertake to construct any permanent works at Peniche ; but I would still recommend to Government to occupy that place for a time after Portugal shall be evacuated by the army ; and it appears by the letters from Admiral Berkeley, that it is his opinion that such a communication can be kept up with the garrison as will facilitate its being carried off. At all events Peniche might be occupied in safety till the winter.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that Lieut. Colonel Fletcher’s letter of the 23rd instant contains a report on the Berlingas, and a survey of the great island. I have no doubt that that island can be held as a military post ; but from recollection of the discussion upon the Berlingas in the year 1808, I am apprehensive that the anchorage near them will be found rocky and bad ; and that they will not afford water

to the troops, whom it might be necessary to station on them.

‘ The marines belonging to Sir Charles Cotton’s fleet, who then occupied them, were supplied with water from the fleet off the Tagus.

‘ I have likewise received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 12th April, regarding the occupation of the Bayona islands off Vigo, and of the fort of Bugio.

‘ Your Lordship will observe from the enclosures in the Admiral’s letter of the 6th May, that this subject had already had his attention.

‘ I have written to Mr. Wellesley, to request that he will obtain the permission of the Spanish Government to have these islands examined by an engineer and an officer of the navy ; and these officers will be sent to survey them, as soon as I shall receive the permission of the Government, and the report shall be transmitted to your Lordship.

‘ I enclose No. 3, the opinion received from Admiral Berkeley regarding the occupation of the Bugio ; and No. 4, the report of Captain Squire, of the Royal Engineers, upon this fort.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that the Admiral differs in opinion with the engineers, regarding the advantage which British ships would derive from the occupation of the Bugio, as well as upon the inconvenience which the enemy would suffer from this measure, and I conclude that His Majesty’s Government will consider his opinion decisive upon these points.

‘ The capability of defence of the Bugio may be more properly the subject for consideration for the Engineers, upon which the report of Captain Squire is conclusive. I have been so little at Lisbon, and always in bad weather, that I have never had an opportunity of acquiring a personal knowledge of the Bugio ; but it has always appeared to me so small, that it could not be held against a bombardment, for which it appears that there is favorable ground sufficiently near.

‘ I have not yet received any further communication from the Admiral regarding the Faro Islands.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

‘ Upon reference to your Lordship’s instructions of the 27th February, directing me to remove the army to Cadiz, in case I should evacuate Portugal, I wish your Lordship to consider whether it would not be more advisable that we should go to Gibraltar or Ceuta, than to Cadiz.

‘ It may be depended upon that when the British troops shall have evacuated Portugal, and more particularly if we should not make an effort to maintain our position, whatever may be the numbers opposed to us, we shall not be very popular in the Peninsula. It may be expected that the people of Cadiz, and possibly even the Spanish Government, would refuse us admission, which would be an awkward occurrence ; and might render uncomfortable the situation of those already in the place.

‘ Would it not be better, after the evacuation of Portugal, to wait till a further reinforcement should be called for by the people of Cadiz, or by the Government ? Or, at all events, to confine the numbers of additional troops to be sent to Cadiz, to those really required for the defence of the place and its dependencies ?

‘ Another point to which I wish to give further consideration, is my own situation after Portugal shall have been evacuated. I will do whatever the King’s Government think proper to order me to do ; but I wish you to consider whether it may not be deemed a hardship upon General Graham that I should go there, and supersede him in the command of the operations for the defence of Cadiz, at the moment when the measures for the defence will be completed, and the serious attack is about to commence. All these difficulties will be avoided by ordering the army to Gibraltar, if you should still wish to keep it in the south of Spain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Celorico, 31st May, 1810.

‘ Since you left me, I have received intelligence that the enemy were in motion yesterday on the Agueda, so that you had better have your division in readiness to move in the morning, in case you should receive intelligence of the occurrence referred to in the memorandum sent to you on the 29th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General the Hon. L. Cole. WELLINGTON.

‘ I beg you to send notice to Major General Slade, that I may have occasion to move his brigade in the morning, and that, should I find it necessary, I shall send him a route in the night.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, Celorico, 31st May, 1810.

‘ I enclose some papers just received, which look like doing things in earnest.

‘ I have sent orders to all the troops to be in readiness to march in the morning; and I shall move them forward, if I should receive any further information of the reports which these papers contain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Marshal Beresford.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Send on the 1st and 16th, and let them know that they may receive orders to move and to be prepared. I shall send to the troops in the valley.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, Celorico, 31st May, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, and I am concerned to find that the Junta have taken so little pains to supply Cadiz with provisions. The truth is, that the Spaniards are incapable of making an effort to provide for a want, however certain its occurrence, if not provided for, which they are not likely to feel in a very short space of

* Letters of the same tenor were sent to other General Officers commanding Divisions and Corps.

time. This fatal disposition of their minds is the cause of all their misfortunes. I am afraid that we cannot assist them.

‘ I shall be very glad to see Alava. There is nothing new here. I have heard that the French were in movement yesterday on the Agueda, and I shall move in the morning if I find the report to be true, and that they have any serious intention in this movement.

‘ Nothing has occurred in Estremadura. Don Carlos de Espana, belonging to O'Donnell's division, endeavored to surprise Truxillo, while Regnier was employed on the left of the Guadiana, but he failed. O'Donnell is now at Alburquerque.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 1st June, 1810, 11 A.M.

‘ Nothing occurred of any importance yesterday. In the morning the enemy apparently threatened to extend to their left, but they had not carried that intention into execution in the afternoon. They are strengthening themselves from Leon and other quarters.

‘ When you move forward, I request you to send orders to General Slade to move with his brigade to Guarda.

‘ I enclose a letter which I beg you to forward to Colonel Le Cor.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Major General

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 1st June, 1810.

‘ Since my private communication to you on the 29th ult., I have had an opportunity of conversing with General Payne, who intends to proceed in the first instance to Caldas, and to remain there till about the 20th instant, and I shall be much obliged to you, if you can find it convenient to provide him a passage in a man of war about that time. I have requested him to inform you of the exact period of his arrival at Lisbon.

‘ I have also to request that you will give directions that a passage may be furnished to certain men belonging to the

depôt squadrons of the cavalry in this country, and to the officers and men of the detachment of the 23rd dragoons, as well as a horse transport to convey to England the horses belonging to the officers of the 23rd dragoons. The Assistant Quarter Master General will furnish the Agent of Transports with the detail.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral* ‘ WELLINGTON.
‘ *the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Celorico, 1st June, 1810.

‘ I have communicated to Lieut. General Payne His Majesty’s desire that he should return to England ; and he will proceed there in a short time,

‘ In the course of the more active operations of the army, I have had opportunities of reporting my sense of his conduct. I am perfectly sensible that the arrangement which has placed Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer in the situation of second in command in Portugal has no reference whatever to the military conduct or character of Lieut. General Payne.

‘ But I think it proper to take this opportunity of assuring your Lordship, that since the more active operations of the army have been discontinued, I have had great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of this officer.

‘ His attention to the cavalry has been unremitting ; and I attribute to the care he has taken of that useful arm the high state in which it is for service at the present moment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Celorico, 1st June, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to General Payne, when I communicated to him the King’s pleasure that he should return to England. I have since seen him ; and although he appeared to think that it was fit and proper that an officer should be appointed to be second in command of this army, in whom the Government could have confi-

dence, and that no man deserved this confidence more than Sir Brent Spencer, he felt that the supercession of himself, under the circumstances which have attended it, and at the moment it took place, was likely to be injurious to his character.

‘ I have written your Lordship an official letter upon this subject; and I have reserved for this private communication to state to you that General Payne is anxious to receive some mark of the King’s approbation under these circumstances. He mentioned to me a government as a desirable object to him, and he said that though it should be one of the smallest value, it was an object to him to obtain it, in order to remove the impression which he was afraid would prevail, that he had been recalled on grounds unfavorable to his military character.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 2nd June, 1810.

‘ There was nothing extraordinary yesterday. Some of the guns which left Salamanca on the 28th appear to have arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I do not see any necessity for your moving your troops up the hill. Indeed, in marching forwards, you will find it a convenience to have your column rather open.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 2nd June, 1810.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 15th May, upon the subject of the bounty to be given to the deserters from the enemy’s army, who should enlist into the British service.

‘ The evident utility to the general cause of enticing Germans and other foreigners in the enemy’s service to desert had drawn my attention to this subject, before I received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 2nd November; by which I considered myself authorised to adopt such measures as I

might think expedient in order to accomplish or forward this desirable object.

Your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th of April likewise went to authorise the grant of such moderate bounties, as I might deem it expedient to give to deserters from the enemy's army.

Before I had received the last mentioned dispatch, I had authorised Colonel Doyle to give bounties of twenty dollars to each man who should have deserted, and should have enlisted into His Majesty's service, under certain terms which were transmitted to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 1st of March.

I considered myself authorised to give these instructions by your Lordship's dispatch of the 2nd November; and in your dispatch of the 5th of April you did not disapprove of that part of them which directed the amount of the bounty to be given.

In the consideration of this subject there are two objects: the one, to entice the soldier to desert from the enemy; the other, to enlist him into His Majesty's service. I should think it desirable to leave to the consideration of the General Officer on the spot, whether any or what bounty should be given to soldiers who should desert; and your Lordship will find in my instructions to General Cox and others upon this subject, transmitted in my dispatch of the 1st May, and which I have given to Colonel Doyle since I have received your dispatch of the 5th April, that I have not held out any bounty as the premium of desertion. I have acted in this manner because I believe that the soldiers were sufficiently inclined to desert, without that additional encouragement.

Upon further information I might have reason to believe that additional encouragement would be desirable; and indeed at present it has been in many instances necessary to allow of the expenditure of money to clothe deserters, before they have had an offer of bounty, as they are generally plundered of every article of clothing and necessaries, by the Spanish or Portuguese peasantry, or soldiers, before they reach our hands.

The enlistment of deserters into His Majesty's service is a subject for consideration, entirely different from the encouragement to be given to soldiers to desert from the enemy

‘ In respect to enlistment, the orders which I have received from the Adjutant General are distinct, and they have been conveyed to the different officers allowed to enlist deserters for His Majesty’s service; and contain directions respecting the application of a part of the bounty to the provision of necessaries.

‘ I beg that your Lordship will inform me, however, whether I am authorised to incur any expense for the object of encouraging desertion, or for deserters before they shall have enlisted into His Majesty’s service, and whether any expense so incurred is to be carried to account against the bounty to which such deserters would be entitled on enlistment.

‘ I have conveyed to General Campbell, at Gibraltar, your Lordship’s directions, that the deserters who have enlisted and have arrived at that place should be detained there. I had before requested that they might be sent to England, in obedience to orders which I had received from the Commander in Chief; which orders will, I fear, have been carried into execution before those from your Lordship can be received.

‘ It is desirable that the wishes of Government upon this subject should be conveyed by only one authority; as in more than one instance the instructions which I have received from the Commander in Chief respecting these deserters have not been consistent with those which I have received from your Lordship.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL, Celorico, 5th June, 1810.

‘ The enemy have been collecting in our front for some days, but they have hitherto not crossed the Agueda, nor increased their numbers to any extent in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, prevented, I conclude, from bringing up their heavy artillery by the badness of the roads. I have ordered Le Cor to collect his troops, in case the enemy should make a dash that way; and I shall keep you informed of all occurrences.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Celorico, 5th June, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of an order which you gave for a sum of money to be advanced to Captain Eliott of the Artillery, upon which I am obliged to trouble you, as Captain Eliott has left Portugal.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know upon what occasion and upon what service Captain Eliott was sent, as that must be stated in the warrant which I must give for the money; and if you will desire Captain Eliott to send his account of the expenditure in triplicate, according to the forms required by the Auditors. It would save some trouble if you were to charge this sum in your own accounts, and were to direct Mr. Bell or Mr. Stuart to repay it to the Commissary General.

‘ I have but little to tell you from hence. Massena is in my front, and is collecting all he can for an attack upon this country; but I do not think that he will be able to make much progress till the French shall abandon their southern projects. They have been six weeks before Ciudad Rodrigo, and have not yet passed the Agueda; and they are proceeding with the utmost caution and circumspection. I hope their progress will not turn out to be as sure as it has been slow.

‘ The Portuguese army are in a good state. We have arms for the militia, and upon the whole we have an enormous military establishment at our command. We only want money to put it in operation and to keep it up. There are also the remains of several Spanish corps hanging about these frontiers and in other parts of Spain, which, if I had money, means, and power, I would put in operation upon the enemy.

‘ I wish that the ministers could strengthen their government; and that somebody would take pains to inform the public and guide their opinion, and not allow every news-writer to run away with the public mind, upon points essential to the interests of the country.

‘ Pray remember me most kindly to Mrs. Villiers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 5th. I think we have a tolerable notion of the strength of Ney’s corps; and I yesterday received a letter from General Mahy, who has a return of Junot’s corps of the end of April, I believe intercepted near Irun, which makes the numbers 34,389 infantry, and 8836 cavalry, including men at depôts in France and Spain, and in hospitals. I have sent for the return itself; but considering that this corps has but lately arrived from France, and has not sustained any loss of consequence, it would be a large allowance to strike off one third for men in depôts and hospitals; and yet, according to this calculation, Junot’s corps would have about 23,000 infantry and above 6000 cavalry, besides artillery.

‘ This corps has been reckoned 20,000 men in more than one report which I have received, and indeed General Mahy states in a letter that 20,000 had marched from Leon towards Castille; and this is besides other detachments of whose march we had heard upon former occasions.

‘ In one of the intercepted letters of which Mahy gives the extract, three Generals of division of infantry are named, viz.: Solignac, La Grange, and Clausel. They are all Generals of division, as appears by the French army list.

‘ There are no troops left at Astorga, excepting one battalion of Swiss, of whom twenty four deserted in one day; and none in Leon. The whole have come to Castille. I have requested General Mahy to put in motion his division and all the Spanish corps in that quarter, and I have ordered the Portuguese militia in Minho and Tras os Montes to move towards the Douro.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Don Andres Herrasti, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

(EXTRACTS.)

‘ Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

‘ The army under my command is also in readiness to move to your assistance, if I should find it practicable to

afford it to you. I do not propose to move till I shall find that the enemy shall have brought forward the whole of his means, and that my movement may be of the utmost possible benefit to you.

‘ I assure you that I am sincerely interested in the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo, not only on account of your Excellency, the garrison, and inhabitants, but from a strong sense of the importance of the preservation of that place for the general cause; and I hope you will believe, that if I should not be able to attempt your relief, it will be owing to the superior strength of the enemy, and to the necessity of my attending to other important objects.

‘ *Don Andres Herrasti.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

‘ Since I had last the honor of addressing you, the enemy have increased in numbers in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, where I have reason to believe that the whole of the corps of Marshal Ney is now assembled. They have also constructed a bridge over the Agueda, under the Convent of La Caridad, immediately above the town; and have commenced constructing another under Los Carboneros, below it. The heavy cannon moved from Salamanca on the 28th of last month, but halted at Matilla, owing it is supposed, to the badness of the roads in Castille; and they had not arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday.

‘ Marshal Massena has returned from Valladolid; and the whole of the enemy's troops in Leon, and, it appears, some of those which have been detached to the Asturias, have been collected in Castille, with a view to the operations to be carried on upon the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ I have not thought it proper to make any alteration in the position of the British army in consequence of these movements; I wait to see the disposition and real strength of the enemy; and any assistance which I may have it in my power to give to Ciudad Rodrigo will be more effectual if given after the enemy shall have brought forward all his means of attack.

‘ I have written to the Spanish General Mahy to request him to put in motion his division, and any other Spanish

divisions which there may be on the frontiers of Galicia and Leon, in order to annoy the enemy's rear; but I doubt whether these troops are in a state of equipment and efficiency, or whether their commanding officers have in their power the means to enable them to move.

I have likewise altered the disposition of the militia, which had been allotted for the defence of the Portuguese provinces north of the Douro, in consequence of the evacuation of Leon by the enemy; and if the Portuguese Government should possess the means of putting these troops in movement, or of subsisting them when collected, they will be upon the enemy's flank.

In Estremadura General Regnier has again brought a part of his corps to Merida, and a small detachment of cavalry and infantry approached Badajoz, by the road of Montijo, on the 31st of May, as it is supposed with an intention of driving off the cattle which were pasturing on the banks of the Caya and Guadiana.

General Ballesteros attacked, on the 25th, the advanced guard of Mortier's corps in the Sierra Morena, and drove them in upon Seville. A detachment of about 6000 or 7000 French troops advanced upon Seville, and attacked General Ballesteros at Aracena, on the 27th ultimo. The action lasted till night, when General Ballesteros retired, leaving 300 killed upon the field of battle, and having some wounded. He was not followed by the French, who returned to Seville on the following day; and then General Ballesteros resumed his position at Aracena.

It is said that the French lost 1500 men in this affair.

It is reported that the French withdrew their troops from the Trocadero on the 19th May, in order to reinforce their position at La Chiclana, which was threatened by the patriots of the Sierra de Ronda. I have a letter from Mr. Wellesley, of the 19th, which does not mention this circumstance. I have not heard from Lieut. General Graham since the 9th of last month.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an estimate of the expenses of the British army in Portugal, from the 25th May to the 24th June, which has been given to me by the Commissary General.

‘ Your Lordship will observe from this paper the large sum now due from the military chest to the chest of the aids for the payment of the Portuguese subsidy.

‘ Your Lordship will also observe that the British expense in the Peninsula, according to this estimate, and your Lordship’s letter, will be as follows :

British army in Portugal	£272,565	5	2
Portuguese subsidy	80,000	0	0
Proposed addition	40,000	0	0
Troops at Cadiz	29,000	0	0
Total	£421,565	5	2

‘ The estimated means of defraying this expense, supposing all debts paid, is £218,352 14s. 2d.; leaving a deficiency of £204,212 9s. 6d.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR, Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

‘ I have received from Mr. Dickens a copy of certain instructions which he has received from the Commissary in Chief.

‘ As I observe that these instructions vary in some important points from those received from the Treasury, particularly in reference to the nature and number of vouchers required to support charges for expenses incurred for the public service, I beg to know whether these instructions have received the sanction of the Treasury.

‘ If they have not, as it is very obvious that the Auditors will not allow of charges against the public which are not supported by the vouchers which have been required by the authority of the Treasury, I recommend that these instruc-

tions should not be acted upon as far as they differ from those received from the Treasury.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR, ‘ Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

‘ I beg that you will direct the Commissary of Accounts to discontinue his inquiries into the accounts of the Lusitanian Legion, which are referred to Marshal Beresford, by direction of the Secretary of State.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

‘ I delayed replying to your Lordship’s dispatch of the 5th January, respecting the Lusitanian Legion, till I should receive the report of the Commissary of Accounts. Your Lordship has, however, by your letter of the 23rd of April, decided the point which had been referred for my consideration, and I have transmitted to Marshal Beresford a copy of your dispatch of that date, and of the enclosed report from the Commissary of Accounts, which I received this day, in answer to a letter which had been written to him to know what progress had been made in the settlement of these accounts.

‘ I have no doubt whatever that the Lusitanian Legion never could have been completed in Portugal on the system of recruiting by volunteers or upon bounty. The men must have been recruited in the mode in which the whole army in Portugal is raised, viz., by requisition; and, in point of fact, the battalions of the Lusitanian Legion have been kept up by requisition only, in the same manner with the rest of the army. This fact is decisive upon the question referred for consideration. His Majesty could not have in his service a body of troops raised by requisition in Portugal; and whatever might have been originally intended, the mode of recruiting the corps subsequently adopted would necessarily have transferred it to the service of Portugal.

‘ I conceive that Marshal Beresford had the power to organise the Lusitanian Legion as he thought proper ; and I certainly did not disapprove of his measures upon that occasion, and did not interfere with those measures any more than I have with others adopted respecting the Portuguese army, under Marshal Beresford’s directions.

‘ In justice to Marshal Beresford, however, I enclose his letter to me of the 15th February, in answer to a reference which I had made to him of your Lordship’s dispatch of the 5th January ; from which, and from the reports of General Hamilton of the state of the Legion, and from the state of the accounts of that corps, your Lordship will be able to form your own opinion upon the whole of this subject.

‘ I have referred to Marshal Beresford your Lordship’s letter of the 27th April, containing the statement of the claims of Mr. ——. Without adverting to the nature of those claims, which are, in my opinion, very questionable, I have to inform your Lordship, that I consider Mr. — to be a deserter from the service of the Prince Regent, and a debtor to the state to a considerable amount. As a deserter, he has forfeited his claim to all arrears of pay, allowances, &c.

‘ I have already taken occasion to draw the attention of your Lordship to the necessity that the Officers, employed by His Majesty to serve with the Portuguese troops, should be obliged to perform the engagement into which they voluntarily entered when they accepted this employment, and should not be allowed to resign when it should suit their convenience or their inclinations, in which principle your Lordship concurred by your letter of the 7th November, 1809.

‘ I have also taken the liberty of drawing your Lordship’s attention to the state of discipline of the army in general, which I have stated to be attributed, in some degree, to the want of the power of reward in the hands of those who are honored with the charge of commanding His Majesty’s troops on foreign and active service ; and it would be desirable if the applications of Officers for the restoration of their pay and allowances, forfeited under His Majesty’s regulations, on account of their absence from their duty with-

out leave, were referred to their Commanding Officers abroad.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 8th June, 1810.

‘ If the rain is as heavy in your quarter as it is with us, the Agueda must have swelled again. Could not Carrera, by floating large trees down the river, destroy the bridge above the town; and the people of the town do something of the same kind by the lower bridge? A bridge upon chevalets cannot be very strong. Silveira writes me on the 5th, that the enemy's parties were approaching the Douro, opposite Freixo de Espadacinta.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

— *R. Craufurd.*

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 8th June, 1810.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 4th. The Government ought immediately to compose the Commission, at Beresford's head quarters, of respectable and efficient people. I have sent some persons to be tried by them, and shall soon send others.

‘ I do not understand the nature of the objections of the Regency to publish their proclamation. I hope that they are not afraid to inform the country of their danger; or do they really believe that it does not exist?

‘ I conclude that Silveira sends all his intelligence, from which you will see that I cannot have less than 50,000 men in my front.

‘ It would be very desirable to bring to a conclusion the police arrangement which I suggested some time ago.

‘ I am convinced that the French now see the necessity of getting us out of the Peninsula as the first object of their attention, and that they will risk every thing for that object, and the trial will be made in a short time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 9th June, 1810.

‘ I received last night your first, and this morning your second letter of yesterday.

‘ I scarcely think that the enemy intend to draw the 2nd corps out of Estremadura; I should rather suppose the preparation of boats to be intended to reinforce it. If our accounts of the strength of the 6th and 8th corps be correct, they have as many men as they can require for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and for ulterior objects. Their other corps would be better situated in Estremadura.

‘ I have a letter from General Hill this morning, of as late a date as the 6th, and he does not mention any alteration in that quarter; and on the 5th, the enemy’s head quarters were still at Merida, and his troops on both sides of the Guadiana.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate these circumstances to General Carrera, particularly the strength of Junot’s corps; and desire him to tell his friend in the Vera to have a look out towards the Puerto de Congosto, and the high road from Talavera to Almaraz, for reinforcements for the 2nd corps, of which it is very interesting to have early intelligence.

‘ I apprehend that Ciudad Rodrigo will have been completely invested last night before the ammunition can have got in. Is it certain that the heavy artillery has reached the place? I should think that Ruman would have had intelligence of their movement from Matilla.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I do not know for what purpose the ammunition stated to have been destroyed at Talavera, or the magazine of provisions at Truxillo are required, if the 2nd corps is to be withdrawn from Estremadura.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Celorico, 9th June, 1810.

‘ I enclose a paper containing intelligence of preparations at Almaraz for the passage of troops over the Tagus. The writer of this paper appears to think that Massena intends to draw the 2nd corps out of Estremadura, which I acknowledge that I do not think very probable ; for, if our accounts be correct, he has a sufficient number of men for the object of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo ; and for ulterior objects, the 2nd corps is better situated in Estremadura.

‘ The 6th corps (Ney’s) has 18,000 infantry, and 8 regiments of dragoons ; and from the returns, I judge that the 8th corps (Junot’s) cannot have less than 22,000 infantry and 3000 or 4000 cavalry. They must be in the whole 50,000 men at least. They can scarcely require more to prevent us from interfering in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I think it most probable, therefore, that the preparation of boats has been for the passage of reinforcements to the 2nd corps ; more particularly, as it appears that the 2nd corps had not moved, when you wrote on the 6th. Besides, I do not exactly understand for what purpose the ammunition stated to have been destroyed at Talavera de la Reyna was required, if the troops were to be withdrawn from Estremadura ; nor for what purpose the magazine of provisions was collected at Truxillo.

‘ However, it is desirable that you should be instructed how to act in case the 2nd corps should be withdrawn from Estremadura. If the enemy should adopt that plan, it is evident that they intend to concentrate their force for an attack upon Portugal, north of the Tagus. This attack may be connected with other operations to be carried on by other corps from the Guadiana ; or it may be insulated ; of which I cannot judge without knowing, more correctly than I do, the precise situation of affairs to the southward of the Sierra Morena. I think it desirable that you should pass the Tagus at Villa Velha, when you find that Regnier does so at Almaraz ; unless you should find that his corps is replaced in Estremadura by one sufficiently strong to overpower that of the Marques de la Romana. In that case you must remain in Alentejo ; observing well, however, the movements of Regnier on the north of the Tagus ; and if you

should find that he endeavors to drive in Le Cor, and to pass between the Sierra d'Estrella and the Tagus, turning the right of this army, you will act as directed by my letter of the 18th of February.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 10th June, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have had a report from Badajoz of the 7th.

‘ The French have spread themselves still more towards the Sierra Morena, having their left at Zafra. They have detached La Houssaye's brigade of dragoons into La Mancha, by the road south of the Guadiana, as well to keep in order the guerrillas as to prevent the Germans, of whom it is composed, deserting.

‘ I see that Ruman says that the heavy artillery had not arrived at Tamames on the 6th. He also says that Massena's force cannot altogether exceed from 25,000 to 30,000 men, in which I observe that he agrees with the report at Salamanca; and yet I think that all reports received by you concur in giving Ney's corps three divisions of infantry of 18,000 effectives, and 8 regiments of cavalry and artillery, which altogether cannot amount to less than 25,000 men; and it can scarcely be believed that Junot's corps, of which the gross return is 34,400 infantry, and 8800 cavalry, with artillery, should not have 25,000 more effectives.

‘ There is no doubt that the whole of Junot's corps is in Castille.

‘ I had a letter yesterday from Silveira, of the 7th; in which he says that General Bonet has evacuated the Asturias, and occupies in Leon some of the points before held by Junot.

‘ Have you been able to do any thing with the enemy's bridges, in the way which I suggested to your consideration?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ There is a report of the French having sustained a very heavy loss by the attack of guerrillas at Guadalaxara.’

To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 10th June, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to transmit a statement of funeral expenses of men who have died in general hospital in this country, and which cannot be recovered, from the circumstance of the regiments having left the country, or from the accounts of the men having been closed and sent to England previous to the charge having been received by the regiments.

‘ I have authorized the Purveyor to enter these expenses in his accounts until he shall receive orders respecting them from England, and I request that your Lordship will be pleased to give directions accordingly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.
the Secretary at War.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of yesterday and the day before.

‘ I had letters from Cadiz yesterday to the 2nd. The enemy had not abandoned the Trocadero, as was reported at Lisbon, and there was nothing extraordinary there. My brother says that the French were in great alarm at Seville, and at Madrid, &c., on account of their distress for the want of men. It may be hoped, therefore, that the large numbers which they have been induced to collect for their enterprise in this quarter may yet lead to some advantage elsewhere.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General
R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have received a letter from Silveira of the 9th, from which it would appear that the enemy are bringing every thing from Leon into Castille. I do not know whether Bonet's division is included in Junot's 34,400; some of it, I believe, certainly was.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22nd May, regarding the regimental hospital of the brigade of Guards at Cadiz.

‘ The regimental hospital of the Guards is managed upon a different principle from those of regiments of the line; but, I imagine, only as far as concerns their finance. In the Guards, the expense of hiring a regimental hospital and all the expenses attending it, beyond the sum defrayed by the stoppage from the pay of the soldiers, fall upon the superior officers of the regiment; but I apprehend that at the time the regimental hospitals of the whole army were managed upon the same system, the principal medical officer of the army had a right, and it was his duty, to visit and inspect them; and I do not believe that what are called the privileges of the Guards extended to an exemption from this inspection.

‘ The alteration of the system of the regimental hospitals of regiments of the line, or of the title of the principal medical officer of the army, cannot exempt the Guards from an inspection to which, in common with the rest of the army, they must have been liable. It is not necessary to point out the inconveniences and evils which might be the result of an establishment of this description being exempt from any inspection and control, excepting that of its own officers.

‘ We have been obliged in this army to adopt the system of general hospitals in preference to regimental hospitals; and it would be impossible for the principal medical officer to perform the duty which is imposed upon him under this system, without having a constant and perfect knowledge of all that is passing in the regimental hospitals, to which the patients are in the first instance admitted, and making frequent inspections: and in point of fact, the Inspector General with this army does inspect the hospitals of the regiments of Guards with this army when he pleases.

‘ I conceive, therefore, that Brigadier General Dilkes and the officers commanding the battalions of Guards at Cadiz are mistaken upon this subject; but if, after the

receipt of this letter, there should be any further doubt, I should recommend to you to refer it to the consideration of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, as a question upon the privileges of the Guards.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st May (No. 15). Lieut. Colonel Fletcher being in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, I have not yet received the papers which Captain Birch has transmitted to him.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby being upon the staff at Cadiz, it rests with you to dispose of his services as you may think best; and I beg you to make any arrangements you may prefer for the command of the cavalry at Cadiz, which shall have my full concurrence.

‘ I beg to refer you to my letter of this date to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs here.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th May (No. 14).

‘ My former letters will have conveyed to you my concurrence in your directing the purchase, by the British Commissary, of any articles which you might think necessary for the British troops, which the Spanish magazines could not afford; and my letter of the 16th May pointed out the mode in which I was desirous that an endeavor should be made to obtain repayment from the Spanish Government of the money thus expended. You will give your own directions to the British Commissary at Cadiz to purchase such articles for the troops, and in such quantities, as you may think it necessary to have; and you will direct the Commissary either to purchase these articles wherever they can be got, or to contract for them, as may be found most beneficial for the

service, adverting in every case to the instructions of the Treasury, and of the Commissary in Chief.

‘ It would be very desirable that the payment for these supplies should be made by bills upon the Treasury, which the receivers should be bound not to negotiate at Cadiz, at Lisbon, or Gibraltar; and Mr. Kennedy *, who is now the Commissary General with the army, will instruct the Commissary at Cadiz upon this subject. But if the persons who furnish supplies are unwilling to take bills in payment on these terms, they must be paid in cash, which Mr. Duff will furnish in the usual manner.

‘ As the Spanish Government have agreed to supply the British troops from the Spanish magazines, as one of the conditions on which they were detached to Cadiz, and I have reported to His Majesty’s Government that I had made this condition, I cannot consent to depart from it without their orders to that purpose. I therefore request that the bills for these supplies may be given to His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz, as suggested to Major General the Hon. W. Stewart, in my letter of the 27th February, and to you of the 16th of last month.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th. The enemy have certainly not abandoned the Trocadero.

‘ So much inconvenience results from the publication of two official statements of the same transactions, even where two individuals mean most fairly by each other, that I think it better that I should make the reports of the operations of the army to the Portuguese Government. I shall send them a copy of my weekly report to the Secretary of State; and I shall only request them not to publish them in ordinary cases, and not to publish them, in any case, till after the packet shall have sailed for England.

‘ I have repeatedly desired that the Portuguese Government might have half of all the money received into the

* Sir Robert Kennedy, K.T.S.

military chest, till the debt from the military to the chest of the "aids," on account of the two sevenths of the receipts, should be reduced. I see no objection to their having all the French money, and as much paper money immediately; but I should wish to speak to the Commissary General upon that subject and the wheat, which I shall do to-morrow.

'The conduct of the Government, in respect to the Corregidor of Lamego, conveys to my mind a clear proof of their reluctance to punish; and in some degree of their desire to screen a person of this description from all punishment. The letter from me, enclosed in Dom Miguel Forjaz's note to you of the 6th, is circular, and a mere form, to enforce the requisition of a Commissary; and you will observe that it refers in terms to a requisition which was to accompany it. Now the requisition from the Commissary, which accompanied this circular letter, was dated the 22nd of March, and it appears that the letter from the magistrate of Celorico was dated the 30th March. My complaint of want of carriages was in the end of April or beginning of May.

'But how is the fact regarding this very requisition for wine, which is stated to be the cause of the failure in supplying carriages? Twelve carts loaded with wine were all that were sent!!

'We are now in the greatest distress for carriages, and I have consequently no forage for the cavalry. I have forwarded many complaints to the Special Commission, but have not yet heard of the result; and I only request you to tell Dom Miguel Forjaz that, notwithstanding my good opinion and respect, and regard for the Government, I am determined to proclaim to the people of this country, and to the world, my reasons for withdrawing from my position in this country, if I should be obliged to withdraw by want; and to make known my earnest and repeated, but fruitless, entreaties since last November, that the Government would exert themselves to enforce obedience from the magistrates and people of the country.

'I fear now that, for want of assistance to poor Leite, the Commission will be useless.

'Believe me, &c.

'Charles Stuart, Esq.'

'WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 2nd; that of the 22nd May has never reached me, nor has Alava arrived; and you either gave it to him or to a Spanish messenger who passed through to Ciudad Rodrigo some days ago, and who, I conclude, gave my letters to the Governor, and I shall never see them. I have more than once observed that letters are not safe in private hands. Some from General Graham are likewise missing.

‘ The movements to which you refer, as likely to be made by Mortier, were made towards the end of last month. Ballesteros drove in the French posts in the Sierra Morena towards Seville; and Mortier afterwards attacked him with 6000 or 7000 men at Aracena, in the Sierra, on the 27th May. The action lasted till night, when Ballesteros retired, having had 300 men killed and many wounded. The French returned towards Seville next day, and Ballesteros resumed his position at Aracena. It is said that the French left 1500 men dead upon the field of battle; for which part of the story I cannot answer. Since that time all has been quiet in Estremadura. Regnier has his head quarters at Merida, with his troops cantoned on both sides of the Guadiana.

‘ Since I wrote last the enemy have been collecting troops from all quarters for their enterprise in this country; and they have now in our front Ney’s corps, which we know consists of 18,000 effective infantry, and eight regiments of cavalry, besides artillery; and Junot’s corps, of which the return has been intercepted, being 34,400 infantry, and 8800 cavalry, besides artillery, including hospitals and depôts in France and Spain; but I should think that we cannot reckon Junot’s corps less than 25,000, and Ney’s as many. They have brought Bonet out of Asturias, and a part of his division, at least, must be added to these numbers. They have but very few or no troops left in Asturias and Leon.

‘ The heavy guns left Salamanca on the 28th of last month, but had not arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo by the last accounts which I have: the enemy had constructed two bridges upon the Agueda, one above, the other below, the town, and had passed some people over yesterday, and the communication

with it had become difficult, but, as I understand from General Craufurd, not impossible.

‘ This *bicoque* has been in part invested for nearly two months; and a fortnight has elapsed since the guns moved from Salamanca; and the French are not yet in possession of the ground they must have for the siege. This is not the way in which they have conquered Europe! Having obliged the French to collect an army for this enterprise, that is, to make the attack of the worst fortified place in the world, I fear that I can do no more for it. I think that I might have delayed still longer the complete investment of the place, and the chances of war and chapter of accidents, which in these days are not allowed to be counted for any thing, might have enabled me to prevent the siege altogether, if the Government possessed any strength, or desired to have any thing done but what is *safe and cheap*. But, with an army considerably inferior in numbers, consisting of a large proportion of troops of a doubtful description, which are scarcely formed, and the enemy being infinitely (three times) superior in cavalry, I think I ought not now to risk a general action in the plains to relieve the place.

‘ However, I do not yet give the matter up. The defence of a Spanish place must not be reckoned upon according to the ordinary rules. If they will defend themselves as others have, the French must feel the consequences of Massena having weakened every other point to collect this large army; and if he should be induced to reduce it at all, I shall be at hand to assist and relieve them.

‘ I have no doubt whatever but that the French feel, throughout the Peninsula, the inadequacy even of the large force they have in it, to complete the conquest and to establish and support the Government; and the continued hostility of the people must distress them much. All the intercepted correspondence tends to show their misery and despondence. Although they may succeed in taking Ciudad Rodrigo, it does not follow that even the force which they have collected will be sufficient to oblige us to evacuate the Peninsula; and as long as we shall not shrink, the cause will not be lost.

‘ I have heard the reports to which General Castaños refers, respecting Massena. It was supposed that an in-

surrection in the south of France was organized, of which he was the head: indeed I believe some persons had communications upon the subject with the late Lord Collingwood: and I was induced to believe that there was some foundation for these reports, as they were in circulation in Spain at the same time that they came from the fleet in the Mediterranean, and could not have originated as false reports from the same source. However, it is evident that there was no foundation for them.

‘ I think, however, there is something discordant in all the French arrangements for Spain. Joseph divides his kingdom into *préfetures*, while Napoleon parcels it out into governments: Joseph makes a great military expedition into the south of Spain, and undertakes the siege of Cadiz, while Napoleon places all the troops and half the kingdom under the command of Massena, and calls it the Army of Portugal.

‘ It is impossible that these measures can be adopted in concert; and I should suspect that the impatience of Napoleon’s temper will not bear the delay of the completion of the conquest of Spain; and that he is desirous of making one great effort to remove us by the means of Massena.

‘ The neglect of the work at Santi Petri is truly consistent with the Spanish character.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 12th June, 1810.

‘ The state of the musket ammunition in Ciudad Rodrigo is not so bad as to render it necessary that you should incur the risk of any loss, in order to throw in an additional quantity. It is what they are most deficient in, and it would have been better if their wants had been fully supplied in time. But they are not in such want as to induce me to recommend that you should incur the risk of losing part of your cavalry to supply them, or to make a larger arrangement to cover a communication with the place. I am apprehensive that I shall not be able to do more for them than oblige the enemy to keep a large force collected in this quarter for the purpose of this enterprise.

‘ With an army one-fourth inferior in numbers, a part of it being of a doubtful description, and at all events but just made, and not more than one-third of the numbers of the enemy’s cavalry, it would be an operation of some risk to leave our mountains, and bring on a general action in the plains, and would, most probably, accelerate the period of our evacuation of the Peninsula. However, I do not give over all thoughts of attempting their relief, at least by throwing in supplies, which possibly might be done without a general action. This must depend upon the position which Massena continues to hold with the right of the army.

‘ You will be concerned to hear of the illness of Mr. Windham. I send you what Lady Liverpool writes to me of him on the 26th. It appears that on the 30th he was still very ill.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 12th June, 1810.

‘ I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from Lieut. General Graham, relative to supplies for the troops at Cadiz, and the copy of my answer; and request you to give corresponding instructions to the Commissary at Cadiz.

‘ When I detached troops to Cadiz from this army, I stipulated with the Spanish Government that they should be fed from the Spanish magazines, which was agreed to. The Commanding Officers there having subsequently represented that it was necessary for the troops that certain articles should be purchased by the British Commissary, I enclose copies of the instructions which I gave to Major General the Hon. W. Stewart on the 27th of February, and Lieut. General Graham on the 16th of May, regarding the mode of procuring payment for these articles.

‘ The same measures must be adopted regarding any supplies purchased, or any extraordinary expense incurred at Cadiz.

‘ It will be desirable that you should furnish the Commissary at Cadiz with blank bills upon the Treasury, or authorize

Mr. Duff to supply him with such as he may require to make the payments in bills, adverted to in the enclosed copy of a letter to Lieut. General Graham.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.,* ‘ WELLINGTON.
‘ *Commissary General.*’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday with one from General Loison, enclosing letters from officers prisoners of war, and their receipt for the last sum of money sent to them.

‘ You did not send me the letter from Carrera, mentioned in your postscript. I have a letter from Badajoz of the 10th, stating that the enemy’s cavalry had appeared there on the preceding evening, and carried off some cattle, &c. About 3000 infantry entered Lobon from Almendralejo on the 10th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Let me hear if a heavy fire should be opened on Ciudad Rodrigo. I believe the letter from Carrera to which you referred was for Colonel O’Lalor, and he has received it.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR, ‘ Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

‘ From a late letter from the Secretary of State, I learn that the 1st batt. 21st regiment, and the Chasseurs Britanniques, and the 31st and 39th regiments, expected from the Mediterranean to reinforce this army, are to go to Cadiz for orders; and I request you to give orders to those regiments to proceed without loss of time on their passage to Lisbon.

‘ Adverting to the possibility that we may be obliged to evacuate Portugal, and to the small quantity of tonnage for horses which I have in the Tagus, compared with the number of horses with the army, and to the expediency of endeavoring to save as many horses for the service as possible, and that I might have it in my power to save the whole by

sending some to Cadiz, I request you to give directions to the Commissary at Cadiz, to endeavor to collect at that place a magazine of 30,000 rations of straw, and 30,000 rations of forage corn.

‘ This magazine may eventually be of use to you, even if I should not have occasion to send any horses to Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 11th, I have received your letter which you had written on the 22nd May, and had given to Alava, but I have heard nothing of Alava himself.

‘ The King arrived at Madrid on the 13th of last month, and I hear that he has since been at Valladolid.

‘ Nothing has occurred of importance since I wrote to you, excepting that Ciudad Rodrigo is completely invested; but not with any great force on this side of the river Agueda.

‘ The enemy’s cavalry approached Badajoz again on the evening of the 9th, and carried off some cattle, &c.

‘ I return General Graham’s letter. Sir Brent Spencer is come here instead of Lord W. Bentinck.

‘ I could not spare the Commissary General to go to Cadiz, as proposed by General Graham. I have a very good opinion of Mr. O’Meara, but I am apprehensive that Lieut. Colonel Gordon will send somebody to Cadiz to supersede him. I shall keep him at the head of the department at Cadiz, if a superior officer should not be sent from England to take charge of it.

‘ I am apprehensive that it would not answer to employ more persons than one to negotiate bills upon the Treasury at Cadiz. One consequence would certainly be to raise the rate of exchange, and I should doubt that two or three shops would sell more bills than one. Duff’s opinion is decidedly against the employment of any other channel for these negotiations besides himself.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 9th. The government police regulation is quite inefficient. The object of the plan I proposed was to have a force capable of preventing the collection of mobs, and their mischief when collected; which mobs are the troops of the conspirators. The object of the decree of the Government is to discover conspirators and prevent conspiracies; but if one should by chance escape them, or if the mob should collect of its own accord, their plan gives them no force to get the better of it. It is therefore essentially deficient, and ought to be amended without loss of time.

‘ I am obliged to you for the intelligence from San Sebastian, &c.

‘ I had directed that Le Cor should be supplied from our magazines at Abrantes. The difficulty in establishing the 2nd line on the Zezere consists not only in provisions for the militia, but in money to pay them; as I understand that they are more expensive when drawn from their homes, than they are when left at them. However, *coute qui coute*, we must draw them out soon.

‘ I received from the Secretary of State a copy of Mr. Harrison’s letter to Colonel Bunbury, and we have completely refuted him. I will send you all the papers upon this subject. He took an estimate made for September, October, and November, as the scale of the expense for eight months, without adverting to the alteration of circumstances occasioned by change of position, increase of prices, of numbers, &c., and concluded upon his own statement that we ought to have money in hand, (having included in it, by the bye, some sums which we had not received,) notwithstanding that our distress had been complained of by every post, and I had particularly desired in December that £200,000 might be sent out, and a sum monthly, equal in amount to the increased Portuguese subsidy. The amount of our estimate now is above £400,000 per mensem.

‘ I have heard no more of the additional £40,000 Portuguese subsidy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

‘ I have spoken to the Commissary General on the subject of the proposition contained in your letter of the 6th, for the relief of the Portuguese Government. The order that they shall have half of all the money that arrives, still continues in force, and will be obeyed to as great an extent as may be possible consistently with the urgent calls upon the military chest. Besides this, they may have immediately all the money which we have in French coins, and any sum in paper money which it may be thought proper to give them, consistently with the attention which it is necessary to give to the state of the market for the sale of paper.

‘ In respect to the wheat, Mr. Kennedy was desirous of considering your proposition upon that subject till the next post shall leave this place before he should give an answer to it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

‘ As soon as the enemy had completed their bridge under Los Carboneros, they passed some troops over the Agueda, and they occupied with their piquets, on the 11th, all the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo on this side of the Agueda; and the communication with the place is at an end. The heavy guns are, however, not yet brought up; and by the last letter which I had from the Governor, of the 10th, it appeared that he still possessed the ground from which the enemy could make their attack with most advantage.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 6th instant, the enemy have shown some troops, principally cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Puebla de Sanabria and Mombuey; and on the night of the 7th instant they attacked General Echevarria at Alcañizas, and dispersed his troops, and plundered the place.

‘ I imagine these troops were the division of General Bonet on their march from the northern provinces of As-

turias and Leon into Castille, to join the main body of the army assembled under the command of Marshal Massena. The enemy have likewise shown some troops on the left bank of the Douro, between the Tormes and the Agueda, which are probably the rear of the corps of the Duc d'Abrantes or the head of the division of Bonet on their march for the same object.

‘ Nothing of any importance has occurred in Estremadura. On the 9th a body of about 3000 infantry, with some artillery, went to Lobon, between Merida and Badajoz; and on the same evening a body of about 400 cavalry drove off some cattle from the neighbourhood of Badajoz.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 2nd instant, when nothing of importance had occurred. The enemy had not evacuated the Trocadero.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 14th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday.’

‘ It is very desirable that we should keep our advanced posts, and the picquets from them, in a forward situation, as long as possible; at the same time I am convinced that when the rivers shall fall, the enemy will pass the Agueda upon your left with the right of his army, as soon as he shall have brought up the ordnance and materials for the siege. The reasons which induce us to wish to maintain our advanced posts in a forward situation, would induce them to desire to force us in, and with their strength they can have no difficulty in effecting their object. I beg you to advert to this circumstance, and be in readiness to withdraw, when you shall find that the enemy pass the Agueda in strength.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I have no news this day from Badajoz. I had yesterday a letter of the 11th from Silveira. The detachment which had attacked Alcañizas retired towards Benavente.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 15th June, 1810.

‘ I received last night letters from General Silveira to the 13th. The Spanish division under General Mahy had made an attack upon the French at Astorga, but had been repulsed, and had returned to Villa Franca. The French cavalry, which had been at Alcañizas, &c., had returned to Benavente, and towards Astorga.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 15th June, 1810.

‘ Nothing of any importance has occurred since I wrote to you last. The enemy have not yet brought the heavy guns to Ciudad Rodrigo; nor have they passed the Agueda in force, excepting by the bridges near Ciudad Rodrigo, for the purpose of investing the place.

‘ It is desirable that you should have a communication with Colonel Le Cor, upon the certainty and speed of which you can depend, and let it go every day, as our *parte* does.

‘ I do not feel very confident in the capacity or inclination of the people at Ciudad Rodrigo to hold out, notwithstanding all their boasting; and when the enemy shall get possession of that place, he will have it in his power to choose his point of attack; and I think it probable that he will attack Le Cor, so as to get between you and me. You have instructions applicable to that movement; and you will derive great advantage from an early knowledge of what is passing on this side of the Tagus.

‘ As the weather is becoming hot, it is necessary that we should advert to the possibility of our troops becoming sickly in Alentejo. I wish that you would make inquiries which are the most healthy stations, and occupy them preferably to others. I have always heard that Portalegre is very healthy, which is fortunate; but Arronches is not so. However, your own inquiries will give you the best information.

‘ I would recommend that the troops should not go into huts, as long as it is possible to avoid it; and do not allow

them to turn out before daylight, or to be out after night-fall, particularly if you should be obliged to keep any of them in stations reported to be unhealthy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Beresford tells me that he has placed the 5th caçadores, now in Elvas, at your disposal. I have omitted to mention to you that I propose to attach General Leith* to your division. I should give him the command of General Tison’s brigade, and of the 2nd division; freeing you, for the present, from the details of that division, and leaving you in command of the whole force in Alentejo.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 15th June, 1810.

‘ Colonel Fletcher has repeatedly informed me of the assistance which you have uniformly given him, in the great work which he has undertaken and has now nearly executed, for which I beg leave to return you my best thanks.

‘ There are, however, two or three points in which I think you could render us very essential service, upon which I am now about to trouble you. One is to give us some of Popham’s telegraph vocabularies. I am very desirous that the naval code of signals and cyphers should be cut out of these books, in order that no evil should result from their falling into bad hands.

‘ I should also be very much obliged to you if you could give us some assistance in forming an establishment for each of these stations. I cannot well spare officers to go down and learn how to use a telegraph; and I am afraid of the mistakes and blunders which will result from using them by their agency, without previous instruction. Officers of marines, or steady midshipmen, or even non-commissioned officers of marines who know something of signals, or sober signal men, one at each station, with one seaman at each, would be a sufficient establishment for the present, and I would add to it what would be necessary hereafter. I would also request you to consider of the assistance which you will

* The late Lieut. General Sir James Leith, K. B., &c.

have it in your power to give us in the way of armed vessels. The right of our position will be at Alhandra, where the Tagus begins to open, where you could give us great assistance and security.

‘ I should think also that a gun boat or two, stationed on the coast between Mafra and Maceira, would be of service, in case the enemy should attempt to push a column along the beach.

‘ You will have heard from Mr. Stuart the state of affairs here. Notwithstanding all their boasting, I doubt whether the people of Ciudad Rodrigo will make a vigorous defence. The enemy have not yet attacked them, nor have they brought up the heavy guns, and yet they are already crying out. They have a formidable army in our front, but not enough yet to venture upon a serious attack of this country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 15th June, 1810.

‘ I was in hopes that I should be able to send you an answer this day, respecting the delivery to the Portuguese Government of the wheat contracted for by the Commissary General; but I find from Mr. Kennedy, that he was obliged to wait for an answer from Mr. Dunmore, before he could venture to decide upon your proposition. In the mean time, as the wheat is most probably not arrived, no inconvenience will be felt from the delay in giving the answer.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th, for which I am much obliged to you. Beresford will be here to day, and I shall have some further conversation with him about the Special Commission. I have sent many people to be tried by it, but it has not yet produced any effect. The want of carriages, and the desertion of drivers, become more grievous every day; and I am obliged to order an increase of our mule establishment, and of course of our expense, in order to make good this deficiency. I fear that all these carriages will fall into the hands of the enemy, who will work them as they ought to be worked. It is grievous to think, that the

want of habits of subordination and obedience in this good and loyal people, and of confidence and vigor in the Government, should tend so manifestly as it does to the loss of the country.

‘ I have accounts this morning from Ciudad Rodrigo. The French have not yet fired a shot at the place, nor have they brought up the heavy ordnance ; but the people begin to cry out. I fear, that after all their boasting, they will not hold out. I have no doubt that Massena has got together 50,000 men for this enterprize. This number, however, will not do his business for him in Portugal, whatever may be the result of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I am going to write to the Regency respecting their issuing a proclamation to have the harvest beat out as soon as possible after it is reaped ; also respecting their taking pains to collect at Lisbon as large a quantity of provisions, particularly grain, as possible. We shall have a great consumption there if we should be shut up in our positions for any time ; which certainly will be the case, unless the enemy should introduce such a force into the country as to oblige me to withdraw. It is desirable that you should press Lord Wellesley to encourage the exportation, as soon as possible, of cargoes of flour particularly, but if not to be got, of wheat, or barley, or oats from Ireland ; I shall not be in want for my troops, but the supply of the inhabitants may be a matter of difficulty, and should be looked to by the Government.

‘ I am afraid also that they are forming magazines of too great an extent in the Mondego, and even in the Douro : mine are limited, and so placed and circumstanced, that I can remove them or destroy them when I please ; and in case of our removal from hence, the enemy would get nothing : I shall speak to Beresford upon this subject. There is really no use in having 800,000 rations of rice at Figueira, which I fear cannot be consumed ; its removal is almost impossible, and its destruction very doubtful. Their great store should be at Lisbon, from whence they should feed periodically the Douro, the Mondego, and Abrantes. If the enemy should get possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, their next operation will most probably be upon Le Cor, if they are

strong enough. This will necessarily remove us from the valley of the Mondego, and all these great magazines here will at least be useless.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 16th June, 1810.

‘ I received last night a letter from Silveira of the 14th. He mentions a vague report of infantry having arrived at Zamora, from Salamanca and Valladolid.

‘ I have also a letter from General Mahy of the 11th, giving an account of his operations, which appear to have deprived the French of Leon. While he was engaged in this operation, the French attacked his advanced guard from Astorga.

‘ Let me know if the rain which is now falling extends to you, and makes any impression on the Agueda.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 17th June, 1810.

‘ By letters of the 13th and 14th, received this morning from Badajoz, it appears that Regnier has collected his corps in the neighbourhood of Merida, probably with the intention of drawing General Hill's attention that way.

‘ I have nothing of any consequence from Silveira. General Beresford has frequently expressed a wish that I should send back the 2nd regiment of Caçadores, in order that they may receive their recruits, &c.; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will make arrangements for sending them back, letting me know by what route.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 17th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th instant. I hope that Mr. Dunmore may have been able to give you some money within these last few days, as I understand that they have lately raised a large sum by bills on the Treasury. However, I shall speak to Mr. Kennedy on the subject this day. The troops in this army have not yet received their pay to the 24th of May, which they ought to have received, according to the King’s regulations, on the 25th of April. I have spoken to Beresford, as I told you I should, respecting the extent of the magazines to be placed in the Douro and the Mondego for the Portuguese troops ; and he wishes them to be confined to the amount stated in the arrangement which he settled with Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘ I do not think that any measure can be adopted, with propriety, to prevent the circulation of false reports, or to remedy the evil which results from them. I believe that false reports respecting the operations of armies are always circulated, particularly where British armies and officers are concerned. These reports are circulated even in this town, where there is no reserve upon any subject, and every person who chooses to call at head quarters sees the reports of intelligence received. Then we are the most indefatigable writers of letters and of news that exist in the world, and the fashion and spirit of the times give encouragement to lies. I know no mode of getting the better of the inconvenience, which is certainly the consequence of the circulation of these false reports, excepting to have no reserve on the subject of the real and well founded intelligence from the armies. I would not recommend publication, as it might lead to inconveniences of another description, and is beneath the dignity of every Government ; nor would I, as Colonel Peacocke very innocently but indiscreetly did last year, check by any public order or proclamation the circulation of any description of report.

‘ The enemy broke ground before Ciudad Rodrigo on the night before last, but they have not yet brought up their heavy ordnance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 18th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th with my brother’s dispatch.

‘ The return of Regnier’s corps agrees nearly exactly with what I have always supposed it to be; and I think that you have nothing to apprehend from it. It is probable, from the collection of his troops at and about Merida, that he is going to strike a blow at O’Donnell, or to annoy Badajoz by another reconnoissance. You know how to act.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Nothing new here. The enemy broke ground on the 15th at Ciudad Rodrigo.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 6th June, 1810, 6 A.M.

‘ I have received this morning the substance of some dispatches and returns of the 1st May, from Ney, intercepted in Biscay, which makes his infantry, in effectives, 23,105; cavalry, effectives, 4856, 4993 horses; field artillery, 1229; siege artillery, 1415; miners, &c., 1006: total, 31,611. Besides these there are 5023 men of this corps in hospital.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 17th, and I shall send an answer to the Government to-morrow. I received yesterday an English newspaper of the 1st; Mr. Windham was still very ill. The bulletin says that he had passed a restless night and was not better.

‘ An Italian servant of the Duke of Cumberland has made an attempt to assassinate the Duke in his sleep, in the night, with his own sabre. He had wounded the Duke desperately, but he was alive and not supposed to be in danger. The man had cut his own throat afterwards, and was supposed to have been mad or jealous.

‘ Mr. Banks had carried two questions against Government by majorities of ten, in favor of the abolition of sinecure offices.

‘ Silveira, in a letter of the 17th, received last night, tells

me that he had received reports that the French had 10,000 infantry at Zamora.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. General

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

‘ The intercepted letters, of which I told you yesterday that I had received the abstracts, contain accounts of the march of several small detachments of 2000, 3000, and 4000 men, towards Castille, certainly to join Massena.

‘ There is also a return of Sera’s division, amounting to 7223 men. This division is called the rear guard. It was on the 1st May at Vitoria, Tolosa, &c.: but we have heard of it so often that I should imagine it has come forward also. I am also certain, from a paragraph in one of the Duc d’Abrantes’ letters, that Bonet’s division which has come from Asturias is distinct from the 8th corps; so that altogether we have in our front a tolerable mass of men.

‘ The letter from General Silveira of the 17th, which I received last night, states that Kellermann (who was Governor General *de la haute Espagne*, and commanded for some time at Valladolid) and Bessières (who commanded either the whole or a part of the cavalry of the 8th corps during the siege of Astorga) had moved with the cavalry from Benavente, and the infantry which he had reported the day before to be at Zamora, to Astorga. This infantry was reported to General Silveira to be 10,000 men; and this report is confirmed by a letter of the 11th and 12th from Salamanca, stating that there were 8000 or 9000 troops at that place. It is probable, therefore, either that the enemy have been alarmed by the movements of Mahy upon Leon, or that, as their reinforcements have come up, they have resumed their original project of an attack upon our left, at the same time with one upon our centre and right.

‘ I received yesterday an account from Serradilla on the Tagus, that the French had ordered rations for 15,000 men at Plasencia on the 15th.

‘ There is certainly no want of food at Ciudad Rodrigo.

I fear there is much more food than the garrison and inhabitants can consume. They had provisions for forty days for the whole population when invested. To the last moment the markets of the place were well supplied. Under these circumstances, and at this period of the operations, I do not think it would be proper to make an attempt to give them relief.

‘From the numbers which it is now evident we have in our front, we may find it impossible to make the attempt at any period of the siege; but I do not think that any peculiar advantage would result from making the attempt at present; and not only would any relief given hereafter have much more effect, but it would be much more justifiable to incur a risk to make the attempt, after the garrison shall have shown their determination to resist, by standing a serious attack. We must, however, look to what, I fear, is the more probable event, that the place will be lost, and that we shall not be able to make any attempt to relieve it.

‘I have occupied Concepcion with a view to be enabled to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, and to cover your retreat upon Almeida, if you should be obliged to withdraw; at the same time that we are prepared for the evacuation and effectual destruction of that fort, if we should be obliged to withdraw entirely from the frontier.

‘From the enemy’s strength in our front, of which we have now a positive knowledge, it is almost certain that if you are obliged to withdraw from your position at Gallegos, it will be useless to hold Concepcion. All the preparations are made for destroying the fort; and I write to General Cox to have in readiness the means for drawing off the guns and stores from that place at a short notice.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I enclose a letter for the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.’

To Don Andres Herrasti, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘SIR, Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th, and from the information which it contains, and from

circumstances which have come to my knowledge of the operations which the enemy are carrying on, I am perfectly aware of your situation.

‘ I refer you to my former letters and to my communications by Colonel O’Lalor, and you may depend upon it, that I have not altered my intentions as therein communicated *. I have made every effort to have a diversion created in favor of Ciudad Rodrigo with some success; and I will not fail to do every thing in my power to assist the place, but I refer you to my former communications.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Andres Herrasti.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR, ‘ Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 11th, I have received your letters, Nos. 11 and 12, of the 20th and 21st May, one marked separate of the 19th May, and one marked separate of the 22nd May.

‘ I beg that you will direct the officer at the head of the Commissariat department at Cadiz to make such advances as you may think necessary, from time to time, to any of the heads of departments or other officers at Cadiz, upon estimates to be furnished by such officers; and these advances will be covered by warrants from me, when those officers shall send in their accounts of expenditures.

‘ I request you also to continue to make such temporary arrangements as you may think proper for the conduct of the duty of the several departments at Cadiz. I beg that you will detain Major MacGregor Murray, as an Assistant Adjutant General at Cadiz, and I shall put him in orders as an Assistant, to do duty at Cadiz, till His Majesty’s pleasure shall be known.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR, ‘ Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from Lieut. Colonel Beckwith regarding the allowed practice in the 95th, respecting the appoint-

* See extracts of letters dated 7th of May and 6th of June, 1810, pp. 95 and 171.

ments of staff to detachments from that corps employed on service; and I request you to allow of the employment and payment of staff accordingly, to the detachments of the battalions of the 95th, at Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ’

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.* ’ ‘ WELLINGTON. ’

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ’ ‘ Celorico, 19th June, 1810. ’

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th, and I am happy to find that you are sensible that I have always done every thing in my power to support and aid your exertions, and to facilitate, as far as was in my power, the performance of the arduous duties of your situation. ’

‘ Notwithstanding the various difficulties with which you have had to contend, of the nature of which those can have no idea who have no experience of the difficulty of supplying an army in a country but ill provided with food; in which the roads and communications are bad; and the means of conveyance bad of their kind, slow in their motions, and difficult to be procured, you have been very successful, as the state of the army, at the present moment in all its branches, shows; and this effect could not have been produced without great and well directed exertion and arrangement by yourself. ’

‘ It was impossible for me to resist a compliance with the desire which I was sensible you must have felt even when you arrived in this country, to be relieved from your situation; notwithstanding that I was convinced that you would bring to a close, with advantage, a service, the progress of which you had conducted with so much success, and I felt the inconvenience which was likely to result from the change at the moment it was made. I therefore consented to your being relieved; but I assure you I regret the loss of your assistance. With best wishes, ’

‘ Believe me, &c. ’

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,* ’ ‘ WELLINGTON. ’

Commissary General. ’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday morning from General Hill your letter of the 9th, with its enclosure, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ The abstracts of the dispatches and returns which you have sent me are very interesting; but it would be most desirable to have the originals, or copies of those relating to the enemy’s corps on this frontier.

‘ Nothing has occurred of any consequence since I wrote to you on the 13th. The enemy broke ground before Ciudad Rodrigo on the 15th, but had not brought up the heavy ordnance. I have a letter from the Governor, of the 13th, in which he holds stout language.

‘ General Mahy moved upon Leon from Villa Franca, twice between the 4th and 9th instant, and I believe obtained possession of that city: but the enemy attacked his advanced guard from Astorga; and he was consequently obliged to retire. They had before dispersed Echevarria’s small corps which had long been at Alcañizas, by an attack by surprise on the night of the 7th. Since they heard of Mahy’s movements, they have reinforced Astorga with cavalry and infantry; of the latter, it is said, 10,000 men; and they have either been alarmed by Mahy’s movements, or they have resumed their plan of attacking us by our left, as well as by our centre and right, since they have been joined by the several reinforcements, whose march is reported in the several letters of which you have sent me the abstracts.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford of the 14th instant, regarding the accounts of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion.

‘ Although His Majesty’s Government engaged to pay a certain sum for 20,000 Portuguese troops to the 31st of December, 1809, and the Portuguese Government had

actually in their service a larger number than 20,000 men, the regiments which were returned by Marshal Beresford to the late Minister, Mr. Villiers, as the subsidised troops, not having been complete, and not having amounted to the number His Majesty engaged to pay, the Portuguese Government did not receive up to the 31st December, 1809, the full amount of the subsidy.

‘His Majesty’s Government will have learnt from the King’s Minister at Lisbon, the exact amount which they did receive, and for what number of men in each month.

‘The Loyal Lusitanian Legion was not among the number of the subsidised regiments during the year 1809, for the reasons stated by Marshal Beresford; but if this corps had been among the subsidised regiments, it would make no difference in the settlement of their regimental accounts, which would equally have been settled by the Portuguese authorities.

‘All that appears wanting to effect this settlement is regular accounts and vouchers on the part of the corps; and it does not appear necessary, nor would it facilitate the settlement, to include the corps among the subsidised regiments for the year 1809. But if the Government should determine that the Lusitanian Legion should be one of the subsidised regiments for that year, it will be necessary to allow to the Portuguese Government the subsidy for that corps for the year 1809, in addition to the sum already paid. Even in that case I imagine that the Portuguese Government will not have received the full subsidy for 20,000 men in any one month of 1809.

‘In respect to the claims of the English officers of the Lusitanian Legion, they are chargeable upon the separate fund of £100,000 per annum, of the subsidy allotted to defray the expense of all the English officers in the Portuguese army. There will be no difficulty in settling these claims, when regular accounts and vouchers shall be sent in.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘ I have nothing this morning either from Estremadura or Tras os Montes of any importance. There is a report that Mortier had moved across the Guadalquivir from Seville.

‘ I find that there are some thoughts of making a sortie from Cadiz, which I think must fail. Whether it fails or succeeds, it will affect our situation in this country, I fear, injuriously.

‘ Whatever may be the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo, I think the French will soon discover that they have not a force sufficiently large to blockade Cadiz, and attack us in Portugal at the same time; and if we begin to make sorties from Cadiz, they will remove their force from thence to throw it upon this country: at the same time that the force at Cadiz, for want of cavalry, cannot be of any use to us as an army in the field acting on the rear or flanks of the enemy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

‘ As the hussars want refitting a little, and it will give Colonel Arentschildt an opportunity of bringing the foreigners to the rear, I propose to send you two squadrons of the 16th light dragoons, to relieve two of the hussars. The 16th are very strong; when I saw them the other day they were 59 file a squadron.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘ I had last night the honor of receiving your letters. The proposition contained in my letter of the 13th May, to fix your hospital at Ceuta, was only for your consideration. You must be the best judge of the propriety of adopting the measure; and I am perfectly satisfied that it should not be adopted, if you do not consider it advisable.

‘ I have directed Dr. Frank to send to Cadiz all the medical assistance which can be spared from the service of this army, and the stores which Sir James Fellowes has required.

‘The case of the bill of the 94th regiment for £1000, is entirely distinct from other transactions of the same kind which have come before me; and if Mr. Murray had mentioned it to me, I should have authorised him to give cash for the bill at *par*. This bill is drawn by the public officer at Jersey, on the Paymaster General, and would be credited, as cash, to the Commissary General in his accounts. I shall accordingly give directions that the demand of Mr. Dunmore, on the committee of Paymastership of the 94th regiment, should not be enforced.

‘I hope that my letter to you of the 11th June (marked A), respecting the hospitals of the Guards, will have induced Brigadier General Dilkes to desire that his letter of the 6th June to you might not be transmitted to England.

‘I entirely concur in the arrangement which you have made for the working parties on the Isla, and their payment, as stated in your dispatch (No. 16).

‘I conclude that you have reported to the Commander in Chief all the appointments which you have made, and I have no objection to them till his pleasure shall be known.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will desire Mr. O’Meara to send to the Commissary General a return of the Commissariat establishment at Cadiz, including Mr. Horne and Mr. Stoneman, appointed to act as assistant Commissaries by yourself. I have desired Mr. Kennedy to comply with your requisition for further assistance, if it should be in his power; but I am apprehensive that he will find it impossible to do so.

‘Dr. Frank is at present indisposed, and I cannot refer to him Sir James Fellowes’s letter of the 16th May, enclosed in your dispatch (No. 16); but I have no recollection of the detention in Portugal of any gentlemen in the medical department destined for the service at Cadiz.

‘I shall write to England for a supply of arms for the British troops at Cadiz.

‘I am much obliged to you for the information contained in your dispatch (No. 17). My letter of the 11th instant (marked B) contains an answer to that part of this dispatch which refers to contracts for supplies, and to the payment for them by bills on the Treasury.

‘There is no intention whatever, here, of sending from

hence a person to supersede Mr. O'Meara in the charge of the Commissariat department at Cadiz, and I hope that his appointment as a Deputy Commissary General will be confirmed by the proper authorities in England. It will be impossible for the Commissary General to go to Cadiz.

‘ My letter of yesterday’s date conveyed to you my opinion on the reference which you had made to me in your letter (No. 13) of the 22nd May; and I am concerned to find, by your dispatch (No. 18), that it does not agree with the decision of the Commander in Chief upon the same subject. The decision of the Commander in Chief, till altered upon a further representation of the case, must be considered final; but generally, it would be desirable that those points which you refer to me for an opinion should not be referred to the authorities in England, unless my opinion should not be satisfactory. With the best intentions on my part to decide on every point according to the regulations of the service, and the wishes of the Commander in Chief, I may, as in the case of the staff of the 95th regiment, differ from him, and this difference will only embarrass you.

‘ I beg that you will send Major General the Hon. W. Stewart to Portugal when you think proper.

‘ I think it probable from the opinion which your dispatch (No. 20) contains of the intended operation proposed to you by General Blake, that you will have exerted your influence to prevent its adoption, and I have no hesitation in giving my opinion of it. I have no doubt whatever that the enemy’s force in front of Cadiz is much under-rated. When the French passed the Sierra Morena in January, the corps now before Cadiz (the 1st, or Victor’s) was stated to be from 20,000 to 25,000 men; and I should think that it consisted of that number. I have a return of it of April, 1809, which makes it 43,000 rank and file, including sick: it was in the battle of Talavera, where its loss was great, but it is not probable that it consists of fewer men now, than it did when it passed the Sierra. The reserve also was at Cadiz, but that corps has, I believe, returned to Madrid with the King.

‘ However, taking the strength of the enemy before Cadiz, according to the accounts of deserters, as stated in General Blake’s paper, it must be observed, that this general attack upon them will be made by a smaller body than that

which it is supposed he has, according to this account, after making allowance for the guards to be left on the Isla, and for the reserve.

‘The success, in this view of the case, is not promising. But there is another view of the case in which, whether successful or otherwise, the operation appears to be but little desirable. Mr. Wellesley will have informed you of the immense preparations which the enemy is making, and of the force which he is collecting to attack us in this country, to which object it would appear that every other has for the present been sacrificed.

‘Notwithstanding all that has been done, the enemy has not yet collected a sufficient force for his purpose. He may be able to take Ciudad Rodrigo, but I doubt the sufficiency of his force to oblige the British army to evacuate the Peninsula. On the other hand, it is probable, from all accounts that have been received, that, unless reinforced very largely, the French army in Andalusia will be in a dangerous situation.

‘If these facts are applied to this intended operation, it will appear, that whether successful or otherwise, it will probably have the effect of increasing the force to be employed against us. If it should be successful, the force now employed in the useless blockade of Cadiz will be thrown upon our right through Estremadura. The French will evacuate Andalusia probably, and hold the left of their army in the Sierra Morena, covering their operations upon us. But the raising the siege or blockade of Cadiz, which would set at liberty a certain force of the allies now in garrison, would not give us the advantage of the operations of this force, as an army in the field, on account of the total want of cavalry, and deficiency of field artillery; and I much doubt whether the force could leave Cadiz at all, until I could reinforce them with cavalry.

‘The failure of the operation might, according to the circumstances attending it, either endanger the safety of the place itself, from the loss sustained, and the want of confidence which it would create, or it might produce the same consequences as its success.

‘The French officers, who are by no means satisfied with their situation in Andalusia, would probably call out for

reinforcements, when they should find that the allies had begun to make sorties from Cadiz, and the danger to which the French force in that quarter would be exposed would probably occasion its being withdrawn, owing to the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of reinforcing it, and of carrying on, at the same time, the other, and, at this moment, evidently more favorite operation.

‘ In every view, therefore, the operation proposed by General Blake appears to me likely to be injurious to the general cause. I can easily conceive the difficulty under which you labor in opposing yourself to the execution of this, or any similar project; but I would suggest to you to make use, upon any similar occasion, of the 4th article of the conditions on which I consented to detach any troops to Cadiz. This will relieve you from all difficulties, which you might otherwise feel, in discussing with General Blake the merits of the plan which he might propose.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘ I should be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to give the late Commissary General of the army, Mr. Murray, who is going home upon being relieved, a passage to England in one of His Majesty’s ships.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 9th, which you sent by sea. I think you are mistaken respecting the additional supplies of money to be procured at Cadiz for bills upon England; and that the increase of the rate of exchange, which would be the infallible result of the employment of any other person to negotiate our bills besides Mr. Duff, would not, after the first month or two, produce any increase of supply. The exchange at Lisbon is, at this moment, 20

per cent. loss; that at Cadiz nearly at *par*: it is not to be believed that out of such a profit as 20 per cent. to the purchaser of a bill, the holder of cash at Cadiz could not continue to defray the expense of smuggling, and risk to export money from Cadiz to Lisbon, and purchase bills at the latter place. Indeed we know that they do export specie from Cadiz to Lisbon; the last vessel which brought money on account of Government, brought a similar sum for individuals. The rise of the exchange, therefore, at Cadiz, which would increase the sums to be procured for bills at that place, would probably diminish the sum to be procured for bills at Lisbon.

‘ It is difficult to form an opinion upon this subject by any local or partial view of it; and I must say that the merchants and others at Cadiz, whose opinions a person would take on inquiry into it, would invariably give opinions against Duff’s monopoly, and his system of keeping down the rate of exchange.

‘ By employing another or other persons to negotiate our bills upon the Treasury they would share in Duff’s profits, and all money holders at Cadiz would gain by the increase of the rate of exchange. At Lisbon, where we have the means of employing so many people, we find it advantageous to employ only one broker; and I have never known an instance of our going more at large upon the market that the exchange has not been raised: and when once raised it does not fall.

‘ I have written to General Graham my opinion of the proposed operations.

‘ There is a very general report of peace throughout Spain, and even in the French armies, taken, I suppose, from the foreign journals; and the notion of the arrangement respecting Ferdinand is probably taken from the expressions in Ferdinand’s own letter to Buonaparte on Kolli’s business. I do not believe there is any negotiation for peace. I am convinced, however, that Buonaparte would be happy to make any arrangement which would tranquillize Spain, and would not throw the power of the government wholly into our hands. I believe there was something in Kolli’s story.

‘ I beg that you will tell the Regency that I have not lost sight of Ciudad Rodrigo, and that I shall do every thing in

my power to relieve that place. After making every allowance however for detachments to the north, and one, of which I received intelligence yesterday, to Plasencia, the enemy cannot have less than 50,000 men in my front, of which number from 6000 to 8000 are cavalry. I must leave the mountains and cross the plains to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, as well as two rivers, to raise the siege. To do this, including Carrera's Spanish division, I have about 33,000 men, of which 3000 are cavalry. Included are 14,000 or 15,000 Portuguese and Spaniards, which troops, to say the best of them, are of a doubtful description. Is it right, under these circumstances, to risk a general action to relieve or to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo? I should think not. To this add that there is nothing to relieve the place excepting the stores belonging to this army. However, I do not give the matter up; if they hold out like men they are worth saving, and I will incur a risk to save them. In the mean time they do not want stores or provisions. They have of the latter enough for a month to come, and plenty of the former, and there is time to try them.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘I received last night your letter of the 16th. It is no trouble to have the reports translated for Dom Miguel Forjaz. They are the same that go to the Secretary of State.

‘I am surprised at the doubts about prosecuting the Marquez d'Alorna. I thought the crime of being a French partizan was the only one now punished in Portugal. The Marquez d'Alorna is however a *fidalgo* of high degree, connected with all the great families in the country; and the same circumstances which have occasioned impunity in so many other instances of other offences are the cause of his safety. I consider the prosecution of the Marquez d'Alorna, however, to be a matter purely domestic, as long as he stays away; and probably it may be deemed a question in which the Regent and the members are so much interested personally, that it is not proper for us to interfere in it at all.

‘ I have written to Dom Miguel Forjaz upon the police and other matters. I wish Dom Miguel Forjaz had mentioned in what instances irregular applications for means of conveyance had been made. The Commissary General declares that he makes them invariably to the Corregidor of Viseu, according to the regulation of the Portuguese Government; but this is one of the tricks encouraged by the Government. The magistrates, when accused, accuse the British commissaries; the accusation is scarcely ever made specific, is never substantiated, but still it serves for an excuse in argument. It would be much better that Dom Miguel Forjaz should not interfere by placing the carriages at stages as he proposes. Really the difficulty is ridiculous; there are 40,000 carriages in this province. The consumption of the army in this quarter may be 100,000 pounds a day, including Portuguese; each carriage carries 600 pounds, and we are at the utmost four days from the navigation; this would not require many carriages. If there was any authority in the country, we ought to be better supplied than any army in the world.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I return you the telegraph. With the greatest difficulty we have discovered it, but it is very intricate and very imperfect, and no *cabo* in Portugal will understand it. I sent it to Beresford to beg he would look at it, and he found it so intricate that he tells me, in answer, that he could not understand it without the key. Observe that what is called the key is in the first page. We must have something more simple than this, or the whole expense will be useless. But if Government are determined to persevere with this code, let me have back the enclosed.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘ The enemy broke ground before Ciudad Rodrigo on the 15th, and have continued working ever since. They had not, however, brought up the heavy ordnance for the siege yesterday.

‘ I have had a letter from the Governor, of the 13th, in

which he declares his intention to continue to hold out; and expresses his confidence in the hope that we shall assist him. He complains that, owing to the destruction of the mills, he had been obliged already to commence the delivery of biscuit to the garrison; but, from the state of the magazines when the place was completely invested, I have no doubt that he has still provisions for thirty days.

‘The enemy has collected a very large force for this enterprise; and I have heard of the arrival of reinforcements in Castille from the northern frontiers. Unless therefore he should be induced to weaken his army for the siege, by detachments, in consequence of diversions made by guerrillas and others in different parts, I apprehend that any attempt which I should make to relieve the place, or to raise the siege, would fail, and might be attended by fatal consequences to the general cause. The army is, however, in a situation to be able to effect this operation if it should be advisable to attempt it; and I shall not give up all thoughts of it till the last moment.

‘Before General Mahy had received the letter which I informed your Lordship, on the 6th June, that I had written to him, to urge him to make a diversion on the side of Astorga, he had moved upon Leon, on the 4th, from Villa Franca; and he repeated this operation again between the 7th and 9th.

‘The enemy, however, attacked his advanced guard from Astorga, and obliged him to withdraw his troops from Leon.

‘These movements of General Mahy have induced the enemy to detach a considerable corps of cavalry and infantry to Astorga, which is, I understand, commanded by General Kellermann; or the arrival of the reinforcements in Castille may have induced Massena to resume his projects upon Galicia, which he had appeared to abandon when he first assumed the command; and the heavy ordnance for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was moved from Salamanca.

‘A considerable division of troops has likewise been moved towards Plasencia, and was in Baños and the neighbourhood, by the last accounts.

‘The war of the guerrillas is carried on with great activity throughout Castille.

‘The enemy has made no movement of importance in

Estremadura since I addressed your Lordship last. His force is collected in the neighbourhood of Merida, on both sides of the Guadiana; and the troops of the allies are in the same situations as before.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th, when nothing extraordinary had occurred.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, ‘ Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter and its enclosure, which I have received from Marshal Beresford, complaining of certain pouches lately sent out from England for the use of the Portuguese troops, and recommending that some person should be appointed to survey the supplies of this description sent to Portugal, who should be responsible for them.

‘ I heartily concur in this recommendation. It is shameful to see the manner in which Government have been served by the contractors employed to supply the Portuguese army. Not only the pouches and clothing are as reported by Marshal Beresford, but I have lately had occasion to observe that the knapsacks recently sent out are of such bad quality, as to be almost useless.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

‘ I have received a letter from Lieut. General Graham, in which he states that arms are wanting for the British troops at Cadiz; and I beg leave to request that a proportion may be sent there from England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Celorico, 21st June, 1810.

‘ I believe that Lieut. Colonel Grant writes to you; but, lest he should not, I mention to you that in a letter which he wrote me on the 17th, from Serradilla, he tells me that

he had heard that 4000 men had passed the bridge of Arzobispo on the 13th. In a postscript he says that he had just heard from Talavera of the 15th, that 7000 men of the enemy's troops had entered Truxillo that day, supposed to be from Merida. He believed they were from Arzobispo. I do not think they could reach Truxillo from Arzobispo between the 13th and 15th, nor could they hear at Talavera on the same day of the arrival of troops at Truxillo; Talavera being 12 or 14 leagues from Truxillo. However, all this is deserving of attention.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 21st June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday evening. I think you had better not attempt to send in my letter to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I have received some more letters intercepted in La Mancha. The French appear to have a very extravagant notion of the strength of Ciudad Rodrigo; they say it is well prepared for defence, and will hold out for twenty days after they shall have opened a breach. However, I believe you are right in your conjecture, and I should not be surprised if the silence of yesterday was to treat for surrender.

‘ These letters talk of further reinforcements, particularly of the arrival of above 7000 Imperial Guards at Burgos.

‘ I had also in the night an account from Serradilla of the 18th, stating that a division of 7000 men was at Truxillo on the 15th. It is stated that this division had retired from Merida, but if it be true that it was at Truxillo, as stated, it must be a division which is stated to have passed at Arzobispo on the 13th. I have a letter from Hill, however, of the 18th, who does not appear to know of the march of this division.

‘ These intercepted letters talk of the siege of Badajoz after that of Ciudad Rodrigo, and express an expectation, founded on the existence of a French party in the town, that Badajoz will not hold out.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General
R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 22nd June, 1810.

‘ The accounts which I received from Badajoz this morning, of the 18th, give some reason to believe that the enemy intend to evacuate Estremadura. They have destroyed their works in the Conventual of Merida; and about 1500 men had marched for Truxillo. This account appears to be in some degree confirmed by that which I received yesterday from Serradilla, of the arrival of 7000 men at Truxillo, although that account was not very consistent in itself, and does not agree exactly with that which I have received from Badajoz.

‘ It is not improbable that Massena wishes to concentrate his troops on this side of the Tagus; but we can do so likewise; and Hill has instructions applicable to this movement.

‘ I enclose a memorandum of the movement which I wish you to make in case of the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I consider not an improbable event.

‘ Carrera is now in operation with us, and cannot be better employed than he is with your advanced guard; but what will he do in case the enemy should succeed in taking Ciudad Rodrigo? Does he propose to continue in operation with the British army, or to join the Spanish army, called of the left? I mean that of the Marques de la Romana. If he should continue in operation with us, I should wish him to continue with your advanced guard.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 21st. Adverting to the great superiority of the enemy's numbers, I am not desirous that you should risk an attack by a superior force to you and Carrera. When they attack you in front (if they should attack you), they will certainly turn you by your left.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that I have just heard that Mr. Windham is dead. Lord Milton moved for a new writ for Higham Ferrers.’

*Memorandum for Major General Picton and Brigadier General
R. Craufurd.*

‘ Celorico, 22nd June, 1810.

‘ In the event of the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, I am desirous that Brig. General Craufurd should retire with his advanced guard upon La Concepcion. On his arrival there, that fort is to be evacuated by the troops of the 3rd division, who are to march to the stations Major General Picton will allot for them, in the cantonments of the 3rd division; and the guns, ordnance, and provision store in Fort Concepcion are to be sent back to Almeida, according to the arrangements already made for that purpose.

‘ The Portuguese six pounder brigade, now in Almeida, is then to join the 3rd division.

‘ The officer commanding at Fort Concepcion is to point out to Brig. General Craufurd all the arrangements which he shall have made for the destruction of Fort Concepcion.

‘ Brigadier General Craufurd will keep his advanced guard in front of Almeida, till threatened by an attack by a superior force, and when he retires from Fort Concepcion, he will blow up that fort.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 22nd June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 17th instant, and I concur entirely with you in thinking that it is desirable that the squadron in the Tagus, alone, should be employed in the transport of our money from Gibraltar and Cadiz.

‘ I write by this opportunity to Mr. Duff, who is our agent at Cadiz, to desire that the money may be invariably sent on board the vessels which you will send for it; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will fix the days on which those vessels shall sail, whether once a week, or once a fortnight, from Lisbon, and desire your secretary to let Mr. Duff know the days on which you will fix. It would also be desirable that I should know the days, that I might take that opportunity of writing.

‘ If, upon the arrival of the vessel from the Tagus at Cadiz, there should be no money ready, she might go on to

Gibraltar, and return to Cadiz, and remain there till a sum should be ready, or till the vessel of the following week should arrive.

‘ I suggest this arrangement for your consideration ; and I write by this post to Mr. Duff, and our Agent at Gibraltar shall be written to as soon as I shall hear from you that you have made this or any arrangement to send a vessel there.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 22nd June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 18th : my brother mentioned to me his wish that we should send to Cadiz a person of the description referred to in his letter to you ; but I acknowledge that I differ with him in opinion respecting the utility of such an arrangement. I am convinced that the only consequence will be to render more unfavorable the rate of exchange for our bills at Cadiz ; and that we shall make no permanent increase of our funds received from Cadiz by these means. I have communicated this opinion to my brother, but I have desired Duff to spare no pains to increase his remittances.

‘ I have also settled that the vessels sent from the Tagus shall bring the money from Cadiz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23rd instant. The instruction which I sent you on the 22nd was to provide for a particular event, viz., the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo. As soon as this should happen, it was obvious that the enemy would have his whole force disposable, and I should find it difficult, if not impossible, to cover the evacuation of Fort Concepcion, excepting in the manner stated in that instruction.

‘The instruction of the 28th May goes to provide for a different event, viz., the passage of the Agueda by the enemy in superior force to you, during the continuance of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. In that case I should have no difficulty in keeping up the communication with Fort Concepcion, as long as I might think proper, and at last I should be able to evacuate the fort.

‘According to this interpretation of the instructions, you will see that, if attacked during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, I wish that you should retire upon Fort Concepcion and Almeida if possible; but of course that must depend upon the enemy’s movements upon your left; but that as soon as Ciudad Rodrigo surrenders, you should withdraw upon Fort Concepcion, for which I conclude you will have time.

‘My object is to be able to continue in our present situation as long as possible, both to encourage a continued resistance at Ciudad Rodrigo, and to be able to relieve the place, if it should be advisable to attempt it, in consequence of any alteration in the enemy’s force. This does not appear to be a very probable event at present, and ought not to be provided for according to the common rules of prudence at any considerable risk; and there is a case not provided for in either of the memorandums of instruction, viz., the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the passage of the lower Agueda by the enemy in force at the same moment.

‘In that case I should wish you to retire as directed by the memorandum of the 28th May; and I should wish you to send directions to the commanding officer at Concepcion to evacuate that fort, and blow it up, and retire upon Almeida.

‘In order to be nearer the scene of action at this critical movement, and not to throw upon others more responsibility than belongs to them, I propose to move the military branch of head quarters to Almeida to-morrow. I think it may be expedient immediately to diminish our equipment at Fort Concepcion, so as to render the evacuation of that fort more easy, upon which I shall decide to-morrow morning when I shall arrive at Almeida.

‘Regnier moved from Merida on the 20th to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, and Hill is about to cross at Villa Velha.

‘Silveira tells me that the enemy have again diminished their force north of the Duero.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

‘General Regnier moved from Merida on the 20th towards Almaraz, and will probably come up to Plasencia. Hill will cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and will be at Castello Branco.

I enclose a letter for General Slade, containing one for General Hill, which I beg you to forward to General Slade without loss of time; desiring General Slade to form letter parties on the road to Castello Branco, till I can provide for the communication by post.

‘I am going to Almeida to-morrow, and will communicate with you by a guide party by Castanheira.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General
the Hon. L. Cole.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

‘I conclude that you will have moved across the Tagus, and I shall immediately send you information and instructions respecting your position, &c. You must draw your supplies from Abrantes.

‘I rather believe you will find your cavalry too numerous in the hills, and it may be advisable to keep it on your right in the Alentejo. However upon that point I shall instruct you.

‘Establish a daily post with Abrantes. I shall order a daily post to be established immediately between this and Castello Branco; and, in the mean time, I desire General Slade, who has his cavalry at Belmonte, to put letter parties on the road, letting you know where they are. One of them will deliver a duplicate of this letter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 20th, and I am much obliged to you for the readiness which you express to give us assistance. In respect to the yard, if the gentlemen of the navy will undertake to manage it for us, I have no objection to the yard being placed across the mast, or in any other way they please; but if we *unlearned* are to have any thing to do with it, I should wish to have only one arm to the yard, and I should think that if the yard were supported by means of two large sized blocks, thus :



there would be no difficulty in discovering the numbers intended. No. 2 would be under the block nearest the mast; No. 3 between the two blocks; No. 4 under the block most distant from the mast. However, upon all this you must be the best judge. I should think the establishment at each station ought to consist of the person to be in charge of the signals, and one or two men to assist him, to whom more would be added from the army when we should occupy the position.

‘ These officers and men should be paid and treated in every respect as parties from the fleet acting on shore, and probably you might think it expedient to employ an officer to superintend the whole.

‘ I write to Colonel Fletcher to request him to let you know what number of stations there are, and where they are; and I request you will let him know how many officers or men you will send to each: he will arrange where they are to reside near the signal post, and will desire the Commissary at Lisbon to provide for their rations. I also desire Colonel Fletcher to point out to you the situation for the gun boats in the Tagus; that is, where our right will be.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

‘I have just received your letters of the 20th. You may depend upon my cordial concurrence in any measures you may adopt for the support of Dom Miguel Forjaz. I am quite convinced that he is the only man in Portugal fit for the situation which he fills.

‘It is useless to write any thing in answer to the Bishop’s nonsense. I really do not understand what he means.

‘I shall write to you upon the police when I see what Government intends to do.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Almeida, 25th June, 1810. 4½ P.M.

‘I arrived here about two o’clock, but I have not received your letter of this morning, as it was sent to Pinhel to meet me, and I did not come by that road.

‘I have heard of the great explosion this morning, at or in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, and am very anxious to hear what it was.

‘Either Romana was misinformed of Regnier’s movement of the 20th, or he has adopted a most extraordinary and dangerous mode of covering it. He was himself on the 21st near Campo Mayor with 4000 infantry, and some cavalry; and he had a strong body of cavalry during the whole of that day at Badajoz. Either he does not intend to cross the Tagus, or he covers his march by these movements, and he will pass these troops by some of the lower ferries. I should believe that he did not intend to cross the Tagus, if it was not stated positively that he had destroyed the works of the Conventual at Merida.

‘I have directed the officer commanding at Fort Concepcion to evacuate that fort when you shall desire him to do so, removing those equipments which he has the means of moving, and blowing up the rest with the works. If you should retire upon Fort Concepcion, and the blowing up should devolve upon you, under the memorandum of the 22nd, I beg you to remove all that there will be means to remove,

which I believe is every thing, excepting some musket ammunition and provisions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I shall pay you a visit to-morrow morning at an early hour ; but do not let the expectation of my coming prevent you from going out wherever you may have business. I shall follow you.

‘ 5 P.M. I have just received your letter of this morning.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Almeida, 26th June, 1810, 7 P.M.

‘ I have nothing from General Hill this day ; but I have a letter from Badajoz of the 22nd, stating that the enemy had retired again.

‘ I have told Colonel Sutton that you would arrange a signal with him to let him know when he should evacuate Fort Concepcion, upon your retiring by the other road. There is certainly a very long tract of open country from your piquets to Gallegos, and from Gallegos to Alameda, to the river Dos Casas, and I wish it could be arranged to hold the ground on which your piquets are, and to have your infantry, or at least the main body, in the wood in front of Alameda, with your cavalry, and one battalion in Gallegos. I wish you would turn this disposition over in your mind, and see whether, by means of it, the piquets of infantry in front, which, after all, must be supported in their march across the plain to Gallegos by the cavalry, would not be as well supported as they are by the existing disposition.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Commissary General Kennedy, to which I beg to draw your attention. I have never heard of the board stationed at Lisbon to settle the price of provisions throughout Portugal.

If there is such a board, its duty is performed but little to the advantage of the public, and the general high price of provisions is a strong practical confirmation of the impolicy and uselessness of such an establishment. It would be much more desirable for the government to leave the price of provisions to find its own level, and to oblige the people to furnish means of conveyance for the army for payment. The price of provisions would then soon become reasonable in all parts of the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

‘ The enemy commenced his fire upon Ciudad Rodrigo on the 24th, and it has continued ever since. That of the place has been well kept up.

‘ Don Julian Sanchez, who commands a party of cavalry, which had been attached to the garrison for some time, quitted it with his party (195 men) without loss, on the night of the 22nd, and brought me a letter from the Governor, in which he states his determination, and that of the garrison, to hold out to the last.

‘ Don Julian states that the garrison had the quantity of provisions which I understood they had, and plenty of ammunition.

‘ Another person who left the place last night arrived at our advanced posts, and states that the enemy’s fire had destroyed a great part of the parapet on the side attacked; that the garrison had lost 150 men killed, and 500 wounded; that there was a fire in the town; and that they were in distress for provisions. I can give no credit to this last part of the report, from the knowledge I have of the state of the provisions in the fort, when it was completely invested, and from Don Julian Sanchez’s report of their state on the 22nd instant. The garrison still kept possession of the suburbs.

‘ It would be very desirable to relieve this place, the loss of which will be attended by many very important consequences. Among others, it will facilitate and connect the enemy’s operations upon this country, in the safety of which His Majesty takes so great an interest.

‘It is obvious, however, that it would be impossible to relieve, much less raise the siege of, Ciudad Rodrigo, without fighting a general action, with forces which, I have reason to believe, not from report only, but from intercepted letters and returns, are infinitely superior in number to any that I have it in my power to bring against them. With every desire, and a strong interest for the preservation of this place, I cannot conceive that any view of the interests of the allies can render it desirable that I should incur the risk of a defeat, under such circumstances, in attempting to effect its relief; and although I have encouraged the Governor to persevere in its defence, and shall still encourage him to persevere, by maintaining a position in the neighbourhood as long as possible, and thus obliging the enemy to keep his force collected for the purpose of this attack, I have repeatedly and invariably told the Governor that the measures which I should adopt, when Ciudad Rodrigo should be in danger, must depend upon a larger view of the interests of the allies in the contest than the mere preservation, however important, of that place.

‘There had been reports in circulation for some time of the intention of the enemy to evacuate Estremadura, and to cross the Tagus with the 2nd corps, which has been employed in that province hitherto; and the communications of the Marques de la Romana to Lieut. General Hill, of the 20th instant, gave reason to believe that this design was about to be carried into execution; and that the whole corps had moved upon Truxillo and Almaraz. On the 21st, however, they made another movement upon Badajoz and Campo Mayor, upon the former on both sides of the Guadiana; and the patrols were pushed forward to within one league of Elvas. The cattle in the neighbourhood of Badajoz and Campo Mayor were driven off; but I understand that the frequent recurrence of these patrols to the neighbourhood of these places has taught the inhabitants the mode of taking care of their cattle; and that their loss upon this occasion has been less heavy, notwithstanding that the enemy’s force was greater, than usual. The enemy retired again to Merida on the 22nd.

‘I moved the head quarters to this place on the 25th instant, as soon as I heard that the enemy had concentrated

his whole force on the north side of the Tagus, in order that I might be nearer the scene of operations, and might more easily direct the movements of the allied army; but, as the enemy continues in Estremadura, I shall remove the head quarters again to Celorico, as it is attended with inconvenience to have them so far forward.

The enemy has drawn again into Castille all the infantry which had been detached to Zamora, upon General Mahy's movements towards Leon. They have still some cavalry in that quarter.

I have no intelligence from Cadiz of a later date than the 9th instant.

The intelligence which I have received from different quarters tends to show the continued enmity of the inhabitants of the Peninsula towards the French, which breaks out into acts of open hostility whenever they are not in strength; and there are parties of guerrillas in operation in every part of the Peninsula from Irun to Cadiz. The intercepted letters from French officers, and from the adherents to the cause of the enemy in the Peninsula, tend to confirm the truth of this intelligence; and in many instances the writers express their conviction that the French power will never be established in this part of the world.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

In the existing state of Portugal, and adverting to the unprovided state of many of the Portuguese magazines, I beg leave to recommend that 2000 barrels of powder may be sent to the Tagus, in addition to the quantity heretofore sent.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter and several returns from Marshal Beresford, regarding the clothing for the Portuguese army.

‘ The object of the Marshal’s proposition is, that the British Government should send to Portugal materials for the clothing of the whole number of the Portuguese infantry, as stated in No. 3, instead of clothing made up for 30,000 men, being the number subsidised by his Majesty.

‘ He calculates the expense of the materials, for the difference of numbers, as equal to that of making up the clothing for 30,000 men.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Almeida, 28th June, 1810.

‘ My letters from Estremadura state that the enemy had retired on the 22nd to Merida; and it does not appear that they intend, at least at present, to cross the Tagus.

‘ Silveira tells me that there was still a small body of infantry and cavalry at Zamora.

‘ Your situation gives me a great deal of uneasiness; and it appears that, if the enemy should make their preparations to attack you before daylight in the morning, and should make the attack at daylight, you would find it very difficult to withdraw your corps. It is certainly very desirable that we should maintain our position as long as may be possible, but we must not risk such a loss as your corps would be. I have no apprehensions for the day or the night, but I am uneasy respecting the time which intervenes between the night and broad daylight. I think that, if your division was halted in the woods between Gallegos and Alameda, having one battalion and the cavalry and three pieces of artillery at Gallegos, and the piquets in their present situation, all would be safe. The piquets of infantry should withdraw to Gallegos at night, two or three hours after dark, and resume their situation after daylight in the morning.

‘ I have just received your letter of this morning. You propose exactly what I recommend in the beginning of this letter, viz., to show the infantry piquets on the heights in front of Gallegos, or in their present situation, and withdraw them at night. If you put them out, you must keep a battalion in Gallegos in the day time to support them. Indeed

in the day time, I do not think there is any danger for any thing. At night the battalion and piquets might go back to the woods, or remain at Gallegos, as you might think best. I conceive, however, that at present it would be in no danger at Gallegos, and to leave it there would be less harassing to the troops. I beg you to make your arrangements accordingly for to-morrow morning.

‘ I have heard from ——— that the enemy had shown themselves again upon the Douro, opposite Freixo de Espadacinta. They ordered rations for 8000 men for this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

Almeida, 28th June, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th, and I am much obliged to you for the pains which you have taken respecting our money concerns. I wait for your answer to my last letter, to determine whether or not I shall give Duff further assistance in procuring money; but I am still of opinion that we shall do best to leave the whole concern in his hands.

‘ The force in our front is certainly enormous; and I only lament that it is impossible for me to relieve the brave garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy broke ground on the 15th, and opened their fire upon the place on the 24th, which they have continued ever since. The garrison still keep up a vigorous fire. The town was in flames in two places the day before yesterday, when I was at our advanced posts, which are in sight of it.

‘ Don Julian Sanchez, a guerrilla, who had been attached to the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, left the place on the night of the 22nd, and made his way to our outposts with his party, with the loss only of one horse. He says that he brought with him 195; he brought in reality about 90. He says that the place was supplied with provisions for at least a month, and with plenty of ammunition.

‘ The Governor sent out a man on the night of the 26th. He said that they had lost 150 killed, and 500 wounded. This I do not believe. The town was in good spirits; but he said that they wanted provisions, which cannot be true.

‘The Marques de la Romana wrote to General Hill on the 20th, that Regnier was about to cross the Tagus, which report was likely to be true, from former communications which we had had to the same purport. In expectation of this movement, Hill had been instructed to cross the Tagus also, and to keep himself in Regnier’s front; and I then moved my head quarters to this place to be nearer the enemy, and more at hand to direct the operations. On the 21st, however, Regnier made one of his patrols to Badajoz and Campo Mayor, and he returned to Merida on the 22nd. I shall therefore remove my head quarters again to the rear. Hill had not moved, as Regnier retains his position.

‘I hear this morning that the enemy are threatening to cross the Douro into Tras os Montes, between the Tormes and the Agueda, upon our left, which is another reason for taking back my head quarters.

‘I am glad to find that the great plan of attack at Cadiz upon the enemy’s lines is relinquished; it would have undoubtedly failed. It would be a great object, however, if you could seize the Trocadero.

‘Send me the originals or copies of as much intercepted correspondence as you can get. I know so much of the French, that every letter is useful, and throws some light upon what is going on. Any return is desirable, particularly that of Junot’s corps.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,
‘The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.’ WELLINGTON.

Memorandum for the 14th Light Dragoons.

Almeida, 29th June, 1810.

‘The object in placing the 14th light dragoons at Val de la Mula, &c., is to keep open the communication between Fort Concepción and Almeida, and to assist and protect the retreat of the garrison to Almeida, under the orders which Colonel Sutton has received.

‘The officer commanding the 14th light dragoons will communicate with Colonel Sutton on this point. When the garrison shall have retired to Almeida, the 14th light dragoons are to cross the Coa by the bridge of Almeida, and to march upon Freixedas.

‘If General Craufurd should move the advanced guard to

Fort Concepcion, the officer commanding the 14th light dragoons is to put himself under his command.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, Almeida, 29th June, 1810.

I received last night from Stewart the letter which you wrote to me. I did not answer it then, as, upon the whole, I prefer the mode of occupying the ground which I had proposed to you. If you were to march from the wood to Gallegos every morning after daylight, the enemy from the heights of Marialva (from whence I understood from you that they could see all that passed in the plain of Gallegos) would see you; and they must then prepare to attack, or, at all events, make a reconnaissance with a large body: either would oblige you to retire, which is what we wish to avoid.

‘They may know the state of things at Gallegos under the arrangement I proposed, but I do not think it so certain as under the other.

‘I have ordered the 14th light dragoons to Val de la Mula and Aldea del Obispo, with a view to protect the retreat of the garrison of La Concepcion. I enclose the instructions which the officer commanding this regiment has. He is now at Concepcion.

‘I have said nothing about the relief of your posts of hussars on the lower Agueda; because I think the duty of them will be much better done by the hussars than by any other of the troops.

‘I have received your letter of this morning. I shall move the head quarters to Alverca to-morrow morning. There is nothing new this day from any quarter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General, ‘WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, Almeida, 29th June, 1810, 6 P.M.

‘If the Marques de la Romana should arrive at Guarda in the course of the night, I request you to direct him to Alverca, where I shall have my head quarters to-morrow.

‘There is nothing new. Ciudad Rodrigo is making a

capital defence ; and I only regret that the enemy have collected such a force that it is impossible for me to attempt the relief of the place.

‘ Believe me, &c. ’

‘ Major General the Hon. L. Cole. ’ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ Alverca, 30th June, 1810. Half-past 6 P.M. ’

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ’

‘ Colonel Murray will send you directions to increase the troops in your front to one brigade of infantry ; and General Slade will be directed to move forward the Royal dragoons to observe Sabugal and Rapoula de Coa, and to communicate by his left with the brigade of your division.

‘ As I am now so much nearer Almeida than you, and so near you, you need not move forward the remainder of the division under the order of the 28th May, till you hear from me. But have them well closed up with Guarda.

‘ I consider it certain, from the disposition made of General Craufurd’s division, that he will retire upon Almeida. The place still held out this morning.

‘ Believe me, &c. ’

‘ Major General the Hon. L. Cole. ’ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ Alverca, 1st July, 1810. ’

‘ I have at last received the return of Junot’s corps, which makes it 25,900 effectives, of which 5000 are cavalry. Bonet’s division is not in Junot’s corps, and this division is likewise in our front. The returns would make Junot’s corps and Ney’s amount to about 56,000 men effectives, of which nearly 10,000 are cavalry.

‘ Orders from the Emperor for Regnier to cross the Tagus have been intercepted. He is to be replaced in Estremadura by the 5th corps, or Mortier’s. However, I should doubt their carrying this measure into execution, for the Emperor, who writes from Dieppe and Havre, is evidently unacquainted with the state of affairs here, with the distresses of the French in Andalusia, and with the measures

which Massena has adopted of reinforcing himself, by collecting all the troops from the northern provinces.

‘I have ordered a brigade instead of a battalion to be at and about Castanheira, to observe Castello Bom and Castello Mendo, and the Royal Dragoons to watch Sabugal, communicating by their left with the brigade from the 4th division. I shall be obliged to you if you will send to these troops when you shall quit Alameda. I conclude that you will have no difficulty in retiring upon La Concepcion from your present position. There is nothing new from England.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General R. Craufurd.’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, Alverca, 1st July, 1810.

‘I received this day some intercepted letters from General Mahy, from which I observe that Buonaparte has ordered General Regnier to cross the Tagus at Alcantara and to manœuvre, in conjunction with Massena, on the right bank of that river. He has also ordered that the 5th corps under Mortier shall come into Estremadura, to replace that under the command of Regnier, which is to cross the Tagus.

‘I have some doubts whether these orders will be carried into execution; but if Regnier should cross the Tagus, I beg you will cross that river likewise at Villa Velha, with the infantry and artillery, and one regiment of Portuguese cavalry of your corps, leaving on the left bank of the river, about Niza, &c., the remainder of General Fane’s division of cavalry.

‘You will make this movement whatever may be the strength of the enemy’s corps, which will be brought into Alentejo to replace Regnier, for which I shall otherwise provide.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’ ‘WELLINGTON.

‘Ciudad Rodrigo still held out this morning. I believe that General Carrera’s division of infantry will soon pass the Tagus at Villa Velha, of which I gave you notice.’

Memorandum for Lieut. General Hill.

Alverca, 2nd July, 1810.

‘ When the enemy shall have brought the 2nd corps of the army out of Estremadura across the Tagus, it is probable that he will endeavor to turn the right of the main body of the British army, by forcing in the troops which will occupy the country between the Zezere and the Tagus, as soon as he shall have obtained possession of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ When General Hill shall have crossed the Tagus, there will then be in this part of the country the corps under the command of Lieut. General Hill, and the two regiments of Portuguese regular infantry, three battalions of militia, a brigade of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, which have hitherto been in that country under the command of Colonel Le Cor, and all the Ordenanza.

‘ If Lieut. General Hill should be in time, I recommend to him to destroy the bridge over the Elja at Segura. If the melting of the snow in the hills should keep that river full, he need be under no anxiety respecting his right.

‘ The object of the enemy will probably be to force the passes of the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere. There are two great lines of road which lead through these mountains from the Spanish frontier; one by the Estrada Nova, as it is called, and the other by Castello Branco and Sobreira Formosa.

‘ There are other roads which lead through these mountains certainly; but these are the principal and the only roads practicable for artillery.

‘ The first position which I should recommend to Lieut. General Hill to take, is upon the Ponsul with his own corps, with his centre at Idanha a Nova, occupying Ladoeiro with his cavalry, most particularly as long as the Elja shall continue full.

‘ The corps under Colonel Le Cor ought, in this case, to be at Alpedrinha, in order to observe the entrance on the Estrada Nova, and to keep up the communication with Belmonte and Guarda.

‘ If the enemy should endeavor to force or turn these positions with a superior force, the retreat of Lieut. General Hill will be by Castello Branco and the high road

by Sobreira Formosa, while that of Colonel Le Cor will be by the Estrada Nova, and each line of road must be defended.

‘The Estrada Nova has been destroyed, but I understand not very effectually. It will be necessary, therefore, that Colonel Le Cor, when he shall retire from Alpedrinha, should send his artillery by St. Vincente and Junçal towards Sarzedas, and make his way with his infantry only to Foz Giraldo.

‘Every part of both these roads may be defended. The first line on the great road is that of Ocreza, taking care to observe the road on the left from Junçal to Sarzedas. The next is the great position of the Alvito, with the right beyond the Ocreza at Villa Velha, and the left at Isna on the Estrada Nova; and the third is with the right behind the Ocreza, again at its junction with the Tagus. The Codes in front of Domingo also affords another position.

‘The positions in the Estrada Nova connect well with these, or they may be considered distinct. That at Moradad might continue to be occupied by Colonel Le Cor, even after the main body should have withdrawn from Sarzedas.

‘The two roads join at Cortiçada, and there is a separation at Cardigos; one road leading by Villa de Rey to the Barca upon the Zezere on the road to Thomar, and the other to Punhete and Abrantes.

‘As already stated, the Estrada Nova has been destroyed, and Colonel Le Cor knows in what places.

‘There are batteries in all these positions, and Colonel Le Cor knows where situated; but Lieut. General Hill should have them examined.

‘Preparations should be made to destroy the ordnance and ammunition in all the batteries from which the ordnance cannot be carried off, in case the troops should be obliged to retire.

‘General Fane’s cavalry, with the exception of the regiment which Lieut. General Hill will bring across the Tagus with him, will keep on the left bank of the Tagus on General Hill’s right and in communication with him. If obliged to retire, it will cross the Tagus at Abrantes.

‘If the batteries at Villa Velha should protect the bridge

at that place, it may be kept as long as Lieut. General Hill shall maintain the position of the Alvito : if these batteries should not effectually protect that bridge, it must be destroyed as soon as the corps shall retire from Castello Branco.

‘ All the ferry boats must be taken off the Tagus above Villa Velha, and afterwards above the right of the corps wherever it may be.

‘ Annexed to this memorandum is an extract of a report on the country, which is the subject of this memorandum.

‘ Major General Leith will be upon the Zezere as a support to Lieut. General Hill with the corps of troops placed under his orders.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 2nd July, 1810.

‘ From your letter of yesterday, which I received this morning, I think it possible that you may have come to La Concepcion. The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo places the whole of us in a new situation, which you will find provided for in the enclosed memorandum. If Ciudad Rodrigo should not have fallen, the instructions which you have before received are to hold good.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Memorandum for Major Generals Picton, Cole, and Slade ; Brigadier
Generals Campbell and Craufurd.*

‘ Alverca, 2nd July, 1810.

‘ Upon the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, the royal dragoons under Major General Slade, and the troops composing the 3rd and 4th divisions of infantry, and General Craufurd’s advanced guard, including with the latter, the 14th light dragoons, two squadrons of the 16th, and two of hussars, will be situated as follows.

‘ Brigadier General Craufurd’s advanced guard at La Concepcion, or in front of Almeida ; the 3rd division of infantry at Pinhel, Porto de Vide, and one regiment of Portuguese infantry at Freixedas ; the 4th division of infantry, General Campbell’s brigade, at Castanheira, &c., observing the passages of the Coa at Castello Bom and Castello

Mendo, and the remainder of the division at Guarda, the royal dragoons observing the upper passages of the Coa, as far as Sabugal.

‘ These officers are requested to communicate with each other, and with head quarters.

‘ In case the enemy should (*threaten to**) attack General Craufurd with a superior force, I wish him to retire upon Almeida, and eventually, should he find it necessary, across the Coa, holding the high grounds on the left of the river, and Valverde, and keeping open the communication with the fort as long as may be practicable.

‘ If the enemy should pass the Coa at Castello Bom or Castello Mendo in force, General Campbell is to collect his brigade at Jurumella, and is to retire gradually upon Guarda, taking care to give intelligence to General Craufurd at La Concepcion of his movement, as well as to General Slade. In this case General Slade with the Royals is likewise to retire upon Guarda.

‘ If the enemy should cross the Coa at any of the upper passages of the river, General Slade and General Campbell are to retire upon Guarda.

‘ It is desirable that, if it should be practicable, General Slade with the Royals should join General Campbell’s brigade in these movements, and General Cole will be in readiness to protect their retreat upon Guarda with the remainder of the division.

‘ When General Craufurd shall receive the account of the retreat of General Campbell, he will retire upon Freixedas.

‘ When General Picton shall receive the account of the retreat of General Campbell, he will collect his division at Pinhel, and as soon as General Craufurd shall have arrived at Valverde, he will retire by Souropires upon Alverca.

‘ If the enemy should attempt the lower fords and passages of the Coa in force, instead of the upper, or at the same time with the upper, or at the same time with an attack upon General Craufurd, General Picton is to give notice of this attempt to General Craufurd, who is to fall back upon Valverde, if not already there. As soon as General Craufurd shall have arrived at Valverde, General Picton will retire by the road of Trancoso till he shall pass Povia del

* See Lord Wellington’s Letter of the 11th of July, 7 P.M., p. 259.

Rey, and will come to the heights on which are situated Villa Franca, Foidal, and Povoia de Concilio, &c., and General Craufurd will retire upon Alverca, and General Campbell and General Slade upon Guarda.

'The regiment of Portuguese infantry of the 3rd division at Freixedas will receive their orders from head quarters.

'WELLINGTON.'

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Alverca, 2nd July, 1810.

'I have received your letter of the 25th, and I hope that the arrival of my letter at Cadiz will remove all difficulties respecting the transport of our money.

'It would not be proper for me to make any suggestion or request to you, inconsistent with the orders from the Admiralty, respecting the Norge. We ought to take care to have a large fleet in the Tagus, otherwise Buonaparte will strike a serious blow upon us, we may depend upon it. All the intercepted letters, and other intelligence, tend to show that he is making great naval exertions.

'Ciudad Rodrigo held out last night, but I fear that they will have surrendered this day.

'Believe me, &c.

'Vice Admiral

'WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

'The Duchess of Richmond tells me that she is going to send Lord March here.'

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Alverca, 2nd July, 1810.

'I have received your letters of the 25th and 27th. I have no recollection of receiving any letter from La Senhora Senora de Niz, and I cannot conceive to what troops her complaint refers. She has omitted to mention time, or the regiment to which the soldier belonged who is supposed to have been murdered. I rather believe that the story refers to a transaction by the drivers of the artillery, which was inquired into; but it is an useless waste of time to search for the papers, till we shall have some more accurate description of the circumstances from the lady.

'I have written to my brother respecting the sending a person to Cadiz, charged with the business of raising money ;

and as I differ from him and General Graham, I prefer not to send any body till I shall hear further from him.

‘ Ciudad Rodrigo still held out last night, but I am afraid that it must have surrendered this day.

‘ I have desired the Commissary General to give you all the money that can be spared.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Honorable Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Alverca, 3rd July, 1810.

I enclose a letter which I have received from General Cox, recommending the Curate of Garcirey to the Spanish Government. He is a person who has long given us intelligence of the enemy's movements in Castille, in consequence of which conduct he has been obliged to abandon his country, and I shall be obliged to you if you will recommend him to the Regency.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alverca, 3rd July, 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a paper which has been transmitted to me by General Mahy, which purports to be the translation of a letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to the Prince of Essling, which had been intercepted, conveying information of the strength of the allied armies, extracted from the English newspapers.

‘ It may be satisfactory to the Government to have the reason which this paper affords, for believing that the enemy have no better means of acquiring intelligence in England than are therein referred to; but I would wish again to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the inconveniences and disadvantage under which we labor, from the indiscretion with which intelligence of this description is continually published in the English newspapers. Very recently all the newspapers contained accounts, not only of the numbers, but of the positions occupied by this army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘Alverca, 4th July, 1810, 1 P.M.

‘I have received your note of half-past 7 this morning. The intelligence which I had before received from La Concepcion rendered this movement very probable. It would be desirable that if in your power you should occupy a height between Castillejo de dos Casas, and Val de Puerco, from whence you will have nearly as good a view of the plain and of Ciudad Rodrigo, as you had on the Azava.

‘I have spoken to the Commissary General regarding your wine. He has some on the road from St. Joaõ da Pesqueira, which you shall have. I shall ask leave from Marshal Beresford for the Captain of Militia, to whom you refer, to be employed on this service.

‘It appears by an intercepted letter received this day, that a corps of 10,000 infantry and some cavalry are to be employed under General Seras, in the country lying between Zamora, Leon, and Astorga. This is probably the same body of troops of which we have heard so frequently.

‘Bonet is either still in Asturias, or is to return to that quarter.

‘There is nothing new from the south.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General ‘WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.’

To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.

‘MY DEAR CAMPBELL, ‘Alverca, 4th July, 1810, 1 P.M.

‘I write to let you know that the enemy crossed the Agueda and the Azava this morning, and that General Craufurd has retired upon the fort of La Concepcion. The siege still continues. The roads to the Coa, however, in your front, are now open. Apprise General Slade of these circumstances.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General A. Campbell.’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, ‘Alverca, 4th July, 1810.

‘Ciudad Rodrigo still holds out, notwithstanding the efforts of the large force, and the formidable equipment

which the enemy have collected there. The fire of the place is as vigorous as it was at first, but that of the enemy has slackened within these last few days; from which circumstance, and from the continuance of the siege, and from some of the enemy's magazines having exploded at its commencement, and from the reports of deserters, it is imagined that they begin to feel the want of ammunition.

‘There has been a heavy fire of musketry on the last two nights; but there has been no change in the enemy's positions before the place.

‘The whole of the corps of Ney, and the greatest part of that of Junot, have certainly been collected in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the enemy occupy in strength the right of the Agueda as far as San Felices.

‘The intercepted letters and various reports would give reason to believe that the 2nd corps, under the command of General Regnier, would be brought across the Tagus. The recent movements of that corps however do not manifest this intention.

‘A division of about 1500 cavalry and infantry passed through the Sierra Morena on the 21st June; and their advanced guard, consisting of 300 men, were attacked at Los Santos on the 23rd by a detachment from the division of General Mendizabal, under the command of Colonel —, and were defeated.

‘A great part of the corps of Regnier was immediately moved by the great road of Seville to Zafra, probably to protect the junction of this detachment from Andalusia, and the corps had not reassembled at Merida when I received the last accounts from Badajoz.

‘No movement of importance had been made in Leon. It appears to be the enemy's intention to form a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, under General Seras, to occupy the country between Zamora, Leon, and Astorga, while a similar corps will be formed under General Kellermann, to keep up the communication between the main army under Marshal Massena, and the places in his rear.

‘My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 19th June, when nothing extraordinary had happened.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. Since writing this dispatch I have received accounts that the enemy had passed the Agueda and the Azava this morning in strength; in consequence of which Brigadier General Craufurd had retired with the British advanced guard to the Fort of La Concepcion.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, Alverca, 5th July, 1810.’

‘I have received your letter, dated two P.M. the 4th, and I am highly gratified by the conduct of Captain Krauchenberg, and Cornet Cordemann and his squadron of Hussars.’

‘I beg that you will tell Colonel Arentschildt that I will take an opportunity of reporting to His Majesty my sense of the conduct of the excellent regiment under his command, during the long and trying period that they have been at the outposts with you.’

‘The Marques de la Romana is still here, and I have had frequent conferences with him on the situation of affairs. He appears to agree that it is impossible for us to do any thing for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, excepting probably to enable the garrison to evacuate the place, by drawing the attention of the enemy to this side. I think they will find much difficulty in effecting their object; but our part of the operation does not appear either very difficult, or attended with much risk.’

‘In the mean time, it appears that the place is not breached; and there is no doubt that there are still provisions for seventeen or eighteen days, even supposing that the inhabitants have no supply excepting from the general magazine.’

‘The Marques de la Romana is strongly impressed with the importance of their holding out till the last moment, which is certainly true; and he feels that even if there is no prospect of relief, it is the duty of those in Ciudad Rodrigo not to give up till the last moment. He could tell, and has told, the Governor this truth, which probably would not come so well from me.’

‘If the enemy have drawn in again from Gallegos, I think it would be desirable that you should resume your position at Alameda, and place your piquets of cavalry on the Agueda,

so as at all events to have a view of the place, encourage its continued resistance, and know what is going on. In that case I would throw the troops of General Picton's division again into La Concepcion, and the 14th dragoons should continue there.

'If you think you are better on this side of the Dos Casas, you might either keep the 14th dragoons with you, or send a part, or the whole of them, to the rear, as you may think proper. If you want to keep only four squadrons with you, they had probably better be two of hussars, and two of the 14th, sending the 16th back. If you wish to have six squadrons, keep two of each regiment; and if eight squadrons, keep the whole.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will direct your posts on your right to communicate with General A. Campbell's brigade, which occupy Castello Bom, Castello Mendo, &c., if you should continue behind the Dos Casas.

'Believe me, &c.

'Brig. General,
R. Craufurd.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

'SIR, Alverca, 5th July, 1810.

'In my letter of the 2nd April I communicated to you my opinion that you should co-operate with the Marques de la Romana in any movements or operations which might have for their object to facilitate the collection of provisions for Badajoz, Campo Mayor, Olivença, and Alburquerque, and to form a magazine for the use of his army; and the existing situation of affairs in the Peninsula renders that object more than ever interesting.

'It is obvious that it cannot be effected as long as the enemy remain in possession of the open and fertile parts of Estremadura; and if these places should not be able to collect a part of the harvest now on the ground, and about to be cut, it must be expected that they will fall into the hands of the enemy for want of provisions.

'The continuance of the corps of the Marques de la Romana in its position on the frontiers of Estremadura and Alentejo, which depends upon the security of these places, and upon the accomplishment of this object, is important

to the cause of the allies, as affording additional security to the position of the British army in the Peninsula, and means of annoying the enemy in his operations against our position.

‘ The letters which have been recently intercepted contain an order to General Regnier to cross the Tagus with the 2nd corps of the army, and to manœuvre on the right bank of that river; and it appears to be intended to replace the 2nd corps in Estremadura by withdrawing the 5th from Andalusia.

‘ From all accounts received of the state of affairs in Andalusia, it is not very probable that the French can diminish their force in Andalusia without evacuating that province altogether.

‘ If the 2nd corps should be removed from Estremadura, and should not be replaced by the 5th, the Marques de la Romana will experience no difficulty in collecting his magazines in Estremadura without your assistance. Even if the 2nd corps should be replaced by the 5th, this latter will probably not be very efficient, and he may still be able to hold so much of Estremadura as to enable him to effect his object.

‘ But even if the 5th corps, having replaced the 2nd, should be sufficiently strong to prevent the collection of the harvest of Estremadura for the magazines of the places on the frontiers, it will be impossible for me to allow you to be cut off from the main body of the army, which would be the consequence of your remaining in Estremadura after the 2nd corps should have crossed the Tagus.

‘ If the 2nd corps should cross the Tagus, therefore, you must abide by my instructions of the 1st instant, and cross that river by the bridge of Villa Velha without loss of time.

‘ If, however, the 2nd corps should remain in Estremadura, it is desirable that you should, without loss of time, co-operate with the Marques de la Romana in an effort to dislodge Regnier from Estremadura, during such time as may be necessary to collect such parts of the harvest as may be required for the formation of the magazines.

‘ From the returns which we have of the 2nd corps, it appears to me that this measure will not be very difficult by the united corps under the command of the Marques de la

Romana and yourself, even though General Regnier should have been reinforced by the troops said to have lately arrived from Andalusia.

‘Accordingly, I request you to arrange an attack upon General Regnier’s positions in Estremadura in conjunction with the Marques de la Romana, adverting only to the following points:—

‘First; that it is desirable that the attack should be made by the two corps united in one solid mass.

‘Secondly; that it is desirable that the troops under your command should not cross to the left of the Guadiana.

‘Thirdly; that it is desirable that you should not move further than Merida.

‘Fourthly; that, if General Regnier should retreat across the Tagus, it is necessary that you should return and cross that river, according to my letter of the 1st instant.

‘Fifthly; you must, at all events, return to your position at Portalegre by the 1st August.

‘You will direct the Deputy Commissary General attached to your corps to be prepared to supply your troops with provisions in this forward movement; and General Leite will be written to, to have as many carts as can be collected, for the purpose of transporting the harvest to the magazines.

‘He will also be requested to relieve the troops under the command of the Marques de la Romana, as far as his means may allow, in the garrisons which they occupy, in order to strengthen his corps in the field.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

‘I have received your two letters of yesterday. The position you have taken up will answer our purposes perfectly.

‘You did exactly as I wished in retiring the day before yesterday. You could not have contested your ground, which, under the circumstances, it was no object to us to keep, at the risk of any loss.

‘I am glad to find that Colonel Elder’s battalion showed a good disposition.

‘There is nothing new from any quarter, excepting that the French continue to show themselves on the Douro, between the Agueda and the Tormes; and that the Duc d’Orleans* has arrived at Cadiz.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.

‘MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

‘I write to let you know that General Craufurd has a post at Fuentes de Oñoro, which will communicate with your post at Castello Mendo.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. Gen. A. Campbell.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 21st of June, and of the 26th November (No. 24,125), and one marked “separate,” of the 17th June. I concur entirely in the measures which you had ordered to be adopted for the accommodation of the sick officers under your command; and I recommend it to you to make it as convenient, as comfortable, and as spacious for them as circumstances will permit.

‘I also recommend it to you, if it should be possible, to hire a house for this purpose, rather than put the officers of the army, who may be taken ill, in a ward of the hospital, even though it should be fitted up. These directions must, however, of course be considered null and void, if they should be inconsistent with those which you will receive from the Secretary of State upon this subject.

‘I have also to observe that it is very desirable that, if possible, the officers of the army who should become sick should not be removed to the hospital, if the owners of the houses in which they are quartered, or the owners of any houses, will allow them to remain in them; and if the Medical Staff, general and regimental, are not sufficiently nu-

* Louis Philippe, King of the French.

merous to attend to the officers as well as the soldiers of your division, they must and shall be increased.

‘Lieut. General Graham.’

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 2nd. I approve highly of the circular letter to the Bishops. I would give an English officer for Lisbon if I had one; but we have not one to spare. I am obliged to employ Leith upon the Zezere.

‘Let the Spaniards have the uniforms. Have them valued, and get their receipt for them.’

‘Ciudad Rodrigo still holds out. It is said that the wall is not breached. The place ought to have sixteen or seventeen days’ more provisions. Don Julian says twenty, or even more. General Craufurd has his posts on the Dos Casas. The enemy are in Gallegos.

‘We hear that the insurrection is spreading and increasing in Castille. If this is true, the enemy will be obliged to weaken his force before Ciudad Rodrigo, and we may have a chance of relieving the place.

‘The Marques de la Romana went this morning.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 6th. I am not desirous that you should move across the Dos Casas, unless it should be perfectly convenient, or if you are to be exposed to an attack, and retire again.

‘The French still continue to show themselves on the Duero. There is nothing new from any other quarter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General

‘WELLINGTON.’

R. Craufurd.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

‘ The Marques de la Romana left us yesterday morning, and will probably be with you shortly after you receive this letter. I showed him the instructions which I wrote to you the day before yesterday, to which he objected the restriction to your crossing the Guadiana. You will observe that I have thus put this point, “it is desirable” that you should not cross the Guadiana. This only expresses my opinion; but you on the spot must be the best judge, whether you can effect your object without crossing that river; and whether you can cross the river with safety, or consistently with my other views for your corps, as stated in that dispatch.

‘ I believe, however, that when you undertake this operation, the difference whether you will be on the one side or on the other of the Guadiana, will be only the difference of a few miles of distance, as the river will probably be fordable every where.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th June, on the subject of fixing the prices of provisions, &c., in the country, on which I had written to you.

‘ It is probable that the demand and consumption of the army in the country is the cause of the high price of provisions, and other articles; and that the Cormaca in each district in which the army is stationed, or which contributes to supply its demands, fixes the price of provisions in reference to the additional demand thus created.

‘ I do not think it would be just towards the public, that an addition of 25 per cent. on all our purchases should be made to the price thus increased by our demands. We have a right to expect from the country the provisions which we require, at the same price which the inhabitants pay for the same articles; and I do not think it would be proper that I should consent to an arrangement which should have for its object to make us pay more.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from Duff, which I do not exactly understand. It appears that he has raised money which he has consigned to you; and that my brother has desired him to do so. I rather think my brother is not aware of the mode in which our business is settled here; and probably the mode most likely to avoid confusion in our concerns would be for you to hand over the 60,000 dollars to the Commissary General, and send Duff his receipt for them; and this sum can afterwards be handed over from the Military Chest to the chest of the “Aids.”

‘ I have desired Mr. Kennedy to give you all the money that he can.

‘ How much subsidy do you now owe to the Portuguese Government?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford with its enclosure, being the report of Brigadier General Miller on 3500 sets of accoutrements, of those lately arrived from England, which had been allotted for the service of the militia in the province of the Minho; which it appears are not new, the pouches small, and containing only 18 rounds of ammunition; to which I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 8th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday. I believe I told you that I had the return of Junot’s corps in detail. The account of the deserter is perfectly correct, but he has not stated all the troops of any division. The total effective infantry of this corps is 19,899; the cavalry, divided into eight instead of three provisional regiments, is 4716. The total effectives of the corps, including artillery, is 25,956.

‘ I have heard nothing yet from the garrison on the proposed plan of escape, and till I do, I do not propose to make any movements on this side; and I think upon the whole, that for the present you are best situated where you are.

‘ If you were to take the position at Espeja you would be obliged to fall back upon Villar Mayor, and you would be much exposed, and would find it difficult to fall back upon the army in this valley, if I did not at the same time collect the whole, or the greatest part of the army upon the Coa. This must be done if it is necessary, but it is desirable to avoid it if possible.

‘ I agree with you in thinking that the enemy will not attack Almeida, and it is not improbable but that after Ciudad Rodrigo shall have fallen, they will direct their march upon Castello Branco, and thus endeavor to cut in between Lieut. General Hill and me. But I have in some degree provided for this movement.

‘ You will observe, that, excepting by Guarda or this place, you could not join the army in the valley of the Mondego. If you were to retire by Villar Mayor, the enemy would be before you on the high road to Guarda. You would then be obliged to retire by Castello Branco, and whether the enemy take that road, or the road by the valley of the Mondego in their attack upon this country, it is most desirable that you should not be separated from the main body of the army.

‘ I hear from Estremadura, that Regnier has made a movement upon Sta Marta, Almendralejo, &c. &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

† *Brig. General* *R. Craufurd.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Alverca, 9th July, 1810.

‘ Although my different letters appear to me to provide for every probable event that may occur, it will save you some trouble, and will be satisfactory to you to be made acquainted with my wishes, in the event of the occurrence of certain events during your expedition into Estremadura.

‘ Under my former instructions you were directed to fall

back upon Abrantes, in case the officer commanding the troops in the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere should have been unable to maintain himself in those mountains; and in case he should withdraw himself from a communication with the bridge of Villa Velha, that bridge was to be effectually destroyed; and for this purpose you were to keep an officer and a party at this bridge.

You are still to follow the same instructions, and observe particularly that the destruction of the bridge at Villa Velha and all the boats there, in case the officer commanding in the mountains gives up his communication with that bridge, is most important for your march upon Abrantes, and your communication with the army. You must therefore leave a British officer and the party at the bridge of Villa Velha, and when they shall have done their work, they are to go to Abrantes by the left of the Tagus.

I have formed a corps under General Leith upon the Zezere, with the object of securing the retreat of Le Cor from the mountains; the communication of this army with the Tagus; and of yourself through Abrantes with Punhete. I think these points are tolerably secure, and in a few days will be more so.

But in the situation in which we are, it is necessary to provide for events which are possible, although I hope not very probable.

When Ciudad Rodrigo shall fall, it is probable that the enemy will direct the march of a large detachment, at least, of his army upon Castello Branco, and the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere. It is not very probable, but it is possible, that the Tagus may be fordable at Villa Velha; in which case, if the enemy should be able to cross that river, your march upon Abrantes would be difficult.

It is also possible that all my measures to secure your communication with Punhete may fail, owing to the strength of the corps which the enemy may throw into the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere.

In the former case, which is not very likely, you should direct your march to pass the river at Santarem: in the latter, I should have an opportunity of instructing you; but if I should not, I should wish you to pass the river at the same place, where boats will be prepared for you.

‘ Ciudad Rodrigo still holds out; and it is obvious will hold out as long as their provisions shall last. I calculate that they have ten days’ provisions from the 11th, even supposing that there was no private store in the town, of which it is probable there were some.

‘ According to the account of Don Julian Sanchez, they would have provisions for five or six days more. So that there is reason to hope that you will have time for your expedition into Estremadura; and if we can effect the object of the expedition, we shall be in great style.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

‘ This will be delivered to you by Lord Burghersh, whom I beg to introduce to you.

‘ I learn from Estremadura that Regnier is gone to endeavor to dislodge the Spaniards from Xerez de los Caballeros, in which I believe that he has succeeded.

‘ Sir Stapleton Cotton wishes to relieve the two squadrons of the 16th which are with you, on Monday next, and I shall be obliged to you if you will have them collected at that time to come away.

‘ I understand that there is some musket ammunition and some biscuit in La Concepcion, which may as well be sent back to Almeida, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Mr. Lutyens to settle with the Government, or the authorities at Almeida, for their removal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Brigadier General A. Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL, ‘ Alverca, 11th July, 1810, 6 P.M.

‘ The enemy got possession of Ciudad Rodrigo by capitulation yesterday evening; and this morning there was an affair with our piquets, of which I have not received the details, in which we lost Lieut. Colonel Talbot, 14th Light Dragoons, and 8 men killed, and 23 men wounded: we have

taken 31 men and 29 horses. General Craufurd has occupied Fuentes; but look out in the morning, and apprise General Slade of these circumstances. Tell General Slade that Carrera is about to march for Estremadura, according to the notice I before gave him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. General A. Campbell.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the weekly state of the army of the 1st July; and an abstract of the state of the Portuguese army taken from the return of the 10th June, which will show you the disposable force which we have to oppose to the enemy.

‘ It is very desirable that the reinforcements destined for this army should arrive at an early period.

‘ I likewise enclose the last state which I have received of the sick of the army. The difference between this state and the military return of the sick in hospital, is to be attributed to the fact that the regiments return all men as sick in hospital who have been sent to the hospital from the regiment, whether on the road to the hospital, convalescent at the hospital station, or on the road to join, recovered; and the hospitals return only those men who are actually on the hospital books.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

‘ The enemy passed the Azava in force, on the morning of the 4th instant, and obliged Brigadier General Craufurd to fall back with his advanced guard to the neighbourhood of the fort of La Concepcion, which had been occupied by a part of the 3rd division of infantry. In making this movement, Captain Krauchenberg and Cornet Cordemann, at the head of a small body of the hussars and 16th light dragoons, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves by making a gallant charge upon a superior body of the enemy.

‘ Upon mentioning the light dragoons, it is but justice to inform your Lordship, that they have been with the advanced guard throughout the winter, and have performed their duty in the most satisfactory manner.

‘ The 3rd battalion of the Portuguese chasseurs, under Lieut. Colonel Elder, had also an opportunity of showing their steadiness during this movement of the advanced guard, and the skirmishing of the enemy which attended it.

‘ The 1st hussars had five men and three horses wounded, and the 16th light dragoons three horses killed.

‘ The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo still continues, and the fire of the place is kept up with unabated vigor. The enemy having collected nearly the whole of Junot’s corps, between the Azava and Agueda, I have not thought it proper to push our advanced guard so forward as Gallegos again; and it remains upon the river Dos Casas: and the piquets of the enemy are on this side of the Azava.

‘ The Marques de la Romana was here last week to confer with me upon the state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula; and he appeared to be convinced of the impossibility of our affording relief to Ciudad Rodrigo, as long as the enemy should be enabled to keep collected near that place so large an army as he now has there. I have heard of the movements of the guerrillas in Castille; and I have reason to believe that the enemy has been in some degree distressed by their operations; but I do not find that they have weakened their corps employed in the operations against the place, or in covering them.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 4th instant, I have received reports that the corps of Regnier, after having been assembled at Merida, broke up again on the 2nd instant, and marched by Almendralejo and Almendral, to endeavor to dislodge the Spanish divisions of Ballesteros and Imaz, which extend from Olivença by Xerez de los Caballeros along the Guadiana into the Sierra Morena.

‘ From the accounts which I have received from Badajoz of the 7th, it appears that General Imaz had retired from Xerez de los Caballeros upon Oliva: and it is probable that all these troops will be obliged to fall back across the Guadiana into Portugal; as, by the movements of Regnier, he has cut off their communication with Badajoz by Olivença.

There had been some skirmishing between the outposts of these divisions and the French advanced guard, in which the French appear to have sustained loss; as seventeen carriages with wounded had arrived in Merida, on the 7th.

No movements of any importance have taken place in the north.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 26th June. Nothing had occurred there deserving your Lordship's attention; excepting the arrival of the Duc d'Orleans on the 19th.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

Since I wrote to your Lordship this day, I have received a report that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered to the enemy yesterday evening.

There was a large practicable breach in the place, and the enemy had made all the preparations for a storm; when, Marshal Ney having offered terms of capitulation, the garrison surrendered.

The enemy took up their ground before this place on the 26th of April; they invested it completely on the 11th of June; broke ground before it on the 15th of June, and opened their fire upon it on the 24th of June: and, advert- ing to the nature and position of the place, to the deficiency and defects of its works, to the advantages which the enemy had in their attack upon it, and to the numbers and formidable equipment by which it was attacked, I consider the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo to have been most honorable to the Governor, Don Andres Herasti, and its garrison; and to have been equally creditable to the arms of Spain, with the celebrated defence of other places, by which this nation has been illustrated during the existing contest for its independence.

I have been most anxiously desirous to relieve the place since it has been attacked; and have been prevented from attempting its relief only by the certainty which I had that the attempt must fail; and that the immediate fall of the

place and the irrevocable loss of the cause of the allies would be the consequence of the failure.

‘ I had intelligence, of the truth of which I could entertain no doubt, that the enemy had collected in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, for the purpose of the siege, the whole of the 6th and of the 8th corps of the army in Spain ; the former consisting of 31,611 effectives, including 4856 cavalry ; the latter consisting of 25,956 effectives, including 4716 cavalry, according to returns of those corps of a very late period which had been intercepted, and communicated to me. There were besides other troops employed in the communications with the rear, and with the right of the enemy’s army. The country in which I must have carried on the operations to raise the siege, or even to relieve the place, would have been highly advantageous to the enemy, on account of his superiority in cavalry.

‘ Under these circumstances, however much I have been interested in the fate of this place, not only on account of its military and political importance, but on account of its brave Governor, and garrison, and inhabitants, I have considered it my duty to refrain from an operation which it was probable would be attended by the most disastrous consequences.

‘ While the Marques de la Romana was here, I had arranged with him an operation, by which it was hoped that we might save the garrison ; but the absolute impossibility of communicating with the Governor, for several days, has prevented its execution.

‘ There was an affair between our piquets and those of the enemy this morning, in which the enemy lost 2 officers and 31 men, and 29 horses, prisoners.

‘ I have not received the detailed account of this affair ; but I understood that we have had the misfortune to lose Lieut. Colonel Talbot and eight men of the 14th Light Dragoons killed, and 23 men wounded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Alverca, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7 P.M., 11th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of this day. The fall of

Ciudad Rodrigo was to be expected, and the defence has been greater than we had a right to expect. I regret poor Talbot, he is a great loss.

‘I have looked over my instructions to you, and I see nothing to add excepting the word “*threaten*” in the fourth paragraph*. That is to say, it will run, “In case the enemy should *threaten* to attack General Craufurd,” instead of “in case the enemy should attack General Craufurd.” In short, I do not wish to risk any thing beyond the Coa, and indeed, when Carrera is clearly off, I do not see why you should remain any longer at such a distance in front of Almeida.

‘It is desirable that the communication with Almeida should be kept open as long as possible, in order that we may throw into that place as much provisions as possible, and therefore I would not wish you to fall back beyond that place, unless it should be necessary. But it does not appear necessary that you should be so far, and it will be safer that you should be nearer, at least, with your infantry.

‘If you should retire towards Almeida, and should break off your communication with the posts in front of Castello Bom, and Castello Mendo, it would be desirable that you should leave a small body of cavalry in that quarter, to communicate with, and fall back upon Brigadier General Alexander Campbell, and acquaint him accordingly.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. General R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

‘As Marshal Beresford has established his hospital at the mouth of the Mondego as well as ourselves, and it would be equally desirable to save his troops as our own, in case we should be under the necessity of quitting the Mondego, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order the whole of the hospital ships up to the mouth of the Mondego.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘Mr. Stuart will inform you of the state of affairs here.’

* See page 239.

To the Right Honorable Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

Alverca, 12th July, 1810.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on the night before last. I have not got the particulars; but it appears that there was a very large breach in the place, that the French were prepared to storm, and Ney sent in to offer terms, and the garrison capitulated. This is the report of two French officers who were taken yesterday morning in a skirmish with our advanced posts.

‘ I enclose the copy of a dispatch which I wrote to Government upon this subject yesterday, and which I think you will do well to communicate to the Regency.

‘ The enemy have made no movement that I have been informed of, since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I think extraordinary.

‘ The Marques de la Romana was here last week to confer with me upon the state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula. He appeared equally convinced with myself, of the impossibility of our effecting anything for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the danger of the attempt. I believe he wrote to the Regency from hence.

‘ Since my last, Regnier has made two movements to the southward; one to relieve a small detachment coming from Andalusia, which had been attacked by the Spaniards; the other on the 2nd instant, to attack General Imaz, and, I believe, Ballesteros. He attacked General Imaz on the 5th, and obliged him to retire to Oliva from Xerez de los Caballeros, and it was expected that he would also attack Ballesteros. But General Mendizabal, who commanded the army in the absence of the Marques de la Romana, states his conviction that Regnier would be able to effect nothing against Imaz and Ballesteros united. I fear that he will drive them across the Guadiana into Portugal, as he had already cut off their communication with Badajoz by Olivença.

‘ Regnier had certainly been ordered by Buonaparte to cross the Tagus; but I imagine that Massena found that the guerrillas, although active to a degree, were not able to annoy him much during the siege; and as he had it in his power to avail himself of the force which Buonaparte had ordered might be employed in keeping up the communi-

cation with the rear, he preferred to keep Regnier on the Guadiana.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,
The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley. WELLINGTON.

‘I heard last night that the Spanish troops in Asturias have been defeated, and that the French had advanced to the northern frontier of Galicia.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR, Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

‘I see by the newspapers that Lord March has been appointed to the 13th light dragoons, according to the intimation which I had received from the Duchess of Richmond, that the Duke had applied to have him removed to a regiment in this country. The 13th dragoons are in the Alentejo; and I think it would be better that you should send him here in the first instance, and I will take care of him. He might go by Thomar, from whence your son would forward him to me.

‘I have received your letter of the 7th instant, and will speak to the Commissary General this day, respecting the rations for the party of the navy, which I will settle as you wish, and will write to you by the next post.

‘The enemy have made no movement since they obtained possession of Ciudad Rodrigo. I have heard in various channels of the enemy’s naval preparations, which have given me some anxiety, and Government appear to be aware of them. I have repeatedly warned them of the danger of our position here, if the naval force was not sufficient, and I shall write to them again upon it. I do not think there will be much use in keeping a vessel of war at Figueira, if we have only an intelligent officer there to manage our transport and hospital concerns.

‘Believe me, &c.

Vice Admiral WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

‘ I informed you in my letter of the 11th that there had been an affair on that morning between the outposts of the two armies, of which I now enclose the copy of the report made to me by Brigadier General Craufurd*.

* *Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Craufurd, dated Val de la Mula, 12th July, 1810.*

‘ The enemy had, during the last three or four days, been in the habit of coming with detachments of infantry and cavalry into Barquilla, and with infantry into Cesmiro and Villa de Puerco, and I was desirous of cutting them off. But considering the vicinity of the enemy’s position, and his strength in cavalry, I did not think it prudent to send a small detachment, and I therefore ordered all that were off duty of six squadrons to assemble behind the Dos Casas at twelve at night, on the road which leads from La Concepcion to Alameda.

‘ It was between one and two when we crossed the Dos Casas, and not a shot had then been heard since six or seven the preceding evening, from which circumstance, and the severe fire of the 9th and 10th, I felt apprehensive that Ciudad Rodrigo had surrendered.

‘ Leaving Alameda on our right, and sending patrols on the road towards Gallegos, we went through the wood, and halted in a hollow within three quarters of a mile of Villa de Puerco. About sunrise, we marched off again; and I have to regret that I did not, as I originally intended, keep sufficiently to the right to come out of the wood between Cesmiro and Villa de Puerco; this would have prevented what happened. But the anxiety to do what we had to do, as quickly as possible, lest the enemy should have been advancing towards our position, (occasioned by the continued cessation of fire at Ciudad Rodrigo,) together with the appearance of some cavalry making off, induced me to take the shorter road, which led us through a bad defile.

‘ Immediately after the head of the column had come out of this defile, we discovered infantry, which, on account of a height and standing corn, were not seen until very close. The squadrons formed successively as they came out; and as the number of infantry did not exceed 300, they were attacked by Captain Krauchenberg’s squadron of hussars, followed by the 16th, part of the former having gone off after some French dragoons. The hussars received the fire of the square; but being unable to penetrate it, they passed on, leaving it to their left. Had the 16th come straight upon it, the square being then without fire, it would probably have been broken; but they were too much to their left, and passed it on the other flank. At this moment a most unfortunate mistake took place, to which alone is to be attributed the escape of the infantry.

‘ Some French dragoons were seen coming out of Barquilla, and behind them was a body of cavalry, which, from its position and manœuvres, every one supposed to be French. Another body of cavalry was likewise seen marching towards Barquilla, upon the road which comes from Valdespino, and no doubt was entertained that these also were French. This drew off our attention from the infantry, and the 16th and hussars advanced towards the cavalry that were near Barquilla, which, except the first mentioned party of French dragoons,

‘ I have had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the troops upon this occasion. The small body of the enemy’s infantry, employed on the patrole with the cavalry, appear to have conducted themselves in the most gallant manner* ; but they could not have avoided sharing the fate of the cavalry employed on the same patrole, if the appear-

proved to be the squadron of the 14th from Aldea del Obispo. Still, no doubt was entertained that those coming by the Valdespino road were French, but they turned out to be Captain Gruben’s squadron of hussars, who had been placed at night in the farm between Villa de Ciervo and Barquilla, in order to cut off the enemy’s retreat. About the same time, a patrole from the Gallegos road brought the report of some squadrons of cavalry having entered Alameda.

‘ Whilst this was passing, the 14th had come out of the defile ; and I am informed by Major Hervey that the following circumstances took place.

‘ Colonel Talbot, after the first squadron was formed, charged the square without effect, and was killed ; and whilst Major Hervey was forming the other two, he received an order from Colonel Arentschildt to march off from the left to oppose the cavalry near Barquilla, which he also supposed to be French. The enemy’s infantry, continuing its march, got into Cesmiro, which was too near to the enemy’s position for it to be possible for me to think of attacking it, particularly as we were now convinced that Ciudad Rodrigo had fallen ; although five companies of the 95th, and three of the 52nd, were in reserve between Castillejo and Barquilla.

‘ We took two officers and twenty nine dragoons, as your Lordship knows. Our loss you are also acquainted with.

‘ R. CRAUFURD.’

Return of the number of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of a detachment of the Army under the Command of his Excellency Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., in the affair near Villa de Puerco, on the 12th July, 1810.

‘ Head Quarters, Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	2	—	7	15	9
Wounded . . .	—	2	20	16	22
Missing . . .	—	—	1	1	1

* They were commanded by Captain Gouache, 3^e Compagnie des Grenadier du 22^{me} de ligne, who received the Cross of the Legion of Honor for his conduct on this occasion.

ance of the Hussars of the Legion, coming out of Barquilla, had not been taken for a body of the enemy, and had not occasioned a momentary discontinuance of the attack of the infantry, of which this body availed itself to withdraw into the woods, and to retire upon Cesmiro.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that the attempt to carry off this patrol was made between the Agueda and the Coa, immediately in front of the enemy’s army; and could succeed only by a *coup de main*. I enclose the return of our loss upon this occasion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR, Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Secretary of State, in which I have informed him of the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ The army has for some time been cantoned in this part of the country, in such situations as were most likely to afford accommodation and provisions to the troops, from which I could assemble it with convenience, if I had found it practicable to undertake any operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, which place it was obvious that the enemy intended to attack.

‘ The advanced posts under General Craufurd were in front of Almeida, between the Agueda and the Coa, and along the Azava, which runs into the former river between Gallegos and Marialva; and I had occupied the Spanish fort of La Concepcion, with a view to General Craufurd’s more secure communication with Almeida, and to cover the assembly of the army beyond the Coa, if that measure should appear to be desirable.

‘ Affairs remained in this situation till the 4th July, when the enemy crossed the Azava in force, and obliged General Craufurd to retire upon La Concepcion. Upon this occasion Captain Krauchenberg and Lieutenant Cordemann, at the head of a squadron of the 1st hussars of the Legion, distinguished themselves; and the 3rd battalion of Portuguese Caçadores, under Lieut. Colonel Elder, had an oppor-

tunity of showing their steadiness. The posts of General Craufurd were then extended along and in front of the Dos Casas; and he occupied La Concepcion and the neighbouring village with his advanced guard; and the enemy occupied Gallegos, Cesmiro, &c., on this side the Agueda and the Azava, with their piquets.

On the 11th in the morning Brigadier General Craufurd made an attempt to carry off one of the enemy's patrols, which for some days had been in the habit of going at daylight to Villa del Puerco. I enclose the copy of Brigadier General Craufurd's report upon this affair, which could succeed only by a *coup de main*, and the rapidity of the attack, and was successful so far as that the whole of the cavalry were taken prisoners. There is also every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops which charged the infantry.

The loss of Lieut. Colonel Talbot, of the 14th dragoons, who had lately commanded that regiment, and had brought it to a high state of discipline and order, is much to be regretted.

The small body of the enemy's infantry which formed part of the enemy's patrol appear to have conducted themselves in the most gallant manner; but they must have shared the fate of the cavalry, if the hussars, seen coming out of Barquilla, had not been taken for a body of the enemy, and had not occasioned a suspension of the attack, of which they availed themselves to retire into the woods, and thence to Cesmiro.

I enclose a list of the killed and wounded upon this occasion.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Rt. Hon. WELLINGTON,
Commander in Chief.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 12th.

Your complete success on the 11th appears to have been prevented by a series of accidents which could not be avoided. I shall be obliged to you if you will direct your posts on the left to report all extraordinaries to Major

General Picton's post on the Coa, and they might fall back upon them if necessary.

'The horses sent in were all sold by auction for the benefit of the captors, before your letter reached me yesterday.

'Have you any intelligence of the French having moved? Whatever may be their plan, I do not understand their keeping so large an army collected at Ciudad Rodrigo.

'There is a detachment of the Guards at Burgos, and it appears to be stationed on the road, as if to protect the journey of Buonaparte to that place. If this be true, they are waiting for him; but still they would separate their army in some degree for the sake of subsistence.

'Believe me, &c.

'Brig. General WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.'

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

'MY DEAR GENERAL, Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

'I have received your letter dated the 12th, 7 p.m., which I conclude was written yesterday.

'You are aware that General Slade, with the Royal Dragoons, is on the right of Brigadier General Campbell, and it is desirable that the posts which you have sent to Furcalhos should communicate with his post at Sabugal, and should fall back upon him if it should be necessary. I shall be obliged to you if you will give them directions accordingly, and write to General Slade.

'—— is put under your directions, and I think that you will do well to send to that quarter; but I have no Portuguese dragoons here.

'It is said that Regnier marched from Merida to cross the Tagus on the morning of the 10th, but I have not heard of his movement from any body on this side.

'It is strange that the enemy have made no movement since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. I should almost doubt their being in possession of the place, and should be inclined to believe that the cessation from fire has been an agreement for a certain number of days, to see whether they would be relieved, as, whatever may be the enemy's ultimate plan of operations, it must be desirable to them at least to see the banks of the Coa.

‘ I think you will do well to move your infantry to Junca, but you had better retain all your cavalry till you shall withdraw across the Coa.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General* ‘ WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of this day, and am much obliged to you for the perusal of Cocks’* letter, which contains a very clear account of the events of the 11th. I can show you Craufurd’s letter to me, which does not throw any blame whatever upon the 16th, and indeed I never heard a doubt upon the subject.

‘ The cause of the failure to take the infantry as well as the cavalry is, as Craufurd states to be, that a body of our own cavalry, which I conclude were Gruben’s hussars, were seen coming out of Barquilla, and were taken by mistake for the enemy, which stopped the attack of the rear squadrons. The 16th had nothing to do with this mistake, nor probably is any body to blame for it. The French infantry appear to have behaved remarkably well, and probably were so posted that no efforts of cavalry could have forced them.

‘ It would really not be fair to the 16th, to have any inquiry into their conduct in this affair. I have no doubt how it would turn out, but the very fact of inquiry supposes some grounds, which to suppose even would be injurious to them.

‘ You may show them this letter if you please.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General* ‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch of the 26th June (marked D).

‘ The questions which your Lordship has discussed in that

* Captain the Hon. C. Somers Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons, afterwards killed at Burgos.

dispatch are of a political nature, with which I can have no concern; and I trouble your Lordship upon the subject of them only to point out to you, that the object of my letter of the 30th May was not to induce His Majesty's Government to refrain from reinforcing Cadiz to any extent that might be deemed advisable to provide for the permanent defence of that important post, but to dispose of the troops after they should have evacuated Portugal, in such a manner as that it would be easy to reinforce Cadiz, if that measure was necessary; and that if the reinforcements were sent they should be well received by the inhabitants of Cadiz.

‘ However unreasonable it may appear to His Majesty's Government and to his subjects in general, and is, in fact, it cannot be denied that the people of Spain are by no means satisfied that His Majesty's troops have taken so active a share, and have performed such efficient services in the war, as might have been expected from them; and the necessity which existed of refraining from undertaking any operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo will render this opinion more prevalent.

‘ It will become still more so, if it should be necessary to withdraw the British army from Portugal, without making an effort to retain our position; and the transfer of the army to Cadiz, and the offer of its services for its defence after these events, will revive the disposition to attribute to selfish motives the interest which His Majesty's Government takes in the security of that place.

‘ However, these are political considerations for His Majesty's Government to decide upon. I have only thought it necessary to bring under their view the existence of these opinions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your Lordship's letter, marked private and confidential, of the 26th June. In that which I wrote to your Lordship of the 30th of May, I did not consider General Graham's feelings upon my superseding him at

Cadiz so much as I did the real injustice which such a supersession would be to him or to any man. I am convinced that General Graham feels as he ought upon such a subject; but the question is not what he will feel, but what it is just or expedient to do by him.

‘I acknowledge also that the justice of superseding General Graham is not the only point of this subject which I have considered. I think that I shall myself stand in a very awkward situation at Cadiz.

‘First; I believe that I am the senior Captain General in the Spanish army, excepting Cuesta, who is gone, or going, to the Balearic Islands. That rank, and the claim to command which it would give me, I should of course waive; but when your Lordship adverts to the opinions which prevail in Spain already respecting the operations of the British army; and to those which will prevail more strongly if we should evacuate Portugal, without making an effort to retain our position, does it not occur to you that I at least shall not be a very welcome visitor at Cadiz; and that the high Spanish rank which I hold will afford, and will be stated as the objection to me as the commander of the British troops in the garrison?

‘Secondly, therefore, I have no disposition to offer my services where they are likely to be refused, or where the offer is likely to be badly received.

‘At the same time I repeat that I am at the disposal of the King’s Government, and will do what they have directed or what they may think proper to direct.

‘I am glad to find that the King’s Government are so anxious respecting the result of the contest in the Peninsula, in which the interests of Great Britain are undoubtedly materially involved.

‘My last dispatches will have shown you the force which we have, and may expect to have, to repulse the attack of the enemy, who, it may be depended upon, will collect for this operation every thing that can be brought together. The head of a column of guards is at Burgos; and I should not be surprised if I was to hear that Buonaparte himself had come into Spain to direct these operations. Indeed, the orders which he has already given, and other circumstances, render this probable.

‘ From what I hear of Sir John Stuart, and from the reports which have been circulated of an intended attack upon Sicily, I think it probable that Sir John will not have sent off the troops expected here as reinforcements to this army; and this circumstance, and the great interest which your Lordship has expressed in your last letter for the result of the contest, induce me to suggest to you to send out to Lisbon, as soon as possible after you shall receive this letter, all the infantry which may be disposable. They might come in ships of war, which, if other reports of naval designs and armaments are founded, would not be useless in this part of the world; and the troops might return to England as soon as the danger should be removed, or as Portugal should have been evacuated.

‘ I beg to inform your Lordship that I have now three brigades in this army without officers of the rank of colonel even to command them; that I have not a General Officer to spare for any service; and that the troops from Sicily and America will have no General Officers with them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Alverca, 15th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th, and conceive that you are quite right respecting the position for the assembly of the troops.

‘ I have a letter from Colonel Grant of the 13th, from which it appears that the enemy are about to cross the Tagus at Garovillas, as well as at Almaraz.

‘ I have no certain intelligence of the enemy having made any movement since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, although there is a report that two or three divisions have marched by the Puerto de Perales into Estremadura; that is, Upper Estremadura. This is by no means confirmed; and as we have troops and officers in that quarter, I do not believe it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

SIR,

Alverca, 15th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th instant, containing one of the 7th from Dom Miguel Forjaz, in which he has enclosed one of the 5th June from Sr de Cardozo, in which the latter draws the attention of the Government to the consequences, which he supposes will result from the increased consumption of beef in Portugal.

Sr de Cardozo has not stated any fact on which his apprehensions are founded; and indeed they are entirely without foundation.

But, besides an omission to state facts on which to found his conclusions, Sr de Cardozo has stated some circumstances which are notoriously unfounded.

That of which Sr de Cardozo complains is, that for the last two years and a half the armies in Portugal have been consuming the cattle destined for the agriculture of Portugal.

I can only answer for the last two years, during which I positively deny that cattle for agriculture have been consumed by the British army; and I particularly deny that in the last year 26,000 head of cattle, belonging to Portugal, beyond the usual supply, have been consumed.

The Portuguese army, being all subjects of Portugal, cannot have added materially to the consumption of wheat since they have been formed. I cannot be so certain that the cattle killed for their consumption have not been those belonging to the agriculture of the country.

I am apprehensive that, as the Junta de Viveres do not pay for the provisions of the army excepting in Lisbon, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, till the contract for meat was lately entered into, the troops took cattle where they could find them, and that some of the agricultural cattle were killed for food.

In respect to the British army, it will be recollected, from the month of September, 1808, till the month of April, 1809, the number of British troops in Portugal was but small, and they were all collected at Lisbon, and lived upon the markets of that city. When the British army was in Spain, either in 1808, or from June, 1809, till January, 1810, it did not consume the cattle of Portugal. The cattle

in Spain are cheaper, and are easily got, and I know that none were brought from Portugal. Upon the return of the army into Portugal in January, 1810, it brought into that country not less than 1500 head of cattle, which may probably have been more than the amount of its consumption in Portugal, from April to June, 1809, before it entered Spain.

‘ The extraordinary consumption of the British army, then, which has taken place, has been from the end of January to this period, or for about five months.

‘ The average weight of the cattle is about 450 lbs. each; and the number of persons at present fed by the British Commissariat is 38,000, which would give a consumption of about 80 a day, and would make the number consumed about 12,000, or less than half the number stated by S^r de Cardozo. But it must be observed that some of the troops are at Lisbon, and others on the Spanish frontier of Alentejo; and that it is probable that the former are fed from the market of Lisbon, and the latter by supplies from Spain.

‘ But in this part of the army, in which there is the greatest part of the consumption, I can state most positively, from my own knowledge, that the greater part of the cattle come from the Minho and Galicia, and some from the frontiers of Castille; and the goodness of the meat, and the small price paid, which is much below the Portuguese contract price, proves that none of the cattle have been used, or even trained, for purposes of agriculture.

‘ What I have above stated to you will show that there was no extraordinary consumption in Portugal by the British army before the month of January last; and it appears by the reports of S^r de Cardozo himself, of the 26th February, that there were at that time in Portugal 218,000 bullocks for agricultural purposes, and 166,394 for food; of which there were in Beira alone 62,000 for agriculture, and 17,200 for food. We have drawn none from Beira.

‘ In respect to the decrease of the agriculture of Portugal in the last two years and a half, having, within the last two years, been in almost every part of Portugal, I can answer for the fact being directly the reverse; and the large sums which have been spent in the country during that period, in the purchase of the produce of agriculture at very advanced

prices, must have had the effect of increasing the cultivation of the country.

‘ It is true that means of transport for the armies are wanting ; but they are not wanting because the army have consumed the cattle which would afford those means, for those have not been consumed, at least by the British army, but because the inhabitants of the country are unwilling to produce them, and the magistrates will not force them to produce those means which they have registered. But if it were true that the cattle for agriculture had been consumed by the British army, the amount of consumption which I have stated, and which is the largest that we have known of, even if the whole had been taken from Beira, would not have occasioned this scarcity of means of transport.

‘ The remedy proposed by Sr de Cardozo to save the agricultural bullocks, and of course to increase the means of transport from the army, shows how little he has turned his mind to what is the peculiar duty of his office. That which he proposes is to issue salt meat or rice to the troops, instead of fresh beef. He forgets that the rice or the salt meat must be brought to the army on carriages ; that the demand for carriages will therefore be increased, as the bullocks which are given as food are driven up to it ; and that he is unable to furnish the number of carriages already required to feed the army with bread alone in its present position.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alverca, 15th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th. The mode in which you propose to demand payment for the clothing delivered to the Spaniards is very correct.

‘ In respect to the account with the Portuguese Government, I enclose the state of that between the military chest and the chest of the “ aids ” to the 24th June. I think there is an error in the abstract which you have enclosed, of that between the chest of the “ aids ” and the Portuguese Government. Owing to the mode in which Villiers settled the

amount, the Portuguese Government would not be entitled to the full subsidy till after the end of last year. For instance, Government agreed to pay for 20,000 men from the 1st of May, and Beresford was called upon to fix upon the regiments of the Portuguese army who were to make up these 20,000 men. Beresford did fix upon those regiments; but, owing to casualties, deficiencies of recruiting, and other circumstances, they never amounted to the number specified to be paid for; and I know that Villiers conceived that the Portuguese Government were not entitled to payment for more than the return of those regiments amounted to; and, as well as I recollect, he so stated in Parliament; at the same time I believe that the Portuguese Government had in their service not less than 40,000 men.

‘ Since the 1st of January, it has been differently arranged. Beresford, upon communication with me, and seeing the inconvenience and loss which the Portuguese Government sustained by the former mode of making up the return, put into the return of the subsidized corps a number of regiments, which amounted then, and have always since amounted, to more than 30,000 men; and the Portuguese Government, consequently, are entitled to the full sum which the King has engaged to pay them.

‘ From your letter it would appear that you had paid the Portuguese Government £650,441 16s. 3d., which sum, in addition to what Villiers had paid them, would be more than their due; but I rather believe that that sum is the whole that they have received, in cash, on account of the subsidy. But it appears to me that the credit side of their account ought to be corrected: First, by striking from £341,000 the amount to which they are not entitled, according to Villiers’s mode of making up the account. Secondly, by striking from £490,000 the sum of £50,000, which is the proportion of the subsidy for six months, allotted for the payment of the English officers, with which the Portuguese Government have nothing to do. After these deductions, I am afraid that the balance of £201,558 3s. 9d. will be reduced very low indeed, and will scarcely admit of the payment of the army demand on the Government for supplies, as stated in the enclosed paper, amounting to £146,540.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of any importance since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. They appear to have spread themselves a little for the convenience of supplies.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ We have received some cargoes of Indian corn from the Western Islands, of which the Portuguese Government may have a part, if you will speak to Mr. Dunmore upon the subject.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 16th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday evening. It is desirable that we should hold the other side of the Coa a little longer, and I think that our doing so is facilitated by our keeping La Concepcion. At the same time I do not wish to risk any thing in order to remain at the other side of the river, or to retain that fort; and I am very anxious that when you leave it, it should be destroyed. I beg you, therefore, not to have any scruples about doing it too soon.

‘ You may be certain, however, that when you do destroy that fort, you will be obliged to draw your cavalry into Almeida, &c.; and the communication with the right of the Coa, excepting at that point, will be at an end.

‘ I wish that it was not necessary to destroy La Concepcion: but we found it in ruins; and no man has urged me more strongly to destroy it than the Marques de la Romana.

‘ If you have any further communication with Loison, send my compliments to him, and tell him that I gave money to the officers of the 1st dragoons, and that the sum which he sent shall be transmitted to them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ It is almost certain that Regnier crosses the Tagus, and General Hill is about to do the same.

‘ Silveira writes me that he had been informed that Seras, who commands the corps which had been formed north of the Duero, had been ordered to attack Puebla de Sanabria, and to examine his position at Braganza.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 17th July, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from Romana, which I opened. The enemy are certainly crossing the Tagus, and Hill has got his corps at Alpalhaõ to cross likewise.

‘ I have a letter from Le Cor of the 16th, in which he gives me an account from a Spanish officer that the enemy had 4000 men, with artillery, at Baños; I conclude, to protect and assist the passage of Regnier.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

‘ The enemy appear to have moved a detachment of about 4000 men from their left towards Canaveral and Coria, apparently with a view to protect Regnier’s passage of the Tagus. I do not think they went by Perales.

‘ I have a letter from Salvaterra, stating that a part of Regnier’s corps had passed the Tagus on the 14th. Although this intelligence is probable, I do not believe it is strictly true. I think, however, that both General Hill and he must be across the river by this time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Can you get any intelligence whether the enemy are making any preparations at Ciudad Rodrigo for the siege of Almeida?’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

‘ The enemy, according to all the intelligence which I have received, having most probably brought his corps across the Tagus, I think it likely that this letter will find you on this side likewise.

‘ My letter, and the memorandum of the 2nd instant, took but one view of the subject, viz., the probability that, as soon as the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo would be concluded, the enemy would endeavor to penetrate into Portugal, with-

out making the siege of Almeida, which event must, however, be contemplated.

‘ If they propose to undertake the siege of Almeida, it is probable that Regnier, instead of manœuvring upon Castello Branco, will take to his right at once from Coria, or will enter Portugal, and will then proceed to his right by Monsanto and Penamacor. The enemy’s object will probably be to dislodge us from Guarda.

‘ If you should find that Regnier, leaving you at Castello Branco or Idanha Nova, moves to his right, I wish you to move immediately upon Atalaya, and send Le Cor forward to Caria, to keep your communication with us at Guarda. You will be prepared to move the following day to Belmonte, and thence to Guarda, where you will join the army; but, upon these movements, I shall instruct you further hereafter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 13th. I propose to write again to my brother respecting the Bayona Islands, as I am convinced that the Spaniards will not do there what is necessary, either so expeditiously, or so well, as we shall. Would any advantage result from the possession of one of the Faro Islands? This is the point to which Government has drawn my attention.

‘ We have found some water on the Berlings, and I have desired them to persevere in their endeavors.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the measures you have adopted respecting the hay.

‘ I write for Cadiz by the post which leaves this on Friday morning, and arrives at Lisbon on Sunday afternoon.

‘ Nine ships are fully enough for our purpose at Figueira. The hospital ships will still ply backwards and forwards as you before proposed.

‘ I refer you to Mr. Stuart for an account of the state of affairs here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, ‘ Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of any importance in this quarter since the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo. The greater part of their army continues near that place, with their advanced guard at Gallegos; and they have extended their right to San Felices on the Agueda; and they have detached a division of about 4000 men to their left, towards Coria and Plasencia, apparently to aid the movement of the 2nd corps d’armée across the Tagus.

‘ This corps returned to Merida after it had obliged General Imaz to retire; and broke up from thence again on the 10th, and moved towards the different passages of the Tagus, in conformity with the orders which had been received from the Emperor, as appears by the intercepted dispatch which I transmitted to your Lordship on the 3rd of July.

‘ Notwithstanding the repeated requests which I had made to the Spanish authorities to remove or secure the boats on the ferries, I have reason to believe that the enemy found those at every ferry; and by the last accounts they were passing at all the ferries between Almaraz and Alconeta.

‘ They protected this operation by the occupation of the Salor; so that it was impossible to attempt to interrupt it without incurring the risk of being too late on this side of the Tagus.

‘ Lieut. General Hill has orders to pass that river at Villa Velha, as soon as he shall find that Regnier’s movement is decided; and I hope that he is by this time at Castello Branco.

‘ I have besides formed a corps de reserve upon the Zezere, near Thomar, under the command of Major General Leith.

‘ A detachment from the enemy’s corps at Seville attacked General Ballesteros in the Sierra Morena, on the same day that General Imaz was attacked by General Regnier. General Ballesteros retired, as he reports, without loss. The French corps continued in the Sierra Morena, occupying Monasterio; and by the accounts of the 15th from Badajoz, it appears that the banks of the Guadiana had been entirely abandoned by the enemy.

‘ No movement of importance had been made in the

north; but General Seras, who commands the troops which are stationed between Zamora and Leon, had received orders to attack the Spanish detachment under General Taboada, which was at Puebla de Sanabria; and to ascertain the strength of the Portuguese detachment at Braganza.

‘I have received no intelligence from Cadiz since the 26th of last month.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

‘I enclose returns of the number of battalions, and squadrons, and companies of artillery in each of the eight corps composing the French army in Spain and Catalonia, which I have extracted from a book lately intercepted, with the letter of which the enclosed is a copy.

‘Each of the battalions ought to be reckoned 600 effective men; the returns of the 6th and 8th corps d’armée show that the battalions in those corps are stronger; and the squadrons ought to be reckoned 100 each. The artillery and others attached to each corps d’armée would make an addition of about 2000 men to each of those corps not equipped for a siege; and of above 3000 to those corps which are so equipped.

‘Besides these corps there is a division of Guards at Burgos which amounts to 7200 men, of which I have the returns.

‘It does not appear that there were any other troops on their march into Spain at the date of this book, nor any disposable for this service, excepting a corps of about 40 battalions, which had been collected at and in the neighbourhood of Nantes.

‘I would beg leave to draw the attention of His Majesty’s Government in a particular manner to this book. It is entitled, “*Emplacement des Troupes de l’Empire Français à l’époque du 1^{er} Juin, 1810. À Paris, de l’Imprimerie Impériale.*”

‘It contains the distribution at the moment of the whole French Army, in all the dependencies of the Empire! and it

would be a most useful document to His Majesty's Government. It is obviously one of an official and secret nature, but I should imagine that it would not be difficult to procure a copy of this book every month at the time it is printed.

'From the inspection which I have given to this book, it does not appear that the French Government had it in their power to reinforce their army in Spain to any greater extent, by sending fresh regiments or battalions. The whole army appears disposed of, in situations from which they could not be withdrawn without inconvenience; with the exception of the corps at Nantes. All the dragoons and the greater part of the hussars and chasseurs are already in Spain; and there remain only the heavy cavalry in the other dependencies of the Empire.

'The Guards are not included in this book; nor, I imagine, a body of French troops employed as Guards with the King of Spain.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

'MY DEAR GENERAL,

'Alverca, 19th July, 1810.

'I have nothing new to tell you this day, Le Cor writes from Castello Branco on the 18th, that the enemy arrived at Coria on the 17th, whether from Castille or the Tagus he does not say. He says that it is reported Regnier's head quarters were to be at Plasencia, so that I suppose the troops at Coria are those from Castille.

'From Badajoz I learn that Regnier was still at Caceres on the 14th or 15th, and it was not believed that he was about to cross the Tagus. Hill was at Alpalhaõ on the 16th, and Le Cor had not heard yesterday of his having passed the Tagus.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Brig. General*

'WELLINGTON.

R. Craufurd.

To Lieut. General Hill.

'MY DEAR HILL,

'Alverca, 19th July, 1810.

'I have just received your letter of the 16th. The information which I have received of the enemy's motions on the

Tagus is the same as yours. It is probable that they have passed, or are about to pass, but it is by no means certain.

‘The letters from Badajoz of the 15th say that the headquarters had not yet left Cáceres, which is possible; but I must observe upon the Badajoz intelligence, that it must be older than that which you have.

‘Regnier was certainly ordered by the Emperor to cross the Tagus with a view to aid in the operations against Ciudad Rodrigo; and he began his march long before he heard of the fall of that place. That event may have stopped it; and it is well that you should be cautious in your movements, till you shall be tolerably certain of his.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Gen. Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Alverca, 19th July, 1810.

‘The French have made no movement of importance since I wrote to you last. They have extended to their right as far as San Felices on the Agueda, probably with a view to procure subsistence more easily; and they have extended to their left to the neighbourhood of Coria and Plasencia. This last movement appears to have been intended to protect the passage of the Tagus by Regnier.

‘I informed you in my last letter that he had received orders from the Emperor to cross the Tagus. After his operations against Imaz were concluded he returned to Merida; and broke up from thence again on the 10th, and moved his corps to Cáceres, and sent a detachment by Truxillo to Jaraicejo. The Spaniards, notwithstanding my repeated representations on this subject, had all the boats at the different ferries unsecured; and he has made demonstrations of an intention to pass at all the ferries from Almaraz to Alcantara. But I have not yet heard that he has actually passed; and it is not impossible that this movement, which was intended to facilitate the operations against Ciudad Rodrigo, has been suspended since the fall of that place. However, if this be the case, I cannot understand for what reason the French have allowed nine days to pass, since that event, without doing any thing.

‘I was always certain that the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo

would be a most unfortunate circumstance, and would be highly injurious to us. But I never expected that this event would make such an impression on the inhabitants of Castille, as it appears to have made; and I am therefore apprehensive that the majority of them, with their usual blind confidence in walls, and in their own prowess, have lodged their moveable property in the place, and that the whole is lost. In no other way can I account for the sullen silence which they have adopted towards us since the place has fallen. We have not received a letter from Spain, or any intelligence, for the last ten days; and the officers who are out on the flanks of the army tell me, that not only they can get no intelligence, but can scarcely procure any body to carry their letters. This is not encouraging.

‘ I have had no further accounts of the enemy’s movements in Galicia since they arrived at Castropol. Seras had been ordered to attack Taboada at Puebla de Sanabria, and to look at the position of the Portuguese at Braganza; but he had not obeyed this order on the 17th.

‘ Mortier attacked Ballesteros in the Sierra Morena on the same day that Regnier attacked Imaz, and obliged Ballesteros to retire. I believe that Mortier’s corps remained in the Sierra Morena as far as Monasterio, although the people of Badajoz say that he is gone from Seville to Cordova.

‘ The same order which directed Regnier to cross the Tagus, directed Mortier to come into Estremadura; but I believe if that part of the order is obeyed, as it is intended it should, the French will be obliged to evacuate Andalusia altogether.

‘ I have lately received the “*Emplacement*” of the French army on the 1st of June, 1810, from which I have extracted the state of their forces in Spain and Catalonia. I enclose a return of the number of battalions of infantry, of squadrons of cavalry, and of companies of artillery, which they had in each *corps d’armée* on the 1st of June; to which ought to be added 7200 Imperial guards, either at or on this side of Burgos; and the French troops, composing the guards of the King of Spain, amounting to about 4000 or 5000.

‘ Each battalion must be reckoned 600 effectives, each squadron 100 effectives, and each company of artillery 100 effectives. The battalions, &c., of the corps in my front are

stronger, but there are some of these lately come from France, and great pains have been taken to reinforce these two corps. But you will observe that all this gives a force of not less than 240,000 men, besides gendarmes, sapeurs, &c., &c., who add to the strength of their armies.

‘The army in Catalonia is composed entirely of foreign troops, and there are a great many foreigners in the 4th corps.

‘I enclose the return * of the regiments and battalions composing the 1st, 4th, and 5th corps, which are in Andalusia, and the division Dessolles, which was there and may be there still, although I have heard that it had approached Madrid.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘Rt. Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘WELLINGTON.

* *État Général de l'Armée Française en Espagne.* 1 Juin, 1810.

Corps d'Armée et Généraux.	Nombre de Bataillons.	Nombre d'Escadrons.	Comp. d'Artillerie.	Observations.
1. Corps d'Armée, Maréchal Victor.	32	20	17	before Cadiz.
2. Corps d'Armée, Général Regnier.	29	18	17	in Estremadura.
3. Corps d'Armée, Général Suchet.	32	8	27	in Aragon and Valencia.
4. Corps d'Armée, Maréchal Mortier.	27	24	9	in the Sierra Morena.
5. Corps d'Armée, Général Sebastiani.	24	20	11	in Andalusia.
6. Corps d'Armée, Maréchal Ney.	37	16	24	Ciudad Rodrigo.
8. Corps d'Armée, Général Junot.	32	32	7	Ciudad Rodrigo.
Armée de Catalogne, Maréchal Macdonald.	58	21	26	in Catalonia.
Division Bonet.	16	1	1	in Asturias.
— Dessolles.	12	—	2	near Madrid.
Arrière Garde.	6	—	—	at Zamora.
Reserve.	—	16	—	attached to Ney's corps.
En garnison.	17	3	38	
Total	322	179	179	

In this account the Imperial guards, at and near Burgos, 7200 men, and the King of Spain's guards, 4000 or 5000 men, are not included.

N.B. There is more French artillery in the 1st corps, and more foreign artillery in the 4th and 8th, than is mentioned in the *État Général*^a.

^a The detail of the divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions, with their generals, colonels, &c., accompanies this *État Général*, but has been omitted, being too voluminous.

‘ The return of the artillery in these corps has not been extracted so correctly as that of the infantry and cavalry. There is some foreign artillery in the 4th and 8th corps, and in the army of Catalonia, not included ; and, I think, some French artillery with the first corps.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

‘ I have received this morning your letter of the 17th, and I reckon that you will arrive this day at Castello Branco.

‘ I have no doubt whatever that Regnier has crossed the Tagus ; and the enclosed copies of reports from our outposts will show you that his route is most probably towards Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ If your intelligence should confirm that which I enclose, or does not contradict it, you had better move in the morning to Atalaya.

‘ I do not know how Le Cor’s troops are posted : if he has any on the left of Castello Branco, they might come on farther than Atalaya, to keep up your communication with us by Guarda.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received intelligence that Regnier has crossed the Tagus, and is at Plasencia.

‘ I have also received intelligence that the French in Asturias, who had moved forward to Castropol on the frontiers of Galicia, had retired again.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

‘ I have heard that the Bishop of Plasencia is going to Lisbon ; and as we received great civilities from him when

we were there last year, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will show him any attention that may be in your power.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 21st July, 1810.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your letter of yesterday evening. I have heard from Hill, who was at Sarnadas on the 19th.

‘ I enclose the copy of a report from Captain Grant from Penamacor of yesterday evening. Le Cor tells me that rations have been demanded at Zarza, but I imagine for the troops at Moraleja.

‘ I have a letter from Silveira of the 19th, in which he tells me that 10,000 men had passed Ledesma for Zamora from Ciudad Rodrigo. I think that he has got this intelligence from Dubrawa, and there is reason to believe that it is not true.

‘ I hear that there is a large quantity of cannon at Gallegos, but I do not know whether it is of a large size.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. General R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 22nd July, 1810. 8 P.M.

‘ I went to General Campbell this day, for which reason I did not write to you by the *parte*.

‘ I had a letter from General Hill from Castello Branco yesterday. It appears that Regnier's corps was, on the 20th, still at Coria and Moraleja, and there was a detachment at Ceclavin, and there were other reasons for believing that they were to move upon Zibreira. I have ordered two battalions to support your flanks; but I am not desirous of engaging an affair beyond the Coa. Under these circumstances, if you are not covered from the sun where you are, would it not be better that you should come to this side with your infantry at least? Let me know how your division is

situated as soon as you can, and I will answer you by the *parte* to-morrow, or earlier.

‘ I have a letter from Silveira of yesterday,—nothing new.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, , ‘ Alverca, 23rd July, 1810.

‘ I received in the night your letter of the 22nd. I have been much annoyed by the foolish conversations and reports and private letters, about the 16th light dragoons. General Cotton wrote to me shortly after the affair of the 11th, to request that the conduct of that regiment might be inquired into ; to which I replied, that in your report you had not made any charge against the 16th, and that it would not be just towards that regiment to make their conduct the object of inquiry, for a failure which appeared to me to have been produced by various unfortunate accidents, which could not be prevented.

‘ Two or three days afterwards General Cotton came here and told me that he had traced some of these reports and conversations to General ——. Upon which I had General —— and him before me ; after having pointed out to the former the inconvenience and impropriety of a person in his situation circulating any reports about the troops, I declared my determination, if I heard any more of it, to oblige him to come forward with a charge against the 16th. So the matter stands here.

‘ In respect to the business itself, it appeared to me from the first, that it would and must have succeeded, notwithstanding the gallantry and steadiness of the French infantry, if various accidents had not prevented the execution of the plan, as first formed ; and I have stated this, as my opinion, in the report which I have made upon the business.

‘ Your own report points out clearly the variations from the original plan, and the different accidents which occurred in the execution, among which, certainly, must be classed the charge of the 1st squadron of the 16th, to the left of the Hussars ; and the delay between the first charge by Talbot, owing to the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 16th having

gone off after the cavalry. But even then the infantry would not have got away, if the squadrons coming out of Barquilla had not been taken for the enemy.

‘ I can only say that I have never seen an attack by our troops in which similar, if not greater, accidents and mistakes have not occurred, and in which orders have not been given, for which no authority had proceeded from the Commander, and in which there were not corresponding accidents and failures. This is to be attributed to the inexperience of our officers, and I must add, to some good qualities in them, as well as in the troops.

‘ All this would not much signify, if our Staff and other officers would mind their business, instead of writing news and keeping coffee houses. But as soon as an accident happens, every man who can write, and who has a friend who can read, sits down to write his account of what he does not know, and his comments on what he does not understand; and these are diligently circulated and exaggerated by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies. The consequence is, that officers and whole regiments lose their reputation; a spirit of party, which is the bane of all armies, is engendered and fomented; a want of confidence ensues; and there is no character, however meritorious, and no action, however glorious, which can have justice done to it. I have hitherto been so fortunate as to keep down this spirit in this army, and I am determined to persevere.

‘ In respect to the 16th light dragoons, they appear in this affair to have conducted themselves with the spirit and alacrity of soldiers. They failed in the intelligence, and coolness, and order, which can be acquired only by experience; but it would be too hard to impute to them, alone, the failure of complete success, which may be traced likewise to other accidental circumstances; and it would be equally cruel to allow the reputation of this regiment to be whispered away by ignorance, idleness, and slander. You and I agree entirely upon the whole matter, and I have gone into this detail, just to explain to you what has passed here, and upon what principle I have acted.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

Alverca, 23rd July, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 22nd, and I conclude that you are now at Atalaya.

‘Regnier’s movements are by no means decided, but I am rather inclined to believe that he will move by Zibreira, &c. upon Castello Branco. If he should, you must move direct from Atalaya upon Sarzedas. Have the roads examined from Atalaya to Sarzedas. If he should come through Perales, I shall order you to Belmonte.

‘I have also received your letter of the 21st. I do not believe that Regnier has more than 15,000 men, of which not more than 11,000 or 12,000 are infantry.

‘In respect to Fane’s cavalry, I think you will find it useless and even burthensome to feed in the mountains, and I recommend to you not to take it.

‘The enemy have made no movement of any importance; and I cannot judge exactly whether they mean to attack Almeida or not. The *partie* leaves this every day at twelve.

‘Believe me, &c. *Lieut. General Hill.* WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

Alverca, 23rd July, 1810.

‘I received your letter of the 18th yesterday morning. I have no objection to the regulation respecting the boats on the Tagus, which appears calculated to carry into execution that which was before passed. There is nothing new here. The enemy have made no movement of importance within these few days, excepting a strong reconnaissance on the 21st, which induced General Craufurd to blow up La Concepcion, and to collect his advanced guard near Almeida.

‘Regnier’s movements have not yet decidedly indicated whether he is to join Massena, or acts separately in Lower Beira, but Hill is on this side of the Tagus, and at Atalaya, within two marches of our right. I do not yet know whether they propose to attack Almeida: I should think not; particularly as Regnier’s movements rather indicate a march towards Castello Branco. I think the accounts of the French force, in my dispatch of last Wednesday, are quite correct.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Alverca, 23rd July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, and the number of hospital ships which you have sent to Figueira will be quite sufficient.

‘ Do you know whether we have any transports at Cadiz? Because the Marques de la Romana is looking for means to get off from hence, if we should be obliged to go.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral ‘ WELLINGTON.
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL, ‘ Alverca, 24th July, 1810, 3 P.M.

‘ I have just heard that General Craufurd was attacked this morning under Almeida, and that he has retired across the Coa; and I have desired him to retire upon Carvalhal at this side of the Pinhel river. I have also desired him to send to your posts at Castello Bom and Castello Mendo, to desire them to retire upon the main body; but lest he should not be able to communicate with them, you will do well to send them these orders, as also to your post at Ponte de Sequeiros.

‘ If any of General Craufurd’s cavalry has crossed at Castello Bom, or Castello Mendo, or Ponte de Sequeiros, keep them with you, and let them patrol towards the Coa, and on your left towards Almeida. If they should not have retired, and are in communication with your posts, let them know the orders, and desire them to retire upon you. If none of General Craufurd’s should be with you, General Slade must afford you the means of patrolling to the Coa, and to the left, with his cavalry.

‘ General Slade should also draw in towards you in the course of the evening and night; but let him continue to patrol as far forward as he can with convenience, as I wish to be informed what the enemy do on our right.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. Gen. A. Campbell,’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Alverca, 24th July, 1810.

‘ I received in the night your letter of yesterday evening. The enemy’s posts at Cilleros and Valverde del Fresno indicate nothing but a desire to communicate with the main body of the army.

‘ I believe I omitted to tell you that I had got lately the *emplacement* of the whole French army of the 1st June, which is a very curious document, and gives a tolerable notion of their whole force in Spain, which is not less than 250,000 men. But I do not think they have means of reinforcing it much farther.

‘ This document, together with the returns which I have of the French corps in our front, gives me a knowledge of the names of all the principal officers, &c. employed with those corps; and any paper which may fall into your hands, such as a requisition upon a village, signed by an Officer or Commissary, would be of use to me, as it would serve to show in some degree their disposition, and would aid other information.

‘ I have observed that the French are singularly accurate in preserving the different *corps d’armée* in the order in which they are first arranged in the line of battle. The corps of Ney, Soult, Mortier, Victor, and Sebastiani are at this moment in the same situation, in respect to each other, that they held before the battle of Talavera; and Junot’s corps has come in and has been placed upon the right of the whole.

‘ Knowing the names of the officers, the numbers of the regiments and battalions, and the names of the commissaries attached to each corps, and the general order in which they stand in the line, the name of any person making a requisition, in any place, must aid me in forming an opinion of the disposition of the army.

‘ Hill is at Atalaya, but I have no letter from him of this morning. The 4th and 6th caçadores will be at Valverde and Aldea Nueva to morrow, at your disposition.

Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ 2 P.M. I have heard both from Pinhel and Valverde that there was firing in your front as late as nine this morning; but I conclude that I should have heard from you, if it had been serious.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ Alverca, 24th July, 1810.

$\frac{1}{4}$ before 3 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I have just received Captain Campbell’s note written at eleven. I think that you had better retire upon Carvalhal, holding Valverde and the heights upon the Coa only by your piquets, and communicate with the left of the Pinhel with General Picton. If you still have the left bank of the Coa, send to General Campbell’s post at Castello Bom, to retire upon the main body, and to communicate the same order to that at Castello Mendo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Alverca, 25th July, 1810, 11 A.M.

‘ From the letters which I have received from General Campbell, I believe that he has either marched to Guarda, or is on his way thither; and that General Slade will follow him there or will have gone there by some other road.

‘ This will be a little inconvenient to us; and I rather wish it had been avoided. If possible, I should wish you to stop General Slade somewhere in front of Guarda towards the Coa; and request him to patrol towards Ponte de Sequeiros, the ford of St. Miguel, Sabugal, and the road towards Almeida. Let him take with him the hussars and the detachment of the 16th which have come in with General Campbell, as well as the Royal dragoons.

‘ You know the country better than I do, and can point out a fit situation for General Slade; probably Parada would do as well as any other place.

‘ Tell him that I do not wish him to be engaged in any affair with the enemy; that all that I want is to have information of what is going on upon our right; and that if

threatened by an attack by a superior force, I beg him to retire upon Guarda.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Gen.

the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Keep General Campbell’s brigade at Guarda.

‘ If General Slade has come in to Guarda, send him to the front in the morning.’

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Alverca, 25th July, 1810, 6 P.M.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have received yours of half past 11. You will have seen by mine that you had done exactly what I wished.

‘ From the reports which I have of the enemy’s movements in General Craufurd’s front and on his right, as well as at Cinco Villas and Villa Torpim, I think it probable that they will move in the morning to dislodge his corps, or General Picton’s, or both, with a large force; and possibly with more extensive projects.

‘ I have therefore directed General Craufurd to fall back to Vendada, between Freixedas and Carvalhal, at moonlight; and I shall order him to retire still farther if I should find that the enemy are really in great strength.

‘ Pray apprise General Slade of these movements. I think he ought to draw a little nearer to you about daylight; and as the enemy’s movements may lead to a general retreat of the whole army, it would be desirable that you should fix upon some signal to be made to General Slade from Guarda when he is to retire upon that place.

‘ You shall hear from me by 9 o’clock. In these critical times I think it would be desirable that the forge carts of the Royal dragoons should be sent down the hill.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Gen.

the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

‘ The cavalry attached to General Craufurd’s advanced guard remained in the villages near the Fort of La Concep.

cion till the 21st instant, when the enemy obliged it to retire towards Almeida, and the Fort of La Concepcion was again destroyed. This fort had been destroyed by the French when they were in possession of Almeida, in the year 1808, at the time the Spaniards manifested the first symptoms of their desire to resist the yoke of the French Government; and it had been repaired by my directions when I deemed it expedient to occupy it. It has now been left in the situation in which I found it.

‘ From the 21st till yesterday morning, Brigadier General Craufurd continued to occupy a position near Almeida, with his left within eight hundred yards of the Fort, and his right extending towards Junça. The enemy attacked him in this position yesterday morning shortly after daylight, with a very large body of infantry and cavalry, and the Brigadier General retired across the bridge over the Coa.

‘ In this operation, I am sorry to say that the troops under his command suffered considerable loss.

‘ For various reasons it had been desirable to keep open the communication with Almeida and with the right of the Coa as long as was possible; but it was not intended to risk an affair or any loss for that object. The enemy had approached too near, however, before the retreat across the river was effected.

‘ The enemy afterwards made three efforts to storm the bridge over the Coa, in all of which they were repulsed.

‘ I am informed that throughout this trying day the Commanding Officers of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments, Lieut. Colonel Beckwith, Lieut. Colonel Barclay, and Lieut. Colonel Hull, and all the officers and soldiers of these excellent regiments, distinguished themselves. In Lieut. Colonel Hull, who was killed, His Majesty has lost an able and deserving officer.

‘ Brigadier General Craufurd has also noticed the steadiness of the 3rd regiment of caçadores, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Elder.

‘ Since yesterday the enemy have made no movement; and I imagine that they intend to attack Almeida.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship last, General Regnier has crossed the Tagus with his whole corps, and has been

established at Coria and Plasencia. I have received a report that on the 23rd he had moved about 1500 men to Zarza la Mayor, from which I conclude that his line of operations will be distinct from that of the other two corps.

‘General Hill has also crossed the Tagus, and is now at Atalaya, from whence he can either be joined to this army, or can be thrown in front of General Regnier.

‘The enemy has now no troops in lower Estremadura, and I have not heard of their making any movement in the north of Spain.

‘I have not heard from Cadiz since the 26th of last month.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of General Craufurd’s report of the affair of the advanced guard with the enemy yesterday, and adverted to in my dispatch of this date; and the return of killed and wounded upon the occasion.*

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

* *To His Excellency Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Carvalhal, 25th July, 1810.

‘I have the honor to report to your Lordship, that yesterday morning the enemy advanced to attack the light division, with between 3000 and 4000 cavalry, a considerable number of guns, and a large body of infantry.

‘On the first appearance of the heads of their columns, the cavalry and brigade of artillery attached to the division advanced to support the piquets, and Captain Ross, with four guns, was for some time engaged with those attached to the enemy’s cavalry, which were of much larger calibre. As the immense superiority of the enemy’s force displayed itself, we fell back gradually towards the fortress, upon the right of which the infantry of the division was posted, having its left in some enclosures near the windmill, about eight hundred yards from the place, and its right to the Coa, in a very broken and extensive position, which it was absolutely necessary to occupy, in order to cover the passage of the cavalry and artillery through the long defile leading to the bridge; after this was effected, the infantry retired by degrees, and in as good order as it is possible in ground so extremely intricate; a position close in front of the bridge was maintained, as long as was necessary to give time for the troops which had passed to take up one behind the river, and the bridge was afterwards defended with the greatest gallantry, though, I am sorry to say, with considerable loss by the 43rd and part of the 95th regiments. Towards the evening the

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

‘I think it proper to inform your Lordship that, since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the Commander in Chief and the officers of the French army in general in this part of Spain, have altered their system of rigor towards the inhabitants of Spain, for one of a milder description, which I understand has had the effect of reconciling many to the French Government.

‘The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo was felt as a great misfortune by the people of Castille in general; and they are not satisfied with the British nation, as an effort was not made to raise the siege of the place.

‘This dissatisfaction, combined with the effect which I have above described as having been produced by the improved conduct of the French officers towards them, has probably been the cause of their discontinuing all correspondence with us, of their ceasing to give us any intelligence, and even refusing to forward the communications of those employed to acquire it.

firing ceased, and after it was dark I withdrew the troops from the Coa, and retired to this place. The troops behaved with the greatest gallantry.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘His Excellency

‘ROBERT CRAUFURD.

Viscount Wellington, K.B.

‘Those returned as prisoners and missing were taken in a charge with the enemy’s cavalry, just after our cavalry and guns had begun to retire.’

Return of the number of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of a Division of the Army under the Command of His Excellency Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., in an action with the French Army, near Almeida, on the 24th July, 1810.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Troop horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	4	3	—	29	3	36
Wounded . . .	23	10	2	164	12	199
Missing . . .	1	1	1	80	—	83

‘ It is probable that these sentiments, and the consequent conduct of the people in this part of Spain in general, may be but temporary; but I have thought it proper to apprize His Majesty’s Government of their existence.

‘ I have no late intelligence of the operations of the guerillas in Castille.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Sir David Dundas, K.B., Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR, Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have written to the Secretary of State, relating to the operations of the advanced guard of the British army since I last addressed you; and the copy of a report from Brigadier General Craufurd, on an affair which he had yesterday with the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sir David Dundas.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.
To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter from Admiral Berkeley, which appears to be decisive regarding the occupation of the Faro Islands.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

‘ Adverting to my dispatch of the 18th instant, containing returns of the number of battalions and squadrons in the French army, I have observed mistakes in some of them, which I think it desirable to rectify; and I now enclose corrected returns of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, which form the army of Portugal, which I request may be substituted for those transmitted in my dispatch of the 18th instant.

‘ It also appears that there were not more than twenty battalions at Nantes.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Alverca, 26th July, 1810, 9 A.M.

‘I have just now come in from the advanced guard. It did not appear that the enemy had many people on this side of the Coa; but they had their piquets on the Pinhel, and I saw a column moving towards Pinhel from Valverde. General Picton withdrew from Pinhel, &c. this morning.

‘General Craufurd’s advanced guard is at Freixedas and Vendada.

‘I have directed the two Portuguese brigades in the Val de Mondego to put up in the pine wood near Roteiro, where they will be more centrally situated than they are at present.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Gen.

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘Alverca, 26th July, 1810,

half past 1 P.M.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘I have just received your letter of this day enclosing one from Captain Cocks to General Slade.

‘I do not think the movement of Regnier so certain as to draw General Hill to Guarda; for it is possible that the troops at Navas Frias and Valverde may be only detachments to keep up the communication with the troops on this side. Regnier will not move upon Guarda unless the enemy make a forward movement in other quarters; and in that case we must retire from that point.

‘But as you have General Slade in your front, it is not possible that you can be surprised, or can be attacked without having some hours’ notice, during which you can communicate with me.

‘You will therefore call to your assistance Colonel Harvey’s brigade in the first instance, if you should expect an attack; as it will not do, at all events, to lose Guarda till the army shall be well forward on its march towards Celorico; and I shall reinforce you by other troops if I should not wish you to retire.

‘If you should have occasion to send to me upon any

thing important, particularly in the night, send an officer who knows the road; or, if you should not have one who knows the road, send a guide with him.

‘ I shall anxiously expect your accounts of the next patrol from Captain Cocks.

‘ There is nothing new on this side.

‘ Inform General Hill of what you have heard respecting Regnier; and beg him to have an eye upon the Estrada Nova and the Serra de St. Simon.

‘ Part of Regnier’s force was certainly at Zarza la Mayor on the 23rd. Have you no accounts from Captain Grant from Penamacor?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Gen.
the Hon. L. Cole.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Alverca, 26th July, 1810.

‘ There has been a report, for which, as far as I have seen, there is no foundation, that the enemy have marched a column on the Trancoso road, on our left. But I suppose I shall receive some report from Sir Stapleton Cotton, who is in that direction still, about Souro-pires. He has orders to observe the road from Pinhel to Trancoso, with General Anson’s brigade of dragoons, and you are to observe Souro-pires with yours. Do not allow this arrangement to be interrupted by his being at Souro-pires, for sooner or later he will receive his orders.

‘ There is a place called Jurumelha, about two leagues on your right, which commands a view of the whole country, and is in communication with all the roads on this side of the Pinhel river. It communicates, by its rear, with Recammodo, and thence by the Ponte do Ladrao on the Mondego, to Celorico. I wish you would send there some intelligent officer with a small party of hussars. I should think that, if he knows the country, the view he would have of the enemy’s forces will let him know their situation; and with a good glass by day he must see them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 20 m. past 7 P.M.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, 26th July, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of this day. I had received Captain Cocks’ report from Villar Mayor, of the same event which he reports to you, which is very important. At the same time the fact is not sufficiently ascertained to enable me to move General Hill.

‘I had written thus far when I received your note from Freixedas. I beg that you will do every thing in your power to have early information of the enemy’s movements, and let me know them without loss of time.

‘It is very important that we should not allow them to make the siege of Almeida without keeping their army collected; at the same time that we must not allow them to push us too hard in our retreat, if they do not intend to make that operation. As I have the army now disposed, I can place the whole between Celorico and Pinhanços the first march, at the same time that I can collect the whole in any part of our position in a few hours. But the enemy must not come too near us.

‘General Cotton, with General Anson’s brigade, will retire by Cerejo, Marçal da Ribeira, and Baraçal, on Celorico. Nothing will go by the Trancoso road, which is out of the way.

Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.’

WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

‘A letter has been received from General Cox, from which it appears that there is no notion of a siege at Almeida. The enemy, as he says, have no force there of any importance, and he can form no notion of their intentions from their movements.

‘These circumstances, and the general view of our situation, have determined me to make a movement to the rear with our infantry, with the exception of the 4th division, which I shall leave in observation in Guarda, and which, when it retires, will move direct upon Linhares.

‘Your division will be at Celorico, and the whole cavalry, under Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, in front, observing the roads and points observed at present. I shall bring the heavy cavalry into the plain between this and Celorico.

‘Whatever may be the enemy’s intentions (which I think are to dash at us as soon as they shall be prepared, and make our retreat as difficult as possible), we shall be in such a situation as to be able to effect it without being much pressed, or to move forward again if a blow can be struck with advantage.

‘I shall desire Sir Stapleton Cotton to see you this evening, and I beg you to give him all the information in your power.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

‘I enclose a letter for General Hill, which I beg you will peruse and forward. It explains our situation and the causes of our movement of to-morrow.

‘In respect to yourself, you will keep out in your front the two squadrons of Royal dragoons which will remain with you; and if the enemy should oblige Sir Stapleton Cotton to retire from this place, or if you should be threatened by a serious attack by a superior force, you are to retire upon Linhares; giving the earliest intelligence of your movement to Sir Stapleton Cotton, who will be here, and to me at Celorico.

‘Keep General Hill constantly informed of all that passes.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Gen. ‘WELLINGTON.
‘the Hon. L. Cole.’

‘P.S. Lord Wellington wishes you to forward the letter to General Hill by an officer. ‘F. SOMERSET.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

‘Since I wrote to you last, circumstances have altered in some degree in this quarter.

‘ The loss which we sustained in the affair at Almeida, and the fatigue which the troops who were engaged had undergone, and the badness of the weather, rendered it impossible, and indeed it would have been useless, to endeavor to maintain the bridge of Almeida; and the loss of the high ground on this side necessarily occasioned the loss of our position at Pinhel. I therefore withdrew the troops from thence to this neighbourhood yesterday, and General Craufurd’s advanced guard to Freixedas, keeping only his cavalry posts of observation in front.

‘ When I ordered you to Atalaya, and intended to draw you to Guarda, I conceived it possible that the enemy would have directed his attack in the first instance upon that point, and I intended to have brought matters to a crisis there. It is obvious, however, that whatever they may try upon Guarda, they have it in their power, and would turn it by our left, so that that plan is out of the question.

‘ There is not the smallest appearance of the enemy’s intention to attack Almeida; and I conclude that, as soon as they shall have got together their force, they will make a dash at us, and endeavor to make our retreat as difficult as possible. I therefore propose, in the morning, to make such a disposition of the army as to insure that point. Accordingly, I shall leave the cavalry in their present situations, observing all the roads, &c., on which they are at present; and shall move all the infantry of the army, with the exception of the 4th division, which will remain at Guarda, between Celorico and Pinhanços. The 4th division, when it shall retire, will go direct to Linhares.

‘ The heavy cavalry will be in the plain between this and Celorico, and the light cavalry in front, and on the left of this.

‘ This new disposition puts out of the question bringing you to Guarda. I would have you, however, still maintain your position at Atalaya, till General Cole shall have retired from Guarda, or till some movement in your own front shall have induced you to move upon Sarzedas, according to the directions before given to you.

‘ But you should make all your dispositions for retiring, as therein directed, and should put such part of Le Cor’s

force upon your left, as you propose should be upon your left in the defence of the mountains.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Alex. Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Alverca, 27th July, 1810, 7 P.M.

‘ I have received your letter, and I beg you will feel no uneasiness respecting any disappointment I might have felt from your coming in. I was uneasy only because I did not know what you were doing, and could send you no directions: but the stay of Slade forward answers my purpose just as well as if you had remained.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. A. Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Tell General Cole that there is nothing new of any kind here this morning.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your dispatches, No. 26, 27, 28, and 29, of the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th instant. I propose hereafter to write to you on the subject of No. 26.

‘ The Government have expressed so much anxiety lately, for the fate of this country, that I should not think myself justified in employing elsewhere, just at this moment, the force which they have allotted for this purpose. I rather think, however, from the postscript of General Campbell’s letter, that no force will be detached from Sicily. I shall endeavor to send you some spring and commissariat waggon, and some horses and drivers belonging to the Waggon train.

‘ I have also received your letter of the 5th (marked separate), and I am obliged to you for the communication it contained, and entirely concur with you in the measures which you adopted to mark a respect for the Duc d’Orléans, at the suggestion of the Spanish Government.

‘ I beg to refer you to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will apply to Admiral Pickmore to send to the Tagus, as soon as he can with convenience, all the transports and empty store ships which can be spared from the service of the troops under your command at Cadiz; as, in the event of our being obliged to evacuate Portugal, I shall be under the necessity of making some arrangement to remove the army under the Marques de la Romana.

‘ If the Spanish Government have any transports, or vessels of any description capable of transporting troops, it would be desirable to have them sent to the Tagus likewise; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what number you will send.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

‘ The enemy obliged us to evacuate Fort Concepcion on the 21st, which we destroyed; and on the morning of the 24th they attacked General R. Craufurd's advanced guard close to Almeida, and obliged him to retire across the Coa with the loss of 4 officers killed, 25 wounded; and 28 men killed, and 218 wounded. Although it was desirable to keep open the communication with Almeida as long as possible, both to supply the place with provisions, which the poverty of the Portuguese Government had obliged them to defer till the last moment, and to maintain our communication with the other side of the Coa, and obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements, yet I had wished to withdraw sufficiently soon, but unfortunately General Craufurd did not begin to retire till the last moment.

‘ The enemy's numbers were about four times his in cavalry, and at least three times in infantry. We hear that their loss has been great. They made three attempts afterwards to storm the bridge of the Coa, in all of which they failed.

‘ Having lost our communication with Almeida and the other side of the Coa, there was no use in contesting the passage of that river, in which we might be turned at almost all points: and I therefore yesterday withdrew our posts from the Coa.

‘ I consider it by no means clear that the enemy purpose to attack Almeida. I should rather think they do not, and that they wish to embarrass us in a forward position in the mountains.

‘ Regnier crossed the Tagns about the 17th or 18th, and I understand that he is now on his march through Perales, towards Sabugal.

‘ General Hill is at Atalaya; but I believe that I shall allow him to retire by the Zezere rather than by this valley, as the enemy is still too strong for us, and can turn us by our left as well as by our right.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th.

‘ Everyours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 14th and 20th. It was settled at a very early period, I believe from the commencement of the subsidy to the Portuguese Government, that the British officers should be paid by the Paymaster of the “aids;” and this charge was to come against the British Government till otherwise ordered. It has never been otherwise ordered; and the £100,000 a year was included in the act made this year to cover that head of expense, from the 1st January; and with this sum the Portuguese Government have nothing to do.

‘ The loss of the exchange should fall upon the British Government: we have agreed to pay a certain sum, as the expense of a certain number of men, but this sum does not defray one half of the expense which it is intended to cover. It would be too hard to make the Portuguese Government adhere to the first erroneous estimate, and then to charge upon them the loss upon exchange, when we ought to pay them in specie.

‘ I enclose a letter from General Cotton, which arrived

'The Fidalgos in Portugal protect every vagabond, high or low; and the Government tremble at the very name of a Fidalgo. But we must force them to do their duty, if possible.

'In respect to the claim of the Portuguese Government as stated in your letter of the 20th, I can only say that I have no official knowledge of any agreement between Mr. Villiers and them; but, as well as I recollect, Mr. Villiers called upon them for an estimate of the expense of 10,000 men, which he forwarded to England; and the British Government engaged to pay that rate of expense, first for 10,000 men, when they should be effective; and then for 20,000 men; and lastly, for 30,000 men. But, if I am mistaken, it is very easy to refer the question to the King's Government.

'I was the person who prevailed upon the King's Government to make the addition to the subsidy, which was made from the 1st of January; and if I was not correct in my notion that the British Government were to pay only a certain specified rate for 10,000 and 20,000 men, I did the Portuguese Government a great injury, instead of a service, in prevailing upon the King's Government to increase their subsidy; for I really believe that the existing subsidy for 30,000 does not defray the expense of 20,000.

'I withdrew my posts from the Coa yesterday morning. Nothing has occurred since. Regnier has, I believe, come through Perales.

'Believe me, &c.

'Charles Stuart, Esq. WELLINGTON.

'I do not believe that the enemy intend to attack Almeida. I have not heard of any preparations for that purpose; and I suspect they are collecting a large force to make a dash at me.'

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

'MY DEAR GENERAL, Celorico, 29th July, 1810, 6 P.M.

'I concur entirely with you, that it is not desirable to fight a battle for Guarda; and it may be very certain that if you are attacked by a small body, and the siege of Almeida is not going on, a large body will be at work somewhere else.

'I enclose a letter from General Cotton, which arrived

this morning, and I did not send it to you, as I was sure from the contents of mine that it contained nothing of importance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

the Hon. L. Cole.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

‘ The enemy’s operations against Almeida are so very feeble, and their intention so little distinct, and the intelligence which we receive has been lately so very bad, that I have thought it advisable to draw in the whole left of the army to the valley of the Mondego, holding Guarda still with a division of infantry, and the ground in front of Freixedas, &c., with our cavalry only.

‘ In this position I am equally prepared for any operation that it might be in my power to undertake for the relief of Almeida, if it should be attacked; and better prepared for our retreat, if that should be necessary. Regnier has not yet passed through the mountains.

‘ We have heard from General Cox; the garrison was in good spirits. I have received your letter of the 25th, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

‘ In consequence of the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, I have made an inquiry into the conduct of the 1st caçadores in the affair of the advanced guard with the enemy on the 24th instant.

‘ It appears that this battalion did not quit its post on the right of the Coa, till it received orders to retire from Colonel Beckwith of the 95th regiment, then fell back upon the bridge of the Coa at an accelerated pace, and a part of the battalion crossed the bridge, mixed with the cavalry and artillery, and ascended the hill on the left of the corps; the remainder of the infantry of the division, and a part of the

1st caçadores still continuing to occupy the ground on the right of the Coa, and in front of the bridge. After the whole division crossed the Coa, the 1st caçadores again took its position on the right of the 52nd.

‘It appears that the conduct of that part of the battalion which crossed the Coa mixed with the cavalry and artillery, has been the cause of the unfavorable impression which has been created respecting them in the affair; but they had no orders to halt on the right of the Coa when they were ordered to retire, and they saw the artillery and cavalry crossing.

‘Upon the whole, although the reports which have been circulated are exaggerated, there appears to have been some grounds for the complaints made of the conduct of the caçadores in the premature and accelerated passage of the river by some of them; but I am convinced that if the officers, on whose statement I had formed my opinion of the conduct of the 1st caçadores, had known of the orders the caçadores had received to retire, of the conduct of the whole before they retired, of part when some had crossed the Coa, and of the whole afterwards, these statements, however well founded, would not have been made.

‘Every report which I have received, and every inquiry which I have made, has tended to raise still higher the opinion which I had formed of the conduct of the commanding officer.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 5th instant, enclosing one of the same date from Mr. Under Secretary Harrison.

‘I trouble your Lordship upon the subject again only to explain that the probable estimate, enclosed in my letter of the 30th of May, was one drawn out by me from the statements of the expenditure in the preceding eight months, made by Mr. Commissary General Murray, and forwarded to your Lordship in the same dispatch.

‘The estimate forwarded in my dispatch of the 6th of

June was framed by Mr. Commissary General Murray, and was founded on the consumption of the army at that moment, and on the prices paid at the time for different articles.

‘The consumption had increased in May and June with the numbers of the army, and with the numbers of the cavalry and horses for the artillery and waggon train in particular, beyond the average consumption of the eight months extracted from the statement of the expenditure; and the prices of May and June had exceeded the average prices of the preceding eight months, still more than the consumption of May and June had exceeded the consumption of the former period.

‘I hope that these circumstances will account for the difference between these estimates; one of which was framed by me solely for your Lordship’s satisfaction, and till I could transmit a document founded upon better information, and framed by the officer whose duty it is to frame it.

‘When I sent the first I believed it would be a tolerably exact representation of the expenses; but I subsequently found that it was otherwise, and the official document was forwarded in the following week.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.
The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON.

To the Secretary of the Treasury.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant, conveying the pleasure of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury on the proposition contained in my letter to the Commander in Chief of the 28th of September, 1809, regarding the mode of supplying mules to carry camp kettles, &c. for the army.

‘I had already given directions that an allowance of one dollar a month should be paid for shoeing, &c. for each mule employed in the carriage of camp kettles, surgeons’ chests, paymasters’ books, veterinary surgeons’ chests, serjeant armourers’ and serjeant saddlers’ implements, under orders which I had received from the Secretary of State of the 23rd of April last.

‘I had also continued to pay to captains of troops and

companies, paymasters, surgeons, and others obliged to furnish mules for the public service, the sums on their arrival in this country, which they had formerly received in the allowance called preparation money, in order to enable the same officers to provide their animals.

‘As you announce to me that it is intended to make some new regulations upon the subject, which will be transmitted to me, and as the nature of the service, in which the troops have been engaged lately has not been so detrimental to the mules as that in which they had been employed in the last year, and has not been so expensive to the officers upon whom the contract for supplying them is imposed, I do not think it necessary at present to avail myself of the permission of their Lordships to grant the 20 $\frac{1}{2}$ bat money to each of these officers.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Secretary of the Treasury.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Celorico, 30th July, 1810, 10 P.M.

‘Pray send back every thing that you think Captain Bull can spare, and I wish you would endeavor to make an arrangement that the farriers of those regiments, which want shoes, should have the facility of making them at those carts which are drawn by horses, and that those drawn by bullocks should be sent to the rear.

‘Your letter of this day arrived in two hours. You do not appear to have occupied Jurumelha, or to be aware of the advantage of occupying that post. You will see every thing from it, and it will of course give you proportionate security.

‘I quite approve of your keeping your strength in the rear, and in reserve, and your posts of observation in front weak. I am afraid that some of the patrols of the heavy dragoons, in the rear particularly, are *too alert*. Where it is desirable that a communication should be kept up from the rear with the posts in front, it is better to have it done by a piquet, to which front and rear might patrol at fixed hours, and communicate intelligence; but from Trancoso, for instance, the officer has sent out three patrols to Povia

del Rey, out of thirty men, in twenty four hours!! It would be better to station six men half way to keep up the communication with Pova del Rey, and to patrol once or twice in twenty four hours to those six men. The same might be done with advantage by all the regiments in the second line. Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

Celorico, 30th July, 1810, 10 A.M.

‘I received in the night your letters of 6 and half past 9 P.M. Regnier’s movement upon Cilleros puts out of the question any attack upon you till the enemy shall have collected in your front more of their force from their right. Having collected his advanced guard at Cilleros from Valverde, &c., Regnier’s only movement can be upon Zarza and Salvaterra.

‘In a view to the facility of your retreat, I think you will do well to extend your division a little. That is to say, send one brigade to Miserelha, the Portuguese half way between the two, and the other brigade, with the light battalions of both, in Guarda. You will continue to hold that point, however, under the same instructions, for I observe that the enemy are feeling about with their patrols; and it would not answer to allow a small patrol to snap up so important a point as that is.

‘You might make this movement this evening.

‘I have begged Sir S. Cotton to attach Captain Cocks specially to you. I begged him to put an intelligent officer who knows the country, and some hussars upon Jurumelha, from whence the movements of any large body between Guarda and Almeida must be seen.

‘I request you to write your communications, notwithstanding that you may think it proper to send an officer; as the mode of stating a circumstance makes a difference in the meaning, which occurred last night in your communication to Cotton.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Gen.

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ I have just come in from Baraçal, and all appears perfectly quiet forward.’

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Celorico, 30th July, 1810, 8 P.M.

‘ I concur entirely in the line of march which you have proposed for the Portuguese troops.

‘ You are to have Captain Cocks as well as the two squadrons of the Royals attached to you.

‘ 31st July, half past 9 A.M.

‘ There is nothing new this morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Gen.

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ Communicate with Colonel Le Cor at Fundão.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Celorico, 31st July, 1810.

‘ I have desired Gordon, who carries this, to go into Pinhel with a flag of truce, and letters and money for Colonel Wyndham, Lieut. M'Culloch, &c., &c.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will warn officers who are taken, to take care what they write. I believe that Colonel Wyndham could not have more accurately described your position, and the stations of your piquets and vedettes, than he has in his letter respecting his capture.

‘ I think your communication with Guarda by any other road than that through Alverca and Recammodo is very little important. Take care that none of the enemy's flags are allowed to pass your out piquets.

‘ There is no ground for alarm; for the post at Trancoso I am more alarmed, lest all these alarms should destroy our cavalry entirely.

‘ Be very careful respecting the road by which the troops are to retire from Cerejo. If this is not well understood, the two columns will join on the high road.

‘ I will send you people to manage the telegraph.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Celorico, 31st July, 1810.

‘I received your letter of the 30th in the night, and I entirely approve of your march from Atalaya, and of the disposition you have made of your troops.

‘The advance of Regnier upon you cannot be insulated; if in earnest, it must be connected with the movements of corps in my front, and till those movements shall be a little more decided, it would probably be desirable that you should have an advanced guard of infantry at Castello Branco, and that you should bring Fane’s cavalry across the Tagus, and keep that of Regnier in check a little in the open ground in front of the Ponsul, and thus enable you to know what is going on.

‘When you would retire, Fane’s cavalry would have to cross the Tagus again at Villa Velha, if possible, as their retreat through the mountains would be awkward to them, and would embarrass you.

‘All this requires nice arrangement, which can be made only on the spot; and you will remember that it is most important to destroy effectually the bridge at Villa Velha when you can no longer command the use of it.

‘If the object of the enemy should be to push you through the mountains, I wish you only to delay them as much as may be practicable consistently with the safety of your corps. You are aware that General Leith has a corps formed upon the Zezere and Ccdes in your rear, and you must not allow yourself to be cut off from him.

‘Keep your communication with me by Guarda as long as you can; sending duplicates through Thomar when Le Cor shall retire from Fundão, or we shall quit Guarda: a single officer might find his way across the Zezere and the mountains, from Le Cor to me; but the secure communication will be by the road of Thomar.

‘If Regnier should strike to his right again towards Guarda, I beg you to move up again to Atalaya.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

‘ You will receive with this, an order respecting the reception of flags of truce, which I request you to circulate without loss of time, and pray let it be strictly observed.

‘ I think that your second line, at least, might feed when they come upon their alarm posts in the morning, as the horses will not eat in the middle of the day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

‘ I cannot understand why the forges should not do as much work in the rear as they can in front, if the farriers are made to do their duty. But whether they can or not, it is most extraordinary that the experience which the officers commanding regiments have already had, should not teach them that it will be impossible for the bullock carts with the forges to keep up with the cavalry only one march, if the cavalry should be obliged to go in any one day five leagues.

‘ The enemy, therefore, must get these forge carts if they press upon our rear, as they undoubtedly will unless we can send them to some little distance. It then comes to this; either the commanding officers of regiments of cavalry *must* make the farriers do their duty at a distance in the rear; or I *must* withdraw to the rear all the regiments in want of shoes which have these bullock forge carts; or I *must* make up my mind to see those regiments of cavalry entirely destroyed thus early in the campaign.

‘ That which the commanding officers do not, or will not understand, is that we shall retreat, and that bullock carts cannot keep up on a retreat with cavalry. I am quite tired of this subject, upon which I have been writing above six weeks.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810, 2 P.M.

‘ The proposition from the Captain of the guerrillas is rather of a delicate nature ; and although I have no objection to his staying with Cocks, I must avoid giving any formal consent to his doing so, till the Marques de la Romana shall have consented to his quitting the Spanish service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letters of the 27th and 28th.

‘ The absence of the 23rd regiment is uncomfortable, more particularly as I believe I shall get none of the reinforcements ordered from the Mediterranean. However, I hope we shall do pretty well yet.

‘ I refer you to Mr. Stuart for an account of the state of affairs to this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 16th, and I agree entirely in opinion with you, that Mr. Drummond can do no good at Lisbon and Cadiz ; and he may do a great deal of mischief. I attribute his mission to a belief prevalent at the Treasury that we have not done our best to procure money, in which they may depend upon it they are mistaken.

‘ However, Mr. Drummond shall have all the assistance and information which I can give him ; till I shall find he does more harm than good, when I shall have no scruple in sending him to the place whence he came.

‘ Nothing of any importance has passed here since the 24th July.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Gordon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

‘ I have spoken to the Commissary General respecting the 2000 barrels of flour; and I am sorry to tell you that he can give 500 barrels only at present, unless he should put this army to great inconvenience. He will order the 500 barrels to be delivered by Mr. Dunmore.

‘ I have not got my papers here, and I cannot tell whether the troops which passed through Irun, between the 6th and 10th June, were the Guards or not. I rather think the Guards were in Spain before that time: they were 7200 altogether.

‘ My dispatch of this date will give you the news.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to report that the 1st batt. 7th regiment is arrived from Halifax; but I understand that the 23rd regiment is detained there, till relieved by the 2nd batt. 8th regiment, which only lately sailed from England.

‘ The arrival of the 23rd regiment in this country, therefore, cannot be reckoned upon.

‘ I have received no intelligence of the reinforcements expected from the Mediterranean. Private accounts received from Gibraltar state that the regiments ordered by Government to be sent here from Sicily, and which your Lordship expected would arrive in the beginning of July, had not received orders to embark.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

‘ As I had no intention of engaging in a general action to prevent the enemy from investing and attacking Almeida, which place is fully provided and prepared for a siege; and as I could not maintain my posts upon the Coa without

exposing them to be attacked by a superior force, I withdrew them from that river on the morning of the 26th. Finding on the 27th that the advanced guard of Regnier's corps had come through the Puerto de Perales, as far as Navas Frias; and the enemy having it thus in their power to throw their whole force upon both flanks of this army, and thus to bring on a general engagement in a situation advantageous to them; or to press the British army in its retreat; I withdrew the infantry another march to the rear, and it is now in the valley of the Mondego, behind this place; with the 4th division, under Major General Cole, upon Guarda.

‘ The whole of the cavalry are in front, observing the movements of the enemy upon the Coa.

‘ General Hill continued at Atalaya till he received reports that Regnier had again drawn his advanced guard through the Puerto de Perales, and had pushed it across the Elja, at Salvaterra; and he moved yesterday morning upon Sarzedas; leaving Colonel Le Cor's division of Portuguese troops, which throughout the winter had been at Castello Branco, at Fundão, in communication with Major General Cole.

‘ The enemy in our front have made no movement of importance since the 26th, on which day they took possession of Pinhel: their principal force is near Almeida, but they have not broken ground before the place, and I have not been able to ascertain that any preparations have been made for the siege of that place. I have occasionally a telegraphic communication with the Governor, Brigadier General Cox, from the advanced posts of the cavalry at Freixedas, by the last of which, yesterday, he informed me that all was going on well.

‘ There are no French troops between the Tagus and the Guadiana; and the Marques de la Romana has, I understand, collected his corps near Merida.

‘ The 5th corps, under Mortier, appears to be collected upon the Guadalquivir.

‘ Nothing of importance has occurred in the north. The corps under the command of General Seras has been collected between the Duero and the city of Leon; and the whole force in this part of Spain appears to be distributed according to the orders received from the Emperor at the end of May.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 10th instant, where nothing extraordinary had occurred.

I have the honor to be, &c.
The Earl of Liverpool.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, Celorico, 1st August, 1810.

In a dispatch which I wrote to your Lordship on the 25th of July, I informed you that the 1st battalion of Portuguese caçadores had behaved ill in the affair of the 24th.

I have since made further inquiries upon that subject, and I enclose your Lordship the copy of a letter to Marshal Beresford, in which I informed him of their result.

My opinion is, that if all the circumstances of the case had been known, there would have been no complaint of the conduct of the 1st caçadores; and adverting to the nature of the attack made upon the advanced guard on that day, to the superior numbers of the enemy, and to the difficulties of the ground over which the troops had to retreat, I am surprised that any part of a corps newly raised, as the 1st caçadores, should have conducted itself so well.

I have the honor to be, &c.
The Earl of Liverpool.

WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

SIR, Celorico, 2nd August, 1810.

In the event of my being obliged to evacuate Portugal with the British army, you are probably aware that I have received the instructions of His Majesty's Ministers to carry it to Cadiz. In this case it appears probable that, for some days at least, we shall be superior to the enemy in force in that quarter, and it has occurred to me that it might be possible to effect an operation by which the enemy should be deprived at least of their establishments on the Trocadero, before they should receive any reinforcements from Portugal.

I request you to collect all the information that can be got on this subject, and which might be useful in enabling us to decide on the expediency of undertaking this enterprise, and on the mode of executing it, if it should be in our power to undertake it.

‘ I beg to refer you to my letter of this date, to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs here.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Celorico, 2nd August, 1810.

‘ The report of the arrival of Regnier’s advanced guard at Navas Frias having been confirmed, and the enemy having it thus in their power to press upon our flanks, and force us to a general action, or hurry us more than was desirable in our retreat, I withdrew the whole of the infantry of the army into the valley of the Mondego, behind this place, on the 28th; excepting one division, which remains upon Guarda. The cavalry still maintains its position in front, observing the enemy’s movements upon the Coa.

‘ General Hill moved to his right from Atalaya on the day before yesterday, in consequence of the reports that Regnier’s advanced guard had returned again through Perales, and had passed the Elja, near Salvaterra; and Colonel Le Cor with his division, which throughout the winter has been at Castello Branco, is at Fundaõ, in communication with the troops at Guarda.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of any importance since I wrote last; nor have they made any serious demonstration to attack Almeida; nor do I hear of any preparations for that operation.

‘ There are no French troops between the Tagus and the Sierra Morena. They have made no movement in the north; but Seras has got together his corps between Zamora and Leon; and the whole disposition ordered by the Emperor in the end of May has been carried into execution. I suppose we shall hear of his arrival soon.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Admiral Sir Richard Keats, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Celorico, 2nd August, 1810.

‘ I have been much gratified by the receipt of your letter

of the 24th July; and I assure you that I shall have much pleasure in co-operating with you for the public service.

‘ I doubt not that, before you left England, the King’s servants gave you all the information in their power regarding the state of affairs in the Peninsula; but lest they should not, I will give you an outline of them in this letter.

‘ Since the battle of Ocaña in November last, and the subsequent passage of the Sierra Morena in January, there has been no Spanish army in the field capable of making any resistance to the French. The allied British and Portuguese army under my command in this quarter, and the corps of the Marques de la Romana, consisting of about 10,000 or 12,000 men, without cavalry, on the frontiers of Estremadura and Portugal, are all that we have capable of opposing the enemy in front.

‘ There are small detachments of Spanish troops in the mountains of Ronda, between Gibraltar and Cadiz; in the Alpujarras in Granada, and in Cuenca; and there is a body of troops still assembled with O’Donnell in the southern parts of Catalonia. But the operations of these troops are necessarily confined to enterprises on the enemy’s flanks and rear, during the time they may be occupied in the siege of the fortified posts on the coast which still remain in the hands of the Spaniards, from the mouth of the Ebro to Cadiz; and to give countenance and assistance to the numerous bands of partizans which are carrying on a destructive warfare against the enemy in all parts of the Peninsula.

‘ The enemy’s force in Spain consists of 250,000 men, according to the best accounts I can make of it. Of this force above one third is engaged in the operations against this army. About 50,000 or 60,000 men, in three corps, are in Andalusia, of which 20,000 are engaged in the operations at Cadiz; 15,000 or 16,000 about Seville, &c. protecting their rear, and Sebastiani, with the remainder, towards Granada, &c. There are two strong corps in Catalonia and Aragon, but most of these troops are in the garrisons; and there are about 20,000 or 30,000 men about Madrid, in the Asturias, Biscay, Navarre, and keeping up the communication by the high road from France.

‘ From this relative view of the disposition of the two con-

tending parties in the Peninsula, you will observe that the enemy have extended themselves to such a degree, that even with their large force they can make no rapid progress towards the final subjugation of the country till they shall have defeated this army, or obliged it to evacuate Portugal.

‘ They cannot carry on the siege of Cadiz in the south, and I doubt their being able to carry on that of Tarragona, or that of Tortosa in the east; and till we are removed, the whole machine appears brought to a stand. It happens, unfortunately, that we can receive but very little, if any, assistance from any of the bodies of troops, which I have above described as being still in existence, excepting from the Marques de la Romana. However, being aware of the advantage of continuing upon the Peninsula, I propose to maintain my ground as long as I can, and I shall risk nothing at any great distance from the sea. I shall withdraw gradually towards Lisbon in proportion as I shall find myself pressed by the enemy; and, at last, if I should find that the chances are at all equal, I propose to try the event of a battle; if I should find they are not so, I shall embark the troops.

‘ We have transports prepared in the Tagus for this purpose, and I think it not improbable that I shall be able to bring away with me a part of the Portuguese army; but besides this army, it will be necessary to have some means prepared of carrying off the corps under the command of the Marques de la Romana. When we shall go, this corps will be entirely cut off, and we must remove it as well as our own troops. I had therefore written to General Graham to request that he would apply to Admiral Pickmore to have the transports at Cadiz not immediately required for the troops sent round to the Tagus, from whence they can easily be sent to any point south of the Tagus, at which the course of the operations of this country might render it more convenient that the Marques de la Romana should embark. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will attend to General Graham’s application upon this subject.

‘ When matters come to a crisis here, it will be very desirable that we should have a large naval force in the Tagus; and as it does not appear that the enemy is now in a situation to attempt any thing at Cadiz, I would suggest to

you to come round to the Tagus with your squadron at that moment. I am so strongly of opinion that no serious attack can be made at Cadiz, till we shall have been obliged to evacuate Portugal, that if I had not received the intimation of the wishes of the King's Government upon the subject, which I consider tantamount to positive orders, I should bring round to the Tagus for the contest General Graham and the greater part of the force under his command.

‘So far for the general operations in the Peninsula. In respect to those at Cadiz, in which you are more immediately concerned, it is desirable that you should turn your mind at an early period, and should state your opinion to the Admiralty on the naval contest which there will be, sooner or later, in the inner harbour of Cadiz. As usual, the Spaniards left in the power of the enemy large naval means, in the merchants' yards at the Trocadero, and they have others in the forests beyond Chiclana, &c., &c.; and I have heard from all quarters that they are actively employed in constructing craft. I apprehend that you cannot depend upon the Spanish seamen in this contest, although the Spaniards may be able to supply vessels. But upon the whole of this subject, Government should have early information, if they have it not already.

‘Adverting to the probable state of affairs at the moment that I might be obliged to evacuate Portugal, it has occurred to me, that as I shall immediately remove the army to the south of the Peninsula, we may, for some days at least, be stronger than the enemy engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, and that we might be able to strike a blow which should deprive them of their naval establishments on the Trocadero, &c. It is desirable that our minds should be turned to this object; and I will write to General Graham to request that he will have all the military information upon the subject, to enable me to decide on the enterprise, if it should be in my power to attempt it.

‘In respect to other objects, you will observe that, even though I should be obliged to retire from Portugal, there are still many strong places on the coast of Spain, by means of which the contest in the Peninsula may be kept up. Tarragona, Tortosa, Peñiscola, Valencia, Alicante, Carthagená, as well as Cadiz, are fortified and garrisoned, and possibly

each, but certainly most of them, are in a situation to receive important assistance from His Majesty's fleet. I do not know whether your station extends beyond Cadiz, but if it does not, the influence which you must possess over Sir Charles Cotton would induce him to attend to these places.

' From the character which I have heard of you, I have written to you with the freedom and confidence of an old acquaintance, which I beg you will attribute to my zeal for the cause in which we are both engaged, and to my desire to co-operate cordially with you for its success.

' I beg to be kindly remembered to Captain Cockburn*, and that you will

' Believe me, &c.

' *Admiral Sir R. Keats, K.B.*

' WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

' MY DEAR COTTON,

' Celorico, 3rd August, 1810, 6 P.M.

' I have just received your letter of $\frac{1}{2}$ past 3. You should immediately relieve the horses, at least of Cocks' party, and give him light dragoons or hussars instead of Royals. He possibly might experience some inconvenience if all his men were relieved, and still greater inconvenience if his detachment were much diminished; and he is in a most important situation in front of the right of the position of the army, and on the communication between the enemy's corps. I would therefore recommend to you to leave him as strong as he is, and refer to his own judgment to send in as many horses and men as he thinks he can spare, keeping the others, and the relief of the Royals, and of those men and horses he sends in.

' Tell him also to keep with him and employ as many Spaniards as he may find useful, and I will find means of paying them. General Cole will have written to him about the German officer. The enemy's plan is evidently not decided, and our steadiness must embarrass them.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General*

' WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

' I sent Scovell and all the telegraph people to you this day.

* Vice Admiral Sir G. Cockburn, G.C.B.

I think you had better send a copy of this note to Cocks. Do you understand that this note was written this day? it is dated the 1st.'

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Celorico, 3rd August, 1810.

' I have just received your letter of the 30th July, containing the dispatch which you had received from Lord Strangford, and the copies of the notes which his Lordship had received from the Government of the Brazils.

' My opinion in respect to the Portuguese Government has invariably been the same. That Government alone can rule the country at all which the Prince Regent has named. I recommend, therefore, that the Conde de Redondo and the Principal Souza and the Dr. Raymondo Nogueira, should now be called to the Regency, for the same reasons that I recommended before that the Conde de Redondo should not be called to the Regency, without the Prince's authority.

' In respect to yourself, you can no more accept the office of Regent without the King's consent, than I could that of Commander in Chief, or Marshal General, without the King's authority; but notwithstanding the additional trouble it may throw upon you, I do most anxiously recommend and entreat you to advise the King's Government to give His Majesty's consent to your acceptance of this office, and to your holding it with the office of King's Minister at Lisbon. I see no other mode in which we shall be able to manage this Government at all, or to get through our difficulties. In respect to the trouble, I do not conceive it will throw much upon you. It will not be necessary for you to attend constantly. You will have a knowledge from Dom Miguel Forjaz of the important business likely to come under consideration, and you can attend at that time; and the influence which you will soon acquire over the decisions of the Government will prevent the other Ministers from venturing to decide, during your absence, upon any measure of importance. In short, I am convinced that your being in the Regency will be highly beneficial; and at all events, is the only remedy for the mischief with which the new arrangement is pregnant.

' There is another question worth considering; and that

is, what is to become of the office of the Conde de Redondo? In my opinion there is no objection to his continuing to hold it as one of a government of six persons. As well as I recollect, the first constitution of government in Portugal placed all the Ministers in the Regency; and if it is desirable that he should continue to be Minister of Finance, I see no objection to his being so, and one of the members of the Regency at the same time.

‘ You will see a letter which I have written to Government this day, respecting an attack made by some of the people of Marmeleiro and Richoso on two of our patrols.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON.

‘ Celorico, 4th August, 1810. 2 P.M.

‘ Send round to the people that they must retire from the villages, and let the magistrates know that if any of them stay, or if any of the inhabitants have any communication with the enemy, they shall be hanged.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Celorico, 4th August, 1810.

‘ Captain the Hon. H. Pakenham, of the 95th regiment, has desired me to recommend him again for promotion, which I do most anxiously, as his commanding officer; and I really do not believe that there is a more deserving officer of his rank in the King’s army. When in office in Ireland I had already taken an opportunity of mentioning to your predecessor the wish of the Lord Lieutenant that Captain Pakenham should be promoted; and as he had served under my command, and had been wounded at Obidos, I added a communication of my opinion of his merit as an officer, upon which ground alone I now solicit attention to his claims.

‘ I also think it proper to solicit your attention to a claim of a similar description which I have before frequently urged,

both as a General Officer, and on the part of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, viz., that of Captain Lloyd * of the 43rd regiment. This officer, always distinguished, has drawn my particular notice by the use of his talents at the advanced posts of the army; and the wound which he received in the affair of the 24th July has rendered his claim to promotion more urgent, if it has not added to its strength.

‘ I have never been able to understand the principle on which the claims of gentlemen of family, fortune, and influence in the country, to promotion in the army, founded on their military conduct, and character, and services, should be rejected, while the claims of others, not better founded on military pretensions, were invariably attended to. It would be desirable, certainly, that the only claim to promotion should be military merit; but this is a degree of perfection to which the disposal of military patronage has never been, and cannot be, I believe, brought in any military establishment. The Commander in Chief must have friends, officers on the staff attached to him, &c., who will press him to promote their friends and relations, all doubtless very meritorious, and no man can at all times resist these applications; but if there is to be any influence in the disposal of military patronage, in aid of military merit, can there be any in our army so legitimate as that of family connexion, fortune, and influence in the country? I acknowledge, therefore, that I have been astonished at seeing Lloyd, with every claim that an officer can have to promotion, still a Captain; and others, connected with the officers of the staff, promoted as soon as their time of service had expired.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I am also tempted to communicate to you my opinion upon another branch of it, viz., the disposal of the patronage of the troops serving on foreign service. In all services, excepting that of Great Britain, and in former times in the service of Great Britain, the Commander in Chief of an army employed against the enemy in the field had the power of promoting officers, at least to vacancies occasioned by the service, in the troops under his own command; and in foreign services, the prin-

* Afterwards Major of the 94th, and killed at the passage of the Nivelle on the 10th November, 1813.

ciple is carried so far, as that no person can venture to recommend an officer for promotion belonging to an army employed against the enemy in the field, excepting the commander of that army.

‘ It was pretty nearly the case formerly in our own service ; and I believe the greater number of the General Officers of the higher ranks of the present day were made lieutenant colonels by Sir W. Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, General Burgoyne, Lord Dorchester, &c. But how is it now ? The form remains still in some degree the same ; that is to say, my secretary keeps the register of the applications, memorials, and regimental recommendations, a trouble which, by the bye, might as well be saved ; but the substance is entirely altered ; and I, who command the largest British army that has been employed against the enemy for many years, and who have upon my hands certainly the most extensive and difficult concern that was ever imposed upon any British officer, have not the power of making even a corporal!!! It is impossible that this system can last. It will do very well for trifling expeditions and short services, &c. ; but those who are to superintend the discipline, and to excite and regulate the exertions of the officers of the army, during a long continued service, must have the power of rewarding them by the only mode in which they can be rewarded, that is, by promotion.

‘ It is not known to the army and to strangers, and I am almost ashamed of acknowledging, the small degree (I ought to say nullity) of power of reward which belongs to my situation ; and it is really extraordinary that I have got on so well hitherto without it ; but the day must come when this system must be altered.

‘ I do not entertain these opinions, and communicate them to you, because there are any officers attached to me in the service for whom I desire promotion. All my aides de camp, respecting whom I do feel an interest, have been promoted in their turn in their regiments, or are to be promoted, for carrying home the accounts of victories. The only person, respecting whose promotion I ever interested myself personally, was that of Colin Campbell, which the Duke of York had promised him, in consequence of his having brought home the accounts of two victories at the same time ; and

the difficulty which I experienced in obtaining his promotion, notwithstanding that promise, is a strong practical proof of the effects of the system to which I have adverted.

‘ The consequence of the change of the system in respect to me would be only to give me the power of rewarding the services of those who have exerted, or should exert, themselves zealously in the service ; and thus to stimulate others to similar exertions.

‘ Even admitting that the system of promotion by seniority, exploded in other armies, is the best for that of Great Britain, it would still be an advantage that those who become entitled to it should receive it immediately, and from the hand of the person who is obliged to expose them to danger, to enforce discipline, and to call for their exertions. I would also observe that this practice would be entirely consistent with the unvaried usage of the British Navy.

‘ I admit that it may be urged with truth that a larger view may be taken of the interests of the public, in the mode of promoting officers of the army, than I am capable of taking ; and this view may have suggested the expediency of adopting and adhering to the mode now in use ; at the same time I must say that the public can have no greater interest than in the conduct and discipline of an army employed against the enemy in the field ; and I am thoroughly convinced, that whatever may be the result in my hands, a British army cannot be kept in the field for any length of time, unless the officers composing it have some hope that their exertions will certainly be rewarded by promotion ; and that to be abroad on service, and to do their duty with zeal and intelligence, afford prospects of promotion not afforded by the mere presence of an officer with his regiment, and his bearing the King’s commission for a certain number of years.

‘ I have been induced to communicate these opinions to you, from the consideration of the claims of those officers to which I have drawn your attention at the commencement of this letter, from a strong conviction of their truth, and not, I assure you, from any interest I feel in the result. I would not give one pin to have the disposal of every commission in the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 4th August, 1810.7

‘ I am not in communication with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I do not interfere in the political concerns of the Government; but I should recommend to you to draw Lord Wellesley’s attention to the arrangement for the Government of Portugal lately made in the Brazils, and to the principles on which it has been made.

‘ It is extraordinary that during the time that you and I have been working here to give strength and stability to the Government, and principally to support Dom Miguel Forjaz, as being the best instrument to co-operate with us to carry on the war, the King’s Minister in the Brazils should have promoted a new arrangement of the Government, purposely calculated to destroy the very influence which we had supported. Then the admission of Doctor Raymondo Nogueira into the Regency, and the reasons for this admission, are truly ludicrous. He is to aid in the destruction of the influence of the Secretariat which we had labored to establish and support, and his appointment is to be agreeable to the lower orders, from among whom he is selected!

‘ It is unfortunate for the people of the Peninsula that we in England have always thought proper to give a democratical character to their proceedings; whereas nothing was ever farther from their intentions. The principle of all the actions of the good people of these countries is anti-Gallican, and that alone: all that they desire is, that they should be saved from the grasp of the French, and it is a matter of indifference to them by what persons, or by what class of persons, their salvation is effected. In the abstract, I believe that they would prefer to be governed by the higher classes, from a feeling that those belonging to the higher classes have turned their minds more to the business of Government, have more experience and capacity in the transaction of public business, and are more deserving of their confidence, as being more likely to save them from the French. If indeed the Doctor had ever shown any talents as a political character, there might be some reasons for his appointment; but as it is, it is absurd and mischievous.

‘ That which we want in Portugal is, that the Government

should be supported in all its measures in the Brazils ; and that it should acquire strength and confidence in its own measures, in consequence of that support. The King's Minister in the Brazils might be highly useful by using his influence for that object. We also require that there should be some permanence in the authority of the persons employed to govern this country, and that men's minds should be diverted from an expectation of change by every vessel which arrives from the Brazils. Here also the King's Minister in the Brazils can be highly useful to us ; but I must observe, that it is by the adoption of a line of conduct directly the reverse of that which he has followed lately.

‘ I hope that my letter to the Prince Regent, written in April, had not arrived in the Brazils before this arrangement was made, as nothing can be more inconsistent with the principles and practice recommended in that letter than what is contained in the papers which you transmitted to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL*,

By Lord Viscount Wellington, Marshal General, &c.

‘ 4th August, 1810.

‘ The time which has elapsed during which the enemy have remained upon the frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded to the Portuguese nation experience of what they are to expect from the French.

‘ The people had remained in some villages trusting to the enemy's promises, and vainly believing, that by treating the enemies of their country in a friendly manner, they should conciliate their forbearance, and that their properties would be respected, their women would be saved from violation, and that their lives would be spared.

‘ Vain hopes ! The people of these devoted villages have suffered every evil which a cruel enemy could inflict. Their property has been plundered, their houses and furniture burnt, their women have been ravished, and the unfortunate inhabitants, whose age or sex did not tempt the brutal vio-

* The original draft of this proclamation having been found, it is substituted for the one published in the first edition, which was a translation from the Portuguese.

lence of the soldiers, have fallen the victims of the imprudent confidence they reposed in promises which were made only to be violated.

‘ The Portuguese now see that they have no remedy for the evil with which they are threatened but determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to render the enemy’s advance into their country as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way every thing that is valuable, or that can contribute to his subsistence, or frustrate his progress, are the only and the certain remedies for the evils with which they are threatened.

‘ The army under my command will protect as large a proportion of the country as will be in their power ; but it is obvious that the people can save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their properties only by removing them.

‘ The duty, however, which I owe to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent and to the Portuguese nation, will oblige me to use the power and authority in my hands to force the weak and the indolent to make an exertion to save themselves from the danger which awaits them, and to save their country ; and I hereby declare, that all magistrates or persons in authority who remain in the towns or villages, after receiving orders from any of the military officers to retire from them ; and all persons, of whatever description, who hold any communication with the enemy, and aid or assist them in any manner, will be considered traitors to the state, and shall be tried and punished accordingly.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

‘ PORTUGAIS.

‘ Les armées du grand Napoléon sont sur vos frontières, et vont entrer sur votre territoire en amis, et non pas en vainqueurs. Elles ne viennent pas pour faire la guerre, mais pour combattre ceux qui vous portent à la faire. Portugais ! ouvrez les yeux sur vos intérêts. Qu’a fait l’Angleterre pour que vous souffriez la présence de ses soldats sur votre sol ? Elle a détruit vos fabriques, ruiné votre commerce, et paralysé votre industrie, dans la seule vue d’introduire chez vous des objets manufacturés dans ses ateliers, et de vous rendre ses tributaires. Que fait-elle aujourd’hui pour que vous embrassiez la cause injuste qui a soulevé contre elle toutes les puissances du continent ? Elle vous trompe sur les résultats d’une campagne, où elle ne veut rien risquer ; elle se fait un rempart de vos bataillons, comme si votre sang ne devait être compté pour rien ; elle se tient en mesure de vous abandonner quand cela conviendra à ses intérêts, dut-il en résulter des dommages pour les vôtres, et pour mettre le comble à vos maux, et à son insa-

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Celorico, 5th August, 1810. 9 P.M.

‘ I wish that you would take an opportunity of making a telegraph signal to General Cox at an early hour in the morning, and state to him the following three sentences.

‘ “ The deserters tell us that the report in the enemy’s camp is that they will attempt to take Almeida by storm.”

‘ “ We do not believe the enemy will make this attempt.”

‘ “ Be prepared, particularly with your flank fire, every morning before day.”

‘ I received Loison’s letter, and sent Gordon with an answer. Send in the inhabitant of Linhares when he shall arrive at Freixedas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Celorico, 5th August, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters to the 2nd, 8 P.M. It appears to me that the disposition which you have made of your corps will answer perfectly.

tiabile ambition. Elle envoie ses vaisseaux dans vos ports pour emmener dans ses colonies ceux de vos enfans qui auront échapper aux dangers auxquelles elle les aura exposé sur le Continent. La conduite de son armée devant Ciudad Rodrigo ne vous dit-elle pas assez ce que vous devez attendre de semblables alliés? N’ont-ils pas excité la garnison et les malheureux habitants de cette place par des promesses trompeuses, et ont-ils brûlé une seule amorce pour les secourir? Plus récemment encore ont-ils jetté quelques uns des leurs dans Almeida, si ce n’est un gouverneur chargé de vous engager à une défense aussi mal entendue que celle de Ciudad Rodrigo? et ne vous ont-ils pas fait outrage en mettant ainsi dans la balance un seul Anglais contre six mille de votre nation? Portugais! ne vous laissez pas abuser plus longtems; le puissant souverain, dont tant de peuples bénissent les lois, la force, et le génie, veut assurer votre prospérité; mettez vous sous son égide, accueillez ses soldats en amis, et vous trouverez sûreté pour vos personnes et vos propriétés. Les maux qui résultent de l’état de la guerre vous sont connus: vous savez qu’ils vous menacent dans tous ce que vous avez de plus cher, dans vos enfans, dans vos parens, vos amis, vos fortunes, et dans votre existence politique et privée. Prenez donc une résolution qui vous offre tous les avantages de la paix. Restez tranquilles dans vos habitations, livrez vous à vos travaux domestiques, et ne regardez comme vos ennemis que ceux qui vous conseillent une guerre où toutes les chances sont contre le bien de votre pays.

‘ Le Maréchal Prince d’Essling, Commandant en Chef de l’Armée de Portugal.

‘ MASSÉNA.’

‘ It is very desirable that Le Cor should keep his station at Fundão, or indeed upon the Serra d’Alpedrinha, at least till he shall be obliged to retire by the enemy’s movements upon him, as his corps preserves the communication between you and me.

‘ I think that one of his battalions at Caria, keeping a good look out towards Penamacor, would be of use for the same object. There is nothing new on this side.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 5th August, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an estimate of the expected expenditure of the army in the Peninsula to the 24th August, and of the expected means to the same period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Celorico, 6th August, 1810.

‘ I wish to mention to you that I have received complaints from different quarters of the conduct of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country, and their conduct has been so bad as to exasperate them exceedingly. It has gone so far that they have inquired whether they might kill the Germans in our service, as well as in the service of the French, when urged to resist the enterprises of the latter.

‘ There is really no excuse for a soldier in the service of Great Britain plundering ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will talk seriously to Arentschildt upon the subject, and point out to him how unfortunate it would be if this conduct, which can be of advantage to nobody, should deprive his regiment of the reputation which they have acquired.

‘ Write to Cocks upon it also, as well as to any other officers who may command detachments of hussars.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Celorico, 6th August, 1810, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 6 P.M.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions to Captain Grant to have the inhabitants of Bemquerenza, to whom he refers as having prepared bread for the French, sent in to Guarda; and I beg you will send him thence here without loss of time.

‘ Send here the inhabitants of Penamacor employed to get intelligence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.’

! To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Celorico, 7th August, 1810 $\frac{1}{2}$ past 11 A.M.

‘ It would be very desirable to remove your hospital farther to the rear than it is. Those men who can ride on horseback might be kept either with their regiments, or, if they require more rest than they can get with their regiments, they might be sent here: but those who cannot ride should be sent to the hospital in the rear.

‘ The Ordenanza have cut up a few Frenchmen, and taken some horses and prisoners near Villar Mayor, and the 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry appear, by an account from Hill, to have taken 18 and killed 12, near Atalaya.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 7th August, 1810.

‘ I received in the night your letter of the 4th, and I am anxious to receive the further accounts of the success of the 1st regiment of cavalry.

‘ I have heard complaints from General Leith of the inconvenience which he feels from the weather in the occupation of his position on the Codes and the Zezere; and, adverting to the existing situation of affairs, I am of opinion that it will be expedient to keep his corps in reserve, rather than throw it in the position which I had allotted to it.

‘ Besides the roads between the Zezere and the Tagus, which you and Le Cor occupy, there is one on the right of the Zezere, leading from Belmonte to Covilhão, and thence to Pampilhosa, and turning the head of the Alva towards Thomar. This road is excessively bad, and scarcely practicable for troops; but I observe that the enemy’s inquiries have lately been for the road to Covilhão, and it is not impossible but that they may intend to push a column that way, which might intercept the communication between you and me.

‘ I also observe the movement of the corps from Andalusia into Estremadura. The movements of this corps may render it desirable that we should have more security for our right than the Marques de la Romana can give us; and this is another reason why Major General Leith’s division should be in reserve. At the same time, that if the press should be made upon you, it will be in your power or mine to throw him into the position formerly proposed for him on the Zezere and the Codes.

‘ I enclose a copy of the instructions which I have given him this day, to which I beg your attention, as well as to the views I have for placing him in reserve, as explained in this letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Leith.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 7th August, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th instant, and I entirely concur with you in the expediency of keeping your troops under cover as much, and for as great a length of time, as possible. None of the regiments of this army, excepting those which prefer it, are now out. All are cantoned in the villages.

‘ I beg of you to dispose of your troops as follows, till you shall receive directions from Lieut. General Hill or from me, to alter this disposition :

Figueiro dos Vinhos .	The 8th Portuguese regt. infantry.
Cabaços	One Portuguese do. do.

Thomar . . .	{	One Portuguese regt. of infantry.
		Three battalions of British infantry.
		Two brigades of Portuguese artillery.
Barca de Codes . . .		One battalion of Portuguese militia.
Torres Novas . . .	{	Two do. do. do.
		One regiment of Portuguese cavalry.
Santarem . . .		One do. do. do.

‘ I shall thus have it in my power to dispose of your corps, either in support of Lieut. General Hill, or to preserve the communication between Lieut. General Hill and this army; or to cover the right and communicate with the Marques de la Romana, as I may think proper.

‘ I request you to let General Hill know what arrangements have been made for the defence of the line which you were to have occupied under your former instructions.

‘ I have written to the Portuguese Government respecting the difficulties in supplying the Portuguese troops under your command, which, adverting to their numbers, and to the stations which they occupy, appear to me most extraordinary.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c,

‘ Major General Leith.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Celorico, 8th August, 1810, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 P.M.

‘ I have just received your note of half past 5 P.M., which contains interesting intelligence, which is confirmed from other quarters. If you keep a strong post on your right at Jurumella, which can patrol the roads leading from Castello Mendo, Castello Bom, and Ponte de Sequeiros, nothing of any importance can come upon your right.

‘ The post at Jurumella might retire direct upon Recammodo, and thence into the plain near Ponte do Ladrão.

‘ Your post at Freixedas becomes very important in case of the enemy making the siege. Ask Cox, in the morning, if they have broke ground; and ascertain by all means in your power, if the numbers augment in your front on this side of the Coa.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 8th August, 1810.’

‘I have this day received your letter of the 3rd.

‘I had a letter from Sir Richard Keats, written from off the Tagus; but neither from him, nor from Government, have I had the slightest intimation of any such design as that of which you have apprized me. If Government had not expressed a wish that I should not do so, I should have brought the greatest part of the British troops at Cadiz round to the Tagus before this time; and at all events, knowing how important it will be to have a very strong fleet in the Tagus when we shall embark, I proposed to Sir Richard Keats, in my answer to his letter, that if he should think it possible to quit Cadiz, he should come round to the Tagus with his squadron; and at all events, that he should send round the transports not immediately required for the service of the troops there. I assure you that I have had no intimation from Government of this plan, and most particularly none respecting yourself.

‘Mr. Stuart will make you acquainted with the state of affairs here. The Portuguese troops are behaving very well, and if Government will act as if they were in earnest in their desire to save this country, and will reinforce us handsomely, we shall not lose it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Celorico, 8th August, 1810.

‘Since I have commanded the troops in this country, I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might fall into their hands, and I must do the French the justice to say that they have been universally well treated, and in recent instances the wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.

‘ On this principle I interested myself last year in favor of General Franceschi, who had been taken by a guerrilla in Castille, and had been confined in the Alhambra at Granada; but the Junta would not attend to my application to exchange him; nor would they allow the money to be given to him which I had sent there for him. Till I received the other day from Madame Franceschi the duplicate of a letter, which she had written to me in January, I believed that General Franceschi had been released from confinement when the French entered Granada; but I conclude that it is not the case, and that he is now in confinement at Carthagena, or at Alicante.

‘ If he should be so, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send to him the enclosed letter, which contains one from his wife, and I beg you also to send him one hundred dollars. I also wish you to urge the Regency to allow him to be exchanged. Let me hear from you what is become of him.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 8th August, 1810.

‘ I enclose the weekly state of the army to the 1st of August, and that of the troops at Cadiz to the 1st of June.

‘ I likewise enclose the weekly state of the detachments at Lisbon to the 1st of August; from which your Lordship will be able to see how the number of sick absent on the military return is made up. Besides the hospital and establishment at Lisbon and Belem, there is one at Coimbra, and one at Figueira; and there are sick men on their passage from Figueira to Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 8th August, 1810.

‘ In my letter of the 1st instant, I omitted to inform you that Lieut. Colonel Wyndham, of the Royal dragoons, had been taken prisoner on the 30th July.

‘It appears by his own account that, being Field Officer of the day, he was visiting the advanced vedettes, and he rode up to one of those of the enemy, and was immediately taken by some French hussars. I understand that he is well treated by the French; and I have sent him money, which I know that he has received.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, Celorico, 8th August, 1810.

‘The estimate of the expenses of the army, and the resources to cover them, which I forwarded to your Lordship on the 1st instant, will have shown you that the latter have increased considerably lately.

‘It is impossible to tell how long it will be in our power to procure this increased supply of money for bills upon England; but I should hope that we are not likely to feel distress before the specie expected will have arrived from America.

‘I am concerned to inform your Lordship that from the communications which I have had with the Portuguese Government and Marshal Beresford, I have reason to apprehend a failure in its pecuniary resources.

‘In my dispatch of the 14th of November, 1809, I made your Lordship acquainted with the result of the financial state of this Government, as furnished to me officially by its officers, from which it appeared that there was a very large deficiency of means to cover the estimated expense.

‘The expenses of the Government have been increased beyond the estimate furnished to me, by the same events and circumstances which have increased the expenses of the British army, and by their having actually in the field, in active employment, a much larger proportion of the militia forces than had been expected by them. At the same time I have reason to believe that the receipts of the revenue have not been materially increased.

‘I was not employed in this country when the estimate was framed of the expense of 10,000 men of the Portuguese army, on which the original subsidy, and its subsequent increase at different periods, were founded; but I believe

that that estimate was a very erroneous one, that it did not include many expenses attending the number of men estimated for; and the prices estimated were lower than those paid at that time, and much lower than those of the same articles at a subsequent period.

‘ His Majesty’s Government will have received full information from the King’s Minister at Lisbon upon this subject; but it is obvious that, although His Majesty has afforded to the Portuguese Government very large pecuniary assistance, the sums with which he has assisted them have not been adequate to defray the military expenses, which they were at different times intended to defray, with the exception of the sum for the increase of pay for the Portuguese officers, and that for the pay of the British officers.

‘ It is difficult to consider of the mode of increasing the pecuniary means of the Portuguese Government without adverting to their whole system and conduct.

‘ There is great firmness, considerable talent and ability, great zeal, and the best inclination in the persons who compose the Government in Portugal, but they are unfortunately under the control of the Government of the Brazils; and it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevail upon them to adopt measures of obvious advantage, and even necessity, because some of them are referrible to the Prince himself, and others interfere with long established but vicious customs and prejudices. The local Government do not feel themselves sufficiently strong in the support of the Government in the Brazils to attempt the reforms in all branches of the Government which the circumstances of the country require; and the consequence is, that many regulations of trade and finance, by which the revenue of the country would be much increased, have not been carried into execution.

‘ The King’s Minister at Lisbon will have acquainted His Majesty’s Government of the party existing in Portugal, not favorable to the French, nor hostile to the influence of His Majesty’s Government over the Portuguese councils, but jealous of the authority of the local Government, and undermining its influence, and paralyzing its power by their private communications and intrigues through their friends and relations with the Government in the Brazils.

‘ This party can be successfully checked and resisted only

by the cordial support given to the measures of the local Government in Portugal by the King's Minister in the Brazils; and till that is done, our efforts in this country, either to increase the revenue, or to govern the country, as it ought to be governed in the critical situation in which it is placed, must fail in producing their effects.

‘ In my dispatch of the 14th of November, 1809, I pointed out to your Lordship one cause of the decline of the revenues of Portugal, and their deficiency to defray the expenses of the Government, in the direct trade of His Majesty's subjects to the Brazils. His Majesty's Government must be the best judges of the policy of foregoing the advantages to be derived by his subjects, and by the revenue of Great Britain, by this direct trade, for the political advantage of increasing the revenue and means, and supporting the power of His Majesty's allies in the Peninsula.

‘ I have reason to believe that the whole amount of the subsidy paid to Portugal is not equal to the loss of revenue alone, without reckoning other advantages surrendered by the establishment of the direct trade of His Majesty's subjects to the Brazils; and all the improvements which can be made in the revenue in Portugal will not make the revenue adequate to the expense.

‘ I have thought it proper to bring this subject under the consideration of His Majesty's Government, as being very important at the present moment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 8th August, 1810.

‘ Although I have no concern with the naval operations on the coasts of the Peninsula, I think it proper to draw your Lordship's attention to the objects referred to in the enclosed extract of a letter which I have written to Sir Richard Keats, in order to draw his attention to them, in case he should have authority from Government or means to attend to them.

‘ It would be very desirable to have a squadron of men of war, with a few victuallers and store ships, on the eastern

coast of the Peninsula, and in communication with the General Officer commanding the troops in Catalonia and Valencia, in order to assist these places, to encourage their resistance to the enemy, and eventually, if necessary and practicable, to carry off their garrisons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 8th August, 1810.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance in front of this army since I addressed you on the 1st instant. They still maintain their position before Almeida, with a small corps on this side of the Coa, with their right at Pinhel; and the main body of their army is near Almeida, and between the Coa and Agueda.

‘ They have not yet broke ground before Almeida; and I have not received accounts, upon which I can rely, of any preparations for the siege of Almeida.

‘ The corps of Regnier, which had appeared first at Navas Frias, and afterwards at Salvaterra, passed a detachment of cavalry and infantry across the mountains from Valverde and Cilleros to Penamacor on the 31st of July, and they occupied Zibreira at the same time.

‘ I am informed by General Hill that the 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry, under Colonel Christophe, fell upon a party of French cavalry belonging to this detachment which were in Atalaya on the 3rd instant, and pursued them to the neighbourhood of Penamacor, and killed twelve, and took eighteen prisoners. I have not received the details of this affair, which Lieut. General Hill mentions as creditable to the troops, and cannot report our own loss.

‘ The Portuguese ordenanza, also in that part of the country, have fallen upon one of the enemy’s detachments, of which they killed twenty-five.

‘ Lieut. General Hill holds Castello Branco with the advanced guard of his infantry; Brigadier General Fane, with the 13th light dragoons and four regiments of Portuguese cavalry, being in his front along the Ponsul.

‘ Regnier had sent a detachment across the Tagus, appa-

rently with a view to secure the boats on the river, which detachment occupied a fortified post at the junction of the Rio del Monte with the Tagus. This post was attacked by Brigadier General Don Carlos de España, and he carried it with a loss to the enemy of 150 men killed, wounded, and prisoners.

‘Mortier’s corps has moved from the Guadalquivir, and by the last accounts had arrived at Fregenal, in the Sierra Morena. The Marques de la Romana, from whom I heard on the 4th, appears to think the movements of this corps are not decided, and that they have been made solely to divert his attention from the Tagus. But as I find by my accounts from Cadiz to the 28th of July that General Lacy was about to return thither, and that all contest had ceased in the Sierra de Ronda, I imagine that the movement of Mortier is decided, and that he will establish himself in Estremadura, in obedience to the orders received from the emperor.

‘I trust, however, that advantage will have been taken of the absence of the enemy from Estremadura, for nearly a month, to fill the magazines of all the fortified places, and to provide for the subsistence of the army of the Marques de la Romana, in conformity with the arrangement which I made with him when he was at my head quarters at Alverca, and with my repeated suggestions since.

‘In the north, the French had advanced with a detachment of cavalry and infantry, and taken possession of Puebla de Sanabria on the 29th of July, from whence the Spanish General Taboada had retired.

‘General Silveira had moved out from Braganza with some infantry, and a detachment of 200 cavalry; and he informs me in a letter of the 4th, that his cavalry had on that morning totally defeated that of the enemy, having taken forty prisoners, only two officers, and one soldier having escaped.

‘When he wrote in the evening of the 4th, the enemy’s detachment of infantry were shut up in Puebla de Sanabria by that under his command, and that of General Taboada.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 8th August, 1810.

‘ My dispatch of this day will have shown your Lordship that we may hope that all the trouble taken, and expenses incurred, to form the Portuguese army, will not have been thrown away; and adverting to the state of the contest in the Peninsula, and the state of the enemy’s force both here and elsewhere, I cannot avoid again recommending to the consideration of His Majesty’s Government the means of reinforcing this army with British infantry.

‘ In reference to the state of health of a great part of the army, it might be desirable to send these troops into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, where they would be equally disposable for service in other parts of the world, as they would be by remaining in His Majesty’s dominions.

‘ I am also of opinion that three fourths of the garrison now at Cadiz might be withdrawn from thence with safety, and employed with advantage in this country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 9th August, 1810.

‘ I have received the duplicates of your letters of the 6th and 7th.

‘ Nothing of importance has occurred here. There is more appearance of the intention on the part of the enemy to attack Almeida than there has been before; but they have not yet broken ground.

‘ Silveira’s cavalry have cut up one of the enemy’s detachments of cavalry near Puebla de Sanabria, and have taken forty prisoners. With his infantry, and that of General Taboada, he had 400 French infantry shut up in Puebla de Sanabria, and he expected on the 4th that they would surrender before morning; but I have not heard from him since the 4th, and I am apprehensive that the French will have been relieved.

‘ I am a little anxious about Mortier’s movements into Estremadura; not on account of the progress he will make, but I think that the Marques de la Romana is inclined to

fight a battle. If we can only avoid any disaster of importance for some time, I hope we may do some good at last.

‘Tell Fane not to allow his cavalry to engage without evident advantage.

I do not think that the enemy can throw forwards any large body of cavalry on your side till he shall advance in earnest.

‘Encourage the ordenanza by all the means in your power; and make the inhabitants carry off their property, and be prepared to quit their villages.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, Celorico, 10th August, 1810.

‘I write to let you know that I have detached General Madden’s brigade of Portuguese cavalry, hitherto attached to General Leith, to the Marques de la Romana. It will be necessary, therefore, that when you shall retire, you should take with you through the mountains two regiments instead of one of Portuguese cavalry, leaving Fane with three regiments, including the 13th, on the left of the Tagus.

‘There is one squadron belonging to Madden’s brigade, now with Le Cor, which ought to be sent to Elvas to join its brigade, and you can replace it by one of Fane’s: let it march to Portalegre and Arronches, and thence to Campo Mayor, as that is the route which Madden himself will take. I have ordered some horse artillery to join Fane from Lisbon. There is nothing new.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. I have received your letter of yesterday, and I enclose an official answer, which you may send to General Regnier, or not, as you like.

‘When you send your answer, do not date where your head quarters are.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

SIR,

Celorico, 10th August, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 22nd of July (marked No. 30), and that of the 22nd (marked separate).

‘ It certainly appears that Government are not aware of the exact situation of affairs in Spain, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to apprise them of their state; and it appears from Lieut. Colonel Bunbury’s letter that they have still less knowledge of the position and strength of the different French corps in Spain.

‘ In my opinion Sir John Stuart has not been ordered to send the reinforcements to the Peninsula; and it has been left to his discretion whether to send them or not, in the same manner as it was left to the discretion of the Commanding Officer in Halifax, whether he would send the reinforcements from thence.

‘ When responsibility for the safety of the territory under their charge is thus placed upon the officers commanding in them, it cannot be expected that they would detach their troops; more particularly as at the very moment the enemy may threaten an attack upon the point from which the troops are to be drawn. But even if all the troops expected from the Mediterranean should be added to your corps, I should still be of opinion that the attempt to raise the siege of Cadiz is one of considerable risk. If, however, you consider the letter from Lieut. Colonel Bunbury to be an intimation of the wishes of Government upon that subject, I beg you to detain the troops, if they should arrive from the Mediterranean.

‘ My letter to Mr. Wellesley, of this date, will make you acquainted with the situation of affairs in this quarter; and you will see what little effect the operations of General Lacy, and others in the Sierra de Ronda, and of General Copons between the Guadiana and Guadalquivir, have upon the enemy’s plans.

‘ My own opinion is, that this country is their object at present; and, as usual, they will abandon every thing else that does not contribute to its attainment. If I had not received the communication of the pleasure of Government

upon this subject, I should pursue the same plan, and withdraw you and three fourths of your force from Cadiz in order to increase our strength here; and with that force, and any reinforcement, we might hope for some success; and any success would relieve Cadiz, and re-establish matters in the Peninsula.

‘ I am concerned to hear of the desertion of the troops from Cadiz; but I am sorry to add that this crime has been, and is still, but too common in this army.

‘ I beg to draw your attention to the orders which I have given this day respecting the private correspondence of the officers of the army. I was astonished some time ago to see in the English newspapers an accurate account of the batteries and works erecting at Cadiz and on the Isla, with the number of guns, and of what calibre each was to contain, and their distance from each other, and from the enemy's works. This information must have been extracted from the letter of an officer. If officers wish to give their friends this description of information, they should request them not to publish their letters in the newspapers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ à Celorico, ce 10 Août, 1810.

‘ MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUES,

‘ J'ai donné des ordres aujourd'hui à la brigade de cavalerie Portugaise qui est sous les ordres du Général Madden, d'aller se joindre à vous, et se mettre sous vos ordres.

‘ Vous savez que cette cavalerie est neuve, mais les chevaux sont bons, et ils sont bien armés et équipés; et je juge par ce qui est arrivé de ce côté-ci que ces soldats feront leur devoir, si on leur fait justice en ne les exposant pas à des nombres inégaux. Le Général Madden est un officier Anglais de beaucoup de talent.

‘ Je vous prie d'entendre que je vous attache ces régimens sous les conditions suivantes :

‘ 1°. Dès leur entrée en Espagne ils seront nourris, hommes et chevaux, selon l'étape Portugaise, pris des magasins de votre armée. Le Général Madden vous fera savoir les rations d'officiers, de soldats, et de chevaux.

‘ 2°. La discipline et l’économie intérieure de ces deux régimens seront exclusivement sous la direction du Général Madden.

‘ 3°. Quoique je ne désire pas que ces régimens ne fassent pas le service ordinaire à leur tour avec les autres troupes, il faut, en toute occasion importante, qu’ils agissent ensemble sous les ordres de leur Général et leurs propres officiers, et qu’ils ne soient pas detachés ou séparés de la personne de leur Général avec différentes divisions de l’armée.

‘ 4°. Ils me seront renvoyés aussitôt que je les demanderai.

‘ 5°. En cas que le corps du Marques de la Romana se trouve dans la nécessité de se jeter dans les places de la frontière, cette brigade de cavalerie sera envoyée à Elvas, ou dans la frontière du Portugal pour attendre nouvel ordre de ma part.

‘ Je ferai part au Général Madden d’une copie de cette lettre comme instruction pour le guider.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Le Marques de la Romana.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 10th August, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th, and I have taken such notice in the General Orders of the letters which you enclosed, as will I hope prevent officers from writing such nonsense in future. I am sorry to hear that our Proctor’s bills are so high, but we cannot help it. I think that Lord March can do without his helmet for a little while.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 10th August, 1810.

‘ After the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the departure of the division of General Carrera from this part of the country for Estremadura, the party of cavalry under the command of Colonel Don Julian Sanchez was left here without any com-

munication with any Spanish corps, without pay or means of subsistence or support.

‘Adverting to the spirit of enterprize and intelligence which Don Julian had already manifested, and to the benefit which would result to the common cause from keeping his party embodied and in a state of activity, as well by the military services it is capable of rendering, as by keeping alive the spirit of hostility against the French throughout Castille, Don Julian and his officers and party being connected in friendship with all the heads of parties of guerrillas in that country, I have deemed it expedient to attach Don Julian for the present to the British army, in hopes that the Marques de la Romana and the Regency will approve of the measure; and I have engaged to provide for the pay and subsistence of his party during the time that he shall be so employed.

‘As he will probably be employed at a distance from the army, occasionally in Spain and occasionally in Portugal, and as it would be impossible to attach a commissary to him, I have thought it best to give him a certain allowance for the rations of each officer, soldier, and horse, by which all violence to the people of this country, and disputes and complaints will be avoided.

‘I enclose a copy of the estimate of the expense of this party for one month, amounting to 6955 dollars, which I have paid to Don Julian; and which, of course, will be a charge against the Spanish Government.

‘As the Marques de la Romana is in want of cavalry, I have attached to his army a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, under the command of Brig. General Madden; and I enclose the copy of the letter which I have written to the Marques, containing the conditions on which I detached that body.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY, Celorico, 10th August, 1810.

‘I write to the Government every Wednesday for the packet which leaves Lisbon on Sunday morning; and to you every Friday, for the ship of war which leaves Lisbon on

Monday for Cadiz; and I cannot adopt a better mode of making you acquainted with events here than by sending you a copy of my weekly dispatch to the Government. I now enclose the copy of that which I wrote on the 8th instant. Since then nothing important has occurred.

‘I have a letter from Silveira of the 5th, at which time the enemy had shown some larger force in his front, but not sufficient to induce him to raise the blockade of La Puebla.

‘I have letters from Badajoz of the 7th, and it appears that Mortier had made another forward movement from Fregenal. I hope the Marques de la Romana will not fight a battle; and if Government are really in earnest about this country, and will reinforce us handsomely, or indeed at all, we may still be able to save every thing. The French are remarkably cautious. They risk literally nothing.

‘I approved highly of the instructions of Government to the Governor of Curacao, regarding the Caraccas, of which I conclude that you have a copy. In those to which you refer in your letter of the 28th July, they appear to have gone more into detail, and to have laid open their intentions in case of the occurrence of every possible event, more than was necessary just at the present moment.

‘I hope the Regency will have firmness to resist the demand of a free trade with the colonies; as a boon to the colonies, it might answer in some degree, and might be connected with measures of finance which would probably give them a very large revenue. But we have no right, and it is the grossest impolicy in us to demand it. Great Britain has ruined Portugal by her free trade with the Brazils: not only the customs of Portugal, to the amount of a million sterling per annum, are lost, but the fortunes of numerous individuals, who lived by this trade, are ruined; and Cadiz will suffer in a similar manner, if this demand is agreed to. Portugal would be now in a very different situation as an ally, if our trade with the Brazils was still carried on through Lisbon; and I would only ask, is it wise, or liberal, or just, to destroy the power and resources, and absolutely to ruin our allies, in order to put into the pockets of our merchants the money which before went into their treasuries, and would

be now employed in the maintenance of military establishments against the common enemy?

‘ I have had no communication from Government on the plan mentioned to you by Sir Richard Keats, but the scheme had occurred to me, among others, to be carried into execution when we should be obliged to evacuate Portugal; and I have written to Sir Richard Keats, and to General Graham, upon the subject.

‘ You may depend upon it that our Government will not give Spain one farthing.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Celorico, 11th August, 1810. 3 P.M.

‘ Tell Captain Cocks to inform the inhabitants of Richosa that I will not pardon them till they give up those who committed the outrage on the troops; and that if they delay it much longer I will destroy their village. Let them give up those who committed the outrage, and trust to my mercy.

‘ If Captain Cocks or you have any flints to spare you may give them, but you must make a demand for others to replace them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General* ‘ WELLINGTON.
‘ *the Hon. L. Cole.*

To Brigadier General Sir N. Trant.

‘ SIR, ‘ Celorico, 11th August, 1810.

‘ I enclose the extract of a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Admiral Berkeley; and I am much concerned to learn that an alarm has been excited at Oporto, by letters written by officers of this army, who appear to have but little information, or means of forming a judgment of the real situation of affairs.

‘ Portugal being invaded by a powerful French army, it is reasonable that those who possess valuable moveable property in a town likely from its known riches and resources to excite the cupidity of the enemy, and incapable, from local

circumstances, of making a defence to be relied upon, should adopt measures to remove their property to a place of greater security.

‘ But the inhabitants of Oporto had no ground for the excessive alarm which they appear to have taken from these two foolish letters; and the conduct which they adopted by creating a want of confidence among the troops employed in the defence of the frontier in which they are more immediately interested, might have had the most disastrous effects on their own interests and the general cause of the allies.

‘ It is impossible for me to foretel the result of the operations of a war in which so much depends upon contingencies, upon the effect of which no calculation can be made.

‘ In my situation it is a duty incumbent upon me to be prepared, as far as circumstances will permit, for every probable event; and although I do recommend to the inhabitants of Oporto to place in security their valuable property, I have no reason to believe that they are at present in any degree exposed to the rapacity of the enemy; or that they are likely to be so exposed in the probable course of the operations of the war. If circumstances should alter, there will be time to see, and provide against the increased danger, as far as our means will permit.

‘ I request you to adopt any mode you think best to communicate these sentiments to the principal inhabitants of Oporto. I wish that it was in my power to give them assurances of complete security; but I am as unwilling to deceive them, and that they should incur any loss by a blind confidence in me which they could avoid by early precaution, as I am desirous that they should not injure their own property and the general cause of the allies by premature and unfounded alarm.

‘ Our powerful and inveterate enemy having declared his determination to subdue this peaceable, happy, and loyal people, and force them to submit to his iron yoke, it is reasonable to suppose, and it is known that he has prepared vast means to accomplish his objects; and the early removal of valuable property from his reach is not only a duty which the merchants and others of Oporto owe to themselves and their families, but will eventually tend to the annoyance of

the enemy, and is equally incumbent upon them, with the duty of determined resistance to the enemy by the whole population of the country.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of the General Order which I issued yesterday to the army, to prevent the circulation of such unfounded alarms in future from hence.’

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Sir N. Trant.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Celorico, 11th August, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

½ past 6, P.M.

‘ I beg that you will let me know the name of the man you wish to have appointed Assistant Provost, and he shall be appointed.

‘ Pay the spies any thing you think they deserve. If you are certain that they go to Valverde, you should pay them very well, as it is a service of much danger. Give them rations as well as payment, which will probably encourage them more than money.

‘ I write to Beresford about the ammunition for the ordenanza. I cannot read the name of the village which the people have not quitted, but let the Juiz de Fora know that they may stay or not, as they please, but that any man who has any communication with the enemy shall be hanged.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.’

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ The enemy abandoned Penamacor yesterday morning.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 12th August, 1810.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 7th, and I am happy to find that you have smoothed the difficulties in respect to the Admiral’s appointment.

‘ There is nothing new. The French have withdrawn from Penamacor. I tremble about Romana, who appears to be determined to try another great action. It would be unfortunate if our prospects were to be again destroyed by

the same circumstances which have so repeatedly put the whole contest in a state of risk.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Celorico, 13th August, 1810.

‘ Regnier has withdrawn his advanced guard from Penamacor to Penagarcia. Tell General Cox, by telegraph, that the 3rd Swiss regiment surrendered, by capitulation, to General Silveira, at Puebla de Sanabria, on the 10th instant.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General* ‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ I enclose some proclamations to be circulated.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 13th August, 1810. 1 P.M.

‘ I enclose a letter for General Hill, which I beg you to peruse and forward. I am delighted with Silveira’s success.

‘ I likewise enclose a memorandum which has been given to me on the conduct of a German, by the name of —, who has quitted the party of Don Julian, and wants to enter the British service, in which view he is in some degree patronised by some of the British officers, and he is, I believe, at this moment with, or not very far distant from, Cocks’ party.

‘ It would be rather a delicate matter for me to take into the British service an officer who should have separated from the Spaniards on bad terms, under any circumstances; but when charges of the description contained in the enclosed paper are made against this Officer, it is quite impossible for me not only to give him a commission, but to allow him to remain under the protection of any part of the British army.

‘ I wish therefore that he should be called upon to answer the contents of the enclosed memorandum; and if he should not be able to do so in a satisfactory manner, I shall not give him up to Don Julian; but I shall request him to go to

the Marques de la Romana, and to satisfy him of the propriety of his conduct, before I can have any thing farther to do with him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General
the Hon. L. Cole.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 13th August, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of 1 P.M. of the 11th. You will probably have heard before from General Cole that the enemy had marched on the 10th from Monsanto to Penagarcia, which confirms Baron Tripp’s notion of their retiring upon Zarza; and I agree very much in opinion with that which, it appears by Fane’s letter, you entertain, viz., “That they are about to recross the Tagus.” Regnier’s movement to this side, although ordered by Buonaparte himself, was certainly a false one, and the sooner a remedy is applied, by recrossing, the better it will be for the enemy. But, if they cross the river, you must cross likewise, and resume your old position at Portalegre, and replace Le Cor in his; leaving, however, until you hear further from me, two regiments of Portuguese cavalry on this side the Tagus, as I have sent Madden’s brigade to the Marques de la Romana.

‘ From comparing some returns, picked up at Penamacor, with those which I have of Regnier’s corps, I do not think he has any reinforcements, excepting possibly of dragoons. He had two squadrons of each of the 17th, 27th, 18th, and 19th dragoons under General La Houssaye; and three squadrons of the 22nd chasseurs, and two of each of the 1st hussars and 8th dragoons, and four of the Hanoverian chasseurs, under General Soult. He received a reinforcement in cavalry, consisting of the four squadrons of each of the 13th and 22nd dragoons from the 5th corps, and these two regiments added about 1300 men to his force, but I believe he sent to the 5th corps at the same time La Houssaye’s brigade of 1100 men. At least, I recollect receiving a report that La Houssaye’s brigade had marched into La Mancha. If it did, Regnier has but little more cavalry now than he had in May: if he did not, he has about 3500 cavalry. You may probably find out from some of the deserters whether

the regiments of La Houssaye's brigade are still with Reginier's corps.

' At all events let Fane understand clearly that his business is to observe the enemy, and to give you intelligence ; and that I expect him not to engage in any affair unless he has an evident superiority of numbers.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General Hill.*

' WELLINGTON.

' I have the pleasure to inform you that the 3rd Swiss regiment has surrendered in Puebla de Sanabria to General Silveira.'

To Dom Miguel Forjaz.

' SIR,

' Celorico, 14th August, 1810.

' I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, and of a list of promotions in the army, made by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the Brazils, which I have received from Marshal Beresford.

' I intend by the first opportunity to have the honor of addressing His Royal Highness on the subject of this promotion ; in the mean time I beg leave to recommend to the Governors of the Kingdom that they should suspend the publication of these promotions, for the reasons which I am about to state to them, till the further pleasure of His Royal Highness shall be received.

' First, I would beg leave to recall to the recollection of the Governors of the Kingdom, that, when General Beresford was called from the service of His Majesty, to take upon him the command of the army of His Royal Highness, it was stipulated with him that the power of reward, as well as of punishment, of the officers and soldiers of the army, should be vested exclusively in his hands ; or, in other words, that he should, exclusively, recommend officers for promotion, and approve and order the execution of the sentences of courts martial. This power was lodged in the hands of Marshal Beresford, not because it was wished, by way of compliment, to give him the disposal of a large patronage as an advantage and an honor to him, and as a mark of His Royal Highness's favor, but they were given to him in order to facilitate and secure the performance of the

arduous duty which he had undertaken; viz., to reform the Portuguese army: and the motive and object in placing these powers in the hands of Marshal Beresford were the benefit of His Royal Highness and the advantage of this Kingdom of Portugal.

‘ It is not necessary that I should now enter into the consideration whether these, among other measures adopted at this period, have been successful or otherwise. In a former letter of the ———, I have laid before His Royal Highness my opinion of Marshal Beresford’s conduct, and of the success of his exertions to reform his armies, and every day’s experience proves the justice of the opinions which I then laid before him. But I would beg leave to observe that the system which it appears has been adopted, of promoting officers in the Brazils, who have not been positively recommended for promotion by Marshal Beresford, is a direct violation of the stipulation entered into with that officer, when he undertook the performance of the arduous duty which he has, with so much success, performed.

‘ Secondly, I would beg leave to call the observation of the Governors of the Kingdom to the fact, that this system is not less prejudicial to the interests of His Royal Highness, and of this Kingdom of Portugal, than it is inconsistent with the stipulations made with Marshal Beresford, and that it is entirely subversive of all authority in Portugal.

‘ I shall not enter into the particular cases of the persons promoted, as that is sufficiently adverted to in the enclosed letter from Marshal Beresford. But I would wish to impress upon the minds of the Governors of the Kingdom, and of His Royal Highness and his Ministers in the Brazils, the impossibility which exists of enforcing any system of discipline and obedience in the army, or of carrying the country through the difficulties which are hanging over it, if individuals, instead of performing their duty to the satisfaction of their immediate superior on the spot in Portugal, and earning rewards by solid, substantial services and real merit, are to acquire them by private applications to the Ministers at the Court of the Brazils. It is obvious that the interests of His Royal Highness and of Portugal must suffer materially in every instance in which this system of preferment is carried into execution.

‘ It is also subversive of all local authority in Portugal. It cannot be expected that Marshal Beresford can perform duties which have required that all the military patronage of the Government should be placed in his hands, in order to enable him to perform them, if the Ministers at the Brazils are to attend to private applications from individuals; any more than the Governors of the Kingdom can perform the important duties imposed upon them, and which they also have hitherto performed so much to the public advantage, if they do not enjoy the full confidence of His Royal Highness; and if any private applications or recommendations are attended to by His Royal Highness’s Ministers in the Brazils inconsistent with the arrangements made by the local Government here under His Royal Highness’s authority, or with the recommendations and advice which this Government may deem it their duty to give to His Royal Highness.

‘ Under these impressions, I earnestly recommend to the Governors of the Kingdom to suspend the publication of this list of promotions, in hopes that His Royal Highness will be induced, by the reasoning in this letter, to cancel it altogether; and that he will be graciously pleased to order his Ministers in the Brazils in future to carry into execution strictly the stipulation made with Marshal Beresford; and to recommend no military officer for promotion, or other mark of honor, in the army in Portugal, who shall not have been recommended to His Royal Highness’s gracious favor by Marshal Beresford.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Celorico, 15th August, 1810. $\frac{1}{2}$ past 6 P.M.

‘ I enclose a report which has been made by Mr. Fielder, the Commissary attached to the 3rd dragoon guards, of a detachment of the enemy having crossed at Villa Nova do Foz Coa, which Burghersh tells me he (Mr. Fielder) saw between one and two P.M. yesterday.

‘ I have heard nothing of this detachment from any of the officers of the ordenanza in that part of the country; and Sewell, Beresford’s aide de camp, who left Meda, the head

quarters of the commandant of the ordenanza, at half past three P.M. yesterday, says they had then heard nothing of this detachment there ; and that, if the detachment had crossed the Coa, under Villa Nova, they must have been seen before ten in the morning.

‘ However, I think it proper to give you intelligence of this supposed detachment, and to beg you to order your piquets on the road to Trancoso, from Pinhel, to have an eye upon their left and their rear, as well as to their front. Anson is, I understand, at Cerejo with the 16th, which place is, I think, completely covered by your piquets.

‘ If the story is well founded, I conclude that I shall receive some further intelligence during the night, and, at all events, I will send to Meda immediately to discover the truth. I rather believe, however, that the detachment, said to be 4000, will turn out to be a strong patrol of cavalry and infantry.

‘ Since writing the above I have seen the Commissary, whose verbal account is precisely the same as his written account.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Celorico, 15th August, 1810.

‘ I enclose the last weekly state of this army, and the weekly return of the sick to the 28th July.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, from the weekly state, that the sick list has increased in some degree ; but the diseases are, in general, fevers occasioned by the heat of the weather, and the cases are very slight, and yield to medicine immediately.

‘ The probability that your Lordship will be disappointed in your expectations of the arrival of the reinforcements from the Mediterranean and North America, and the anxiety which His Majesty’s Government have expressed for the success of the operations in this country, induce me again to suggest for your consideration, that I should be allowed to draw away from Cadiz a large proportion of the force employed there ; and from Gibraltar at least such part of the force belonging

to that garrison as is cruising in ships of war and transports on the southern shores of the Peninsula, and as I may think can be spared from that garrison without endangering its security.

‘ These measures would appear to be desirable, whatever may be the strength of the reinforcements which may arrive from the Mediterranean, North America, or England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 15th August, 1810.

‘ I have deemed it expedient to make an advance of 6955 dollars to Colonel Don Julian Sanchez, of the Spanish service, for the support of his corps of cavalry, for the reasons stated in the enclosed extract of a letter to His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz; and I beg to receive the directions of His Majesty’s Government whether I shall continue to make similar payments to Don Julian Sanchez, on account of the Spanish Government, if I should deem it advisable to keep his troops in co-operation with the British army.

‘ The course of the operations of the campaign may and will probably remove the troops under the Marques de la Romana within the Portuguese frontier; and I have already had a correspondence with that officer and with the Portuguese Government, respecting the mode of supplying them with provisions in this country.

‘ It is very obvious to me that they will get no regular supply of provisions, and that their passage through, and stay in the country, will be a most intolerable grievance upon the people, and worse than the presence of the enemy, if the supplies which they require are not paid for; and it is equally obvious that the Portuguese Government cannot pretend to supply them with provisions, or with money to pay for the supplies of provisions which they will receive, as they cannot at this moment supply either provisions or money for their own troops: nor, from what I hear of the distresses of the Spanish Government, does it appear very probable that they will be able to send round money to support the troops of the Marques de la Romana while they shall be in Portugal.

‘ I should propose, therefore, to supply these troops from the British magazines, and by means of a British Commissary, while they shall remain within the Portuguese frontier; and to keep a separate account of the expense, to be charged against the Spanish Government.

‘ I beg to receive the orders of His Majesty’s Government upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. *The Earl of Liverpool.* WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, Celorico, 15th August, 1810. ’

‘ I have the honor to enclose the report of Lieut. General Hill, with its enclosure, on the affair which the 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry had with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Atalaya, which I had not received when I addressed your Lordship on the 8th instant.

‘ The enemy still continue in the same positions in front of this army; they have not yet broken ground before Almeida, excepting to construct what I conceive to be a mortar battery, near the windmill, at which the left of General Craufurd’s division stood in the affair of the 24th of last month; but I understand that they are collecting materials and are transporting stores from Ciudad Rodrigo, apparently for the siege of the place.

‘ General Regnier’s advanced guard continued at Penamacor and Monsanto till the 10th, when it was withdrawn to Penagarcia, and still farther back towards Salvaterra.

‘ The inhabitants of the country have generally quitted their villages, and the enemy experience great difficulty in procuring subsistence: they are obliged to send a considerable distance to find it, so that their detachments for this purpose and their patrols are much annoyed by the ordenanza, and by the light detachments of the army.

‘ In Estremadura, Mortier’s corps advanced to Xerez de los Caballeros, while that of the Marques de la Romana was collecting at Olivença, Barcarrota, &c.: the enemy then moved from Xerez de los Caballeros to Zafra; and from Zafra it appears, by the last accounts which I have received from Badajoz of the 11th instant, that it had retired on the

night of the 8th to Llerena; and the Marques de la Romana established his head quarters at Zafra on the 10th.

‘I have not been able to ascertain whether all the French troops which had been brought from the Sierra de Ronda, &c., had arrived in Estremadura, but from the time which has elapsed since they passed Seville I should imagine that they had.

‘I have reinforced the Marques de la Romana with a brigade of Portuguese dragoons, under the command of Brigadier General Madden, which I had in reserve upon the Tagus, so that his corps will be in a respectable state of efficiency.

‘I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the enemy’s detachment, which I informed you in my dispatch of the 8th instant was shut up in Puebla de Sanabria, by the troops under the command of General Silveira and of the Spanish General Taboada, surrendered by capitulation on the 10th instant. I enclose two reports on this subject, of the 10th and 11th instant, which I have received from General Silveira.

‘It appears that General Seras was moving to the relief of these troops in Puebla de Sanabria, but was too late; and General Silveira very properly retired within the Portuguese frontier, rather than risk a general engagement. He has conducted his detachment with great spirit and prudence since he advanced for the relief of Puebla de Sanabria, by which operation, in killed, prisoners, and deserters, he has deprived the enemy of more than 500 men.

‘I have had no accounts from Cadiz since the 28th of last month.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘Celorico, 16th August, 1810.
½ past 6 P.M.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘I have received Waters’s report, whom I had sent to Meda. The party which crossed the lower Coa was merely a plundering party of 400 or 500 men, and they are about Villa Nova do Foz Coa. However, keep a look out still upon your left.

‘ To-morrow morning Pack goes with his brigade to Trancoso, which movement will encourage the ordenanza, and we may look for certain information, if not for security, on that side hereafter.

‘ I find by the telegraph from Guarda that Cocks and his detachment, and the ordenanza, have destroyed the mills near Castello Mendo.

‘ I shall be with you in the morning, and shall be at Freixedas about seven, but I cannot dine with you to-morrow. I must defer that pleasure to some future day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Celorico, 16th August, 1810.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s dispatch of the 19th July, in which you enclosed a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, containing the instructions of the Treasury to Mr. Drummond, for his guidance in the commission with which he is charged by their Lordships.

‘ Nothing can be more satisfactory to me than that the Lords of the Treasury should have an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the objects referred to Mr. Drummond, through a channel in which their Lordships place confidence; and every information and assistance that it is in my power to afford shall be given to Mr. Drummond.

‘ But as some points are referred to the consideration of Mr. Drummond, upon which it might be very inconvenient, if not injurious to the public service, to make any alteration in the system now in practice, such as in the directions conveyed to him to “point out any articles which he may think might be supplied from Great Britain, or from any other part of the world, either for the use of the British army, or in part payment of the subsidy to Portugal,” and in the directions to him to report any observations or suggestions which may occur to him for reducing the demand for money; and as it may be desirable that your Lordship and the Lords of the Treasury should receive the opinions of the Commissary General and myself upon Mr. Drummond’s suggestions, since we have had some experience in the re-

sources of this country, and the demands of different kinds of the army, I propose to desire Mr. Drummond to furnish the Commissary General with copies of all his reports to the Treasury, in order that our observations upon them may reach their Lordships as soon as possible.

‘I also propose to direct Mr. Drummond not to make any alteration in the mode of raising supplies of money at Lisbon or at Cadiz, without previous reference to me; of which directions, adverting to the evils which may result from any mistake of Mr. Drummond, I trust that His Majesty’s Government will approve.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Celorico, 17th August, 1810.

‘The enemy have broken ground before Almeida, and I consider the siege of that place to be determined upon. Under these circumstances it is my intention to bring up the army a little nearer, so as to be able to strike a blow, if the enemy should afford an opportunity; and at all events to oblige the enemy to keep his corps in a more collected state during the siege than it is at present, and thus to render the operation more difficult on account of the want of subsistence.

‘I think it not improbable that as soon as the enemy shall have found that we have moved, he will bring Regnier through Perales again; and in that case I wish you to come up again to Atalaya with your corps, keeping Le Cor on your left about Belmonte, and Fane on your right.

‘I send this by Lord Clinton. I have not heard from your quarter since the 12th, the date of your last letter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 18th August, 1810.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 13th, and I am concerned that you have reason to complain of the seamen of the transports.

‘I am glad to find that the transports are coming round from Cadiz. It is desirable that these transports should be kept distinct from those belonging to this army, and should be considered solely applicable to the army under the Marques de la Romana.

‘There is nothing extraordinary. The enemy have broken ground before Almeida; and I am about to close up the army to the front again, in order to take advantage of any mistake or mishap, and at all events to oblige the enemy to keep his whole force collected for this siege.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Celorico, 18th August, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 13th, and I enclose a letter to the Secretary of State on the subject of the transports detained in England and Ireland; and I request you to get from the Admiral, and to enclose in the letter, the names of the transports detained.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I have received your letter, and I concur entirely with you respecting this new proclamation, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will make my opinion of it known to the Government.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Celorico, 18th August, 1810.

‘I have received information that twenty empty transports, of which I enclose a list, which had been lent by the Admiral commanding in the Tagus to the Portuguese Government, and sent to England and Ireland to bring out cargoes of corn in lieu of money for the subsidy, have been detained by the Transport Board; and I request your Lordship to give orders that they may be allowed to receive their cargoes and to return to this country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Celorico, 18th August, 1810.

‘I beg to draw your attention to the publication of intelligence from Spain in the *Sun* newspaper of the 21st and 23rd July, which I enclose.

‘The newspaper of the 21st contains translations of letters to the Marques de la Romana, from persons whose signatures are affixed to them; which letters I know were written, as I have copies of the originals. The towns in which these people reside are now in the possession of the enemy; and it is probable that these people will suffer for having corresponded with the Marques de la Romana.

‘The letters marked in the newspaper of the 23rd July are from a correspondent of mine at Salamanca, who fortunately did not sign his name to his letters; and I believe I communicated these letters to the Marques de la Romana.

‘It is not impossible that this person may likewise be discovered, and may suffer accordingly; but, if that should not be the case, the French need only publish the translation of these letters at Salamanca, and they will cut off this source of information. Indeed, the translation and publication of all these documents, without any further observation, would be sufficient to increase the already existing difficulty of procuring information in Spain, and to render it impossible.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

‘Since I wrote to you on the 17th I have received your letters of that date.

‘General Craufurd will be at Freixedas to-morrow, and General Picton immediately in his rear.

‘I wish that you would order Le Cor up to Belmonte at all events, whether you move upon Atalaya or not.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

‘ I learn from Dom Miguel Forjaz that there are at Lisbon and Setuval, and in the neighbourhood, a considerable number of French prisoners, whom it is desirable to send to England without loss of time.

‘ I request of you (with the concurrence of the King’s Minister at Lisbon) to communicate with the Secretary of State upon this subject, and to obtain from him a list of the officers, and a return of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and to arrange with Admiral Berkeley respecting their embarkation for England. I write to the Admiral upon this subject by this post.

‘ You will send to the Transport Board a list of the officers, and a return of the non-commissioned officers and privates, when they shall sail for England; and inform the Transport Board that these prisoners have been sent to England, and that you have addressed them by my directions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

‘ I have had a communication with the Portuguese Ministers respecting the number of French prisoners in and in the neighbourhood of Lisbon; and it appears to me to be very desirable that they should be sent to England without loss of time. I have desired Colonel Peacocke to address you upon this subject, and to make all the arrangements preparatory to their embarkation; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take measures to send these prisoners to England as soon as it may be convenient to you.

‘ I beg also to draw your attention to the surrender by capitulation of a Swiss battalion at La Puebla de Sanabria. This battalion, consisting of about 450 men, including officers, has been marched to Coruña, from whence it is desirable that they should be removed to England at an early period. If Coruña should not be within the limits of your command, I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate with the officer commanding His Majesty’s ships at that station; and,

if there should be no means there of removing these men, I would request you to send there a transport or transports, for the purpose of conveying them to England.

‘ I enclose the extract of a letter of the 25th July, which I have received from the Secretary of State. The return of the vessels therein referred to to England may probably afford you the means of performing these several services without inconvenience.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral *the Hon. G. Berkeley.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

‘ In respect to the cavalry at Trancoso, it must, of course, be under the orders of Pack, but, unless upon an extraordinary occasion, Pack must not use it, excepting for the purpose for which it is stationed at Trancoso, viz., to keep up the communication between your posts on the road to Pinhel and that place, and I will instruct him accordingly.

‘ I do not like the enemy’s attempt to make the siege of Almeida with the 6th corps only; and, in order to oblige him to perform that operation with more men, I propose to move up the infantry of the army to the front again. Accordingly, General Craufurd will be to-morrow at Freixedas, and General Picton’s division in his rear: and on to-morrow or next day I shall move my head quarters to Alverca.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General *Sir S. Cotton, Bart.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

‘ As I conceive that the enemy ought not to be allowed to make the siege of Almeida with the 6th corps only, I move up the infantry of the army to-morrow, and General Craufurd will be at Freixedas, and General Picton in his rear.

‘ I wish that Colonel Harvey’s brigade may be moved up to Recommendo, and the artillery of your division to Guarda.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General *the Hon. L. Cole.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

• MY LORD, Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

‘ I enclose copies of certain papers which have been transmitted to me by General Mahy, being translations, or copies and extracts, or the substance of letters recently intercepted. It appears to me that these letters, with others written by the Duque de Santa Fé at Paris, which have likewise been intercepted, and have been forwarded to His Majesty’s Government, contain so accurate a description, from authentic sources, of the state of affairs in Spain, and are so highly interesting in themselves, that I propose to request Admiral Berkeley to send home a ship of war express with this dispatch.

His Majesty’s Government will see in these letters a description of the difficulties under which the enemy labor, in consequence of the operations of the guerrillas, notwithstanding the large force which, there is no doubt whatever, is employed in Spain; and the whole of the information before them will probably convince them, as it has me, that the enemy cannot conquer Spain without employing a force still larger; and that they cannot increase their force in the Peninsula, even admitting that they possess the military means, without increasing their pecuniary and other difficulties and distresses.

‘ I beg also to draw the attention of His Majesty’s Government to the opinions delivered by these excellent authorities, of the value of Portugal to the Allies, of the mischiefs done to them by its continuance in our possession, and of the benefit which they expect to derive by depriving us of this possession.

There are other evidences from these same authorities in these papers of the great interests involved in the continuance of the contest of the Peninsula, which equally deserve the attention of His Majesty’s Government; but I wish to draw their attention to those parts of the correspondence which relate to the British army and to this country, as confirming every opinion that I have ever given them upon this part of the subject.

‘ It will be unfortunate if Great Britain should not possess the means of securing still further the position of His Ma-

jesty's troops in Portugal, so as to ensure the continuance of the contest in the Peninsula, which it is evident to me must end favorably for His Majesty's interests, if his army can be maintained in the field in Portugal.

' Besides the papers above referred to, I enclose a letter from General Mahy to Don Miguel Alava, who is employed here by the Spanish Government, in which the former has explained the state of the forces in Galicia, and what might be done in that province.

' I beg leave to refer to a former dispatch, written after the battle of Ocaña, in which I urged His Majesty's Government to send to the Tagus the supplies which were necessary, and could be afforded for the armament of troops, and to keep them there at the disposition, when they should be required, of His Majesty's Minister, who should be authorised and employed to distribute them.

' I beg to recommend this measure again to the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

' Since I addressed you on the 15th the enemy have broken ground before Almeida; and I propose to collect the army again to the front, in order to oblige the enemy to keep his forces collected during the operations of the siege, and thus increase his difficulties as to subsistence, and afford more scope for the operations of the guerrillas, and opportunities for the resistance of the people in Castille.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.*

' WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

' MY DEAR LORD,

' Celorico, 19th August, 1810.

' The importunity with which I press the war in this country upon the attention of His Majesty's Ministers will, I hope, plead my excuse for troubling you for a few moments with my own private feelings upon this subject.

' Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations which have been carried on for the last year; and it is very obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the little reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of this country. Nothing therefore could be more desirable to me personally than that either the contest should be given up at once, or that it should be

continued with a force so sufficient as to render all opposition hopeless.

‘ In either case the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country, as well as of this, and by those of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who, after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons and property, would fall upon the Government. But seeing, as I do, more than a chance of final success if we can maintain our position in this country, although probably none of a departure from our cautious defensive system, I should not do my duty by the Government if I did not inform them of the real situation of affairs, and urge them, with importunity even, to greater exertion.

‘ I acknowledge that it has appeared to me, till very lately, that the Government themselves felt no confidence in the measures which they were adopting in this country ; and not an officer has come from England, who has not told me that it was generally expected that he would, on his arrival, find the army embarking ; and even some have told me that this expectation was entertained by some of the King’s Ministers.

‘ These sentiments are not encouraging ; and I acknowledge that I have been induced to attribute the little exertion which has lately been made in the cause to this want of confidence of the members of the Government in the result of the contest.

‘ If Government are really in earnest in the contest I recommend the following measures to their immediate attention :

‘ First ; To order positively the commanding officers in Sicily and Malta to send their troops. Those islands cannot be attacked under present circumstances.

‘ Secondly ; The same orders to be sent to Halifax.

‘ Thirdly ; To make me responsible for the safety of Cadiz and Gibraltar, and to leave it to my discretion to draw away such parts of the garrisons of those places as I may think proper.

‘ Fourthly ; To send to Lisbon as much of the disposable Walcheren infantry, as may be in any state for service. They shall not be moved from the neighbourhood of that town, and they will probably recover there entirely.

Fifthly; To send to the Tagus, without loss of time, arms, military stores, clothing, shoes, great coats, and blankets; and to authorise me, or any body else, to give them to Spaniards or Portuguese, as may be thought expedient.

Sixthly; To send some victuallers and ordnance store ships to Lisbon loaded with provisions, arms, ammunition, powder, shoes, and great coats; and authorise me to send them round to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, for the supply of the garrisons, &c. there.

Seventhly; To authorise me to assist the Spaniards or Portuguese with small sums of money, if I should have it in my power, or stores, or provisions, if necessary.

Believe me, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON.

There is one point to which likewise I wish to draw your attention again, and that is the necessity which exists of keeping a large fleet in the Tagus, as well of ships of the line, as of frigates and small craft.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

MY DEAR COTTON, Celorico, 20th August, 1810.

I enclose No. 1, the copy of a letter from Governor Cox, explaining a telegraph, No. 2; and No. 3, another telegraph which I had proposed to him; No. 4, Popham's book, which contains the explanation of the different signals made; and No. 5, a note from Governor Cox, given by Captain Ellis, pointing out in what manner we were to know whether the Governor was using his own or Popham's code.

Adverting, however, to the facility with which we manage the Portuguese telegraph, I beg you to make the following communication to the Governor:—

“ Lord W. finds the Portuguese telegraph so convenient, that he recommends you to prepare one of the upright ones, to be put up, and used occasionally when that now in use shall be knocked down. Let the upright be as high as the present telegraph, and the board attached to the moveable beam be three feet English square, and we shall be able to distinguish it. The mode of using this telegraph is described

in the Portuguese book. Have two or three of them made, in case the enemy should destroy one of them by his fire."

' Believe me, &c.

' Lieut. General

' Sir S. Cotton, Bart.'

' WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

MY DEAR COTTON, ' Celorico, 20th August, 1810, 3 P.M.

' I have just received your letter of this morning. Do not make any alteration in your piquets or patrols to the front, till I shall see you. Lord Blantyre's brigade will be, for the present, at Baraçal, and it would probably be as well not to move the forge carts till I shall have an opportunity of talking with you.

' I shall be at Alverca in the morning.

' Believe me, &c.

' Lieut. General

' Sir S. Cotton, Bart.'

' WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Celorico, 20th August, 1810.

' I received last night your letter of the 16th. In respect to Admiral Berkeley's appointment, the first question is what power the Carta Regia intends to give him; and the second, what power it is really necessary he should have over the boards and departments, in order to enable him to perform the duties and exercise the power given to him by the Carta Regia.

' My opinion and practice has always been, that in the exact proportion that a person in the Admiral's situation declines to assume power is power conferred upon him; and that his moderation would give him more influence and real power than the assumption of direct authority. He may, however, be of a different opinion, and may be determined to enforce his own construction of the Prince's orders; and where there is a difference of opinion between the Admiral and Government upon the construction of the Prince's orders, I conclude that the Government will refer the case for my advice; and I shall advise to the best of my judgment.

' Whatever may be the result of this discussion, which pro-

bably is not of much importance, I would recommend to you to have an explanation with Admiral Berkeley respecting Dom Miguel Forjaz. Whether we are right or wrong does not much signify; but you and I, and Marshal Beresford, who are principally concerned in carrying on the war in this country, think Dom Miguel Forjaz the best instrument we can find in Portugal, and are determined to support him in authority. We are, I conceive, the fittest persons to judge, and the best judges upon this subject; and it will not answer for the Admiral to be induced by any cause whatever to set himself, or to allow his name to be used as an authority against what we think right upon this subject. I am convinced that the Admiral's patriotism, and his good wishes to the cause in which we are all engaged, will induce him, upon a proper explanation, to act with us respecting Dom Miguel Forjaz, whatever may be his private opinion of him.

'I shall hear from you again upon this subject, when I shall enter more at large into it.

'There is nothing new. The enemy have broken ground before Almeida.

'Believe me, &c.

'Charles Stuart, Esq.'

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

'MY DEAR HENRY,

Celorico, 20th August, 1810.

'Since I received your letter of the 4th, I have received from Mahy extracts from other intercepted letters from Urquijo, Mazaredo, and O'Farrell and Azanza; and others from Frenchmen at Madrid to the French Ministers at Paris, which I thought so interesting, that I sent them to England by express yesterday, with letters of which I enclose copies. You will see, from these papers, that I concur entirely in the opinion which you entertained respecting the contest in the Peninsula, when you had seen Azanza's letters only. The others are a valuable sequel to these; and the whole tend to show that Buonaparte has no means to support his armies in Spain, and that Spain can afford him no assistance whatever. The Spanish Government were unable to govern, or to draw any reserve from the provinces

north of the Ebro; and his more vigorous military system has made matters worse: the partisans and guerrillas have become more numerous; and the military corps maintained in those countries are more than ever unequal to govern them, or to maintain tranquillity.

‘Notwithstanding that they have so large a force opposed to us, it is not sufficient for their object, which will become every day more difficult. The people of Portugal are doing that which the Spaniards ought to have done. They are removing their women and properties out of the enemy’s way, and taking arms in their own defence. The country is made a desert, and behind almost every stone wall the French will meet an enemy. To this add, that they have the British and Portuguese armies immediately in their front, ready to take advantage of any fault or weakness.

‘If we cannot relieve Almeida, it will, I hope, make a stout defence: the Governor is an obstinate fellow, and talks of a siege of ninety days. From the folly of the French in being a month before the place before they were prepared to attack it, the garrison, which was not a very good one, has become accustomed to the sight of them, and have confidence in themselves, and are in good spirits. The garrison are supplied for at least as long a time as they talk of holding out, and every day that they hold out is an advantage to the cause.

‘I refer you to a letter which I wrote to Sir Richard Keats on the 1st, for an account of my intentions in case I should be obliged to evacuate Portugal, which I hope will not be the case yet, if Government will adopt the measures pointed out in the enclosed letters to reinforce us. If Almeida should make a stout defence; if the Marques de la Romana will be satisfied with the defeat he received on the 11th, and will not risk another action in the field, my opinion is, that the French will be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz. What is the Spanish Government prepared to do in that case? Can they put an army into the field? Or can they do any thing to relieve us from the pressure which will be upon us?

‘I wish that you would talk over with Castaños the situation of affairs. Before this time the Spanish Government ought to have had an excellent army formed and

equipped in Cadiz, another in Carthagena, a third in the Balearic Islands, and a fourth in Galicia, as well as that under the Marques de la Romana, all prepared to take the field, not to engage in general actions, but to give countenance and support to the partidas and guerrillas. But I fear there is nothing of the kind. It is not yet too late, and I only hope that if the Regency should have Cadiz opened for them, they will not be found in a state of inability to take advantage of that event.

‘When the intercepted letters to which I have referred at the commencement of this letter shall reach Cadiz, I beg you to send me entire copies of them.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,
‘*The R. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,’ ‘Alverca, 22nd August, 1810.

‘I have sent Fletcher to endeavor to arrange a telegraph communication between you and us; and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will let us know by telegraph when any deserters come in, what regiment they belong to, what corps d’armée, and whence they come; and then send them to head quarters as soon as they can move with convenience.

‘There is nothing new here this morning.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General* ‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.

Memorandum for Colonel Murray.

‘Alverca, 22nd August, 1810.

‘The officers employed by Major General Leith, to procure intelligence and observe the enemy’s movements, must be paid three dollars a day each, and their expenses, of which they must send the bills upon honor. I cannot but observe, however, that Major General Leith being in the second line, it does not appear to me necessary that he should employ three officers in this manner. A correspondence with General Hill, with Colonel Carroll at the Marques de la Romana’s quarters, and with head quarters,

would answer all the purpose; and leave these officers to do duty with their regiments. General Leith will hardly believe that we have only one officer thus employed. The officers employed to reconnoitre particular parts of the country may be paid the same sums as those employed to observe the movements of the enemy; but I should imagine that they must, by this time, have performed the service on which they were sent. In respect to the officers employed as engineers, they are to be paid, as usual, ten shillings a day; but I should hope that, by this time, their work is finished. With every desire to provide amply for every service, it is still necessary to save the public money, as much as possible; and no expense must be incurred which can be avoided. It is also necessary to keep the officers with their regiments as much as possible.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Alverca, 22nd August, 1810.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from General Mahy, in which he has requested to have six 5½ inch howitzers, with their ammunition. I have not the means of supplying him with these pieces of ordnance.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter and of a return of the Portuguese stores at Lisbon, to which I beg to draw your Lordship's attention.

I recommend that 200 barrels of powder, in addition to the quantity already required, may be sent to Lisbon, without loss of time; as well as 1000 rounds of canister shot for each of the calibres of 12 and 18 pounders; and 500 five and a half inch, and 500 eight inch shells.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Alverca, 22nd August, 1810.

The enemy broke ground before Almeida on the night of the 15th, and have continued their works ever since; but they have not yet opened their fire upon the place; and I understand that they experience great difficulty in working,

on account of the nature of the soil, and that the fire of the garrison has delayed them considerably. As soon as I found that the siege of Almeida was determined upon, I moved the army again to the front, in order to oblige the enemy to keep his troops collected, and thus increase his difficulties of subsistence; and by the removal of the enemy's troops from Castille give more scope for the operations of the guerrillas, and the general resistance of the inhabitants. The collection of the troops to the front will also enable me immediately to take advantage of any opportunity which may be afforded of relieving the place.

The enemy had collected the troops under the command of General Seras, and of General Kellermann, for the relief of the battalion which surrendered on the 10th instant, at Puebla de Sanabria, to General Silveira; but they returned towards Valladolid as soon as that battalion surrendered; and the Spanish General Taboada is now at Puebla de Sanabria.

The second corps under General Regnier was still at Zarza la Mayor, with its advanced guard at Salvaterra, when I last heard from Lieut. General Hill; and the troops under his command in the same position at Sarzedas. I have directed Colonel Le Cor to move up to Belmonte from his position in the mountains, with the same view with which I have moved the army to the front.

The advanced guard of the corps under the Marques de la Romana, and Ballesteros's division, and the Spanish cavalry of 900 men under General Carrera, the whole commanded by General Mendizabal, were defeated by a part of Mortier's corps at Bienvenida, between Zafra and Llerena, on the 11th instant.

The Marques de la Romana had intended to engage the enemy's corps with the whole of his force, and he was coming up himself with the 1st division of infantry. A reconnaissance made in the morning with the whole of the advanced corps, and the impetuosity of the General officers and troops led to the action, in which the enemy turned and defeated the left of the Spaniards, and cut off their communication with the Marques de la Romana; and they were obliged to retreat in a dispersed state by Monasterio and

Monte Molin to Fregenal de la Sierra, where they were collecting again.

‘The last letter I have from the Marques de la Romana is of the 15th, from Salvaterra. He supposes that his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, had been 500 men; Colonel Carroll estimates it at 1000 men.

‘The enemy had returned to Llerena; and it was imagined that they would retire again into Andalusia.

‘The Portuguese cavalry had not joined the Marques de la Romana when this action was fought.

‘The last letter which I have from Cadiz is of the 4th instant, when nothing extraordinary had occurred.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, Alverca, 23rd August, 1810.

‘I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might move across the fords of the Tagus at Villa Velha, and thus turn your right. It must be observed, however, that this movement, when made, must be in concert with the movement of the other corps in this quarter; and therefore it cannot be made till after Almeida shall have been carried. Also, although this movement will be in concert with others to be made here, the corps which makes it will be entirely disconnected from those which will be in this quarter.

‘This movement may have for its object to cut off the communication between the Marques de la Romana and you, and to insulate the Marques between the 2nd corps and the 5th, as well as to turn your right flank.

‘From the reports in circulation of the enemy’s intention to attack Badajoz when they shall take Almeida, I should not be surprised if that were the object of this movement.

‘It must be observed that, if Regnier should cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, as supposed, his communication is cut off, not only with the corps here, but with the French troops in Estremadura, at least for a time. He can have no regular military communication across the Sever, nor any between Portalegre and the Guadiana, and you will be between him and the French corps in this quarter.

‘If the movement is made therefore, it can be but for one

of two objects, to turn the right of our army, and oblige us to quit our positions in the mountains, in concert with other movements to be made in our front, or to turn the left of the Marques de la Romana and cut him off from us, in concert with other movements to be made in Estremadura.

‘ I have never seen the fords of Villa Velha; but, according to the description which I have read of them, I should believe that they are under the command of the right of your position. If this be true, Regnier cannot pass the Tagus at Villa Velha till he shall have dislodged your right.

‘ There would be one effectual way of preventing this movement, and that would be to place Leith's corps at Niza, where he would be joined by a part of Fane's cavalry, and he would effectually defend this point. But there are several reasons against this disposition of Leith's corps, one of which is, that it is not in a state to be moved so far; and another, that I do not think this movement by Regnier so probable as one between the Zezere and the Alva; thus turning all the positions in this valley, and in the mountains behind Castello Branco and on the Zezere. By this movement the communication between you and me would be completely cut off, if Leith's corps were across the Tagus.

‘ The movement of Regnier across the Tagus is very important, in whatever way it may be viewed, and whatever may be the enemy's intentions; the following measures therefore should be adopted:

‘ I recommend to you to destroy the fords at Villa Velha at an early period, as far as may be in your power, by stakes and stones in the river; blowing up, or otherwise destroying, the roads leading to the fords on both sides. If they should be under the command of your position in the mountains, you will of course impede the enemy's passage as far as may be in your power; but if you should find that he effects his passage, notwithstanding all the opposition you can give to it, you must then fall back upon Abrantes and Punhete.

‘ If the enemy's design should be to turn the Marques de la Romana's left you will cross the Tagus at Abrantes, and move up to Gavião, threatening his rear while he may be operating upon the Marques de la Romana.

‘ If Regnier's object be to turn our right, and to cross the Tagus by some of the numerous fords between Abrantes

and Santarem, and Santarem and Salvaterra, you must adopt the following measures:—

‘First,—You must have the bridge at Abrantes taken up, and the boats brought over to this side under the protection of the guns of the fort. They might be either sunk and kept under water, or brought ashore. I have already spoken about having the provision stores at Abrantes brought up from the bank of the river into the town, which ought to be done, at all events, without loss of time.

‘Secondly,—You should keep Fane in observation of the enemy’s movements on the left of the Tagus as long as you can, directing him to fall back upon Santarem, where he will find a ford.

‘Thirdly,—As soon as you find that the enemy’s plan is to turn our right, which their first movement from Niza will show, you will order Leith’s corps to Santarem, and with your own you will follow the enemy’s movement along the Tagus. When your right shall reach Santarem, Leith’s corps should move on upon Villa Nova, observing the fords at Salvaterra, below which place there is no ford.

‘Fourthly,—All the boats must be sent down below Villa Nova, according to the directions before given to you.

‘The great object for you will be to prevent the enemy’s passage at a point below you, which you will be able to effect by Leith’s corps; and by the position at Santarem to prevent the enemy from annoying the march of this part of the army on the great road from Leyria to Lisbon, if he should cross on any of the fords above you.

‘The enemy have not yet opened their fire upon Almeida, but their preparations are very formidable. They have some difficulty in working the ground, and are obliged to make their trenches with gabions. The garrison are stout.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.* WELLINGTON.

‘I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have, with some of the fords on the Tagus marked upon it; but I believe that the whole river from Barquinha to Santarem is fordable.’

To _____.

SIR,

Alverca, 23rd August, 1810.

I have received your letter, containing a complaint against _____, of the Quarter Master General's department, that he had ill-treated one of your servants, into which I shall make inquiry, and let you know the result.

It is impossible, however, for me to interfere in any manner with a billet given by the magistrate of Coimbra, for an officer and his family to be quartered in your house.

I must at the same time inform you, that I am not a little surprised that a person of your rank and station, and quality in the country, should object to give accommodation in your house, and should make a complaint of this officer, that he had asked you for additional accommodation; when it appears by the letter which you enclosed, and which I now return, that when you objected to give him this additional accommodation for which he had asked, he acquiesced in your objection, and did not any longer require this accommodation.

The unfortunate situation in which Portugal is placed, and the desire of the insatiable enemy of mankind to force this once happy and loyal people to submit to his iron yoke, to plunder them of their properties, to destroy their religion, and to deprive them of their monarch, has rendered it necessary to collect in this country a large army, in order, if possible, to defeat and frustrate the designs of the enemy.

It is the duty of those whose age, whose sex, or whose profession do not permit them to take an active part in the defence of their country, to assist those employed in its defence with provisions, lodgings for officers and troops, means of transport, &c., and at all events not to oppose themselves to the granting of this description of assistance. These duties are more peculiarly incumbent upon the rich and high in station, who would be the first victims of, and greatest sufferers from, the enemy's success; unless indeed they should be of the number of those traitors who are aiding to introduce the common enemy into the country, to destroy its happiness and independence.

Under these circumstances, I am not a little astonished to receive these frivolous and manifestly unfounded com-

plaints from you, and that you should be the person to set the example of objecting to give quarters to an officer, because he is married and has children.

‘It is not very agreeable to any body to have strangers quartered in his house; nor is it very agreeable to us strangers, who have good houses in our own country, to be obliged to seek for quarters here. We are not here for our pleasure: the situation of your country renders it necessary; and you, a man of family and fortune, who have much to lose, should not be the first to complain of the inconvenience of our presence in the country.

‘I do every thing in my power to alleviate the inconvenience which all must suffer. We pay extravagant prices for every thing we receive, with unparalleled punctuality; and I make it a rule to inquire into and redress every injury that is really done by the troops under my command, as I shall into that to which I have above referred, of which you complain in the conduct of ——— towards your servant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘———’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Alverca, 25th August, 1810.

‘I have received the directions of the Secretary of State to draw from Cadiz the 79th and 94th regiments, and 100 men of the 95th regiment, and the squadron of the 13th light dragoons, now at that place; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will order tonnage of the transports lately sent by Sir Richard Keats for 1820 infantry, and for 160 horses, to be sent to Cadiz for their conveyance from thence to the Tagus.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Alverca, 25th August, 1810.

‘I enclose an extract from a private letter which I have this day received from Lord Liverpool; and, according to his Lordship’s intentions, I have requested Admiral Berke-

ley to send transports to Cadiz to bring round to Lisbon the 79th and 94th regiments, and 100 men of the 95th regiment, and the squadron of the 13th light dragoons, which troops I request you to have embarked as soon as the vessels arrive for their conveyance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
 ‘ *Lieut. General Graham.* W. WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, Alverca, 25th August, 1810.

‘ I shall speak to Beresford about the cavalry equipments for the Marques de la Romana. I have none, I believe, excepting some carbines, which I cannot give him.

‘ I enclose a letter from Principal Souza, and my answer. Send back the former, and forward the latter, when you shall have perused it.

‘ Send the twelve prints, which the Government have given me, to Lady Wellington, in Harley Street, and I shall be much obliged to you.

‘ There is nothing new. The fire has not yet opened on Almeida ; but it is expected that it will open this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Alverca, 27th August, 1810.

‘ Adverting to the question put in Captain Grant’s letter of the 24th, transmitted by you yesterday, respecting the mules, &c., taken from the French, it is a matter of indifference to whom they belonged ; they must all be sold by auction, and the money divided among the captors.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
 the Hon. L. Cole.*

WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

Alverca, 25th August, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Alverca, 27th August, 1810.

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 P.M.

‘ I just write, as I told you I would, to let you know that there is no doubt that the enemy is in possession of Almeida.

‘ You will get your orders from Murray for the movement of your artillery and of Harvey’s brigade.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General
the Hon. L. Cole.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alverca, 27th August, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd. Underneath you have the strength of the Swiss battalion to be sent home, and you are the best judge in what ship it would be expedient to send them.

‘ We must land the troops at Lisbon, notwithstanding the length of the march and of the voyage.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *Return of the Swiss battalion taken at Puebla de Sanabria.*

19 Officers,

33 Serjeants,

36 Corporals,

13 Drummers,

239 Soldiers.

Total 340

‘ Besides the above, there is one officer, two serjeants, and twenty-two soldiers, wounded, some of whom will probably be in a condition to embark.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alverca, 27th August, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd. If such frequent instances did not occur, in various quarters, of the intrigues of individuals against the cause, in the success of which they are personally as well as politically interested, one would not believe all the stories one hears of conduct of this description.

‘ I cannot conceive what De Souza expects the Portuguese would gain by the appointment of the Duke of Brunswick to command the Portuguese army. This is a little intrigue which has been long on foot, at the bottom of which

is —, who is as fond of having a concern in an intrigue as any person I know; and that foolish fellow De Souza has entered into her views to please her, without considering the effect which this arrangement must have upon every thing here. The foundation of all our strength here is the unanimity of our proceedings. I doubt if I should be able to manage the concern if the Duke of Brunswick was to be at the head of the Portuguese army, and I was to meet the Portuguese vanity and self-sufficiency at every corner, encouraged as it would be by him.

I conclude that Lord Wellesley feels as Canning did about —. All that he desired of me was that I should allow nothing to be referred to — in England, and the policy of that arrangement is obvious: if matters are referred to —, they are not in the hands of our Government. It is much better that, in a case of difficulty, in which you cannot prevail upon the Government to decide as you like, the question should be referred to me in obedience to the Prince's order.

‘ You will observe the turn which I have given to the fresh demand for money in my answer to Principal Souza.

‘ The fire opened upon Almeida yesterday. The garrison returns it vigorously.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

Alverca, 27th August, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, containing a requisition for some intrenching tools, and I request that your Lordship will be pleased to give directions to have them sent to Lisbon as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’

WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Alverca, 27th August, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ I am sorry to tell you that the enemy are in possession of Almeida; in what manner they obtained the possession

I cannot tell, but we see that they have the place from our posts.

‘ I shall in the morning again place the infantry in the valley of the Mondego, and shall remove the head quarters to Celorico; and I shall be prepared to draw off to the rear, to form my junction with you and Leith, if I should find that the enemy press me with a superior force.

‘ You will act according to the instructions you have already received; and I think you will do well to withdraw Le Cor again from Belmonte, so as to be *en mesure* with you in the mountains.

‘ Watch the movements of Regnier, which will probably give us a clue to the enemy’s intentions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 28th August, 1810.

‘ I beg you to forward the enclosed to General Hill. Consider the instructions which I wrote you on the day before I last left Alverca as applicable to the existing situation of affairs.

‘ Let Cocks and Don Julian know that Almeida has fallen; keep the former in hand, so as that he may be in readiness to retire with you. I think the enemy will drive in Cotton in the morning at least as far as Alverca.

‘ The infantry, with the exception of your division, will all be in the morning in, and in the rear of, Celorico, the cavalry all in front of Celorico.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 28th August, 1810.

‘ After I wrote to you last night, the fire at Almeida recommenced at about nine, and continued until near two; but it had not recommenced at nine this morning, when I left our advanced posts. There is no doubt but that the place has fallen.

‘ The enemy’s piquets skirmished with ours on the whole

Edward, who must be by this time in Marçal do Chaõ. I think you should move your own head quarters to Marçal do Chaõ.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ Celorico, 29th August, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

½ past 2 P.M.

‘ I wrote to Sir Stapleton Cotton this morning to desire him to put his light cavalry in Bassa Cova, Marçal do Chaõ, &c., keeping his piquets only in, and in front of Alverca; and I desired him to let me know if he adopted this arrangement, in order that I might give you corresponding instructions. In answer he has told me that he again occupies Freixedas; that he will write to you if he should keep his piquets only in Alverca.

‘ If you should find that he adopts the arrangement which I had proposed to him, I beg you to keep one battalion only in Guarda; and to have the other two where General Campbell’s brigade is; and send him to Linhares. The Portuguese brigade might likewise be moved to Linhares, if you think it proper.

‘ You must bring Cocks with you across the mountains, if you are not quite sure that the valley of the Mondego is in our possession when he shall join you, and you will fall back. You might probably send him by the road by which Colonel Harvey will march.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 29th August, 1810. 8 P.M.

‘ I received your telegraph message (but as Fletcher was out, who had the key, I did not immediately understand it), and I have just received your note of 4 P.M., announcing the enemy’s arrival at Sabugal, and their probable attack of Guarda. You have your instructions upon that point; and

I think that at all events in the morning you had better carry into execution what I directed this day.

‘ Give Sir Stapleton Cotton and me the earliest intelligence, by the most expeditious mode, of any thing that may come to your knowledge in the course of the night or morning.

‘ Have you any intelligence of Hill, or has he any of Regnier’s movement?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. L. Cole.

‘ There was nothing new in my front this day; and I think we shall still have to-morrow before us.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Celorico, 29th August, 1810. 8 P.M.

‘ I have just received a letter from General Cole, by which I learn that the enemy are collecting a corps at Sabugal, partly or entirely Regnier’s, and that it is supposed they will attack Guarda. They may be attacked in the morning, but at all events I think that before day in the morning you ought to place your troops as I proposed to you this morning, and you may still leave your small piquets on the heights of Freixedas.

‘ If Cole should retire, which he certainly will if attacked in force, you must also retire upon Celorico with your cavalry. He will give you the earliest information of the enemy’s movements in his front.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 29th August, 1810.

‘ The enemy opened their fire upon Almeida late on Saturday night, or early on Sunday morning, the 26th instant; and I am concerned to add that they obtained possession of the place in the course of the night of the 27th.

‘ I will not conceal from your Lordship that this unfortunate event has disappointed me much ; as, adverting to the manner in which the garrison was supplied with all the necessities for the defence of the fort, to the respectable state of the works, and to the good spirit which I had understood from the Governor that the garrison maintained, I had hoped that this place would hold out to the last extremity, if I should not have had an opportunity of relieving it ; and at all events would have detained the enemy till a late period in the season.

‘ I have no intelligence, upon which I can rely, of the cause of its surrender. Some prisoners taken yesterday state that the magazine of the fort, which, however, was bomb proof, blew up on Saturday night ; that, in the course of Monday, the Governor had desired to capitulate on the terms that the fort should be given up, but that the garrison and inhabitants should be allowed to join this army, which terms had been refused ; and that the fire had then recommenced and he had held out as long as his ammunition lasted, and had surrendered at two in the morning of yesterday ; and that offers had been made to the soldiers of the garrison to take them into the service of the Emperor, or to send them prisoners to France, and that they had all preferred the latter.

‘ This account deserves credit, as coming from an enemy ; and it is so far confirmed, that I had an opportunity of observing that there was a cessation from hostilities from one P.M. till nine on Monday night, when the fire recommenced, and lasted till near two, when it ceased again.

‘ An explosion had likewise been heard at our advanced posts ; and I observed, on Monday, that the steeple of the church was destroyed, and many of the houses of the town unroofed.

‘ I hope that this account will be found correct in all material points ; and it will give me great satisfaction to find that the loss of Almeida, and the transfer to the enemy of the stores and provisions which it contains, have not been occasioned by any fault of the Governor or of the garrison.

‘ I had a telegraphic communication with the Governor. but unfortunately the weather did not allow of our using it

on Sunday, or during a great part of Monday; and when the weather cleared on that day, it was obvious that the Governor was in communication with the enemy.

‘Adverting to the position in which I had collected the army so near the place, it is unfortunate that I had not an opportunity of knowing their situation, after the loss of their magazine.

‘After I was certain of the fall of the place, I moved the infantry of the army again into the valley of the Mondego, keeping a division upon Guarda, and the outposts of the cavalry at Alverca.

‘The enemy attacked our piquets twice yesterday in the morning, but feebly, and they were repulsed. In the afternoon, however, they obliged Sir Stapleton Cotton to draw in his posts to this side of Freixedas. Captain Lygon*, of the 16th light dragoons, was wounded in the morning; and two men of the royal dragoons were wounded in the afternoon.

‘A piquet of this regiment made a gallant and successful charge upon a party of the enemy’s infantry and cavalry, and took some prisoners.

‘The 2nd corps, under General Regnier, has made no movement of any importance since I had the honor of addressing your Lordship last. A patrole, however, belonging to this corps, fell in with a squadron of dragoons, consisting of one troop of the 13th British, and one troop of the 4th Portuguese, belonging to Lieut. General Hill’s corps, under the command of Captain White of the 13th, on the 22nd instant; and the whole of them were taken, with the exception of the Captain and one man, who, I since understand, have been killed. I enclose the copy of Brig. General Fane’s report to Lieut. General Hill of this affair, which it appears was highly creditable to Captain White and the allied troops engaged.

‘No movement has been made, and nothing of any importance has occurred, in Estremadura, since I addressed your Lordship last.

‘In the north, the enemy moved a small body of infantry and cavalry on the 20th to Alcañizas; but General Silveira

* Major General the Hon. H. B. Lygon.

moved towards them from Braganza, and they immediately retired.

‘ The last accounts I have from Cadiz are of the 16th instant; and I understand that General Graham is about to send 2000 men from Cadiz round to the Tagus. Nothing extraordinary had occurred in that quarter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool:*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Celorico, 29th August, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd instant. You may depend upon it that the intelligence which I send you every week of the enemy’s movements is as nearly correct as it can be. I receive the intelligence which goes to every body else, and I form my opinion of its truth from a consideration of the whole.

‘ Junot’s corps never went to Zamora. I believe the right was never farther than San Felices, on the Agueda, or, at farthest, opposite to Freixo de Espadacinta, on the Duero, between the Agueda and the Tormes.

‘ In respect to the enemy’s force in Spain, I consider it 250,000 men, including guards, &c. The battalions at Nantes should each be reckoned 1000 at least, as they are within the French territory.

‘ In respect to the enemy’s force upon the frontier of Portugal, the question is, what part of it is supposed acting against us? The 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps are occupied with us exclusively; and the 5th corps in Estremadura, has the Marques de la Romana in its front. I do not think the latter is equal to the former.

‘ Besides the Marques de la Romana’s corps on our right, we have General Mahy’s upon our left in Galicia; but General Mahy’s letters will have confirmed the statements I before made of the wants of this corps, and will show your Lordship that even if the divisions of Seras, Bonet, and Kellermann, were not sufficient to keep it in check in Galicia. I cannot hope for any efficient co-operation from it. I would also beg to observe to your Lordship that the system of caution prescribed to me has increased the difficulty, already existing, of doing much for the Spaniards; and

I could not with propriety advise them to place their armies in a state of risk, only to provide the better for my own security.

‘ I am aware that their ultimate success depends upon my being able to maintain my ground. But still they would not understand the motive of the advice I should give them; more particularly as hitherto I have constantly urged them to keep their armies in a state of security, and not to risk them in actions of which the result was doubtful. I did arrange a plan of operations with the Marques de la Romana, applicable to his own corps when this country should be attacked; but, although I entertain a high opinion, and great regard, for the Marques de la Romana, I cannot feel confident that he will carry the plan into execution. Indeed I am apprehensive that he has already put it out of his power to be of much use to us, and the enemy certainly may cut him off from us. However, I have written to urge him to fall back, and secure his communication with us under any event.

‘ I have already written to your Lordship fully respecting reinforcements. I am apprehensive that the Duke of Brunswick's corps will not be of much use. They will set an example of desertion, which they will increase amongst us, and it may reach the Portuguese army.

‘ One of the prisoners taken reports that Governor Cox has lost his arm, another that he was killed. I do not credit the last, as I am convinced that the proposition for the garrison to join the army came from him; and I have not mentioned either of the reports in my dispatch, in order not to alarm his friends unnecessarily.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 29th August, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a requisition for 10,000 blankets, which I request may be sent out as soon as possible to Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 30th August, 1810.’

‘ I have received your dispatch (No. 32), dated the 5th instant, and I am obliged to you for sending round the transports.

‘ I am also much obliged to you for sending the reinforcement to this country of the 79th, and (2nd batt.) 88th regiments, and the squadron of the 13th dragoons, which I have heard from other quarters are on their passage. I have, however, in this army so many corps of the same description with the 2nd batt. 88th regiment, which I had already sent away from Portugal to Gibraltar last year, as being unfit for service in the field, that I propose to keep this battalion at Lisbon, and to send it back to Cadiz as soon as I can relieve it by the 2nd batt. 58th regiment, also of the same description, from the army. I conclude that you will send off the 94th regiment from Cadiz as soon as you receive the letter from the Secretary of State, which I transmitted to you a few days ago.

‘ I am much concerned to hear of the illness of Major General Ferguson, and that you have lost the benefit of his assistance.

‘ I beg to refer you to my letter, by this conveyance, to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs here.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Celorico, 30th August, 1810.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 16th, and I now enclose my weekly report of yesterday to Government.

‘ The loss of Almeida is a great misfortune, but I do not lose all hopes yet. Since I wrote yesterday to Government, I have heard that Regnier’s corps has been brought to Sabugal, where it arrived yesterday; so that I have now got the three corps upon my hands. Since yesterday they have made no movement.

‘ Government have sent me out 20,000 stand of arms, of which I shall send a proportion to you to be forwarded to

Catalonia, &c. I shall send the remainder into Galicia and Biscay.

‘ I do not know how Government are to get the money to give the Spaniards the million sterling of which they talk. The ten millions are quite out of the question.

‘ You are already in possession of my opinion respecting the proposed treaty of commerce.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 30th August, 1810.

‘ I heard from Government of the appointment of Mr. Drummond, and I have written to that gentleman on the subjects referred for his inquiries. I am convinced that he will not be able to procure more money, either at Cadiz or Lisbon, than we get at present; and I only hope that his arrangements will not diminish our supplies. Villiers’ favorite notion on supplies of money was that by exertion a great deal more might be got. My answer was, that we were neither pickpockets nor coiners; that we could get only the sums which it was convenient to, or the interest of, individuals, to transmit to England; and that I did not see in what manner an increase of exertions by us could increase these sums. However, he has been more successful with the ministers in England than he was with me; and we owe to him Mr. Drummond’s arrival.

‘ You will have seen my dispatch of yesterday. Regnier’s corps is at Sabugal: since I wrote that dispatch I have received the information, so that I have now the three corps on my hands.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 30th August, 1810.

‘ I have to request that when the 79th regiment shall arrive at Lisbon they may be immediately prepared for the field in the usual manner, as well as the squadron of the 13th light dragoons.

‘ The 88th regiment are to continue in garrison at Lisbon ; and the 83rd, as soon as the 88th shall arrive, are to be sent to join the army by the route of Thomar.

‘ When any regiments shall arrive, you will be pleased to direct that they may prepare for service in the field without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Celorico, 31st August, 1810.

‘ I return the consul's bill and vouchers for expenses incurred at Faro, which I think it would be best that you should pay ; as it is not specified whether the dispatches sent were mine, and on military subjects, or yours.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Celorico, 31st August, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th. I think that the Carta Regia would have been better, if it had not been an apology.

‘ The Arganil militia, which was part of the garrison of Almeida, has been sent in, and the two other battalions are to follow this day and to-morrow. The Colonel reports that the explosion of the magazine destroyed the whole town, made a breach in the place, blew all the guns, excepting three, into the ditch, destroyed all the ammunition, excepting ten or twelve barrels of powder, and killed or wounded the greater part of the artillerymen. The garrison, till this accident, had sustained no loss, and was in the best order and spirits, and had no thoughts of surrender, and expected to hold the place for two months. The Colonel talks highly of the conduct of Governor Cox.

‘ I am sorry to add that the whole of the 24th regiment, with the exception of the Major and of the English officers, have gone into the French service. It is said that their object is to have an opportunity of deserting from it, which is well enough for the private soldiers, but is highly disgraceful to the character of the officers.

‘ The Major commanding the artillery was the person employed by Cox to settle the capitulation for him. He went out and informed the French of the exact state of the place after the explosion, and never returned!! Massena has made him a Colonel!!

‘ There is nothing new this morning. The enemy talked of attacking Guarda this day, but it is now half-past ten, and I have just received a telegraph message from thence, stating that a patrole had come in, and there was nothing new.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Celorico, 31st August, 1810.

‘ I have just received your note, and I approve so entirely of what you propose, that I beg you to carry the new arrangement into execution this afternoon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General* ‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ I have just had a telegraph from Guarda; there is nothing new on that side. Cole says that one of the militia officers has informed him that either Ney or Massena was gone to Pinhel.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Alverca, 31st August, 1810.

‘ From the period at which Regnier’s movement to the northward was made, and at which the orders for it must have been issued, as well as because nearly at the same time the enemy’s whole army was collected, I judge that these movements were not occasioned by the fall, or by the early expected fall, of Almeida; but that the enemy collected his army as soon as he found that I had brought up mine to the front. I consider it possible, therefore, that the intention of the enemy may yet be to remove Regnier’s corps through the mountains.

‘ If, however, you should find that Regnier moves upon Belmonte, and crosses the Zezere, so as to place himself

between the Zezere and the Alva, or if he moves upon Guarda from Sabugal, where he now is, you must move directly by Villa de Rey upon Thomar, where you will receive further directions from me.

‘ Possibly Le Cor, without his guns, might be able to reach the Zezere by the road of Sertaom, and might cross that river at the Ponte de Cabril to Pedrogão Grande, or lower down at the fords of Foz d’Alja.

‘ If I should find that the enemy throw their whole force between the Douro and the Zezere, I shall endeavor to collect the allied army in the position of Ponte da Murcella, on the Alva.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ In order to save time, and to avoid hurrying the British infantry, it occurs to me that you might move them now to Sobreira Formosa, from whence you could get them across the Zezere between Thomar and Villa de Rey in two marches. If Regnier should return to the southward, in order to move into the mountains, you could easily bring them up again to Sarzedas from Sobreira Formosa.

‘ I should likewise observe to you that, if you should make this movement, it would not be necessary for you to go to Thomar to join me upon the Alva. Your line would be from the Zezere to Cabacos, thence to Espinhal; but you shall have the exact route by the post of to-morrow.’

To Major General Leith.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Celorico, 1st September, 1810.

‘ Colonel Murray has communicated to me Captain Williams’ report on the Zezere, which is very satisfactory.

‘ There is no doubt, that if we are to have any works upon the Zezere, they ought to be constructed on the principles stated by Captain Williams, and in themselves efficient; and I should certainly be glad if the works on that river could be reformed as proposed by him.

‘ In this season of the year, however, it is in the power of the enemy to turn the line of the Zezere in so many different ways, that I should hesitate to disperse or fatigue the troops

in any great degree, in order to reform the works as Captain Williams proposes.

‘ If however, the work can be performed either by the peasantry or by the troops, without any great inconvenience, the line of the Zezere may hereafter become very important to the army; and I should be glad if what Captain Williams proposes were done.

‘ At present the enemy have collected their whole force in this front: whether they did so in consequence of my movements, in order to protect the siege of Almeida, the early surrender of which place they could not have expected when the collection of the force was ordered, or in order to press *en masse* down this valley, it is impossible for me to say. If the latter is their object, and they should carry it into execution, the line of the Zezere can be of no use to us. I shall endeavor, in that case, to collect the army upon the Alva, and stop them if circumstances will permit.

‘ I beg you to forward the enclosed letter by an officer to General Hill.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General Leith.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 1st September, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 15th and 16th August, by Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby.

‘ We are in want of General Officers in this country, but I understand that Major Generals Sir William Erskine and Lumley, and Brigadier General Hay have been ordered out; and as the late promotions have made many colonels, I imagine that we shall have a sufficient number of officers of rank for the duty of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Lieut. General Graham.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 1st September, 1810.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of my letter of yesterday. I likewise enclose your route from the Zezere towards the Ponte da Murcella, in case it should be necessary for you to come that way.

‘ There is nothing new this morning. The enemy have made no movement that we have heard of.

‘ I have omitted to tell you that the magazine at Almeida was blown up on Sunday night, and all the ammunition destroyed; a breach made in the place; the guns, excepting three, blown into the ditch, and nearly all the artillerymen killed or wounded. The whole town was destroyed, and the stones of the buildings killed or wounded forty men even in the enemy’s lines.

‘ Till the occurrence of this accident, the garrison had no idea of surrender. Their loss had been trifling, three or four men wounded; and they were in good spirits, and well supplied with every thing they wanted. They expected to hold out for two months. They all talk highly of the conduct of the Governor: even the enemy acknowledge that he behaved remarkably well.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON

To Marshal Beresford.]

‘ Celorico, 2nd Sept., 1810.

$\frac{1}{2}$ before 1, P.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have just received a report that the enemy have driven our piquet out of Freixedas and through Alverca to Bassa Cova, and a column of some strength was coming down Freixedas hill.

‘ Our cavalry will probably be in here and herabouts in the course of the evening, and you had better move your quarters this evening to Cortiço, and come here yourself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Cole sends a report by telegraph, that the enemy are moving upon Covilhaõ, which he says he does not believe.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Celorico, 2nd September, 1810.

‘ The enemy have driven our piquets through Freixedas and Alverca, and I shall retire from hence in the morning. General Cole will leave Guarda this afternoon.

‘ It is reported that Regnier moved upon Covilhaõ this

morning. If it is so, you will have received intelligence of the movement from Le Cor, who was at Fundaõ.

‘ It is possible that I may receive positive intelligence upon this subject this evening, when I shall write to you again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Since writing the enclosed, I have heard that Regnier moved upon Castello Branco. However, Le Cor will be able to give you the most correct intelligence of this movement.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 2nd Sept., 1810.

‘ I did not answer your former letter on the subject of the navy at our several signal stations, because I felt considerable embarrassment upon the subject. The difficulty does not consist in giving the officers and seamen additional rations, or an allowance in lieu of additional rations, so much as in creating a precedent by the grant of this allowance or these rations, which may be very inconvenient to the service hereafter. I beg you to consider the subject in that light.

‘ If you should still be of opinion that the additional rations, or an allowance instead of them, must be made, they shall be made, subject to a reference to England, or I will try to arrange to manage our signals without the assistance of these officers and men.

‘ I think it best to detain the transports which brought round the 79th and 88th, till we shall hear further from Cadiz, and not to send those respecting which I wrote to you on the 25th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Celorico, 3rd Sept., 1810. 8 A.M.

‘ Every thing appears tolerably quiet in front, and I am going to Gouvea.

‘ I beg you to attend to the former instructions; observe the enemy’s movements, but do not engage yourself in any serious affair.

‘ If you should find the enemy advance in strength, retire upon the Light division at Sampayo, giving General Craufurd and me the earliest information of their movement, and observing them still with the hussars, or one of the other regiments of light dragoons.

‘ Captain Cocks is upon Prados, with a piquet of observation upon Guarda. Prados is on the hill on the left of the Val de Mondego, and from thence Captain Cocks will retire upon Linhares. You can communicate with him either by Lagiosa, along the Mondego, or from Celorico through Linhares.

‘ It might be advisable to strengthen Captain Cocks a little, so as to enable him to strengthen his post at, and to patrol from Guarda, to obtain better intelligence of the enemy’s movements.

‘ The post at Trancoso also becomes important on your other flank. Murray has told you by what road it is to retire when you will come through Celorico.

‘ I believe Cole has left the English key of the telegraph at Guarda with Cocks; if he has not, I shall desire him to send it to him. I shall leave mine with the telegraph officer you have had with you, who shall stay here.

‘ When Guarda and Celorico are finally evacuated, take care that the telegraphs are destroyed; and probably the most effectual mode of destruction would be to have straw laid in them ready to burn them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General* ‘ WELLINGTON.
‘ *Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Gouvea, 4th Sept., 1810.

‘ I received your letter of the 2nd this morning. If Regnier passes the Upper Zezere, or if he marches upon Guarda, and you should consequently make the march suggested in my letters of the 31st and 1st, General Fane’s cavalry should likewise cross the Zezere after you, as it is my wish to have the whole army on the right of that river. If Regnier, however, should move and attack you in the mountains between the Zezere and the Tagus, then the

instructions of the 10th August will apply to the disposition of Fane's cavalry.

'The movement directed for you by my letters of the 31st August and the 1st September was intended only to prepare you for what might possibly happen, viz., the collection of the enemy's whole force between the Zezere and the Douro, and for the march which I wished you to make in consequence. Le Cor could be in no danger from the enemy's movements, which were supposed in those letters; and he might have remained in safety at Fundaõ, with his cavalry forward, at least till the enemy's movement would have been decided. Indeed, his remaining would appear important, to enable you to procure intelligence.

'I withdrew the infantry of the army yesterday one march. The cavalry is still in the same situations; and we have a look out upon Guarda.

'The enemy has made no movement since Sunday, and I believe they returned to the Coa after driving in our piquets from Freixedas. Our piquets are again in Alverca.

'It is reported, but I do not know whether to believe the report, that the enemy have moved fifty pieces of cannon upon Sabugal, by Alfayates, from Almeida.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. General Hill.' WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

'MY DEAR HILL,' Gouvea, 4th Sept., 1810.

'Since I wrote my other letter, two prisoners who were taken yesterday morning say that the enemy positively returned on Sunday to the Coa; but it was expected that the 6th and 8th corps would advance immediately by this road.

'An officer of Don Julian Sanchez's party has also just been with me; and has informed me that Regnier marched on Saturday from Sabugal to Penamacor, and has collected his corps at that place. You must have heard of this movement if it be true. If it be true, and the cannon has gone to Sabugal, it is probable that Regnier will cross the Tagus, and proceed according to the plan discussed in one of my late letters, and that he takes with him all, or the greater part, of the enemy's cannon, as he goes by the

road which is the most practicable for artillery; at least, in the opinion and according to the knowledge and information of the enemy.

‘ Believe me, &c. ’

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.* ’ ‘ WELLINGTON. ’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ’ ‘ Gouvea, 5th Sept., 1810. ’

‘ I enclose a letter from Colonel Cox, late Governor of Almeida, to Marshal Beresford, containing a copy of the capitulation of Almeida, and an account of the circumstances which occasioned the early surrender of that place. ’

‘ It was impossible to expect that Colonel Cox should continue the defence of the place after the unfortunate occurrence which he mentions; and I am happy to add, that all the accounts which I have received from officers and soldiers of the militia who have come into the interior under the capitulation, concur in applauding the conduct of the Governor throughout the siege, and in the unfortunate situation in which he was placed toward its close. ’

‘ It is certain, that until the explosion of the magazines of the place, the garrison had sustained but little loss, and were in the highest spirits; and, encouraged by the example of the Governor, and the confidence they had in him, were determined to hold out to the last moment. ’

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford, in which he enclosed the letter from Colonel Cox; to which I have to add, that the two officers mentioned in that letter, the Teniente del Rey, and the Major of artillery, have entered the service of France, and that the latter has been promoted to the rank of Colonel. I am also informed, that when sent out by the Governor into the enemy’s lines to negotiate the capitulation, and after he had informed the enemy of the unfortunate situation of the garrison, he did not return to the place when hostilities recommenced, but continued in the enemy’s lines. ’

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ’

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ’ ‘ WELLINGTON. ’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘Nothing has occurred this day worthy of attention.

‘I rely upon your prudence and discretion not to engage yourself in any affair of which the result can be at all doubtful. Retire gradually, if you find the enemy threatening you in too great force; and let me hear from you constantly.

‘If we can avoid any accident before we all join, I have confidence of our final success.

‘Some time ago I ordered General Leith to throw one of Le Cor’s regiments of regular infantry into the garrison of Abrantes, in case of retiring from that place; which is not necessary now, as the 22nd regiment are in that garrison.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘SIR,

‘Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘I send herewith a prisoner, respecting whom I enclose a memorandum received from Colonel Alava.

‘After this person had had with Colonel Alava the conversations referred to in the enclosed paper, and of which I was apprized, which marked him as a suspicious deserter, I saw him conversing with different people in the public market place, such as sutlers and others, followers of the army, from whom he might have received intelligence, and I had him confined, and I now send him to be disposed of by the Commission.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Leith.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 3rd and 5th. I have no objection to the reform of the works on the Zezere in the manner proposed, and Captain Williams is authorized to pay the peasants employed upon them at the following rates: artificers, 320 reas per diem; labourers 200 reas;

and boys 120 reas per diem. Let application be made to the Commissary at Abrantes for money for this purpose, and I will grant a warrant for the amount, as soon as I shall be informed of it.

‘ I have no doubt of the zeal of the troops under your command, nor of their desire to be actively employed.

‘ In answer to your desire to have more English troops under your command, I must inform you that I class and dispose of the troops of the different descriptions according to my views of the service which will be required of them, and not as a matter of favor to any officer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General Leith.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ à Gouvea, ce 6 Sept., 1810.

‘ MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

‘ J’ai reçu vos lettres du 1^r. Vous aurez appris les mouvemens du corps de Regnier de la part du Général Hill. Ou l’ennemi va faire le mouvement sur notre droite, dont je vous ai écrit, ou il va faire le siège de Badajoz. On dit que du canon a passé d’Almeida à Sabugal, et de là vers Regnier ; mais je ne suis pas sûr que ce soit vrai, ou que ce soit du canon de siège. Si c’est de l’artillerie de campagne, l’ennemi va tâcher de nous tourner par la droite et de vous couper d’avec nous avec une partie de ses troupes, tandis qu’il s’avancera par ici avec l’autre.

‘ J’ai distribué mon armée de manière à faire face à tout. Je rassemblerai la plus grande force qu’il me sera possible, toute l’armée, si cela ce peut, en Alentejo, si on va faire le siège de Badajoz, et cela sans perte de tems.

‘ Vous savez ce qu’il faut faire si on se met entre nous deux en passant le Tage à Villa Velha, ou au dessous de la jonction de la petite rivière le Sever avec le Tage. Si vous trouvez qu’on passe le Tage au dessus du Sever, c’est très important de s’assurer de la possession de Campo Mayor, ainsi ayez soin d’y mettre une bonne garnison ; et, en tout cas, je vous en prie, une bonne garnison et un gouverneur sur lequel vous pouvez vous fier en Badajoz.

‘ Je vous envoie la copie d’une lettre de Cox, la capitula-

tion d'Almeida, et la copie d'une lettre que j'ai écrite là dessus au Gouvernement Anglais.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Le Marques de la Romana.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Il y a un petit poste sur la frontière, qu'on appelle Ouguela, qui serait très important pour tous nos mouvemens pour relever Badajoz. Je vous prie d'arranger avec le Général Leite pour son occupation, ou qu'il soit complètement détruit.

‘ Je vais vous dire pourquoi je crois que l'ennemi va faire le siège de Badajoz. Quand Regnier a marché de Sabugal, sa route pour nous tourner par Villa Velha était par Penamacor, Idanha à Velha, Idanha à Nova, &c.; et, protégé par les montagnes, il pourrait faire cette marche sans risque. Au lieu de cela, il a passé par Valverde del Fresno à Moraleja, et son armée s'est rassemblée encore une fois sur l'Elja, une avant garde seulement ayant passée par Penamacor, et s'étant replacée à Penagarcia. Il n'a pas donc l'intention de faire le mouvement par Villa Velha; et on va repasser le Tage au dessus d'Alcantara pour entrer en Estremadura. Voilà mes conjectures. Mais il se peut que l'ennemi ne connaît pas le pays et les routes aussi bien que moi, et qu'il craignait faire sa marche par Idanha.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘ The enemy appear to be moving to their left, probably for the siege of Badajoz.

‘ I wish that you would strengthen the party upon Guarda, and get Cocks to go out to the front towards Sabugal, and discover what they are about: whether they have really moved cannon from Almeida by Sabugal; whether it is cannon of a heavy calibre; whether the troops of the 6th (Ney's) corps have moved that way; and let me know the number of any regiment that has marched, and I shall know to what corps it belongs.

‘ It would be very desirable, if possible, to send somebody into the country about Valverde del Fresno, Cilleros, &c., as that is the road by which they are passing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd, in which you omitted to enclose the note to which yours of the 2nd was an answer. I have received a very extraordinary letter from the Government, to which I have written the answer of which I enclose the copy ; I beg you to send it to England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘ You will see all my dispatches to Government of this day and yesterday. I think it possible that the French are about to attack Badajoz. They are either going upon that operation or to turn our right flank. However, if the Marques de la Romana will come in in time, they cannot do us much mischief.

‘ I have written a letter to Dom Miguel Forjaz, which ought to be published and generally circulated. I am told that confidence is flagging, and it is calculated to revive it, without pledging me to any thing positive.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘ MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you had placed before the Governors of this Kingdom my dispatch of the 27th August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida ; and that the Government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place ; hoping at the same time that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect from the efforts of the army.

‘ I have already made known to the Government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom.

‘ It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succoured the place; and I now request the permission of the Governors of the Kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined on, after the most serious deliberation, as most adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, of Portugal.

‘ I request the Government to believe that I am not insensible of the value of their confidence, as well as of that of the public; as also that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my Sovereign, to the Prince Regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamor or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘ I enclose the estimate of the expenses of the army, and of the means of defraying them to the 24th instant.

‘ I also enclose the state of the army on the 1st instant, and the last return which I have received of the sick. There have been more sick lately than there had been before; but the cases are very slight, and the men soon recover.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 6th Sept., 1810.

‘ The 2nd corps, under General Regnier, which had been at Zarza la Mayor during the siege of Almeida, broke up from thence on the 28th, and marched to Sabugal and Alfayates, where they arrived on the 29th; and the whole of the three corps, composing what is called the Army of Por-

tugal, were thus collected in front of this part of the allied army.

‘ The enemy attacked our piquets at Freixedas on Sunday, the 2nd instant, in some strength, and afterwards withdrew to Vendada; in consequence of which, and from the reports of the prisoners and deserters, expecting that the enemy’s whole army would move forward on the following day, I withdrew the infantry of the army one march into the valley of the Mondego on the 3rd, still keeping the cavalry in the plain in front of Celorico, and a small post of observation on Guarda.

‘ It appears, however, that the 2nd corps moved to its left from Alfayates and Sabugal, one column by Valverde, the other by Penamacor, on Saturday and Sunday; and it is even reported that a part of the 6th corps has marched in that direction likewise; and the enemy were again collecting in force about Salvaterra and Zarza la Mayor, when I heard from General Hill on the night of the 4th instant.

‘ No movement has been made in front of this part of the army since Sunday, and the enemy’s outposts continue at Vendada.

‘ I have received a report, which, however, wants confirmation, that the enemy have moved between forty and fifty pieces of cannon from Almeida, likewise upon Sabugal.

‘ No movement of importance has been made in the north since I had last the honor of addressing your Lordship.

‘ I imagine that the French troops in the Asturias have been in some degree pressed, as General Seras has moved towards Leon.

‘ In the south, General Lacy landed on the 23rd August at Morla, and attacked the Prince d’Aremberg’s position at Moguer on the 24th, he having been posted there with some troops belonging to the 5th corps, in order to cover the blockade of Cadiz on that side.

‘ It was intended that General Copons should co-operate with this attack from Castillejos. The Prince, however, made good his retreat through Niebla on the morning of the 25th, before General Copons arrived there, and he retired upon San Lucar la Mayor, within four leagues of Seville, with the loss, in his engagement with General Lacy, of about 200 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners.

‘ General Lacy embarked again on the 26th ; and General Copons has been obliged to retire upon Castillejos and towards the Guadiana, as the Prince d’Aremberg had been reinforced from Seville.

‘ These occurrences in Andalusia had obliged the division of the 5th corps, which was in Estremadura, to fall back in the Sierra ; and the Marques de la Romana had moved forward to Zafra, in order to prevent this division from falling upon Copons. By a letter, however, which I have received from him of the 1st instant, he assures me of his intention to collect his troops upon the Guadiana immediately, in order that he may be in readiness to co-operate more immediately with me.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 16th August. The 79th, and 2nd battalion 88th, and one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, have arrived in the Tagus from thence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Right Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 7th Sept., 1810

‘ I beg leave to enclose copies of letters, reporting the neglect and want of cleanliness on board the cavalry transports, which brought the 13th dragoons from Cadiz.

‘ I shall be much obliged if you will repeat your orders upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Gouvea, 7th Sept., 1810.

‘ I enclose some letters from Cox. The money sent him was intended for Portuguese as well as English officers, but he appears not to have had the Portuguese officers with him, and therefore they have got none.

‘ If you would let me know the names of those who have remained true to the cause, I will send them some money.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Gouvea, 7th Sept., 1810.

‘I have received your letter of this morning. I recommend to you to keep an officer with a good glass always upon the highest part of the hill above Marçal do Chaõ, from whence he will command a view of the whole country. Cocks will be well off. Put a few men at Linhares, to communicate with those at Prados.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘*Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Gouvea, 7th Sept., 1810.

‘As you have not transmitted the note of the Government, to which yours of the 2nd was an answer, I am probably not very well able to judge of its contents; but in order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the Government that I will not stay in the country, and that I shall advise the King’s Government to withdraw the assistance which His Majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointments of Marshal Beresford’s staff, for which he is responsible; or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, under the original arrangement with Marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management.

‘I propose also to report to His Majesty’s Government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken if the Portuguese Government refuse, or delay to adopt, the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago; and Marshal Beresford did not write to Government upon them, till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes upon the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted, not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, north of Torres Vedras, as originally pro-

posed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal; and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers.

‘ I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others, in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavor to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which for the last twelve months I have recommended to the Government, to impede and render difficult, and, if possible, to prevent the advance into and establishment of the enemy’s forces in this country.

‘ But it appears that the Government have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power, I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call, and the cause would now have been safe; but now, having the power in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese Government.

‘ I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the Regency, and as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the Government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the Prince Regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct.

‘ I leave it to you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter to the Regency.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Gouvea, 7th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have no news for you that is not contained in my letters to the Secretary of State, of which I enclose copies.

‘ It appears that the enemy’s plan is to attack Badajoz

next, where I shall have more advantage in opposing him than I have had yet.

‘Seventeen officers and 500 men of the 24th Portuguese regiment have already deserted from the French, and have come in at one place; and others have come into Braganza.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,
‘*The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Gouvea, 7th Sept., 1810.

‘I enclose a letter which has been received by the Commissary General of this army, upon which I have only to observe that if it is the desire of His Majesty’s Government to carry on extensive military operations, they must leave some power of reward for zeal, intelligence, activity, and ability in the power of those who are to stimulate their inferiors to exertion; and that if the system proposed in the enclosed letter is to be adopted, it would be better at once that the heads of departments in England should take upon themselves the detailed management of concerns here, and should make themselves responsible for them.

‘While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid drawing your Lordship’s attention to the mode of promoting, not only commissaries, but the officers of the army, and those attached to all the departments.

‘With the largest concern to manage that has lately been entrusted to any officer in the British army, and with the heaviest responsibility that ever was placed upon any, I have not the power of promoting a man of any rank or of any description; and the trial will certainly have been made in my case, whether with success or not still remains to be ascertained, with how small a proportion of the power of reward an officer in command of an army can carry on the service.

‘At the same time I assure your Lordship that I have no desire to possess the power of promoting officers of the Commissariat, which it is the design of the enclosed letter to retain in the hands of the Commissary in Chief, or that of promoting officers in the army. I am not acquainted even with their names or their persons, excepting in the service;

and excepting to reward their services, or to stimulate their exertions, it must be a matter of indifference to me whether they are promoted or not.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ’

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ’ ‘ WELLINGTON. ’

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ’ ‘ Gouvea, 8th Sept., 1810. ’

‘ I enclose another complaint respecting the boats upon the Mondego. I desire that Mr. — may send me without loss of time the register of the number of boats received and of the number delivered for the use of the Portuguese Commissariat for ten days preceding the 3rd instant. If my orders have been disobeyed, I shall bring Mr. — to a Court Martial. ’

‘ Believe me, &c. ’

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.,* ‘ WELLINGTON. ’
‘ *Commissary General.* ’

To the Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.

‘ SIR, ’ ‘ Gouvea, 8th Sept., 1810. ’

‘ I received only yesterday your letters of the 30th August, and 1st September. The army is well supplied with cattle, but I will refer the suggestion contained in the latter to the consideration of the Commissary General. ’

‘ I am obliged to you for the suggestion contained in the former, upon which subject I have repeatedly written to the Marques de la Romana; and I hope that by this time he will have made a disposition of his army by which his communication with us will be more certain. ’

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ’

‘ *The Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.* ’ ‘ WELLINGTON. ’

To Major General the Hon. G. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ’ ‘ Gouvea, 8th Sept., 1810. ’

‘ The man named Leitaõ, who prepared and gave provisions to the French at Penamacor, is now at Marshal Beresford’s quarters, and I shall be very much obliged to

you if you will desire Captain Grant to go over there and state to the Commission what he knows of him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Gen.

the Hon. G. L. Cole.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Gouvea, 8th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 6th. The enemy appear to be moving to their left, and I understand have some cannon at San Martin de Trebejo, which is heavy; but I cannot get positive intelligence of this fact.

‘ I beg that you will tell Colonel Le Cor, in answer to his letter, that if the people of the country are in earnest in their desire to defend themselves, and to be saved from the French, the proclamations of the Marquez d’Alorna, which contain nothing but sophistical nonsense, can have no effect upon them. I have no doubt that they are inclined to defend themselves, and that the country will yet be saved; but it is necessary that every person should do his duty, and that no encouragement should be given to the notions propagated by Alorna and other traitors, whose only object is to facilitate the entry of the country to the French. And yet it is extraordinary that any man in his senses should act this part, which is, after all, only that of the jackal; but the French would certainly not be satisfied even with the lion’s share of the plunder, but would take all.

‘ The conduct of the Marquez d’Alorna can be accounted for only by imputing to him extreme folly and inordinate vanity and ambition. I am convinced that nothing is to be hoped for in a negotiation with such a man; but if any thing could be hoped for, I have no right to authorize Colonel Le Cor to enter upon it; and I cannot allow of his having any communication with any body in the enemy’s army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. General Hill.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Gouvea, 8th Sept., 1810.

‘ Upon considering the subject which you mentioned to me last night, I do not think it so important as it appeared to me upon first hearing it. The remedy which we agreed upon will answer some purpose, and I have it in my power to make some arrangements immediately, and others hereafter, which will effectually prevent all mischief of the description supposed in that quarter.

‘ I beg you, however, not to mention the subject to any body. The croaking which already prevails in the army, and particularly about head quarters, is disgraceful to us as a nation, and does infinite mischief to the cause; and it would become much worse if this story were known.

‘ In respect to Principal Souza, I shall have time to consider what shall be done with him between this and next Thursday. I can certainly get rid of him, if that is thought desirable, and an object worth incurring the unpopularity of any interference in the frame of the Government by us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Gouvea, 8th Sept., 1810.

‘ I return Silveira’s letter of the 4th. He gets the report in his letter of the 5th from Echevarria, who writes to the same purport on the 3rd, to O’Lalor. But I enclose a letter of the 2nd from Salamanca, which positively contradicts the account of the arrival of the reinforcement at Toro, and states that all the troops are gone into Navarre.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from Ruman, which states that on the 28th the reinforcement had not arrived at Valladolid; could it be in Toro on the 1st? I shall write to Massena about the ordenanza.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

' SIR,

' Gouvea, 9th Sept., 1810.

' I beg that two companies of the 2nd battalion 88th regiment may be posted at St. Julian, to take charge of the new works there, and of that fort, with such a detachment of the Royal Artillery as can be spared from the duties at Lisbon.

' You will give directions to the officer who will command at St. Julian, to attend to the orders heretofore given respecting the works, and to allow no person whatever to go into or to inspect them, excepting the officers of the engineers or artillery, and persons employed under their directions, or persons having orders in writing from Marshal Beresford or me, to be admitted to view them.

' I request that the fort at Paço d'Arcos may be occupied by the troops from St. Julian, by an officer's guard of twenty men.

' I beg you to arrange with the Portuguese Secretary of State, by the permission of the King's Minister at Lisbon, to carry these orders into execution, and you will give the directions which may be necessary for cleaning out the barracks, &c. The post at St. Julian is still to continue under your orders.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Colonel Peacocke.*

' WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Pavetti.*

' MONSIEUR,

' Au Quartier Général, ce 9 Sept., 1810.]

' J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez adressée de Thomar, et j'envoie vos lettres aux avant postes de l'armée Française.

' Votre domestique a passé ici il y a trois jours avec vos effets; et comme je n'ai reçu aucune proposition de la part du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Française pour vous échanger, je vous prie de vous préparer à partir par la première occasion.

' J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

' *Le Colonel Pavetti.*

' WELLINGTON.

* Commanding the gendarmes of the French army: he was taken prisoner at Nava d'Aver by the Portuguese ordenanza.

To Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Essling.

' Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,
' MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, ce 9 Sept., 1810.

' Il m'a fait la plus grande peine d'apprendre que vous avez donné des ordres à l'armée Française de ne pas faire de prisonniers parmi l'ordenanza Portugaise, et que les troupes Françaises obéissent à cet ordre, et fusillent tous ceux de ce corps qui leur tombent dans les mains.

' Il faut que je vous fasse savoir que tout Portugais est obligé par les anciennes lois du pays de servir dans les troupes de ligne, ou dans la milice, ou dans l'ordenanza; et que les troupes des trois descriptions sont également soumises aux lois militaires, et sont sous les ordres des officiers Généraux Portugais. La preuve en est, que malgré que l'ordenanza ait souffert et se plaint des ordres que vous avez donnés, et de la violation des usages de la guerre en leurs personnes, ils obéissent aux ordres qui leur ont été donnés; et ont préservé la vie, et ont bien traité tous les prisonniers qui sont tombés dans leurs mains. Monsieur le Colonel Pavetti, au sort duquel vous vous êtes intéressé, a été fait prisonnier par cette même description de troupes, et il en a été bien traité, aussi bien que son escorte.

' Comme l'ordenanza fait donc partie de l'armée Portugaise, comme elle est également sujette aux lois militaires; et comme elle agit d'une manière loyale envers les prisonniers de l'armée Française qui tombent dans ses mains, je vous prie de donner ordre que les officiers et soldats de l'ordenanza, faits prisonniers, jouissent également avec les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise des droits et usages de la guerre.

' Depuis que j'ai commandé les troupes dans ce pays ci, j'ai fait tout ce qui a été en mon pouvoir, et j'ai réussi à faire faire la guerre d'une manière loyale; et j'ai fait respecter les usages de la guerre établis et reconnus parmi les nations civilisées qui avaient été oubliés. Mais si l'armée Française continue à faire fusiller les prisonniers qu'on fera de l'ordenanza, on ne peut pas s'attendre que les soldats de ce corps, aussi bien que les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise, ne retournent pas sur les prisonniers qu'ils feront de l'armée Française. Il ne sera plus en mon pouvoir de les protéger;

et les ordres que vous avez donnés seront la cause des malheurs que souffriront les soldats de l'armée Française qui tombent dans les mains des troupes Portugaises.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Massena.* WELLINGTON.

To the Correspondent at Salamanca.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 9th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd instant, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ We have had no news lately, but I shall write to you when there is any. Every thing is going on well, and I hope that in the end we must succeed.

‘ I approve highly of the plan of general communication which you have mentioned. Let me know how I can aid you in it; and if you want money, how much, and how it can be sent.

‘ I have not got the paper which contained the letters; but I saw it. It is certainly a matter of no importance, although I considered it proper to inform you of it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Correspondent*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *at Salamanca.*

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, Gouvea, 9th Sept., 1810.

‘ There is some suspicion at Lisbon, whether with ground or not I cannot tell, of the Visconde de ———, who is an officer of the —th regiment of cavalry, with Fane. Some letters will be sent by him to his wife, by a servant who left Lisbon on the 5th instant, and it is desirable to endeavor to get hold of these letters. Communicate with Fane upon this subject.

‘ The first thing to do is to endeavor to discover whether such a servant has been sent, or rather has reached the Visconde; the next to observe him, and to seize him when he leaves him, and forward his papers to me by post, and himself afterwards, under pretence that he is a spy.

‘ If possible, employ no Portuguese in this business, and do not create any suspicion of the Visconde, for I believe that, after all, there is nothing in the story.

‘ If you cannot discover the servant, and seize him, without bringing some Portuguese into the plan, or suspicion upon the young man, leave it alone, as I can have the servant stopped near Lisbon.

‘ There is nothing new here. Watch Regnier’s movements well, particularly if he goes across the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Gen. Hill.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, I have received your letter of the 5th. I do not recollect to have had the advantage of serving with the navy on shore, but there are several officers in this army who have, among others the Commissary General; and they all declare that they do not recollect an instance of the officers and seamen and marines having any additional allowance, either of provisions or pay, upon such service, excepting bāt and forage for the officers, or the allowance of Brigadier Generals for the Captains, where officers of that rank were employed, of sufficient standing, and in command of brigades of seamen.

‘ It is certainly a great disadvantage to us to be deprived of the assistance which it is now, and will be, I hope, more, in your power to give us in various ways; but, without orders from the Secretary of State, I cannot make any alteration in the allowances of pay or provisions, or establish a precedent which might be attended by such important consequences. I propose, however, to refer your letter to the Secretary of State, by the next packet. In the mean time I have requested Colonel Fletcher to desire the Engineer in charge of our works to adopt measures to take charge of our signal stations; and if you should withdraw the officers and men of the navy from them, I request you to desire the Lieutenant to communicate, on his quitting them, with the Engineer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Gouvea, 9th Sept., 1810.

‘Beresford has communicated to me your letter of the 5th, and as the Visconde ——— is in Hill’s corps, I have written to Hill to endeavor to have the servant stopped, if he can do so without involving himself, or bringing unfounded suspicion on the Visconde. But, as he may not be able to do so, I recommend that, as the servant must be known by the police at Lisbon, they should stop him as a spy and seize his papers, as he shall approach Lisbon.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Gouvea, 9th Sept., 1810.

‘Marshal Beresford has stated to me a circumstance which appears to deserve some attention, upon which I am now about to trouble you. It appears that there was a fire at Lisbon nearly about the time that the accounts were received of the fall of Almeida, and that the two regiments of militia of the town of Lisbon were employed upon the occasion. Either during the continuance of the fire, or after it, both officers and soldiers went into the neighbouring coffee houses to refresh themselves, and the general conversation among them turned upon the fall of Almeida, upon Massena’s and Alorna’s proclamations, and the probability that the English would embark; and the general notion appeared to be that it would be proper for these two battalions to take possession of *as Torres*,* and prevent the English from carrying their intention into execution.

‘These battalions were destined to garrison Setuval and Palmella; but, as their disposition appears to be warlike, I have ordered them up to the army, and I shall send into these garrisons other battalions not quite so well disposed to war. I have, besides, given directions that Colonel Peacocke will occupy the only *Torres** which can be of any importance to us; and I hope soon to have it in my power

* The forts.

to secure the command of all the communications with Lisbon, in such a manner as to set at defiance these patriotic citizens. In the mean time, however, the temper of mind of Lisbon becomes a subject of importance; and, as the French appear inclined to afford us leisure to adopt any arrangements we may think proper on any subject, I think we cannot employ our time better than in accustoming these gentry to the discipline, to which it is obvious they must submit as soon as matters become at all critical. What I should propose, therefore, is that the Government should now carry into execution the plan of police which I proposed to them some time ago. If they consent to adopt it, it may be adopted, if they choose it, on a suggestion which I shall make to them; but they ought to publish a proclamation, directing that all the coffee houses should be shut up at sunset; that the patrols which are organized should go every hour, day and night; that all disorderly assemblages of people should be immediately dispersed, &c.

‘These measures will accustom the mob of Lisbon to the discipline they must undergo, and will keep matters quiet at the critical moment. I can only declare this,—that if I find the Government hesitating upon this subject, and alarmed by the mob of Lisbon, and inclined to allow them to go to the lengths in which they will be really formidable, I shall forthwith embark the army, whatever may be the prospects of final success in our military operations. In taking this step, I shall literally obey the instructions which I have received; and the Portuguese nation will have the satisfaction of losing itself, and the Peninsula, notwithstanding the best prospects of salvation, by the folly of the people and the pusillanimity of the Government.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will confer upon this subject with the Government, and communicate to them my ideas as above stated.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what progress has been made in the organization of the shipping concerns, and the arrangements for embarkation, what quantity of forage they will have disposable, &c., &c., as we may as well take advantage of the present calm to settle all that matter conclusively.

‘I must say that I attribute much of the existing agita-

tion in Lisbon to the conduct of the Government, and particularly of the new members of it: not from evil inclination and design, but from what is worse, probably, in men in public situations in these times—bad heads. If these foolish fellows cannot be kept in order, we must get rid of them; and one mode of doing so is, that I shall insist upon Souza's being sent away; and he might go upon an embassy to England to ask for money, or any thing else that might be suggested; and once there, we might keep him there. However, it would be preferable, first, to try the effect of your presence in the Government.

' Pray write to Lord Wellesley, and beg him not to allow the English de Souza to talk to him upon the affairs of Portugal, with which he has nothing to do.

' Believe me, &c. *Charles Stuart, Esq.* WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

' MY DEAR COTTON, *Gouvea, 10th Sept., 1810. 4 A.M.*

' I received your letter at one, and I have delayed till now to answer it, in hopes that I should have received something further from you.

' If the enemy continues upon Guarda, you cannot keep your piquets so far forward as they are now. You must keep a post of observation at Prados; and the most advanced vedette in the daytime should be on the hill above Marçal do Chaõ; the hussars in Lagiosa, or in the open ground in front of Celorico; every thing else on this side of Celorico, or in that town. Put something in Linhares to keep up the communication by that road with the post at Prados, and something by the Val das Aras for the same purpose by the other.

' I think it most probable that this advance upon Guarda is a strong reconnaissance, particularly if the enemy do not advance upon your front this morning.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General* WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Gouvea, 10th Sept., 1810.

‘ Having received no further intelligence from you or Cocks since last night, I conclude that the detachment seen from Guarda was not of the size stated by the dragoon; and that they did not even go to Guarda, and were only a reconnaitring party.

‘ It is not improbable, however, that, as they have been reconnaitring the roads towards Guarda for some days past, they will take possession of that town, and they can do it when they please.

‘ A surgeon upon the French staff, who was attached to the 66th regiment, has been taken prisoner, and just now brought in here. He was with the 66th on Thursday or Friday night, when they were moving towards Guarda to reconnaitre it. He lost his way, and was taken prisoner by the peasantry. He says that on this day or to-morrow, the head quarters were to be moved from Fort Concepcion to Pinhel. His other reports refer to matters foreign from the plan of operations in Portugal.

‘ Whether Guarda was taken possession of or not yesterday evening, I think you will do well to carry into execution the movement which you proposed yesterday with the Royals and the 14th light dragoons, to which Murray signified my consent yesterday evening.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Gouvea, 10th Sept., 1810. 2 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of 10 A.M. I enclose one which I have received from Cocks. Both accounts appear to agree pretty well. If the enemy advance in concert, I think that they will take possession of Guarda with a stronger force. I conclude that Cocks will have returned to Guarda. You will observe that he retired by the road to Manteigas, to which I see no objection when he shall retire again. But if he does so, there should be likewise a post on Prados, to

observe the enemy, and also one at Linhares, otherwise they would be on the great road before you would know it.

‘ The road from Guarda to Manteigas is by Misarella, Famalicaõ, Valhelhas, and Sameiro. From Misarella there is a road by Vide Monte to Prados and Linhares. From Famalicaõ there is a road to Mello, but a bad one. From Manteigas there is a road to this place, to Cea, and to every other place in this valley.

‘ Desire Cocks to have the road from Guarda to Manteigas examined, and let me know what kind of one it is.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ The people of Covilhaõ have lodged their property in Manteigas, but I fancy that nothing can keep the enemy out of that place.

‘ Send Cocks this letter, or a copy of it, as an answer to his, and tell him I shall keep his two men here to give them provisions, and send them to him early in the morning.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Gouvea, 10th Sept., 1810.

‘ Cocks sent a dragoon with a message to Cotton yesterday evening, at half past five, to inform him that a column, consisting of 3000 cavalry and 5000 infantry, were just entering Guarda. The dragoon arrived here at one in the morning; but I have as yet heard no more of this column. The telegraph, however, tells me that Cotton is at Celorico.

‘ A surgeon, taken prisoner on Thursday or Friday night, says that Massena’s head quarters were to be moved this day, or to-morrow, to Pinhel. He was going with the 66th regiment to reconnoitre Guarda, when he lost his way, and was taken by the peasants.

‘ When you talk of the survey of the ordnance and stores in the forts of the Alentejo, do you mean Setuval and Palmella, or Elvas and La Lippe? Because I fear that Leite will be a little jealous of interference in the latter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,’ ‘Gouvea, 11th Sept., 1810.

‘I enclose you Forjaz’s letter respecting Captain Fain. Will you order him to Lisbon? I find that Senhor Sodré* is a suspected person, as well as Lemos and Mozinho.

‘Let me know when you wish that I should send the orders for to go to Elvas.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Gouvea, 11th Sept., 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 8th, which has induced me to suspend the execution of an intention which I had formed of writing to the Government on the 3rd article of their *Noticia*, respecting the officers of the army who have entered the service of the enemy. The arrangements under this article are directly contrary to those which Beresford and I had settled and agreed to recommend, and which I recommended in my letter to the Government of the 5th, and which Beresford has, I believe, announced in General Orders to the army. However, as I understand from your letter that you approved of this *Noticia*, as well as of the Proclamation, &c., I shall defer noticing the subject to the Government.

‘I do not recollect a circumstance which made such an impression on the British army, and upon the English officers serving with the Portuguese army, as the account of the conduct of the officers of the 24th regiment; and after full consideration, the measure which I recommended, and the distinct statement of the principle on which it was recommended, appeared the only means of reconciling the minds of the officers of the British army to what had occurred, and to further service with the Portuguese; at the same time that it held out a standard of sentiment and principle for the officers of the Portuguese service on similar occasions. I wished to avail myself of this opportunity of showing them what the principles of men of honor, and the sentiments of

* The Portuguese interpreter and translator at the head quarters.

officers and gentlemen, ought to induce them to do on similar occasions. I am sorry to say that this object is defeated by the publication of the notice of the Government; and it would have been accomplished, if the Government would have waited for the official communication of the circumstances on which they have decided, as I am convinced that you would have seen at once my object in the measure which I recommended, and would have supported it with all your influence.

‘As it is now the arrangement, it must be left to take its course.

‘While writing upon this subject, I should wish to draw your attention to the inconvenience resulting from the precipitation of the Government, as well as from the practice, notwithstanding what I before wrote to them, of publishing Marshal Beresford’s accounts, as well as mine, of the same transactions. There is no person who deprecates mystery more than I do; and it is impossible for two people to understand each other better than Beresford and I. He is two miles from this, and I see him every day; and I believe that we take pretty nearly the same view of every transaction. But a different mode of expression, a difference in the degree of importance assigned to any transaction, the details of which are related by different individuals, who probably have taken the same view, make a material difference in the eyes of the very jealous public, both of the Peninsula and of England, who will judge of our actions.

‘In a late instance I see that the Portuguese papers have observed and canvassed some little difference which they suppose there was between Beresford’s reports and mine, which observations will certainly be copied into the English newspapers, with all the additional observations which malevolence can suggest. I attribute the publication of these reports made by Beresford to the feverish state in which the Government has been since Principal Souza has become a member of it. Beresford very properly makes a daily report of events, but it must be observed that the view to be given in these reports cannot be so accurate as that which is given after the events have been well considered and further inquired into.

‘For instance, if I had written to you yesterday, I should

have told you that the enemy had on Sunday night marched a large column upon Guarda. I now know that this was merely a reconnaissance, that but a few cavalry entered Guarda, and that the whole fell back upon Sabugal yesterday, owing to their patrols falling in with ours. There is no harm in Government being informed of these events as they come to our knowledge; but where is the use of keeping the public in a state of fever by the publication of them? But it comes to this, if the Portuguese Government publish any report of military transactions, excepting mine, I shall make them no report; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will intimate this to them. They now have the same report that I make to my own Government.

‘It appears that you have had a good smart contest with the Government respecting our plan of operations. They will end in forcing me to quit them, and then they will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone keep things in their present state. Indeed, the temper of some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese Government. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I have commanded; but, for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means of putting an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions; but Officers of high rank or situation ought to keep their opinions to themselves: if they do not approve of the system of operations of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this is the point to which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense prevents them from going on as they have done lately. Believe me that, if any body else, knowing what I do, had commanded the army, they would now have been at Lisbon, if not in their ships.

‘As for advancing into Spain, the idea is ridiculous. I can only tell you, that of which I am the most apprehensive

is that the enemy will raise the blockade of Cadiz. Unless Heaven shall perform a miracle, and give the Spaniards an army, arms, and equipments, we should be ruined by this measure, and then the cause is gone.

‘ Now, supposing that I am wrong in my plan of operations, and the principal officers of the British army still more wrong, and Principal Souza and the Bishop right, and that I have it in my power to act offensively in Spain, how would it be when the French army in Andalusia would be brought against us? Would the Spanish force, which a part of that army keeps shut up in Cadiz, be equal to the whole of it in the field? Not unless, by a miracle, Heaven would add to their numbers!

‘ The intelligence from Madrid is very interesting. I observe, however, that they have omitted a great part of the French force in their statement. Regnier’s force is not mentioned at all.

‘ I enclose a most interesting dispatch which my brother has desired me to send you. Let me have it again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Gouvea, 11th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant; and the detail of the distribution of the transports, which it contains, is very satisfactory.

‘ As it is always in our power to send transports to Cadiz, and not so easy to get them back again, I think it would be advisable to detain the transports which brought the 79th and 88th regiments. The six empty victuallers and store ships might be sent to England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Moimenta, 12th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter, at noon, conveying the intelligence of the enemy advancing upon Guarda. I am here, dining with Beresford.

' You had better carry into execution this evening, or early in the morning, the directions contained in my letter written to you yesterday morning at four.

' Arrange with the officer at Trancoso that he is to fall back by the road before pointed out to you, when your piquets shall be obliged to retire from the front of Celorico.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General* WELLINGTON.

' *Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

To the Earl of Liverpool.

' MY LORD, ' Gouvea, 12th Sept., 1810.

' I have the honor to enclose a correspondence respecting the want of cleanliness in the cavalry transports which conveyed the squadron of the 13th light dragoons from Cadiz to Lisbon, in consequence of which the horses of that squadron have become very sickly.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.* WELLINGTON.

' Believe me, &c.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

' MY LORD, ' Gouvea, 12th Sept., 1810.

' I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 17th August, in which you enclosed one of the 15th August, addressed to Lieut. General Graham.

' I am not certain, from the perusal of these papers, whether it is your Lordship's intention that any troops should be sent from Cadiz to Portugal besides the 79th and 94th regiments, and the squadron of the 13th light dragoons; or whether it is your Lordship's intention to leave to General Graham a discretion to send more troops to Portugal, if he should find that I am pressed by the enemy. I understand that I am not to call for more than those already arrived; but General Graham, as well as His Majesty's Government, is acquainted with my opinion that all the British troops might with safety be withdrawn from Cadiz, with the exception of a small detachment, and that the reinforcement of this army is an object of importance, if it be wished to maintain the contest in the Peninsula.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.* WELLINGTON.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘à Gouvea, ce 13 Sept., 1810.

‘ MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

‘ Le Général Hill vous aura appris que le corps de Regnier est encore une fois venu de ce côté ci ; je ne comprends pas pourquoi, à moins que ce ne soit vrai, comme on le dit, qu’une partie du corps de Junot est allé à Salamanque, à cause des insurrections du côté de Valladolid.

‘ Je vous écris seulement pour vous dire que comme j’avais entendu que quelques chevaux de la brigade de Madden étaient blessés aux dos par les selles, je lui ai fait renvoyer deux escadrons du régiment qui est à Elvas, pour les remplacer jusqu’à ce que les siens seraient rétablis ; et je vous prie de mettre ces deux escadrons sous les ordres du Général Madden avec les autres.

‘ Tous les Portugais ont déserté, excepté à peu près 200 qui n’en ont pas eu l’occasion, et ceux là ont été envoyés prisonniers en France. On a abandonné le projet de faire de ce corps le cadre d’une Légion Portugaise.

‘ Je crois que quelques uns des bataillons que je vous ai dit être à Nantes et sur la Loire, ont joint le corps de Junot.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Au Marquis de la Romana.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Je n’ai pas eu de vos nouvelles depuis le 1^r du mois.’*To Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 11th. A detachment which, from your account of the march of Regnier’s corps, and as it came from Penamacor, I believe belonged to the 2nd corps, entered Guarda yesterday, and retired towards the Coa again in the evening. I have as yet heard of no movement this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th. I am very much afraid that the Government are going too fast with their

suspensions. I find they are about to send a number of suspected persons to the Western Islands. Surely, if there is any ground for suspicion, it is not proper to send them to those islands. I have sent them Captain Fain, whom they desired to have; but I believe there was no reason to suspect him. I dismissed him from our Staff for illness and neglect of duty; but these faults do not constitute treason and disaffection,

‘ I enclose my dispatch to Government, as well as one for the Portuguese Government, which I beg you to keep, unless the Government shall engage to make public the reports they receive from me only.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Lieut. General Hill, in which he has recommended that Mr. Ogilvie should be appointed a Deputy Commissary.

‘ From a sense of the abilities and services of Mr. Ogilvie, I had already appointed him to act as a Deputy Commissary till His Majesty’s pleasure should be known; and I now beg to request your Lordship to use your influence with the Commissary in Chief in his favor.

‘ I assure your Lordship that the supply of troops is no easy matter in this country; and that the officers of the Commissariat, who really perform their duty, require encouragement.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Lieut. General Graham, respecting Colonel —. Colonel — has since arrived at Lisbon, and I have desired him to remain there for your Lordship’s further instructions.

‘ I have already apprized your Lordship of the measures

which I had adopted to encourage desertion from the enemy's army opposed to me; and I am convinced that their success is limited only by the difficulty of communicating with the foreign corps, and by that which the soldiers experience in getting away.

‘ From what I know of Colonel —, I do not think him capable of removing or decreasing either the one or the other.

‘ Great suspicion attaches to all foreigners in the Peninsula, particularly to those who have been in the enemy's service. I have already been obliged to send Colonel — to England once, on account of the suspicions which were entertained of him, very much owing to his own misconduct; and I should send him away again immediately, if your Lordship had not been desirous of employing him here. I request, however, that the circumstances which I have above stated may be considered, and that I may have your Lordship's further orders respecting this gentleman.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

‘ About the period when the accounts of the loss of Almeida arrived at Lisbon, there was a fire in the town, at which the two regiments of militia were employed; and either during the continuance of the fire or after it was over, many of the officers and soldiers of these regiments went into the coffee houses to refresh themselves. Here the conversation turned upon the operations of the armies, upon the loss of Almeida, and upon the proclamations by Massena and the Marquez d'Alorna; and I understand that the sentiment which generally prevailed was, that the design of the English army was to embark, and that it was the duty of those two regiments of militia to seize “the towers,” as they are called, meaning Belem, St. Julian, the Bugio, &c., and to prevent the execution of this design.

‘ I should not have troubled your Lordship upon this subject, having already adopted measures to employ this militia more usefully for the public service, and to secure the towers,

if I did not conceive that these sentiments of the militia were in some degree connected with those entertained by the Portuguese Government, and with their conduct since the recent changes.

‘ This country has before been in great danger, and a great part of it, probably the richest and most important, was last year in the possession of the enemy; but at all times, and under all circumstances, I have possessed the confidence of the Government; and their object has been, as far as was in their power, to forward my views for the public service. I have apprized them of the system of operations in which I deemed it expedient to carry on the defence of the country, and they are aware of the grounds of my opinion, and the details of the plan; and till the late change, excepting occasional remarks from the Patriarch on the supposed danger of his favorite city Oporto, I never received from the Government any observation, excepting of confidence, in the measures which I recommended or adopted; and the confidence and satisfaction of the public surpassed that of the Government. But the Principal Souza, who was introduced recently into the Government, is of that impatient, meddling, and mischievous disposition (without, however, designing to do harm), that we cannot expect to go on as we have hitherto, so long as he shall continue a member of the Government. His indiscretion is equally well known with the other defects of his character; and to this I attribute the dangerous sensation which appears to have been occasioned at Lisbon on the fall of Almeida.

‘ In imitation of the fatal conduct of the central Junta, the Portuguese Regency, since the late changes, have flattered, instead of coercing the mob of Lisbon, which will become dangerous in proportion as this new system is persevered in.

‘ They have likewise, in imitation of the same body, interfered in the military operations, have deliberated upon the propriety of adopting offensive measures, and of moving the army into Spain; and I have no doubt that from the usual indiscretion of the same gentleman, these deliberations and opinions are as well known to the mob of Lisbon as they are to me. Then they have cast reflection and suspicion on every Portuguese employed by Marshal Beresford and me, likewise, in imitation of the Central Junta; and in

many important instances, some relating exclusively to the army, they have recently disobeyed the orders of the Prince Regent, to adopt no measure without consulting my opinion.

‘ His Majesty’s Government will be the best judges what measures ought to be adopted, as a remedy to these evils: but I have already desired Mr. Stuart to give notice to the Regency, that if they continued to interfere in any manner with the military operations, or with the appointments of Marshal Beresford’s staff, I should recommend to His Majesty’s Government to withdraw the army; and if I found that they did not adopt the political and civil measures recommended to them, to correspond with the military operations, I should bring their conduct under the consideration of His Majesty’s Government; and that if they refused or omitted to coerce the mob of Lisbon, their neglect in this instance would immediately create a danger which would oblige me to evacuate the country, under the instructions which I had received

‘ In respect to the military operations, His Majesty’s Government are best aware whether they have been conducted in a manner satisfactory to them or not. About a year has now elapsed since the army under my command has been the only force which could keep the field in the Peninsula; and, contrary to the general expectation, it is still in the field, has sustained no important loss, and the successful result of this campaign to the enemy becomes every day more doubtful.

‘ The Portuguese Regency may be right in their notion of an offensive operation, and I may be wrong in the calculations which have induced me to prefer the defensive system which I have pursued; but I am very certain that the General and other officers of the British army, at least, of the two, prefer that which I have adopted; although if some of them held the command, the army would long ere now have been in their transports.

‘ In respect to an offensive operation in Spain, I have only to observe that if I have mistaken the strength of the several French corps now opposed to me (which is scarcely possible, as I have their returns to the middle of July), and I believe that the Regency have neither information nor fixed

plan of any kind, I think I may infer, from the general conduct of the French, that they would not allow their army to be for any length of time inferior to their enemy; and that the result of this advance, if it could be attempted, would be the abandonment of their projects in Andalusia. This would not give the allies any corresponding increase of force, unless the Spanish Regency could, in an instant, raise, form, arm, and equip an army. It could not be supposed, even by the Portuguese Regency, that the army which is now blockaded at Cadiz by a part of the enemy's force in Andalusia, could be equal to the whole of that force, when they should be in the field. The offensive operations, therefore, and the movement into Spain (supposing this last to be allowed by the instructions of His Majesty's Government), whatever might be their commencement, must end in defeat and disgrace, and in the destruction of the cause of the allies in the Peninsula.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance in front of this part of the army since I addressed you on the 6th instant. A body of about 800 infantry, and some cavalry, entered Guarda on Sunday evening, and obliged our post of observation to retire from thence: the enemy remained there that night, but retired to Alfayates again in the morning after their patrols had fallen in with ours.

‘ Another detachment entered that city again yesterday, and our post of observation retired. The enemy withdrew towards the Coa again in the evening.

‘ By letters from Lieut. General Hill, of the 11th, I learn that the whole of the 2nd corps were in movement again to the northward from the neighbourhood of Zarza and Salvaterra, and I therefore imagine that the troops which entered Guarda yesterday, and which came from Penamacor, belonged to this corps.

‘ No movement has been made in the north, or to the southward of the Tagus.

‘ I have heard of the march within the Spanish frontier of

two divisions, each of 10,000 men, commanded by General Reille and General Drouet, which, it is said, have been turned off into Navarre, on account of the increasing disturbances in that part of the country.

‘ I am not certain that the troops which I know have passed the frontier have been disposed of in this manner; but I rather believe that some of the battalions, which I heretofore informed your Lordship were collected on the Loire, have joined the 8th corps.

‘ I understand that, with the exception of about 200 men, the whole of the 24th Portuguese regiment have quitted the enemy; and that they have relinquished their intention of making this regiment the foundation of their Portuguese levy, and have sent these men prisoners to France. I have every reason to believe that these men likewise would have returned to Portugal, if it had been in their power.

‘ My last letters from Cadiz are of the 1st instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 13th Sept., 1810.

‘ The letter which I have had the honor of addressing to your Lordship this day will probably point out the expediency of stationing in the Tagus a large naval force.

‘ It is desirable, at all events, that I should be made acquainted with the intentions of His Majesty’s Government upon this subject at an early period, as there are several measures depending upon it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 14th Sept., 1810.

‘ I judge, from letters which I have received from England since I wrote to you on the 11th instant, that Lieut. General Graham may consider himself authorized to send to Lisbon another detachment of the troops under his command; and I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will send back to Cadiz the transports which brought round the 79th and

88th regiments, which in that letter I requested you to detain in the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 14th Sept., 1810.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your letter regarding the horse transports. We experience so much inconvenience from disorders acquired by horses in transports, that I had written to Government in order to have some general regulation to provide for their being cleaned regularly after being used.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Gouvea, 14th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 31st August and the 1st instant, and you will have observed from my former letters that I agree entirely with you respecting the impolicy of the conduct of our Government regarding the Spanish colonies.

‘ From what I hear I believe that they think in England it is impossible to prevent the spirit which has broken forth in Caraccas from spreading all over America. It is my opinion they are mistaken; and the conduct of the people at Monte Video is likely to open their eyes. I likewise think that a premature declaration of independence in the Colonies is likely to defeat our object, which must be to keep them out of the hands of France.

‘ I understand that the mulattos and whites at Caraccas have quarrelled already; and, if that is the case, depend upon it not only the other Colonies will not follow their example now, but they will consider the matter well before they will separate themselves from Spain, even though Spain should have been completely conquered by the French.

‘ The probability of the division of the people of color and whites, or rather of the rebellion of the former, is not so

great after the conquest of Spain by the French as it is now, unless the people of color should have before their eyes the example of successful rebellion in the Caraccas. I trust, however, that the conduct of Monte Video will open the eyes of our Government.

‘ I enclose the copy of my report to Government of yesterday. I suspect that the French have got some of the troops which I told you were collected at Nantes as a reinforcement. I have heard of three of these battalions having joined Junot’s corps.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right. Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 14th Sept., 1810.

‘ Dr. Frank has sent me a letter regarding a person who is in the British service by the name of Le Court, whom the Government have desired to send out of Portugal. It is really necessary to begin drawing some line upon this subject, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will say that I shall send Mr. Le Court and his son to England, although it will be very inconvenient to the army to do so, if the Government will be so kind as to state the grounds which they have for suspecting either of improper conduct.

‘ Mr. Le Court was employed by me to take care of the French prisoners going home from Oporto last year, and he has since been employed with the army hospitals, and both he and his son have given great satisfaction.

‘ I have heard that the mob of Lisbon attacked Colonel Pavetti, whom I lately sent down to Lisbon as a prisoner, and one of our officers who was in charge of him. This is the way in which they began last year, and they ended by attacking Sir John Cradock’s house; and I believe that Villiers’ servants were insulted, and he did not think his own life very safe. If I find the fact to be well founded, I shall call upon the Government to state what steps they have taken to punish those guilty of this outrage.

‘ I think that the French have got a reinforcement, not only from Nantes, but from a corps which was at Versailles. I find three battalions, which were at Nantes in June, now

in Junot's corps, and one battalion, which was at Versailles, in Ney's.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810. 8 P.M.

‘ The enemy have entered the valley of the Mondego in strength, by Guarda and by Marçal do Chaõ; and I understand that Massena's head quarters were to be this day at Pinhel, and to-morrow at Trancoso.

‘ If that is the case, it is probable that they will move a considerable column by Viseu, which would turn any position we might take upon the Alva. I do not yet know whether it is Regnier's corps which has moved into the valley by Guarda, but you will know that to a certainty from Le Cor; and, if it should be so, you will of course have carried into execution your instructions of the 31st August.

‘ If you should find, when you shall receive this, that it is Regnier's corps that has passed through by Guarda into the valley of the Mondego, or if part of it, which is probable, has crossed the Upper Zezere, the other part having come into the valley of the Mondego by Guarda, send orders to General Leith to move his corps from Thomar to Cabaços, Espinhal, and Foz d'Arouce.

‘ I send this letter open to him, that he may be prepared to obey your orders upon this subject. If the enemy should not have moved in force by the Viseu road, this will enable us yet to stop him upon the Alva; if he should, it will only oblige me to give General Leith's corps the trouble of a countermarch.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th August, and I am much obliged to you for the communication of the intentions of the Commander in Chief respecting Captain Pakenham.

I certainly understand that Captain Lloyd of the 43rd was a candidate for promotion by purchase. If officers who are able to purchase will not purchase, they must wait until it comes to their turn to be promoted.

‘ In respect to other parts of your letter, I observe from some expressions which it contains, and the general tenor of your observations, that I trod upon tender ground when I addressed you on the subject to which it relates. The sooner I quit it therefore the better, and I shall confine myself merely to referring you to my letter, in respect to the claims of gentlemen of family, fortune, and influence, to promotion ; from which you will observe that I urged the expediency of attending to their claims to promotion, only when their professional merits were at least equal, if not superior, to those of others.

‘ When I wrote to you I had no intention of making any invidious statement of the advantages which any set of individuals had derived from the system of promotion which had been adopted. I adverted to what is generally understood and reported in the army ; and as I purpose to drop the subject entirely, about the result of which I do not care a pin, I shall not enter into any proof of the truth of the statement which I made.

‘ In respect to Colin Campbell, I shall add that you have been misinformed, or I am much mistaken. Before I came to Portugal the first time, the Duke of York promised both Lord Wellesley and me that he would promote him to be a Major, in answer to our recommendations solely on account of his services. He then carried home the dispatches with the accounts of the successes of Rolica and Vimeiro, and he was made a Major by brevet ; and the Duke then told him that as soon as he could appoint him to an efficient Majority he would make him a Lieutenant Colonel by brevet, recollecting that he had before intended to promote him, and that he had increased his claim by bringing home the accounts of two successes.

‘ I never intended to say that I was not obliged by the Commander in Chief’s attention to the claims of Colin Campbell to promotion ; but I asserted, and with due submission to superior authority must maintain, that he had claims

which, independent of any recommendation of mine, must have promoted him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Felton Hervey, 14th light dragoons.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ Upon perusal of the letters which you gave me yesterday from Colonel Taylor and Mr. Fremantle, and from Colonel Torrens to Colonel Taylor, I cannot advise you to make any further effort to have your commission of Lieutenant Colonel dated to the day of the vacancy.

‘ I am decidedly of opinion that your claim to this favor is strong; first, as it was granted to Lieut. Colonel Wynyard in a vacancy in this army occasioned in an action in which he was not present. I understand also that there is another recent instance of the grant of this favor to Colonel Nisbett, whose appointment was antedated to the period of the vacancy to which he was promoted on the permanent staff. Secondly, the misfortune which you suffered in a former action in this same service would appear to give you a claim to consideration. Thirdly, you were present in the affair in which the vacancy was occasioned: and, lastly, it was owing to an unfortunate accident that you were not recommended by me sufficiently early to have your commission signed before the brevet took place.

‘ Colonel Talbot was killed in the morning of Wednesday the 11th, the day on which I usually dispatch the mail for England from head quarters, in order that it may be sent by the packet which leaves Lisbon on Sunday. By accident I did not receive the account of Talbot’s death till Wednesday evening, and I was obliged to detain the messenger to write the dispatch with the account of it, and I did not recommend you by that occasion, as I did not know what officers were to be promoted in the succession. You were not recommended till the following Wednesday, the 18th.

‘ If you had been recommended, as you ought to have been, on the 11th July, you would, in the usual course, have been appointed to the Lieutenant Colonelcy, before the brevet took place.

‘ Although the delay in the transmission of the recommendation is thus the cause of your being lower down in the list of Lieutenant Colonels than you would have been, I am convinced that you will believe that, if I could have imagined that there was to be a brevet, I should have hastened rather than have delayed the letters recommending you.

‘ Notwithstanding all this, I cannot recommend to you to adopt any mode of obtaining an earlier date to your commission, of which the Commander in Chief will not entirely approve.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Hervey.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Leith, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th instant, with the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieut. —, of the — dragoons.

‘ It is always my wish to attend to the recommendation of a General Court Martial, but I am desirous that the Court, of which you are President, should reconsider their recommendation in favor of Lieut. —. It appears to be founded solely on the length of his confinement, which, I must observe, has been in arrest at large. This length of confinement has been owing, in a great measure, to Lieut. — himself, as he did not know the name of the officer, or the number of the regiment to which he belonged, to whom he asserted that he had reported his arrival at Abrantes, and from whom he declared that he had received his orders to proceed to Lisbon. Much time was spent in inquiry for this officer, and then the time of the Deputy Judge Advocate was occupied by other trials.

‘ The extent of the service on which the army is employed, and the difficulty and inconvenience of calling officers from their duty in one part of the army to attend as witnesses upon a trial in another, was the cause of continued delay in bringing Lieut. — to trial : and I would beg the General Court Martial to observe, that if length of confinement is considered and admitted as the ground of recommendation in this instance, it ought in every one, in which the public

convenience may render the delay of the trial of an officer necessary.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Leith.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ I thought it likely that you would come over this evening, and I did not send to you to let you know that the enemy moved upon Guarda this day in strength, and apparently in earnest, as they have crossed the hill, and are on this side as far as Lagiosa. They likewise moved from Freixedas in strength upon Baraçal. My last note from Cotton was at 5 P.M., when he was about to retire through Celorico. I do not yet know where he will be for the night.

‘ The lady sent to your head quarters says that Massena was to be this day at Pinhel, to-morrow at Trancoso. I enclose a note which she brought from Alorna to his wife, which rather shows that the route of the main body is by Viseu. I do not know whether it is Regnier's corps, or a part of Ney's, which has come through Guarda.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Send off to Trant at Moimenta.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have just received from the Secretary of State; and as I conceive that it is important to reinforce this army, I beg that you will send to the Tagus the 94th regiment, the 2nd batt. 30th regiment, and the 2nd batt. 44th regiment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter for Lieut. General Graham, which it is important should be sent to him without loss of time; and if

the vessel which leaves Lisbon every Monday should have sailed when this shall reach you, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will dispatch another vessel with it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 3 P.M.

‘ I consider it almost certain that the enemy have now taken possession of Guarda in earnest; and I think it probable that they will now move forward in your front, and possibly on the Trancoso side in the morning. You had better, therefore, move to the rear of Celorico the whole of the cavalry this afternoon, with the exception of the hussars, which may remain at Celorico, or in front of the town observing the plain.

‘ Put the regiments into Villa Cortez, Cortiço, Carapichana, Mesquitella, &c., and if you leave the hussars in front of Celorico, one regiment in that town.

‘ If, however, you find that they do not come in great numbers down the hill of Guarda this afternoon, and you think that you can remain in Lagiosa, Memoial, and Barçal, without danger of being disturbed this night, you might remain; otherwise it is better to move, although at night. At all events, you must get the regiments to the rear of Celorico in the morning at daylight. Watch Prados, &c., well.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ Probably you could put more squadrons into Celorico, and the others in the rear in the neighbourhood of that town, without making any great noise in the night.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

20 minutes before 5 P.M.

‘ I have received your note of 2 P.M., and I have heard from Captain Cocks from Misarelha that the enemy were

pushing down Guarda hill; and they have moved a column, but apparently of no great strength, upon Famalicaõ.

‘ You had better retire every thing on this side of Celorico, or into that town for the night, leaving only the hussars in front. It is very desirable that you should put the horses up somewhere for the night, and it would be best at once to remove them to the rear. You may depend upon it that the movement is general. Let me hear from you as soon as the enemy appear to have taken their ground for the night. Do not forget the troop at Trancoso.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

Midnight.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ I was in hopes that I should have heard from you as soon as all was quiet for the evening; and I am now apprehensive that the directions I shall give you may not suit the situation in which you may be. I wish you to fall back.

‘ I have just received your letter of half-past 8.

‘ I think you had better put the two heavy regiments in march to the rear at 4 in the morning. Let them be followed by the 14th, the 16th follow the 14th, and the hussars wait to follow the enemy’s movements. Let the baggage go off, and pass through Sampayo and Pinanços.

‘ The officers of the General Court Martial will join their regiments.

‘ There is some straw at Villa Cortez, which should be destroyed by the rear regiment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ You had better draw the hussars through the town before daylight. Apprise Cocks of your movement; he is at Villa de Mata and Prados.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 15th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have only time to tell you that the enemy entered the valley of the Mondego this day in force by Guarda, and by Marçal do Chaõ; and I believe that they are about to move a column by Trancoso and Viseu. I shall know more, however, in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Gouvea, 16th Sept., 1810.

‘ I fear that we shall knock up the regiments if we do not allow them to get to their ground; and the hussars, having observed the enemy into Celorico, should be allowed to retire to their cantonments.

‘ We have a good deal of work before us, and we must not knock up the troops. I have received your note of the 12th from Celorico.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Gouvea, 16th Sept., 1810. 8 A.M.

‘ The enemy showed yesterday two brigades of infantry and three or four regiments of cavalry on this side of Baraçal, and five regiments of cavalry and about 5000 infantry on this side of Guarda. Their advance on that side was at Porto de Carne. The peasants told Cocks that more troops were following these from Pega, and that Belmonte was occupied. But we have a letter from Hervey from Covilhaõ of yesterday, in which he does not mention this fact.

‘ I have nothing from the side of Trancoso. They have only a few squadrons of dragoons on the road from Guarda towards Manteigas. I have ordered our cavalry to fall back, and they are now, I believe, in march. I cannot tell from our telegraph hill whether the enemy has yet moved.

‘I propose to move my head quarters to Cea, yours to St. Romaõ. Murray wishes me to go to Villa Duce, which is a league further back; but I shall not determine upon that till I see how things turn out in the course of the day. Could you come over here?’

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Cea, 17th Sept., 1810.

‘I enclose a report received in the night. The column mentioned as marching on our left went off by Fornos yesterday morning, and was at Fornos about three p.m. It can scarcely have got so far as Mangualde last night. It can have no guns with it; and the prisoner says that Junot has marched upon Oporto, which I conclude means upon Moimenta, from the lower part of the Coa; and this column is intended to keep up the communication with him.

‘You should order all your sick away from Coimbra at all events, and send people down to be in readiness to remove or destroy your ammunition and other stores there without loss of time.

‘I am going to give similar orders.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

‘I have ordered every thing to be prepared for a short move in the afternoon, if the enemy should move. The whole of the 2nd and 6th corps are in the valley of the Mondego.

‘I enclose another report from Waters.’

To the Commander in Chief of the French Army (Marshal Masséna, Prince d'Essling).

‘Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

‘MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

ce 17 Sept., 1810.

‘Le Capitaine Percy*, au sort duquel je suis fort intéressé, a été blessé et pris, ou tué hier auprès de Celorico, et je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez permettre qu'on donne de

* The Hon. H. Percy. He was afterwards aide de camp to the Duke of Wellington, and brought home the dispatches of the battle of Waterloo.

ses nouvelles à mon aide de camp, le Major Gordon; et s'il n'est pas tué, si vous voulez permettre qu'il reçoive les secours d'argent, hardes, &c., que je lui envoie.

‘ J’ai l’honneur de vous envoyer des lettres que j’ai reçues, il y a deux jours, du Gouverneur d’Elvas. Je crois que c’est arrangé entre nos Gouvernemens que les officiers non combattans ne seraient pas prisonniers de guerre, et si vous l’entendez de cette manière, je prierai le Gouvernement Portugais de permettre qu’on renvoie M. Galland; mais en tout cas je lui ferai donner l’argent qui lui est nécessaire.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ à Son Excellence

‘ WELLINGTON.

le Commandant en Chef.

To Major General Leith.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Villa Doce, 17th Sept., 1810.

‘ As the enemy’s whole army has decidedly entered the valley of the Mondego, I conclude that you will have received orders from General Hill to make the movement stated in my letter to the General of the 15th.

‘ I wish you in the first instance not to come farther than Espinhal with your division; and on the day that you shall find that the head of General Hill’s corps shall arrive at Espinhal, you will move on with your division to Miranda do Corvo, and you will remain there till you shall receive further orders.

‘ I request General Hill also to collect his corps at Espinhal, Penella, &c., and remain there till farther orders.

‘ The 2nd and the 6th corps came to Celorico yesterday, and a part of them crossed the Mondego to Fornos. More have crossed the Mondego this day, and no part of the enemy’s army has moved this way. It is generally understood that the whole army is between the Douro and the Mondego, and are about to march upon Coimbra. I shall have troops in Coimbra to-morrow.

‘ Send this letter to General Hill.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General Leith.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘Sampayo, 17th Sept., 1810.

8 $\frac{1}{2}$ A.M.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘It does not appear that the enemy are moving in front, but it is evident that they are doing so on the left beyond the Mondego. I see a very heavy dust hanging over Mangualde.

‘I think you had better, as soon as convenient to you, make the disposition for the day. Let every thing march, excepting what you will leave in Sampayo and Gouvea to observe the enemy. These should fall back as soon as they shall observe them entering the plain in any strength about Villa Cortez, &c., and not engage any thing. The hussars here want bread.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.

‘SIR,

‘Cortiço, 18th Sept., 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 12th and 14th, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘I believe that we may have every confidence in the Governor of Elvas, who is a very honest and an able man, and who does not want for firmness.

‘The enemy’s recent movements on the right of the Mondego have enabled me to call in all the detached corps of this army, and we shall have them collected immediately.

‘I wish that the Marques de la Romana was a little nearer to us. However, I hope he is in no danger.

‘Mr. Kennedy, the Commissary General, will send a gentleman to Badajoz immediately, to endeavor to purchase for the army a supply of cattle.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Hon.*

A. Cochrane Johnstone.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Cortiço, 18th Sept., 1810. 6 A.M.

‘In case you should not have read Waters’s reports, I send them to you. It is evident that the enemy’s arrangements

are all directed to a movement on the right of the Mondego ; but it is still desirable to have an eye upon their proceedings on the left of the river. I think, therefore, that you should leave an intelligent officer, with a party of hussars, in Gouvea, who might keep a few men in Sampayo. This is desirable, as well to keep an eye upon what is passing upon that road, as to communicate with Waters at Folgozinho.

‘ I beg you to write to him, and desire him to forward his reports to the officer of hussars at Gouvea, and desire this officer to send them on to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Tell the officers of hussars to give any reward that Waters may desire to the peasants who shall bring letters from him.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cortiço, 18th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th, and I entirely concur with you, that nothing can be more shameful, or more injurious to the common cause, than the recent conduct of the Portuguese Government. If I should find that it is really believed that we have any concern in the recent arrests, I shall adopt some mode of denying it publicly ; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will take every opportunity of saying that those who have been arrested are not more displeased with the measure than we are all.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Mr. Stuart will tell you the news. Things are not quite so bad as they will be supposed. The enemy’s movements have enabled me to order Hill, Leith, and Le Cor to join me. Coimbra is safe, and we have a good position.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cortiço, 18th Sept., 1810.

‘ I enclose a complaint against the Juiz de Fora of Torres Novas, which I request you to lay before the special commission.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cortiço, 18th Sept., 1810.

‘ The enemy collected the whole of the 2nd and 6th corps in the valley of the Mondego on the 15th, and on the 16th in the morning moved upon Celorico, from the two directions of Guarda and Marçal do Chaõ. They at the same time moved a large column on their right towards the right of the Mondego.

‘ Our cavalry retired from Celorico, and the enemy then moved a column of infantry and cavalry from thence on Fornos towards Mangualde. I understand that they had not yesterday arrived at Mangualde, although it was at first reported that they arrived there on the night of the 16th. They were all day yesterday employed in moving troops from Celorico on Fornos. I have not heard what they have done this day.

‘ It is said that the 8th corps moved by Trancoso on Pena-verde on the 16th, so that the whole are collected on the right of the Mondego:

‘ This movement has enabled me to call in all my detached corps, and I expect that Hill will cross the Zezere this day, or will do so to-morrow. Leith will move when Hill does.

‘ I have begun by securing Coimbra with six brigades of infantry, against any advanced guard that might have been pushed forward.

‘ The other three divisions and the cavalry are on and in front of the Alva, the advance of the latter still observing the enemy near Celorico.

‘ As soon as I shall hear that Hill has moved, I shall cross the Mondego, move up the troops from Coimbra, and have Hill, Leith and Le Cor joined to my right.

‘ I shall be in a good position, covering Coimbra and the

communication with Oporto, which I hope to be able to preserve.

‘ There are certainly many bad roads in Portugal, but the enemy has taken decidedly the worst in the whole kingdom.

‘ You will hear a good deal of these movements, and I conclude that it will be necessary to appease the mob by the imprisonment of a few French partizans; but I think the enemy are mistaken in their plan: they evidently do not know the country, and in the mean time we are safe.

‘ I have received your letters of the 15th; I never was so shocked as upon hearing the account of the arrests. I declare publicly against it; and if I find that justice is not done to us by the Portuguese nation upon this subject, I shall take some opportunity of making known my opinion of it to the public.

‘ I make no objection to the publication of any official papers received by the Government; but I wish to give them reports of the transactions which I am conducting, and if they publish any other reports, I shall not give them any. Of course, both Beresford and you must make regular reports to the authorities by which you are respectively employed; but it is impossible to lay before the public two reports on the same transactions, in which the ingenious public, or rather, the newswriters, will not discover an inconsistency: this I want to avoid.

‘ I have not heard one word from Romana of the plan which Mr. C. Johnstone says he entertains; and I do not believe he entertains it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Pavetti.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Au Quartier Général, ce 18 Sept., 1810.

‘ Je viens de recevoir vos lettres. Les gendarmes sont prisonniers de guerre comme les autres soldats.

‘ Votre domestique Bernard Gomarki ne sera pas censé prisonnier de guerre; ni votre domestique Baptiste Cella s’il est envoyé ici.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ Colonel Pavetti.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Leith.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cortiço, 19th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, and I conclude that you will be this day at Espinhal.

‘ I beg that you will march your division to-morrow morning to Foz d’Arouce, stretching the head of your column on as far as Villa Franca.

‘ Let General Hill know that you have received these orders, and that I expect that he will be at Espinhal to-morrow, and that he shall receive directions to march on the next day. The advanced guard of Regnier’s corps moved yesterday along the left of the Mondego to Sampayo, where they arrived at eleven o’clock. I believe that the rear of the 6th corps crossed the Mondego to Fornos yesterday, and the movements of the advanced guard of the 2nd corps of this day will show definitively what line this corps will take.

‘ Send this letter on to General Hill.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Leith.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Cortiço, 19th Sept., 1810. 8 A.M*.

‘ I have only now received your letter of 5 P.M. yesterday. I shall wait here this day.

‘ Desire Arentschildt to watch well the movements of Regnier’s advanced guard, particularly if they turn off at Pinhanços to the bridge over the Mondego.

‘ Keep up the communication with Waters.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

* *Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, Military Secretary to Marshal Beresford.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cortiço, 19th Sept., 1810. 7 P.M.

‘ Lord Wellington desires me to inform you that he forgot to mention he is very desirous that you should send off to Trant to direct him to proceed as expeditiously as possible to Agueda and Sardaõ, crossing the Vouga, if possible, at St. Pedro do Sul, or any where below it. When at Sardaõ he will be on the left flank of the army, and will cover the road over the Serra leading towards Oporto.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ J. BATHURST.

To Lieut. Colonel Waters.

‘ MY DEAR WATERS, ‘ Cortiço, 20th Sept., 1810.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for all the information you have sent me, and I beg you will come to head quarters with Captain Goldfinch, when you please.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Waters.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Cortiço, 20th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have given you this day’s rest in order that you may distribute the remount horses to the different regiments.

‘ You see that the enemy have all crossed the Mondego, and I propose that you should cross to-morrow, upon which subject Murray writes to you.

‘ You must take care to cross the Mondego below its junction with the Daõ, otherwise you will find it difficult to cross the latter.

‘ Be so kind as to leave on this side of the Mondego an intelligent officer, either Krauchenberg or Cordemann, or Cocks, with about a squadron, to observe the enemy’s movement between the Daõ and the Mondego, and do you take care to keep up a communication with him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General* ‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ Send the enclosed to Waters.’

To Colonel Le Cor.

‘ Au Couvent de Lorvaõ, ce 20 Sept., 1810.

‘ MONSIEUR,

10 heures du soir.

‘ Je viens de recevoir une lettre du Général Hill de la date d’hier, par laquelle j’apprends que vous êtes arrivé hier au soir à Pedrogaõ Grande. Aussitôt que vous recevrez cette lettre je vous prie de marcher sur Ponte da Murcella et par la route enfaisant les marches qui vous conviendront le mieux. Faites moi savoir ce qu’elles seront. Je compte que vous ferez une marche demain le 21, et que vous serez

en arrière de la Serra da Murcella à St. André de Poyares après demain le 22.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Au Colonel Le Cor.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lorvaõ, 20th Sept., 1810.

‘ The 2nd corps, under the command of General Regnier, was again brought to the northward, and arrived at Sabugal and Alfayates on the 12th and 13th instant. On the 15th, the enemy moved a large force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery upon Guarda the third time, and passed the hill into the valley of the Mondego, and obliged our party of observation which had been stationed there under Captain Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons, to retire upon the Serra. On the same day, a large column passed the hill of Alverca (which forms the left of the Guarda range) and Marçal do Chaõ, and halted at Baraçal, likewise in the valley of the Mondego; and the 8th corps, under General Junot, passed the Coa at Porto de Vide.

‘ Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton withdrew the British cavalry through Celorico on the morning of the 16th, and the enemy entered that place on that day from the side of Alverca and Guarda; and the 8th corps entered Trancoso.

‘ The enemy, instead of following the retreat of our troops from Celorico by the valley of the Mondego and the left bank of that river, immediately marched by Jejua to the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard was in Fornos on that night. They followed this movement on the succeeding days by passing all the troops of the 2nd and 6th corps from Celorico over the bridge of Fornos, with the exception of the advanced guard of the 2nd corps, which, on the 18th, protected the passage of the rear of the column and passed yesterday at a bridge lower down the river. A small party entered Viseu yesterday.

‘ The enemy’s intention in these movements is apparently to obtain possession of Coimbra, with a view to the resources which that town and the neighbouring country will afford them. The movements, however, which I had previously made to enable me to withdraw the army without difficulty from a position in which I did not consider it advisable to

risk an action, enabled me to secure Coimbra against the attack of any small corps; and the whole of that part of the army which has been under my immediate command, with the exception of five regiments of cavalry, has passed to the right of the Mondego, and in front of Coimbra, Brigadier General Pack's brigade of Portuguese infantry being at S^{ta}. Combadaõ with the Royal dragoons, and Brigadier General Craufurd's division at Mortagoa. The cavalry will pass to-morrow.

‘ When Regnier made the former movement to the northward, apparently with the intention on the part of the enemy of attacking this part of the army with his whole force, I had directed Lieut. General Hill, and Major General Leith, who commanded a small corps upon the Zezere, to prepare to join me; and as soon as I found from the enemy's movement of the 15th, that he was then about to carry his intention into execution, and that the plan was decided, I directed those officers to march. Major General Leith is this day at Foz d'Arouce, and will join the army to-morrow; the head of Lieut. General Hill's corps is at Espinhal, and will join on the next day. I also expect that Colonel Le Cor, who has been with a small body of troops in the mountains of Castello Branco, will join about the same time. I shall thus have collected in one body the whole of the disposable force in Portugal, and I hope to have it in my power to frustrate the enemy's design.

‘ I imagine that Marshal Massena has been misinformed, and has experienced greater difficulties in making his movements than he expected. He has certainly selected one of the worst roads in Portugal for his march.

‘ Since the affair of the 11th August, in Estremadura, which I heretofore reported to your Lordship, the Marques de la Romana has been successful in carrying off two of the enemy's small detachments, one in the neighbourhood of Cordova, and the other in proceeding as a relief to the enemy's garrison in Castillo de las Guardias; and the Marques's advanced posts were within three leagues of Seville.

‘ Marshal Mortier, however, collected his corps, and moved out of Seville in strength, and the Marques de la Romana was obliged to retire into Estremadura. On the 14th the Spanish cavalry was engaged with that of the enemy near

Fuente de Cantos, the Portuguese brigade, under Brigadier General Madden, being at La Calzadilla. After the engagement had lasted a considerable portion of the day, the Spanish cavalry gave way in some confusion, and Brigadier General Madden having moved forward, fell upon the enemy in a most decided and effectual manner, overthrew and pursued them to their cannon, and killed and wounded many, and took some prisoners and saved the Spaniards. The Marques de la Romana, from whom I have received the account, mentions in high terms the conduct of Brigadier General Madden, and of the Portuguese troops under his command, which he says has excited the admiration of the whole army.

‘The Marques de la Romana has retired upon Merida, and after fixing a good garrison in Badajoz, is about to take a position between the Tagus and the Guadiana.

‘I must take this opportunity of mentioning to your Lordship the obligations I am under to the British cavalry commanded by Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton. Since the end of July, they have alone done the duty of the outposts, and the enemy has never been out of sight of some of them; and on every occasion their superiority has been so great, that the enemy does not use his cavalry excepting when supported and protected by his infantry. The 1st hussars, under Colonel Arentschildt, in particular, have had many opportunities of distinguishing themselves; and it is but justice to mention the zeal and intelligence with which the duty of the outposts has been performed by Captain Krauchenberg and Cornet Cordemann, of the 1st hussars, and by Captain the Hon. C. Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons.

‘Nothing of importance has occurred in the north. My last letter from Cadiz is of the 9th.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘Convent of Busaco, 21st Sept., 1810.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

½ past 9, P.M.

‘By the accounts which Lord Fitzroy Somerset has brought of the enemy from General Craufurd, I judge that the 6th corps, at least, is assembled on the left bank of the

Criz; and I conclude that it did not attempt to pass this day, because the other corps were not ready.

‘ Their first operation must be to drive in the squadron of the Royals which are on the Criz, in order to repair the fords of the bridge; and when this body is driven in, you may be certain that the whole, not only of this corps, but of the others, will advance in a few hours afterwards; you should therefore have all your dispositions made to retire the troops in advance, when the squadron of the Royals should be obliged to quit the Criz.

‘ I have not yet heard the result of the examination of the Ponte de Vagia, above the bridge, near S^{ta}. Combadaõ. You should observe this point, as it is the nearest to Tondella; and not only the bridge exists, but the banks of the river are more practicable than they are lower down.

‘ If you withdraw from Mortagoa, bring the whole of the troops to the villages on the fall of the hill between this place and that. I shall be with you in the morning.

‘ We have an excellent position here, in which I am strongly tempted to give battle. Unfortunately Hill is one day later than I expected; and there is a road upon our left by which we may be turned and cut off from Coimbra. But I do not yet give up hopes of discovering a remedy for this last misfortune; and as for the former, the enemy will afford it to us, if they do not cross the Criz to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ Convent of Busaco, 21 Sept., 1810.
half-past 9 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of this day at 6 P.M. from General Stewart.

‘ I am much concerned that you did not receive the orders to march till 8 in the morning. I gave them at 6 in the evening, as soon as I found that it was desirable you should march.

‘ I was also concerned to learn from General Stewart that, although the march was short, some of the troops,

owing to that circumstance, did not reach their ground till morning.

‘ You received a note from General Craufurd which I opened. Lord Fitzroy Somerset arrived here since, having left the Criz at 3; the 6th corps was certainly collected on the left bank, but we had a piquet of the Royals on the right bank which was not driven in; and while that piquet remains, the enemy cannot repair the bridge or the ford to pass.

‘ I do not think there is any chance of your being attacked; at all events, none at present, of your being attacked without my being on the spot to state the nature of the resistance; and I therefore do not now think it necessary to give any particular instruction upon that subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Busaco, 21st Sept., 1810.

‘ I think it proper to enclose to your Lordship an extract of a letter which I have received from the Marques de la Romana stating his sentiments on the good conduct of the brigade of the Portuguese cavalry under Brigadier General Madden in the action with the enemy’s cavalry on the 14th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Convent of Busaco,

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

22nd * Sept., 1810, half-past 8 P.M.

‘ The enemy have appeared upon the Criz in force, and have crossed that river apparently with the intention of re-

* *Le Maréchal Prince d’Essling, Commandant en Chef de l’Armée de Portugal, à Son Altesse le Prince de Neuschâtel.*

‘ MONSEIGNEUR,

‘ Viseu, le 22 Sept., 1810.

L’armée est partie le 16 d’Almeida, comme j’ai eu l’honneur d’en rendre compte à V. A. Les trois corps d’armée sont arrivés le 19 à Viseu, après avoir parcouru des chemins affreux. L’ennemi s’est retiré partout à notre approche,

pairing the bridge for the passage of their army. We have our advanced guard still at Mortagoa; General Leith's, General Picton's, and General Cole's divisions in the Serra de Busaco; and General Spencer, with his own division and two Portuguese brigades, at Mealhada. The British cavalry is also in front at Mortagoa.

'The enemy have this day made some demonstrations of an intention to recross the Mondego. The French are not in the habit of separating their forces much; and I do not entirely credit this report, but still the movement which they have made must be attended to.

'We have a detachment of cavalry under Lieut. Corde-mann, of the 1st hussars, K.G.L., on the left bank of the Mondego, near Sampayo, who reports that this day several parties of the enemy appeared on that side of the river. These parties certainly belong to Regnier's corps; and I wish you to make the arrangements as follows, to be prepared for any event that may occur.

'First; to send a regiment of cavalry to Moita, about nine miles in front of Ponte da Murcella; and to have small piquets of cavalry on all fords of the Mondego from Foz Daõ to Foz d'Alva.

Secondly; to have strong piquets of Colonel Le Cor's

et il s'est réuni sur Coimbra. J'ai porté le 2me et 6me corps sur le pont du Criz.

'Les Anglais qui occupaient ces points en ont été chassés; le 8me corps est encore à Viseu. Le grand parc d'artillerie et les gros bagages sont encore en arrière, et n'arriveront que demain. Les bagages ont été attaqués par 2000 Portugais, que 200 hommes ont suffi pour repousser avec perte. Il est impossible de trouver de plus mauvais chemins: ils sont hérissés de rochers: notre artillerie et nos bagages ont considérablement souffert, et je suis obligé de les attendre. Je les laisserai deux jours à Viseu, à leur arrivée, pour s'y reposer, et je continuerai ma marche sur Coimbra, où on m'assure que je trouverai les Anglais et Portugais réunis.

'Monseigneur, nous ne marchons qu'à travers du désert; pas une ame nulle part; tout est abandonné. Les Anglais poussent la barbarie jusqu'à faire fusiller le malheureux qui resterait chez lui; femmes, enfans, vieillards, tout fuit. Enfin on ne peut trouver nulle part un guide. Nos soldats trouvent des pommes de terre, et d'autres légumes; ils sont fort contents, et ne respirent qu'après le moment de rencontrer l'ennemi.

'Les marches nous ont fort peu donné de malades.

'Je suis, &c.,

Le Maréchal Prince d'Essling,
Commandant en Chef de l'Armée de Portugal,
'MASSENA.'

infantry at Ponte da Murcella and Ponte de Val d'Espinho on the Alva; and to be prepared to spring the mines in these bridges if the enemy should advance.

‘ Thirdly; to have small piquets on the Serras to communicate between these and your cantonments or camp in the rear.

‘ Fourthly; if the enemy should cross the Mondego in force, you must make the disposition of your force as follows:

‘ Colonel Le Cor’s division at Arganil. The cavalry in the open ground between Arganil and the Alva. General Hamilton’s Portuguese division on the Serra of Saboga, and keeping the communication with Le Cor. The 2nd division of the British infantry on the Serra da Murcella.

‘ The infantry need not go on the Serras till the piquets in front of them shall be attacked, but the communication between the Serra de Saboga and Arganil must be effectually provided for; and Arganil, if the enemy attacks that point with his whole force, must be supported by the whole of yours.

‘ Fifthly; in order to provide for the most probable event, viz., the attack by the enemy’s three corps on this point and the Serra between this and the Mondego, with the exception of the cavalry and the piquets mentioned in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd instances, you will have your whole force in readiness to move by its left, at a short notice, across the Mondego at the Barca de Pena Cova, and thence to this place. Upon this point of preparation orders will be sent to you, as well as for the momentary disposition of your corps; but, if I should have occasion to call you here, I shall send an officer with the order, who will be able to show you the road. I shall go over to see you, if I can venture from this point so long. In the mean time,

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Send any sick you may have to the Barca de Pena Cova, where there will be boats to take them to Coimbra. Let somebody, however, first inquire whether the boats are there.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Convent of Busaco, 22nd Sept, 1810.

‘ I enclose my dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the day before yesterday. There has been no alteration since.

‘ The enemy have not passed the Criz, and are all on this side of the Mondego. I am in a capital position, but I fear it may be turned by its left. Its right is quite secure; and I have always the retreat open on Coimbra.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Massena, Prince d'Essling.

‘ Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

ce 24 Sept., 1810.

‘ J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a adressée le 14 de ce mois.

‘ Ce que vous appelez “des paysans sans uniforme,” “des assassins et des voleurs de grand chemin,” sont l'Ordenanza du pays, qui, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous assurer, sont des corps militaires commandés par des officiers, payés et agissant sous les lois militaires. Il paraît que vous exigez que ceux qui jouiront des droits de la guerre soient revêtus d'un uniforme; mais vous devez vous souvenir que vous-même avez augmenté la gloire de l'armée Française en commandant des soldats qui n'avaient pas d'uniforme.

‘ Vous vous plaignez de la conduite de l'Ordenanza à Nave d'Aver envers M. le Colonel Pavetti. La question est seulement si un pays qui est envahi par un ennemi formidable a le droit de se défendre par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Si ce droit existe, le Portugal est justifié en mettant en activité l'Ordenanza, un corps reconnu et organisé par les anciennes lois du pays. Je peux assurer votre Excellence que l'Ordenanza de Nave d'Aver a bien traité M. le Colonel Pavetti, et il aurait été puni s'il l'avait maltraité. Je voudrais n'avoir pas entendu que malgré que cet officier fût aussi bien traité et par le Capitaine de l'Ordenanza et par moi, la maison du Capitaine de l'Ordenanza à Nave d'Aver avait été brûlée, et que quelques uns de sa compagnie ont été pris et fusillés parcequ'ils avaient fait leur devoir envers leur pays.

‘ Je suis fâché que votre Excellence sente quelques inconvénients personnels de ce que les Portugais quittent leurs foyers à l’approche de l’armée Française. Il est de mon devoir de faire retirer ceux que je n’ai pas les moyens de défendre ; et j’observe que les ordres que j’ai donnés là-dessus n’étaient presque pas nécessaires. Car ceux qui se ressouvenaient de l’invasion de leur pays en 1807, et de l’usurpation du Gouvernement de leur Prince en tems de paix, quand il n’y avait pas un seul Anglais dans le pays, pouvaient à peine croire aux déclarations que vous faites la guerre aux Anglais seuls ; et ils pouvaient à peine trouver la conduite des soldats de l’armée Française, même sous vos ordres, envers leurs propriétés, leurs femmes, et eux-mêmes, conformes aux déclarations de votre Excellence.

‘ Il n’est pas étonnant donc qu’ils quittent leurs foyers volontairement, brûlant et détruisant tout ce qu’ils ne peuvent pas emporter ; et je n’ai nulle excuse à offrir pour l’encouragement que je leur en donne, excepté pour les inconvénients personnels qu’ils peuvent causer à votre Excellence.

‘ Votre Excellence a été mal informée sur l’affaire de la milice ci-devant partie de la garnison d’Almeida. Avant de vous plaindre de l’infraction de la capitulation d’Almeida, votre Excellence aurait dû se ressouvenir qu’elle a été violée aussitôt que signée. Votre Excellence s’est engagée que les officiers et soldats de la milice retourneraient chez eux ; et malgré cet engagement, vous en avez détenu 7 officiers et 200 soldats de chaque régiment, pour en faire un corps de pionniers. La capitulation d’Almeida est donc nulle, et je suis en droit d’en faire ce que je voudrais. Mais je puis vous assurer qu’il n’y a pas un soldat de la milice qui était à Almeida, au service.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Masséna.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Busaco, 24th Sept., 1810.

‘ I was not able to go to you as I intended. I think it would be desirable to place the whole of Fane’s cavalry upon the Serra de Moita, keeping piquets upon the fords of the

Mondego between Foz Daõ and Foz d'Alva. The enemy were yesterday inquiring the road to Galizes, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ Convent of Busaco, 24th Sept., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

8 P.M.

‘ I have a letter from Waters of yesterday from the Serra de Caramula, in which he says that the enemy's plundering parties are in the Serra, but they retire from it in the evening.

‘ I have desired General Leith to get some Portuguese dragoons to be stationed in his front at Gondalem, near the Barca de Cerco, but you had better send a small party there this day. Sir Stapleton will take care of the Serra on your left.

‘ You will make a handsome retreat from your present situation if you are only prepared in time. Indeed, I believe it would now be time to place the different corps of your division and Pack's brigade *en échelon*, on the two sides of the road, from the entrance of the heights to the village where you have your quarters.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Busaco, 24th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 17th and 19th. I concur in the queries which you have made to the Admiral respecting the tonnage in the harbour.

‘ However, unless some terrible accident happen, or unless the French raise the siege of Cadiz, I hope there will be no occasion to embark this winter. The French advanced guard is on this side the Criz, ours at the bottom of this Serra; their whole army between the Criz and Tondella, or Viseu at farthest; ours upon this Serra, or that of Murcella. We are in an excellent position, indeed one which cannot easily be attacked in front; and, if they wait another day or two, they will be unable to turn it on the only vulnerable point. I

shall do every thing in my power to stop the enemy here. If I cannot do it here, I shall still try to stop him at Coimbra. The army is in good spirits, and all going on well. I beg you will transmit the French prisoners taken by the Spaniards to England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Convent of Busaco, 27th Sept., 1810.

‘ We have been engaged with the enemy for the last three days, and I think we shall be attacked again to-morrow; as I understand they must carry our position, on which, however, they have as yet made no impression, or starve. Our loss has been trifling; that of the British troops about 300 men; that of the Portuguese, who have conducted themselves remarkably well in several brisk attacks, rather greater; the loss of the French must have been very large indeed, and we hear from deserters that they are much discouraged. Our position is an excellent one, and it is certainly no easy task to carry it; but I think they will make another trial.

‘ Pray detain the packet till the result of the action is known.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Be so kind as to tell the Admiral that I saw his son this day, after the action, in which General Leith’s corps were engaged, and that he was quite well.’

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ On the top of the Sierra, 28th Sept., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

10 min. before 7 P.M.

‘ I see the columns behind the wood in front of your right, but not standing to their arms. I cannot see any thing to your left of them.

‘ I think that, if you see nothing upon your left, you had better collect at least one regiment of Colonel Harvey’s brigade to support your centre and right.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
the Hon. L. Cole.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

* Written in pencil.

‘ As General Craufurd is threatened as well as you, you had better not draw towards you in the first instance more than two battalions of the Germans. You need not move any of the Germans till you are certain that you are about to be attacked.’

To Major General Leith and to Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Busaco, 28th Sept., 1810. 8 A.M.

‘ Have you had any patrol out to the front of your right, towards Gondalem, or beyond Carvalho Velho ?

‘ Has General Hill any intelligence from the left bank of the Mondego ?

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Busaco, 28th Sept., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

half-past 10 A.M.

‘ Send to Le Cor, and desire him to have at least a battalion and two guns on the northern extremity of the Serra da Murcella, in order to defend the right flank of the post of N^a S^a del Monte.

‘ Let Fane watch well the movements of the enemy’s left, and give me the earliest intelligence of them. Foz d’Alva is a very important point.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ 28th Sept., quarter before 6 P.M.

‘ Observe the enemy upon the right, and, if there is no attack directed upon that side, close the British infantry to the right.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Fornos, 29th Sept., 1810.

‘ It appears that the enemy withdrew last night from their position in front of the Serra ; but we do not yet know which way they have marched, after passing the hills between the Serra and Mortagoa. Our cavalry have not seen them on the road from Mortagoa to Sardaõ ; nor are they seen passing the road which leads to the rear from the Criz. It is possible, therefore, that they may be about to cross the Mondego, and endeavor to force your right.

‘ Give me the earliest intelligence of any movement of this description. Let Fane occupy the Serra de Moita with his cavalry, and show himself upon the Mondego, and well forward in the valley.

‘ If you should find that the enemy cross the Mondego, send Le Cor immediately to Arganil, and depend upon my being with you, with the whole army, in a few hours.

‘ If they try our left instead of our right, I shall give you instructions for movements corresponding with ours.

‘ General Craufurd is still upon the Serra; General Cole and General Spencer near this place; Generals Leith and Picton between this and the Mondego.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above, I have received accounts which induce me to believe that the enemy have moved to our left.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Fornos, 29th Sept., 1810. $\frac{1}{4}$ past 3 P.M.

‘ If the enemy should advance upon you in force, you must retire from Mealhada.

‘ General Cole is with his division at Carqueijo, about a mile and a half in front of this, where I wish you to go if you should retire. Craufurd will be at Botaõ this night.

‘ I propose that you should fall back in the morning, according to your former instructions from the Quarter Master General.

‘ Send off your baggage early.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 30th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, with the proposal to land the regiments which may arrive from England at the mouth of the Mondego. I am much obliged to you for the sugges-

tion, but I wish all ships with troops to proceed to the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Right Hon. Lady Sarah Napier.

‘ MY DEAR MADAM,

‘ Coimbra, 30th Sept., 1810.

‘ I am concerned to be again the channel of conveying to you intelligence of a distressing nature, but you received the last which I communicated to you in a manner so becoming yourself that I have less reluctance in writing to you than I had upon the former occasion, although the cause is more serious.

‘ The army was engaged with the enemy on the 27th, and your sons Charles and George were wounded. I saw the former after he was wounded, and he was well and in good spirits, although he had a severe but not a dangerous wound in the jaw. George is wounded in the hip, but very slightly, and both are doing well.

‘ You will see the account of the action in which the troops were engaged, and I hope it will be some consolation to you to reflect that your sons received their wounds upon an occasion in which the British troops behaved so well.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Lady Sarah Napier.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 30th Sept., 1810.

‘ While the enemy was advancing from Celorico and Trancoso upon Viseu, the different divisions of militia and ordenanza were employed upon their flanks and rear; and Colonel Trant with his division attacked the escort of the military chest and reserve artillery near Tojal, on the 20th instant. He took 2 officers and 80 prisoners, but the enemy collected a force from the front and rear, which obliged him to retire again towards the Douro. I understand that the enemy's communication is completely cut off, and he possesses only the ground upon which his army stands.

‘ My dispatch of the 20th instant will have informed you of the measures which I had adopted and which were in progress to collect the army in this neighbourhood, and, if possible, to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of this town.

‘ On the 21st the enemy’s advanced guard pushed on to S^{ta} Combadaõ, at the junction of the rivers Criz and Daõ; and Brig. General Pack retired across the former and joined Brig. General Craufurd at Mortagoa, having destroyed the bridges over those two rivers.

‘ The enemy’s advanced guard crossed the Criz, having repaired the bridge, on the 23rd, and the whole of the 6th corps was collected on the other side of the river. I therefore withdrew the cavalry through the Serra de Busaco, with the exception of three squadrons, as the ground was unfavorable for the operation of that arm.

‘ On the 25th, the whole of the 6th and of the 2nd corps crossed the Criz in the neighbourhood of S^{ta} Combadaõ; and Brig. General Pack’s brigade and Brig. General Craufurd’s division retired to the position which I had fixed upon for the army on the top of the Serra de Busaco. These troops were followed in this movement by the whole of the corps of Ney and Regnier (the 6th and the 2nd); but it was conducted by Brig. General Craufurd with great regularity, and the troops took their position without sustaining any loss of importance.

‘ The 4th Portuguese caçadores, which had retired on the right of the other troops, and the piquets of the 3rd division of infantry, which were posted at S^t Antonio de Cantaro, under Major Smyth of the 45th regiment, were engaged with the advance of Regnier’s corps in the afternoon, and the former showed that steadiness and gallantry which others of the Portuguese troops have since manifested.

‘ The Serra de Busaco is a high ridge which extends from the Mondego in a northerly direction about eight miles. At the highest point of the ridge, about two miles from its termination, is the convent and garden of Busaco. The Serra de Busaco is connected by a mountainous tract of country with the Serra de Caramula, which extends in a north easterly direction beyond Viseu, and separates the valley of the Mondego from the valley of the Douro. On the left of the Mon-

dego, nearly in a line with the Serra de Busaco, is another ridge of the same description, called the Serra da Murcella, covered by the river Alva, and connected by other mountainous parts with the Serra d'Estrella.

‘ All the roads to Coimbra from the eastward lead over the one or the other of these Serras. They are very difficult for the passage of an army, the approach to the top of the ridge on both sides being mountainous.

‘ As the enemy's whole army was on the right of the Mondego, and it was evident that he intended to force our position, Lieut. General Hill crossed that river by a short movement to his left, on the morning of the 26th, leaving Colonel Le Cor with his brigade on the Serra da Murcella, to cover the right of the army, and Brig. General Fane, with his division of Portuguese cavalry and the 13th light dragoons, in front of the Alva, to observe and check the movements of the enemy's cavalry on the Mondego.

‘ With this exception, the whole army was collected upon the Serra de Busaco, with the British cavalry observing the plain in the rear of its left, and the road leading from Mortagoa to Oporto, through the mountainous tract which connects the Serra de Busaco with the Serra de Caramula.

‘ The 8th corps joined the enemy in our front on the 26th, but he did not make any serious attack on that day. The light troops on both sides were engaged throughout the line.

‘ At six in the morning of the 27th the enemy made two desperate attacks upon our position, the one on the right, the other on the left of the highest part of the Serra. The attack upon the right was made by two divisions of the 2nd corps, on that part of the Serra occupied by the 3rd division of infantry. One division of French infantry arrived at the top of the ridge, where it was attacked in the most gallant manner by the 88th regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Wallace, the 45th, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Meade, and by the 8th Portuguese regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Douglas, directed by Major General Picton. These three corps advanced with the bayonet, and drove the enemy's division from the advantageous ground which they had obtained. The other division of the 2nd corps attacked farther on the right, by the road leading by St Antonio de Cantaro, also in front of

Major General Picton's division. These were repulsed, before they could reach the top of the ridge, by the 74th, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Trench, and the brigade of Portuguese infantry of the 9th and 21st regiments, under the command of Colonel Champelmond, directed by Colonel Mackinnon. Major General Leith also moved to his left to the support of Major General Picton, and aided in the defeat of the enemy by the 3rd battalion of Royals, the 1st battalion of the 9th, and the 2nd battalion of the 38th regiments. In these attacks Major Generals Leith and Picton, Colonels Mackinnon and Champelmond, of the Portuguese service, who was wounded, Lieut. Colonel Wallace, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Meade, Lieut. Colonel Sutton, of the 9th Portuguese, Major Smyth of the 45th, who was afterwards killed, Lieut. Colonel Douglas, and Major Birmingham, of the 8th Portuguese regiment, distinguished themselves.

‘ Major General Picton reports the good conduct of the 9th and 21st Portuguese regiments, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Sutton and Lieut. Colonel A. Bacellar, and of the Portuguese artillery, under the command of Major Arentschildt. I have also to mention, in a particular manner, the conduct of Captain Dansey of the 88th.

‘ Major General Leith reports the good conduct of the Royals, 1st battalion, and 9th, and 2nd battalion of the 38th regiments; and I beg to assure your Lordship that I have never witnessed a more gallant attack than that made by the 88th, 45th, and 8th Portuguese regiments, on the enemy's division which had reached the ridge of the Serra.

‘ On the left the enemy attacked with three divisions of infantry of the 6th corps, on the part of the Serra occupied by the light division of infantry commanded by Brig. General Craufurd, and by the brigade of Portuguese infantry commanded by Brig. General Pack.

‘ One division of infantry only made any progress to the top of the hill, and they were immediately charged with the bayonet by Brig. General Craufurd, with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th, and the 3rd Portuguese caçadores, and driven down with immense loss.

‘ Brig. General Coleman's brigade of Portuguese infantry, which was in reserve, was moved up to the right of Brig.

General Craufurd's division, and a battalion of the 19th Portuguese regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel MacBean, made a gallant and successful charge upon a body of another division of the enemy, which was endeavoring to penetrate in that quarter.

‘ In this attack, Brig. General Craufurd, Lieut. Colonels Beckwith, of the 95th, and Barclay, of the 52nd, and the Commanding Officers of the regiments, distinguished themselves.

‘ Besides these attacks, the light troops of the two armies were engaged throughout the 27th; and the 4th Portuguese caçadores, and the 1st and 16th regiments, directed by Brig. General Pack, and commanded by Lieut. Colonel Hill, Lieut. Colonel Luis de Regoa, and Major Armstrong, showed great steadiness and gallantry.

‘ The loss sustained by the enemy in his attack of the 27th has been enormous. I understand that the Generals of division, Merle, Loison, and Maucune are wounded, and General Simon was taken prisoner by the 52nd regiment; and 3 Colonels, — officers, and 250 men.

‘ The enemy left 2000 killed upon the field of battle, and I understand from the prisoners and deserters that the loss in wounded is immense.

‘ The enemy did not renew his attack, excepting by the fire of his light troops on the 28th; but he moved a large body of infantry and cavalry from the left of his centre to the rear, from whence I saw his cavalry in march on the road from Mortagoa over the mountains towards Oporto.

‘ Having thought it probable that he would endeavor to turn our left by that road, I had directed Colonel Trant, with his division of militia, to march to Sardaõ, with the intention that he should occupy the mountains, but unfortunately he was sent round by Oporto, by the General Officer commanding in the north, in consequence of a small detachment of the enemy being in possession of S. Pedro do Sul; and, notwithstanding the efforts which he made to arrive in time, he did not reach Sardaõ till the 28th at night, after the enemy were in possession of the ground.

‘ As it was probable that, in the course of the night of the 28th, the enemy would throw the whole of his army upon the road, by which he could avoid the Serra de Busaco and

reach Coimbra by the high road of Oporto, and thus the army would have been exposed to be cut off from that town or to a general action in less favorable ground, and as I had reinforcements in my rear, I was induced to withdraw from the Serra de Busaco.

‘ The enemy did break up in the mountains at eleven at night of the 28th, and he made the march I expected. His advanced guard was at Avelans, on the road from Oporto to Coimbra, yesterday, and the whole army was seen in march through the mountains. That under my command, however, was already in the low country, between the Serra de Busaco and the sea; and the whole of it, with the exception of the advanced guard, is this day on the left of the Mondego.

‘ Although, from the unfortunate circumstance of the delay of Colonel Trant’s arrival at Sardaõ, I am apprehensive that I shall not succeed in effecting the object which I had in view in passing the Mondego and in occupying the Serra de Busaco, I do not repent my having done so. This movement has afforded me a favorable opportunity of showing the enemy the description of troops of which this army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has not been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving.

‘ Throughout the contest on the Serra, and in all the previous marches, and those which we have since made, the whole army have conducted themselves in the most regular manner. Accordingly all the operations have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest spirits.

‘ I have received throughout the service the greatest assistance from the General and Staff Officers. Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer has given the assistance his experience enables him to afford me; and I am particularly indebted to the Adjutant and the Quarter Master Generals, and the officers of their departments and to Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, and the officers of my personal staff; to Major General Howorth and the Artillery, and particularly to

Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, Captain Chapman, and the officers of the Royal Engineers. I must likewise mention Mr. Kennedy, and the officers of the Commissariat, which department has been carried on most successfully.

‘I should not do justice to the service, or to my own feelings, if I did not take this opportunity of drawing your Lordship’s attention to the merits of Marshal Beresford. To him exclusively, under the Portuguese Government, is due the merit of having raised, formed, disciplined, and equipped the Portuguese army, which has now shown itself capable of engaging and defeating the enemy.

‘I have besides received from him all the assistance which his experience and abilities, and his knowledge of this country, have qualified him to afford me.

‘The enemy have made no movement in Estremadura, or in the northern provinces, since I addressed your Lordship last.

‘My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th instant.

‘I enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the allied armies in the course of the 25th, 26th, and 27th.

‘I send this dispatch by my aide de camp, Captain Burgh*, to whom I beg to refer your Lordship for any further details, and I recommend him to your Lordship’s notice.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘WELLINGTON.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., on the 25th and 26th of September, and in the action with the French Army, commanded by Marshal Masséna, at Busaco, on the 27th of September, 1810.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	11	6	180	5	197
Wounded .	62	32	920	12	1014
Missing . . .	1	3	54	10	58

The Portuguese loss is included in the above numbers.

* Lord Downes, K.C.B.

To the Marques de la Romana.

à Coimbra,

‘ MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

ce 30 Sept., 1810.

‘ Alava ou O’Lalor vous aura appris ce qui s’est passé de ce côté ci ces derniers jours ; et je vous enverrai demain la copie de ma lettre au Gouvernement. L’ennemi a fait une perte immense. Les troupes se sont bien conduites, et notre perte n’est pas grande ; je n’ai aucun doute sur les résultats de cette campagne.

‘ J’ai envoyé au Commissaire Anglais à Estremoz pour pourvoir à la subsistance de votre corps quand vous entrerez en Portugal. Il est pourvu d’argent pour vous donner 80,000 piastres, et de 8000 paires de souliers.

‘ Je vous envoie une lettre à son adresse, que je vous prie de lui envoyer quand vous entrerez en Portugal pour vous mettre en co-opération avec nous. Je vous prie de faire les arrangemens qui suivent pour régler cette affaire.

‘ 1. Toute subsistance qui sera prise par les troupes Espagnoles en Portugal passera par les mains du Commissaire Anglais.

‘ 2. Les Commissaires de guerre Espagnols, attachés aux troupes Espagnoles, donneront des réquisitions et reçus au Commissaire Anglais pour tout ce qu’ils recevront pour les troupes.

‘ 3. La ration pour les troupes Espagnoles sera la même comme celle des troupes Anglaises, viz., une livre et demie de pain, ou une livre de biscuit et une livre de viande par jour. Pour les chevaux 10 livres d’avoine et 10 livres de foin ou de paille.

‘ 4. Le Gouvernement payera, à l’arrangement final des deux nations, pour chaque ration pour homme ou cheval le même prix que paye le gouvernement Portugais, selon l’arrangement fait par moi en Juin, 1809, quand les troupes Portugaises recevaient des provisions du Commissaire Anglais.

‘ Je vous prie d’établir la bonne discipline dans votre armée, sans laquelle, soyez sûr que nos troupes manqueront de subsistance dans ce pays ci, malgré tous nos arrangemens. Menez avec vous seulement les Officiers Généraux et de l’Etat Major qui vous seront nécessaires. Je serai préparé à vous donner des transports pour 10,000 hommes,

en cas que, malgré mon attente, nous soyons obligés de nous embarquer.

‘ Les trois corps qui sont ici sont toujours diablement forts, malgré leurs pertes ; mais je ne suis pas trop sûr qu’ils ne s’avancent pas tout de suite. S’ils le font, je vous appellerai à mon secours, et je vous prie d’être préparé à marcher. Je vous prie de venir par Elvas, 3 lieues ; Estremoz, 6 lieues ; Arrayolos, 6 lieues ; Monte Mor ó Novo, 3 lieues ; Vendas Novas, $3\frac{1}{2}$ lieues ; Pegoes, $3\frac{1}{2}$ lieues ; Aldea Galega, 5 lieues, où vous trouverez des barques pour vous embarquer, pour vous joindre à la droite de nos positions. On sera préparé à vous donner des provisions pour 10,000 hommes, et 160 chevaux sur cette route.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Au Marquis de la Romana.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Le Maréchal Beresford a écrit au Général Leite pour l’empêcher de demander les deux escadrons de cavalerie.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 30th Sept., 1810.

‘ You will receive herewith a copy of my dispatch containing an account of our operations to this day, and you may now allow the packet to sail when you like.

‘ I am quite certain the French will not get Portugal this winter, unless they receive a very large reinforcement indeed. It is probable that they will not succeed, even in that case. But if they should, and it should be necessary to embark the Portuguese troops, I must protest against their embarking in boats, or in any vessels excepting those of the same description as those in which the British army are to be embarked.

‘ The Government shall have transports to send to the Cape de Verd Islands for horses ; but let us wait a little to see the result of what is now going on.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Sir D. Dundas, K.B., Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR, Coimbra, 30th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have the satisfaction of enclosing a copy of my dispatch of this date to the Earl of Liverpool, containing an account of the good conduct of the troops under my command, and most particularly of their gallantry in the action of the 27th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.* WELLINGTON.

the Com. in Chief.

To Captain Daniel, H.M. Ship Jasper, commanding off Figueira.

‘ SIR, Coimbra, 30th Sept., 1810.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th, and I shall be obliged to you to order all ships having on board troops and stores to proceed to the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Daniel,* WELLINGTON.

H.M.S. Jasper.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

Pombal, 2nd October, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, Half-past 10 A.M.

‘ I received your note as I was leaving Redinha, and I am sorry to learn that you sustained a loss yesterday. I saw Krauchenberg on the road, and he was tolerably well.

‘ Murray has conveyed to you your instructions for this day, and I have nothing to add to them. Craufurd is by this time at Redinha, where he will halt for some time; and you might as well communicate with him. He will be here this afternoon.

‘ I move my head quarters to Leyria this evening; but I shall stay here for two or three hours, to see how things go on in front.

‘ Mellish left Coimbra yesterday evening. He did not see any guns. One of Junot’s divisions of infantry had passed at Coimbra, and was on the road between Coimbra and Condeixa; one brigade about half way, the other near Coimbra. Some cavalry had passed by the ford. From all

this it would appear that the enemy are not in a situation to annoy us much this day.

‘Junot’s corps being the right of the army, there can be nothing, excepting some of his cavalry, on our left.

‘There are 10,000 lbs. of Indian corn and barley here, in twenty cars, belonging to the Portuguese army. If you want it, send the enclosed order to this place to a serjeant of the 15th Portuguese regiment, who is in charge of the corn, and it will be delivered to you. If you should not want it, send an order to the serjeant to march on.

‘There are likewise here 6000 rations of straw, if you should want any.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘Since writing the above, I have heard that there are here 5000 rations of Indian corn for the cavalry, so that you will not want that which the Portuguese serjeant has; and I have ordered it to Thomar.’

To the Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.

‘SIR,

‘Leyria, 3rd October, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 26th September, for all of which I am much obliged to you.

‘It is very desirable that some arrangement should be adopted to give the Spanish nation an army. They have certainly nothing in the shape of one at present; and they must have the aid of Great Britain, both in officers and equipments, in order to be enabled to form one.

‘It is not in my power, however, to give the aid of the former from this army, as I have supplied the Portuguese army with officers almost exclusively from the regiments in this country; and there remains with each barely a sufficient number to do the duty, and certainly not enough to provide for the casualties of the service.

‘It would not answer to hold out hopes of a description of assistance which it is not in my power to give; and therefore I shall be obliged to you if you will acquaint the Marques de la Romana with my ideas upon this part of the subject.

‘Money to pay and provide for the troops is equally

necessary with arms, and equipments, and discipline. It is impossible to expect that any people will submit to military discipline, or will do what is required of them as soldiers, if they are neither fed, nor clothed, nor paid; or that food, raiment, and pay for the troops can be provided for without the advance of money by the State. The mode of procuring this money is, however, purely a Spanish question, with which I can have nothing to do, although I think it probable that the Spanish Government would be happy to avail themselves of some mode of the description suggested by you.

‘Adverting to the situation of Spain relatively to the Colonies, it might be doubted whether individuals would be found to advance their money in England, on the credit of the bills to be drawn by the Regency on the Government of Mexico, even at the advantageous rate proposed; but this is a question for the consideration of the Spanish Government on one side, and the individuals on the other, with which I can have no business.

‘The arrangement of this concern, however, in the manner proposed, would affect the situation of the British army. We draw a very large proportion of our supplies of specie from Cadiz, where it is procured by bills upon the Treasury, regulated by Mr. Duff. There must of course be a limit to the sums to be procured in this manner at Cadiz; and it is obvious that if the Spanish Government are to have £600,000 out of the money to be procured at Cadiz for bills of exchange upon England, that sum of money will be *minus* in the military chest of this army.

‘I am so convinced of the truth of this proposition, and have stated it so frequently to the King’s Government, and to the King’s Minister at Cadiz, that I could not with propriety now recommend the adoption of any measure to procure funds for the payment of the Spanish armies, which should interfere with those funds allotted for the British army, without which the contest could not continue long.

‘I recommend to you, however, to bring the whole subject under the consideration of Mr. Wellesley at Cadiz, who will certainly give it every attention in his power, and be happy to attend to your suggestions.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Hon. A. C. Johnstone.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Leyria, 3rd October, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 29th September; and although I could not save Coimbra, I have very little doubt of being able to hold this country against the force which has now attacked it.

‘ There will be a breeze near Lisbon, but I hope we shall have the best of it.

‘ In respect to money from Cadiz, the Government have sent out Mr. Drummond for the special purpose of inquiring what could be done to increase our funds, and I cannot interfere with him. I am induced to believe that Duff got as much money as can be procured, and I should be anxious not to take the business out of his hands. But, as I said before, it is Mr. Drummond’s business to inquire; and if the result of his inquiry should be that the funds can be increased by any new mode of proceeding, I shall not be found wedded to that upon which we have acted hitherto.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Leyria, 3rd October, 1810.

‘ I transmit by Colonel O’Lalor the copy of a dispatch to the Secretary of State, containing an account of the recent operations of the army under my command, which I request you to lay before the Regency of Spain.

‘ Colonel O’Lalor has been employed by the Spanish Government with this army since the month of June, 1809, and recently in the same commission with Colonel Alava. I have had every reason to be satisfied with both these officers. They were both with me during the late operations of the army; and as they are perfectly acquainted with all that passed, Colonel O’Lalor will be able to give the Regency any further details they may be desirous of having, for which reason I send this dispatch by him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Leyria, 3rd October, 1810.

‘ I have but little to add to the intelligence contained in the dispatch which Colonel O’Lalor will give you with this. I withdrew our advanced guard to this side of the Mondego on Sunday, and the enemy took possession of Coimbra.

‘ They have since crossed the Mondego, but not in great strength. The allied army is behind this town, and the advanced guard in Pombal.

‘ We shall make our retreat to the positions in front of Lisbon without much difficulty, or any loss. My opinion is, that the French are in a scrape. They are not a sufficient army for their purpose, particularly since their late loss, and that the Portuguese army have behaved so well; and they will find their retreat from this country a most difficult and dangerous operation.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd September. You have already my opinion upon making La Carlotta Regent of Spain. You and I entirely agree upon that subject. The Spanish politicians have only one object in the measure, and that is, to get hold of the resources of this country, as they are afraid of forcing the people of Spain themselves to submit to the privations and inconveniences to which they must submit, if ever they mean to form an army.

‘ I rather believe that, under the ancient laws, La Carlotta cannot be the Regent herself. How is this?

‘ I do not believe that much benefit would be derived to the common cause from the association of La Romana with the existing Regency.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Leyria, 4th October, 1810.

‘ There is a report that there are some stragglers, Portuguese as well as English, in the villages on the right and left of the road near where you are cantoned, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send out patrols, and take up all men of this description, and send them in here as prisoners.

‘Murray will have sent you your instructions. Keep yourself right in front to observe the enemy, and do not engage in any affair with a superior force.’

‘After this day’s halt, the sooner the enemy advance, the better: I have little doubt of the result.’

‘Believe me, &c.’

‘Lieut. General

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Marshal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen.

‘Au Quartier Général, ce 4 Octobre, 1810.’

‘MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘Je vous envoie l'extrait d'une lettre* que je viens de recevoir de l'Angleterre; et j'ai grand plaisir de pouvoir vous communiquer un événement qui pourra vous être agréable.’

‘J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.’

‘M. le Maréchal Ney,

Duc d'Elchingen.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Leyria, 4th October, 1810.’

‘The Commissary General has just given me the enclosed order issued by you, which cannot be carried into execution without incurring the risk of starving the divisions of the army which precede you on the march. I would also observe to you that if the officer commanding one division gives orders of this description in respect to one part of the road, the officer commanding another may give one of a similar description respecting another, and in this contest what becomes of the responsibility of the Commissary General.’

‘Believe me, &c.’

‘Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

‘P.S. There is no occasion to countermand the order; but I think you had better desire the Commissaries not to carry it into execution.’

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Leyria, 4th October, 1810.’

‘I have received your letters of the 31st of August, 11th

* Respecting his nephew.

and 19th of September, for all of which I am much obliged to you.

‘ Let us drop the subject of army promotion altogether, for I assure you I feel no interest in it, excepting with a view to the public good, in which I may be mistaken; and I should be sorry that you believed that I disapprove of any thing you have done in your office. My opinions went against the system, not against the mode of carrying it on.

‘ I am quite indifferent where my regiment is, as far as I am concerned. I rather think it is better for the officers that the regiment should be in England.

‘ I am much obliged to you for relieving me from Major General ——— and Colonel ———. I have no public objection to make to the former, but he has been guilty of many little improprieties which render him a discreditable person with the army; and before I had received your letter of the 19th, with the official letter announcing his recall, Major General ———, who commands the division in which his brigade is posted, had urged his removal so strenuously, that I had determined to send him word that he had my leave to quit the army, and go to Lisbon.

‘ Sir David Dundas will be the best judge whether this communication will be sufficient authority to hold the language which he proposes to hold to him. In these times I should prefer avoiding to employ him and give no reason; and I should have acted accordingly, if I had sent him leave of absence, as I intended before I received your letter.

‘ I have seen ———, and I think he will do very well; and I dare say so will ———.

‘ The French have not yet any force this side of Coimbra. We make our retreat with great ease. This day we all halt; and I have every thing now so clear, that I shall go no farther till I see their movements. The old troops behave very well. The young ones are not quite so well acquainted with me, and they have had a few stragglers; but I shall soon have them all in good order.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Alcobaça, 5th October, 1810.

‘ I beg that, as soon as convenient after the receipt of this letter, the 2nd batt. 58th regiment may be moved by the usual marches to Torres Vedras. Also, that all the officers and soldiers of the army who are fit to do their duty, and are now at Lisbon or Belem, may be sent to Cabeça de Montachique, where they are to wait until they shall receive further orders to join their respective regiments.

‘ Send me a return of the names of the officers and number of men of each regiment who will join, and you will take care that each is provided with the usual camp equipments and with 60 rounds of ammunition.

‘ You will also send to Cabeça de Montachique any regiments which may have landed; and all the officers and soldiers of the Royal Artillery in Lisbon, Belem, or St. Julian, with the exception of those belonging to Captain Lefevre’s troop.

‘ Send me a return of the names of the officers and number of men of these latter who will be at Cabeça de Montachique.

‘ Desire the Commissary at Lisbon to adopt measures to supply with provisions the troops who will be at Cabeça de Montachique.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ à Leyria, ce 5 Octobre, 1810. 6 heures du matin.

‘ MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

‘ L’ennemi a passé le Mondégo en force hier; les avant postes étaient à Pombal, et je vous prie de vous mettre en marche par la route que je vous ai envoyée dans ma dernière lettre aussitôt que vous pourrez. C’est à dire par Elvas, Estremoz, Monte Mor ó Velho, et Aldea Galega.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Au Marques de la Romana.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Vous feriez bien de laisser votre cavalerie, au moins la cavalerie Portugaise, sur la frontière pour masquer votre mouvement; et en tout cas, envoyez les deux escadrons qui

appartiennent à la garnison d'Elvas à Elvas, si vous faites passer cette ville par la cavalerie Portugaise.'

To the Earl of Liverpool.

'MY LORD, 'Alcobaça, 5th October, 1810.

'The enemy having moved forward his advanced guard in strength in front of Coimbra, on the evening of the 30th September, and in the morning of the 1st instant, I thought proper to withdraw the advanced guard of the British army to this side of the Mondego on the 1st, and to continue the retreat of the main body of the army.

'In retiring the British cavalry from Fornos, Captain Krauchenberg, of the hussars, and Captain Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons, charged the enemy. Captain Krauchenberg was wounded, but, I am happy to say, not severely.

'I continued the retreat of this part of the army by the roads of Soure and Pombal to Leyria, near which town the whole arrived on the 3rd, and halted yesterday, the advanced post being in Pombal.

'Lieut. General Hill's corps retired by the road of Espinhal upon Thomar, where it arrived yesterday.

'The enemy's advanced guard arrived yesterday at Redinha, and he drove in our piquets at Pombal in the evening; and I had intelligence that the 8th corps d'armée was at Condeixa, and the other troops on this side of the Mondego. I have, therefore, this day continued the retreat, and the advanced guard will be in the rear of Leyria.

'With few exceptions, the troops have continued to conduct themselves with great regularity, and they have suffered no fatigue.

'The army is now at no great distance from the position in which I proposed that it should receive the enemy, and it is in high spirits.

'From all accounts which I have received, the enemy suffer great distress. The inhabitants of the country have fled from their houses universally, carrying with them every thing they could take away which could be deemed useful to the enemy; and the habits of plunder which have so long been encouraged in the enemy's army prevent them from deriving any general advantage from the little resource

which the inhabitants may have been obliged to leave behind them.

‘ Nothing of importance has occurred in the northern or in the southern provinces of Spain since I addressed you last. My last letters from Cadiz were dated the 22nd September.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I have learnt that General Grandorge and General Foy, both belonging to the 2nd corps, were wounded in the action of the 27th ultimo, as well as those officers mentioned in my last dispatch, and that General Grandorge has since died of his wounds.’

To Captain ———, Royal Engineers. (Circular.)

‘ SIR,

‘ Rio Mayor, 6th October, 1810.

‘ I enclose a memorandum, by which you will see the manner in which I have divided into districts the country which has been fortified between the Tagus and the sea; the objects for which this division has been made; and that you are appointed regulating officer of the district No. —.

‘ I likewise enclose a list of the redoubts and works in that district; stating the number with which each is marked; the number of guns it contains, and the number of infantry deemed necessary for the defence of each.

‘ The business of your situation, as regulating officer of district No. —, is to arrange the troops in their several stations, when they shall be sent into the district to occupy the redoubts; to take charge of the mines intended to blow up the roads and bridges; and to carry my orders in the district into execution, till an officer to command the troops within it shall be appointed; you are then to assist him in making his arrangements as one of his staff, and in the defence of his post, with your professional abilities.

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Capt. ———, Royal Engineers.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Memorandum for Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, commanding Royal Engineers, and the Commissary General.

‘ Rio Mayor, 6th October, 1810.

‘ With a view to the occupation of the works in the line

in the front of Lisbon, they must be divided into certain districts, and an officer must be appointed to command or regulate the troops in each.

The troops, viz., the militia, the British and Portuguese artillery, and the ordenanza artillery, must be assembled in the district; and the officer commanding, or the regulating officer, must make the arrangement and distribution of them, to be carried into execution when it shall be necessary by the advance of the enemy.

The districts are to be as follows:—

No. 1. From Torres Vedras to the sea. Head quarters, Torres Vedras.

No. 2. From Sobral de Monte agraco to the valley of Calhandriz. Head quarters, Sobral de Monte agraco.

No. 3. From Alhandra to the valley of Calhandriz. Head quarters, Alhandra.

No. 4. From the banks of the Tagus near Alverca to the pass of Bucellas inclusive. Head quarters, Bucellas.

No. 5. From the pass of Freixal inclusive to the right of the pass of Mafra. Head quarters, Montachique.

No. 6.— From the pass of Mafra to the sea. Head quarters, Mafra.

The Commissary General of the British army must supply all the troops in these positions, under the arrangement of June, 1809, and there must be a Commissary in each district.

No. 1. Tents for 2,500 men

No. 2. 2,000

No. 3. 5,000

No. 4. 5,000

No. 5. 10,000

No. 6. 10,000

No. 1. District troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith:

2470 Militia infantry.

250 Ordenanza artillery.

140 Regular Portuguese artillery.

70 British artillery.

No. 2. District troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith:

1300 Militia infantry.

300 Ordenanza artillery.

140 Regular Portuguese artillery.

40 British artillery.

No. 3. District troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith :

400 Militia infantry.
60 Ordenanza artillery.
60 British artillery.

No. 4. District troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith :

1100 Militia infantry.
500 Ordenanza artillery.
80 Regular Portuguese artillery.

No. 5. District troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith :

2400 Militia infantry.
480 Ordenanza artillery.
120 Regular Portuguese artillery.
50 British artillery.

No. 6. District troops to be assembled at the head quarters immediately :

700 Militia infantry.
350 Ordenanza artillery.
230 Regular Portuguese artillery.
40 British artillery.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Rio Mayor, 6th October, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 11 P.M.

‘ I have just arrived here. The enemy entered Leyria yesterday evening with cavalry and infantry; and our advanced guard was about a league and a half on this side of that town. They withdrew this day to Candieiros, about two leagues from hence, and I have not yet heard that they had been at all pressed by the enemy.

‘ If the enemy should get on as far as Candieiros this day, they will be at Alcoentre to-morrow. At all events, the advanced guard will be here to-morrow. Your movements, therefore, become a subject of some anxiety to me.

‘ I understand that half, possibly the whole, of your infantry will be at Santarem this day. Every thing that arrives at Santarem this day should march in the morning to Azambuja. Any part of your corps which makes a short march into Santarem to-morrow morning must move on to Cartaxo, and the whole must move early the next morning upon Villa Franca.

‘ If Fane’s cavalry should be able to get through Santarem to-morrow, it may follow your march as above stated;

but it must positively be able to reach Castanheira early on the 8th.

‘ If there are any boats at Santarem you should embark your sick and other incumbrances, and send them down to Lisbon. If there are no boats, send them across the Tagus by the ford, and down the left bank of the river to Salvaterra.

‘ In like manner any of your infantry or cavalry which cannot quit Santarem to-morrow, so as to arrive at Castanheira early on the 8th, ought likewise to cross the Tagus by the ford at Santarem, and proceed to Salvaterra, to which place orders will be sent them to go where boats shall be sent to ferry them over the river.

‘ I shall write to you again this evening, as soon as I know how far the enemy have pushed their advanced guard. In the mean time make all your arrangements for to-morrow as herein suggested.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Rio Mayor, 6th October, 1810. $\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 P.M.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning, and since the accounts were sent to you that the enemy had passed a column towards Porto de Moz, I have heard from Sir Stapleton Cotton that they have shown some troops in front of his advanced posts at Carvalhos, which, however, had not advanced. They had not followed Sir Stapleton’s march this day; and at sunset this evening all appeared quiet, and no movement could be seen at the top of the Serra de Junto, near this, on either side of the mountain. I think therefore that your rear may be able to make its march to Castanheira, even though it should not move from Santarem till the day after to-morrow.

‘ I shall, however, know more of the enemy’s movements this night or to-morrow; and I shall write to you again to Santarem if I should think it probable that my letter will reach that place before you will leave it, or to Azambuja.

‘ My head quarters will be to-morrow at Alemquer. The cavalry will stay here as long as it can, and General R. Craufurd will be at Alcoentre.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Sontag.

SIR,

Rio Mayor, 6th October, 1810.

Lieut. Colonel Bathurst will have apprized you of my wish to employ you, and will have conveyed to you my request that you should proceed to Torres Vedras, where you will receive further orders from me.

The object for which I have requested you to go there is to take the command of the troops destined for the defence of the redoubts constructed at and in the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras, and extending from thence along the river to the sea. The redoubts and works at Torres Vedras are numbered from No. 20 to 27 inclusive, and have 48 pieces of cannon, and require 3800 men for their defence. The redoubts on the left of Torres Vedras are No. 30, at Ponte de Rol; 31, Alcatena; 32, S. Pedro de Codiera; 111, 112, and 113, between 32 and the sea. These require 1500 men, and have 33 pieces of cannon.

I enclose a note of the number of men deemed, by the chief Engineer, necessary for the defence of each redoubt, and of the number of guns in each, and a memorandum from the chief Engineer of the object in view in constructing these works.

My intention is to occupy these works partly with British infantry, partly with Portuguese infantry of the line, and partly with Portuguese militia.

I have ordered to Torres Vedras immediately the 58th regiment, consisting of 300 rank and file, and two regiments of militia, consisting of 1700 men. To these I shall add another British regiment, a Portuguese regiment of the line, and another regiment of militia, if I should find that the enemy manifests any intention of moving in that direction.

I have also ordered to Torres Vedras 60 British artillery; 140 Portuguese artillery of the line, and 250 artillery of the ordenanza: so that the garrisons for the redoubts will be complete in artillery, and will be wanting only in their complement of infantry.

I enclose a memorandum, by which you will see the mode in which I have divided the district of country between the Tagus and the sea; and that I have appointed a regulating officer for each district. These regulating officers are the Engineers who constructed the works; and, in the

case of an appointment of a General Officer to command in any district, would only assist him as part of his staff. Captain Mulcaster and Lieut. Thompson are appointed to the station at Torres Vedras. I have also sent Lieut. Dundas to Torres Vedras to act as Brigade Major under your orders.

‘There are provisions at Torres Vedras for the troops destined to defend that post. There is musket ammunition, and 60 rounds for each gun in the redoubts. There are likewise tents there for 2500 men.

‘I recommend that you should immediately distribute the artillerymen in the several redoubts according to the number required for each gun; that you should likewise station a proportionate number of the infantry intended for the defence of each redoubt in it immediately, so that the officers and men may become accustomed to their station.

‘The 58th had better be kept, five companies at Torres Vedras, the other five companies in the six redoubts between Torres Vedras and the sea.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Sontag.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Rio Mayor, 6th October, 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 5th, and I shall take care that the Commissary General shall not exchange any paper during the existing crisis. I do not know what people feel at Lisbon, but we at the army entertain but little doubt of success.

‘The Bishop and Souza would do more harm than good in the north, where we are carrying on operations of great importance; but I hope the letter which I enclose will bring these gentry to their senses, or I shall certainly carry into execution the threat which it contains.

‘I believe you and the Government do not know where the lines are. Those round Lisbon are not those in which I shall place the army, but those extending from Torres Vedras to the Tagus.

‘All I ask from the Government is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops; and as

God Almighty does not give "the race to the swift or the battle to the strong," and I have fought battles enough to know, that even under the best arrangements, the result of any one is not certain, I only beg that they will adopt preparatory arrangements to take out of the enemy's way those persons who would suffer if they were to fall into his hands.

' I shall have my head quarters at Alemquer to-morrow.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

' WELLINGTON.

' I shall add the last paragraph of this as a postscript to my other letter.'

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Rio Mayor, 6th October, 1810.

' I have just received your letter of the 5th. I beg that you will do me the favor to inform the Regency, and, above all, Principal Souza, that His Majesty and the Prince Regent having intrusted me with the command of their armies, and exclusively with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them; that I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system, framed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs.

' I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz., to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army, and of the people, while the troops shall be engaged with the enemy.

' As for Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the Government; that being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to their end; but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula, for one moment, after I shall have obtained His Majesty's leave to resign my charge, if Principal Souza is to remain either a member of the Government, or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I shall; and if I should

be obliged to go, I will take care that the world, in Portugal at least, and the Prince Regent, shall be made acquainted with my reasons.

‘ From the letter of the 3rd instant, which I have received from Dom Miguel Forjaz, I had hoped that the Government were satisfied with what I had done and intended to do; and that, instead of endeavoring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town. But I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness; and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure. I request you to communicate this letter to the Regency; and to transmit it to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is, tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions *for their own troops*, while they shall be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to discover that the result of any one is not certain, even under the best arrangements, I am anxious that the Government should adopt preparatory arrangements to take out of the enemy’s way those persons and their families, who would suffer if they were to fall into his hands.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Alemquer, 7th October, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 P.M.

‘ When I heard from Sir Stapleton Cotton from Rio Mayor at 3, the enemy were about Candieiros, and I think it probable that they will be at Rio Mayor, and be at Alcoentre this night. However, I have no account since 3 this afternoon.

‘ Your whole corps, even including that part of Fane’s cavalry, which will not leave Santarem until to-morrow morning, will be in good time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

'I am going to Alhandra in the morning. If I should find that the enemy move to Rio Mayor this day, I shall go either to Arruda or Sobral de Monte agraco with my head quarters to-morrow. You shall know in the morning whether I go, when I go, or whether I remain here.'

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

'MY DEAR HENRY,

'Alemquer, 7th October, 1810.

'I enclose my dispatch of the 5th to the Secretary of State. Nothing of importance has occurred since: we have continued our retreat without difficulty, and the troops, with the exception of the advanced guard, will be in their positions to-morrow.

'Our cavalry had a skirmish with the enemy on the 5th, in which they had the advantage. I entertain very little doubt of our success.

'I hope that Romana will have marched this day to join us.

'Ever yours most affectionately,

'*The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

'MY DEAR BERESFORD,

'Alemquer, 7th October, 1810.

'Regulating officers are appointed to the several fortified districts as follows; and I shall be obliged to you if you will direct the officers commanding the militia, and the ordenanza and regular artillery, to report themselves, and to apply to these officers for orders:

1st District . Captain Mulcaster.

2nd do. . Captain Goldfinch.

3rd do. . Captain Squire.

4th do. . Captain Burgoyne.

5th do. . Captain Dickenson.

6th do. . Captain Ross.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal Beresford.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

'SIR,

'Alemquer, 7th October, 1810.

'I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 4th and 6th instant.

'I think you had better detain the Melpomene and St. Fiorenzo for a few days.

‘ With regard to the transports mentioned by Sir Richard Keats in his letter to you of the 24th September, I am of opinion they should be sent back to Cadiz.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Alemquer, 8th October, 1810. 5 A.M.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th instant. The forts of Cascaes and St. Antonio have never been considered as at all affecting the place of embarkation of the army, if embarkation should become necessary, nor the passage of the transports from the Tagus.

‘ In the event, however, of the army occupying the works at St. Julian, the ordnance in Cascaes and St. Antonio might be used by the enemy against the former; and it would therefore be desirable that the ordnance and stores should be removed from these forts to St. Julian, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will have this done. Indeed, I understood that it had been done long ago, under the general directions given to remove the ordnance and stores from all the forts not within the line of our own works.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral ‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Alemquer, 8th October, 1810. 5 P.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th. In my opinion, none of the transports ought to be sent home under present circumstances. I do not believe there are any sick or wounded soldiers at Lisbon who will not recover there.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to order the armed transport and the flat boats which you mention, up the river, to anchor off Alhandra. I have directed the bank of the river to be cut down, so as to enable the guns of the latter to bear upon the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Alemquer, 8th October, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th.

‘ I had hoped that I should have had more men of the artillery, and I beg that you will order those at Cascaes to march upon Mafra, and desire the commanding officer of artillery to send me a return, accounting for every man of the British and German artillery at Lisbon and in the neighbourhood.

‘ I beg you to issue tin camp kettles to the regiments recently arrived, and let them march as ordered; but I beg you will understand that it is important to have the troops in health, and not over fatigued, and therefore I desire that they may make their marches early in the day; that if they leave Lisbon late, their march should be proportionably shortened; and that they should not march in the night.

‘ Although these regiments are now to be supplied with tin kettles, they are eventually to have the others, and the officers commanding companies must provide mules for their carriage.

‘ I experience great inconvenience from the want of the return of the recovered officers and soldiers sent to Montachique.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ Arruda, 8th October, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

½ past 3 P.M.

‘ I send two persons with this letter, who will be guides to any body you may have to send to me; I am not more than six miles from you.

‘ The enemy’s advance on the Alcobaga road was last night at Caldas, but this day’s rain will have impeded their progress. I think, however, that the great attack will be upon the left.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ SIR,

‘ Arruda, 8th October, 1810.

‘ The Quarter Master General sends orders to Major General Fane to withdraw the cavalry under his command to Tojal and Loures to-morrow morning, with the exception of one squadron of British cavalry, and two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, which are to continue to observe the ground in front of the right of the army, as long as it may be practicable for them.

‘ I request you also, to-morrow morning, to send a brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders, (which you were to have sent to General Leith in exchange for the 9 pounders,) and two 6 pounders belonging to the brigade with Major General Leith, which you brought from Nostra Senhora del Monte, from Villa Franca, through Alhandra and Arruda to Sobral de Monte agrão, where the 6 pounder brigade is to join the 6th division of infantry; and the two 6 pounders are to be sent on to Ribaldeira, to join the 3rd division of infantry.

‘ I also request you to send from Villa Franca, through Alhandra and St. Antonio de Tojal to Cabeça de Montachique, the Portuguese 9 pounder brigade which has been with your corps; where it is to remain in reserve, and in readiness to move at a short notice.

‘ The other Portuguese 6 pounder brigade with your corps, and the 3 pounder brigade with Colonel Le Cor, must be brought to Alhandra.

‘ It is my intention that the troops under your command should (as they have hitherto) be the right of the army; and occupy the position of Alhandra, &c.

‘ There must be a brigade of British infantry for the occupation of the line on the right, extending from the high road to the Tagus; and adverting to the strength of the remainder of the ground, it is my opinion that, as the whole of the mountain is scarped, one brigade of Portuguese infantry of General Hamilton’s division, and the 12th regiment, and the three battalions of militia under the command of Colonel Le Cor, will occupy this ground, and the other ground which I am about to describe, very sufficiently; unless the enemy should make his great attack on the right flank: in which case further measures will be necessary.

There are six batteries on the line from the Tagus to the left of the mountain, containing thirteen 12 pounders, and seven 6 pounders, numbered from No. 1 to 6 inclusive; and six redoubts, No. 114, for 100 men, with two 9 pounders; No. 115, for 100 men, with two 9 pounders; No. 116, for 100 men, with five 9 pounders; No. 118, for 400 men, with eight 12 pounders; No. 119, for 350 men, with six 12 pounders; No. 120, for 130 men, with two 12 pounders, and a *flèche*; No. 117, for 150 men.

‘ You will find the batteries and redoubts on the hill so placed, as not only to defend the faces of the hill itself, but to command different parts of the road from Arruda to Alhandra.

‘ No. 6 commands the valley upon the left of the position, through which a road leads to Calhandriz.

‘ In order more effectually to stop any body of troops attempting to turn the left of the position by the valley of Calhandriz, Nos. 7 and 8 have been constructed, each calculated to contain 200 men, and having in each of them three 12 pounders; and further, upon a hill on the left of the valley, No. 121, for 250 men, and three 9 pounders; No. 122, for 300 men, and three 12 pounders; No. 123, for 300 men, and three 12 pounders, and one 9 pounder.

‘ I conceive that the infantry above mentioned will be sufficient for the occupation of all these works and ground in the first instance; and I shall hereafter send you directions for the disposal of the remainder under your command. In the mean time I request you to allot the brigades and troops for the occupation of this ground; but they need not move into their position till the enemy be rather nearer.

‘ In order to provide artillerymen for all these works, 300 artillery of the *ordenanza*, 140 Portuguese artillery, and 40 British artillery, have been ordered immediately to Alhandra. Captain Squire, of the Engineers, has been appointed the regulating officer of this district, in order to assist whoever may be appointed to command the troops in it; and he can give you every information, and will assist you in making the arrangements for the distribution of the troops, &c.

‘ I recommend that the artillery, at least, should be posted in the redoubts and batteries as soon as they shall arrive.

Tents have been ordered to Alhandra for 5000 men, and some should be sent into the works for their accommodation. A double set for the usual number of men will probably keep them dry. The Portuguese artillery and ordenanza in the works must receive their provisions from the British Commissary at Alhandra: and some of them must come down from the works for them daily.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Lieut. General Hill.

WELLINGTON.

To Major General Picton.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Arruda, 8th October, 1810. half past 3.

I am very much obliged to you for having made arrangements to occupy the redoubts at Torres Vedras till the arrival of General Sontag. I have been to the right this day, and shall be with you to-morrow.

Colonel De Grey is ordered to observe the enemy in your front and on our right flank, and report to you. I think the attack will be upon our left, by Torres Vedras.

I beg you to peruse the instructions to General Sontag, which Lieut. Dundas has.

Believe me, &c.

Major General Picton.

WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

MY DEAR SIR BRENT, Arruda, 8th October, 1810. half past 3.

I send with this a letter for General Picton, which I beg you to peruse and to forward to him.

The enemy did not come more forward than Candieiros upon the high road yesterday, and they had not many troops on that road. I have not yet heard of their having come to Rio Mayor, on the high road. If they do not come there to-day, the attack will certainly be on our left; and so much the better.

Hill is at Alhandra, where I have been this day.

Believe me, &c.

Lieut. General

WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

' Sta Quintina, near Sobral, 11th October, 1810.

*' MY DEAR GENERAL, half past 11 A.M.**

' I hope that your men are well put up in Arruda in this terrible weather. I do not think the enemy's plan is quite decided yet. He has still some troops at Alemquer, and there is a body of cavalry and infantry (I saw of the latter about 300 men) on this side of Alemquer. I mean however to hold the town of Sobral as long as I can.

' The peasants say that they were marching this morning upon Villa Franca, which is to attack our right, where Hill is. They can make no impression upon the right, positively; and they must therefore endeavor to turn Hill's position upon the Serra of Alhandra by its left. This is a tough job also, defended as the entrances of the valleys are by redoubts, and the villages by abbatis, &c. However, that is what they must try.

' The paved road which leads through Arruda passes on to Alhandra, in front and under the fire of the Serra of Alhandra: there are roads of communication with this road, on its left, going to Alhandra, with Villa Franca, and I believe Castanheira, but these are at present impracticable; and on its right with Loureiro and Calhandriz, in the valley of Calhandriz, by which Hill's position on the Serra of Alhandra may be turned. These roads are, however, not paved, and are, of course, now impracticable, and there are redoubts upon the heights on both sides of the valley of Calhandriz, and the village itself is prepared.

' In the present state of the weather the enemy may certainly get light troops upon the paved road from Arruda to Alhandra, without passing through Arruda, but they positively cannot get guns there; and as the only paved or at

** Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, Military Secretary, to the Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.*

' SIR, ' Sta Quintina, 11th October, 1810.

' I am directed by Lord Wellington to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th October, relating to money concerns, and I am to acquaint you that his Lordship has no doubt that the three millions of dollars which you mention will be wanted for the service of the army, and that the Commissary General will be happy to give his bills at the exchange of the day, whenever these dollars will be offered; but his Lordship cannot at this distance of time enter into any positive engagement to receive them for bills upon England upon any terms.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' JAMES BATHURST,

' The Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.'

' Lieut. Colonel.

all practicable road to Arruda, from this side of the river of Arruda, passes through Sobral, I hope that that point is, for the present at least, pretty secure.

‘ From this statement, however, you will see how important the situation of Arruda and the possession of the pass of Matos (which, by the by, itself turns Hill’s position) are to our operations. Arruda, itself, I do not think, could be held for any great length of time against a superior force, but the pass of Matos can, defended as it is by the two redoubts.

‘ I understand from Fletcher also that the redoubts command the road going out of Arruda towards Alhandra. So that if you should find it most advantageous to give up Arruda, the enemy could not make much use of that road, at least by daylight.

‘ I need say nothing to you about the defence of the pass of Matos. I think it would be desirable, however, that you should occupy, with the 52nd or 43rd, the high ground which continues from the right of the right hand redoubt, looking from Matos towards Arruda.

‘ As soon as the attack upon Hill shall be absolutely decided, I shall move Sir B. Spencer’s division upon S^t Iago dos Velhos, about two or three miles to the south of Matos, on the road from Matos to Bucellas. He will then occupy the heights of St. Romão on your right, bringing his right to the redoubts which protect the left of the valley of Calhandriz. I do not like to move him yet however, because I still think it possible that the enemy may turn himself this way ; and if he does, I have another arrangement prepared for him, upon which I shall write to you hereafter. I wish you, however, with a view to this arrangement, to look out for the roads of communication from Matos to the high road from Sobral to Bucellas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Sta Quintina, near Sobral,

11th October, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make me three separate reports of your affairs at Leyria, Alcoentre,

and Quinta de las Torres, that I may send them home, as being all highly creditable to the cavalry. I have already taken an opportunity of expressing to the Secretary of State how much the army were indebted to the cavalry, and I shall be happy to have another opportunity of doing so.

The 14th light dragoons, one squadron of the 16th, and one of Hussars which you had sent to General Craufurd, are now here, and I have put up the greater part of them, keeping out only three, necessary to observe the enemy this side of Alemquer. De Grey is very quiet at Ramalhal, in front of Torres Vedras. I think that you had better collect at Mafra all stray squadrons and detachments, and individuals of all the regiments, as well as the head quarters of the Hussars, 16th, and Royals, and make them up again as well as you can. I shall give orders for all of them to be sent to you.

Believe me, &c.

Lieut. General

WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Do not be long in what you have to do, as I think I shall have occasion both for you and Fane soon.

To Lieut. General Hill,

MY DEAR HILL, S^{ta} Quintina, 11th October, 1810. 8 A.M.

I received your letter of yesterday in the night from Mr. Sodré. That which the enemy has got on the road between Carregado and Alhandra is only his advanced guard; and I recommend to you to hold the town of Alhandra, keeping a few guns at the church, and barricading the streets. The enemy can bring no guns to the heights on the left of the high road as long as this weather lasts; and this measure will preclude the necessity of your throwing your people into the position prematurely, where they would be exposed to the bad weather.

I recommend to you, however, to occupy immediately the three villages on the left of the Serra, called Calhandriz, A dos Mellos, and Loureiro. The first is loop-holed, and there is an abbatis in its front; and it commands the passage by the valley of Calhandriz, which the redoubts on the left of the heights, and the corresponding redoubts on the

other heights, are calculated to defend. There are roads to these villages from Alhandra, at the back of the Serra, and from Alverca.

‘Sixty British artillery were ordered to you yesterday, and all the Portuguese artillery of the line, remaining at Lisbon, were ordered to Alverca. I have now sent to order 200 volunteer artillerymen from Bucellas to Alverca, and they will bring you a note from Captain Burgoyne. Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘They swear that the tents have been sent from Lisbon. Make inquiries about them at Alhandra and Alverca. When the gun boats arrive, make some of them take their stations above the town, so as to assist in enabling you to hold it.’

Memorandum for Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘11th October, 1810.

‘I believe that the force which appeared yesterday at Alemquer is the same advanced guard, and it afterwards proceeded by Carregado towards Villa Franca.

‘Colonel Hawker, however, should receive orders to patrol well forward towards Alemquer, so as to ascertain whether there is any force of the enemy in Alemquer, and of what strength.

‘If the enemy should move from Alemquer upon Sobral de Monte agrão in superior strength, I should wish the following arrangements to be made.

‘General Sir Brent Spencer’s division to move to Zibreira, and canton in that village and Gozondeiza. Head quarters to Patameira. Major General Cole and Major General Campbell to retire when necessary from Duas Portas and Ribaldeira, and occupy the heights immediately behind those villages, extending their line across the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

‘General Pack’s brigade is in that case to occupy for the present the redoubts on the heights above Sobral de Monte agrão, with his light infantry in the redoubts on the points of the rocks above the road leading to Arruda, marked Nos. 11, 12, and 13. The largest number should be in No. 11. Nos. 12 and 13 require each about one third of No. 11.

‘ Captain Williams, of the engineers, will communicate to General Pack all the details of the information respecting these redoubts.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Ajuda, 12th October, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 10th. No tents arrived yet!

‘ The troops are suffering every where for want of them; and General Hill was obliged to draw in from Villa Franca.

‘ I do not know that the enemy has more than an advanced guard in Alemquer. He reconnoitred us last night at Sobral with a large body of cavalry and some infantry; and, by mistake, our troops left the place, and I believe neither party were in it during the night. We were in it, however, this morning.

‘ I believe the floating battery went off up the river this morning, and is off Villa Franca.

‘ I must write to England on the Admiral’s desire to have an allowance for carrying home prisoners of war. It is a new question, on which I cannot decide.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General Pack.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Ajuda, 12th October, 1810. 2 P.M.

‘ Captain Chapman has delivered your message to me; and, first, I beg to assure you that there is no chance that the communication between your troops in the redoubt and the army will be interrupted; but, if such a chance existed, I had provisions prepared for the troops in the redoubts, which were consumed by the troops that first arrived at Sobral. In this supply wood was included, and forage for horses and mules. Wood and forage are still in large quantities in Sobral; and I have again desired the Commissary General to send some more provisions to the redoubts, and to send there also some of the wood at Sobral: and, if you will be so kind as to send your mules to Sobral, with a note from yourself to the Commissary there, they may bring away with them as much forage as they can carry.

‘ In respect to tents, the Portuguese Government were to supply them; but they have failed in this, as they have in every thing else. You must only keep your troops in the neighbouring villages and houses till it shall be necessary to occupy the redoubts in force, with piquets only in the redoubts; and, before it may be necessary to go into the redoubts, I still hope that you will have the tents.

‘ I beg that you will communicate with the commanding officers of the two regiments of Lisbon volunteers, who are to go to the redoubts likewise.

‘ I beg you to send an officer round to the three redoubts occupied by the Caçadores, and see that they are either in their stations or near them, and that the artillerymen are there likewise; and that these people are supplied with provisions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Pack.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will see whether a communication exists, or can be made, from the left and rear of the redoubts to Zibreira.’

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ à Ajuda, ce 12 Octobre, 1810.

‘ MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

‘ Je reçois ce matin votre lettre du 7, et je vous prie de faire rester la cavalerie Portugaise, si vous le trouvez bon.

‘ L’avant garde de l’ennemi est à Alemquer. Je ne sais pas où est le corps d’armée. Peut-être que le mauvais tems, qui a rendu les chemins exécrationnels, l’empêche de s’avancer, comme il m’empêche d’entreprendre quelque chose sur son avant garde.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Le Marquis de la Romana.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Memorandum for Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

‘ 13th October, 1810.

‘ When the army shall be ordered to occupy the position of Zibreira and Patameira, the troops will be formed as follows from the right:

‘ Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer’s division, with its right

at the two windmills between Zibreira and the redoubts of Sobral, will occupy a line extending to an old mill on the right of Zibreira; and thence to another old mill on the left of the church of Zibreira, bringing their left to the ravine. This line extends about 1000 yards.

‘ The remainder of the troops of the division to be in reserve in the rear of this line, with the exception of the battalions of light infantry attached to the brigades which are to occupy Zibreira.

‘ Major General Picton’s division is to form with its right in a line with the left of the 1st division, and is to extend to the village of Patameira, about 800 yards.

‘ The remainder of this division to be in reserve in rear of the right of General Cole’s division, throwing its light infantry along the ravine in its front, and occupying the houses and Patameira.

‘ Major General Cole’s right is to rest on the ravine in a line with Patameira. His centre on the lower of the two mills on the hill on which there are two; and his left on the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, where that road passes through the Portella.

‘ This line extends 1700 yards, and the remainder of the troops of this division will be in reserve in the rear of its left, throwing the light infantry battalions of the brigades of Portuguese and British infantry out in its front.

‘ The 6th division are to place their right at the point where Major General Cole’s left will stand, and occupy the mountain on the left of the Portella, looking to Ribaldeira, placing the Lusitanian Legion on the mountain still further upon the left, on the left of a road leading from Runa into the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

‘ Major General Leith’s division will be in reserve in rear of the right.

‘ Brigadier General Campbell’s and Brigadier General Coleman’s brigades in reserve in rear of the left on the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

‘ The artillery to be placed as follows:

‘ The British 9 pounders, and the 6 pounders attached to General Hill’s division, at Zibreira.

‘ The 6 pounder brigade attached to the 1st division at the mills on the right of that division.

‘ Major Arentschildt’s 9 pounders and 6 pounder Portuguese brigades at an old mill on the right of Patameira.

‘ Major Dickson’s 9 pounder Portuguese brigade, and the brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders attached to Major General Leith’s division on the left of the village of Patameira, and on the right of General Cole’s division.

‘ The brigade of artillery attached to General Cole’s division at the mill, where his centre will stand.

‘ Three of the 6 pounders attached to the 6th division in the Portella, on the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, and three on the road from Runa to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

‘ The 3 pounders attached to Brigadier General Campbell’s brigade to be in reserve, as well as Captain Ross’s troop of horse artillery.

‘ The officers commanding divisions will reconnoitre the situation of their several posts.

‘ The communications are from the great redoubt of Sobral by the windmills to Zibreira; thence to the rear, and across the ravine by a concealed road to Patameira: thence in the rear of Patameira to the right of General Cole’s post; thence behind the mountain on which his centre will stand, to the high road leading from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

‘ As soon as possible, cover should be made for the guns of Zibreira, and on the right and left of Patameira, masking this from the view of the enemy.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Ajuda, 13th October, 1810.

‘ The army continued its retreat by the routes of Alcobaça and of Rio Mayor; and Lieut. General Hill’s corps by that of Santarem, till it arrived with its right at Castanheira and Villa Franca, its centre at Sobral, and its left at Torres Vedras, on the 7th and 8th instant, without being pressed or molested by the enemy.

‘ The movement of that part of the army under my own immediate command was covered by the British cavalry

under Sir Stapleton Cotton; and that of the troops under Lieut. General Hill, by the 13th dragoons and Portuguese cavalry, under Major General Fane.

‘ The British cavalry had several occasions of distinguishing themselves, upon which I enclose Sir Stapleton Cotton’s reports, and I must add my sense of the obligations which I owe to this body. They were preceded on the march immediately by the advanced guard of infantry, under Brig. General Craufurd.

‘ On the 8th the rain commenced, which usually falls at this season of the year in Portugal, and has continued with great violence ever since. This has probably increased the enemy’s difficulties, and delayed his progress. He has shown some troops in front of our right at Villa Franca, and a large division of cavalry, with some infantry, patrolled up to Sobral de Montê agração on the 11th, having driven in our piquets of cavalry and infantry.

‘ A large division of infantry, which I understand to be the advanced guard of the 8th corps, moved upon Sobral yesterday evening, from whence Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer withdrew the advance of his division, and the enemy continue in that town; the division under the command of Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer being closed on this side of it, and at no great distance from the great redoubt of Sobral.

‘ They also this day attacked the piquets of General Cole’s division near Sobral, but without much effect. I have learnt with great satisfaction that the Portuguese troops (Colonel Hervey’s brigade, the — and 23rd regiments) again distinguished themselves upon this occasion. Colonel Hervey unfortunately was wounded, but I hope not seriously.

‘ As soon as I shall have ascertained the line of the enemy’s operations, I shall take up the line of defence of the army; and as I conceive that I have reason to hope for success, I propose to bring matters to extremities, and to contend for the possession and independence of Portugal in one of the strong positions in this part of the country.

‘ The Marques de la Romana marched to Campo Mayor on the 8th instant, to join this army and share our fortune.

‘ All is quiet in the north of Portugal. I understand that

one of General Bacellar's detachments, under Colonel Wilson, was in the position of Busaco on the 6th instant; and it is reported that Colonel Trant has entered Coimbra.

'As all the inhabitants, however, have quitted the country, and the weather has rendered the communication by sea impossible, I cannot procure accurate intelligence from that part of the country.

'My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 4th instant.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

'MY DEAR GENERAL,

'Ajuda, 15th October, 1810. 5 A.M.

'The enemy have now got a good large body in front of General Spencer, at Sobral, and he withdraws this morning to Zibreira. A squadron of the 14th dragoons will be sent to you, as likewise the axes. Fletcher will give orders respecting the bridge which you mention to Runa.

'We shall want you upon our right, if the enemy collect their whole force in the centre, which, at present, appears probable, though not quite clear. Pray examine all the roads leading from your rear to the great redoubt of Sobral.

'I move my head quarters this morning from hence to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, but I shall either be at the great redoubt all day, or they will know there where to find me.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

'MY DEAR HILL,

'Ajuda, 15th October, 1810. 5 A.M.

'I do not think the enemy's designs are yet quite clear, but they rather point to our centre, where they have assembled a large corps, and the prisoners say that the whole are thereabouts.

'Sir Brent Spencer withdrew this morning from the front of Sobral, where he could not stay longer without engaging on terms of disadvantage. Pack is in the great redoubt, and this road is completely blocked. I move my head quarters, however, this day to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, in order

to be nearer what appears at present to be the probable scene of action.

‘I moved your troops to Bucellas the day before yesterday, partly in order to be able to close them to the centre, if that should be the active scene; partly because that I think at Bucellas, and from thence in the villages, along the foot of the Serra de Serves, as far as the Casa de Portella, some of them would be better situated to give support to the troops in the redoubts at Trancoso, and to those which defend the left of the valley of Calhandriz, than they would be further to the right. I wish you would look over this ground, and the communications with its rear, and see how it could be best supported.

‘These troops, however, should still remain at Bucellas, &c. for the present, and I beg that the other British and Portuguese brigade may be in readiness to march at a short notice to join the centre of the army.

‘Keep an officer at the signal post, and I will send you the orders by signal, as well as by message.

‘Le Cor shall occupy the lines of Alhandra, while you will be away; and the 2nd batt. 88th shall be ordered up from Lisbon to support him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘Pero Negro, 16th October, 1810.

11 A.M.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘I enclose an order for Colonel Fisher to deliver to your directions the 12 pounders belonging to the British army; and I likewise enclose an order for the brass 12 pounders, Portuguese. I would recommend the former, as the French have with them French 12 pounders, which are heavier than the Portuguese brass 12 pounders.

‘I consider the loss of the boats at Santarem to be the greatest misfortune that could happen to us, and it may oblige us to change our position, and take up our second line. The French will either arm these boats, and operate upon Hill's right flank, in which case the strength of your flotilla, and the support to be given to it by larger vessels,

will become an object for your consideration ; or they will use them to form a bridge, and establish themselves upon the island in the Tagus, across Hill's right flank ; or they will use them for a bridge or other communication with Mortier, whom they will have it in their power to draw to their support either on this side or on the other side of the river.

‘ In whichever way the boats may be used, their loss is a serious misfortune ; and at all events the whole of the Alentejo lies at the mercy of the enemy !!

‘ The Government may congratulate themselves upon this notable arrangement. They would not adopt in time any one measure to remove what might be useful or necessary to the enemy ; they neglected their peculiar business to occupy themselves with what did not concern them ; and there is not an arrangement of any description which depended upon them, or their officers, which has not failed.

‘ At this moment the enemy are living upon grain found close to the lines ; and they grind it into flour with the mills in our sight, which the government were repeatedly pressed to order the people to render useless, and which could have been rendered useless only by taking away the sails.

‘ Then the boats are left at Santarem in order to give the enemy an opportunity of acting upon our flank, and thus dislodging us !

‘ The first object to attend to is to prevent the enemy from establishing himself on the island of Alhandra ; your gun boats, by occupying the river at the north east end of it, and on both sides, will probably prevent that, if supported by something stronger in the main channel.

‘ Another object well deserving of attention is the great island Lyceria, which is, I understand, full of corn and cattle. If you could get a flotilla of gun boats up the eastern channel of the river to the point of separation, where the two channels form this island, this object might be effected ; otherwise, I fear, it will not.

‘ I have not heard from General Hill that he was in want of seamen to work his guns. He has a great number of artillerymen, both British and Portuguese, as well as of the

ordenanza, and I am convinced that the seamen would give us more efficient assistance in the gun boats on the river.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ If you cannot get gun boats to the north east end of Lyceria, by the eastern channel, it will be necessary to have some naval strength off the south west end of it, lest the enemy should endeavor to pass a force down that way.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance yesterday or this day. They appear to be fortifying themselves at Sobral; but their delay is probably connected with the acquisition of the boats at Santarem.

‘ I have directed that a heavy battery may be constructed on the right flank of the lines at Alhandra, which will tend to support the gun boats there.’

To Brigadier General Alexander Campbell.

‘ At the great redoubt, 15th October, 1810. ’

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

12 at noon.

‘ I see some large bodies of troops forward, which appear from hence to be in movement towards you. You had better be in readiness to fall back upon the position pointed out for you in the Memorandum sent by the Quarter Master General, in case it should be necessary, keeping your piquets well down upon the river. I do not wish you however to quit your villages till it shall be necessary.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brigadier Gen. A. Campbell.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Head Quarters, 16th October, 1810. 11 A.M.

‘ The Admiral has just now apprized me of the loss of forty boats at Santarem, which is a serious misfortune, to be attributed solely to the Government. I have written to him upon the arrangements to be adopted in consequence of it, which go principally to our own defence, but there are others which require the early attention of the Government.

‘ First; the island of Lyceria, which is at present at the enemy’s command, is full of corn and cattle. There is a safe communication now with the south end of it, and all the supplies should be drawn away immediately to Lisbon. If the Admiral can station a flotilla at the N.E. extremity of this island, so as to prevent the enemy from bringing their boats lower down the river, if not already brought down, this island may yet be safe. But at all events, the corn, cattle, straw, &c., should be brought away from it.

‘ Secondly; the province of Alentejo being now open to the enemy, the people should be directed to remove under the cover of Palmella, and fort S. Filippe, at Setuval, which are both garrisoned; and the ordenanza should be collected there. It is probable, however, that fort S. Filippe and Palmella are not provisioned, as was the case with Obidos, which was therefore abandoned, and is the case with other Portuguese forts, notwithstanding repeated applications and remonstrances.

‘ Thirdly; care should be taken of the other boats on the river, that they do not fall into the hands of the enemy. Positive orders ought to be given that all boats of every description should anchor on this side, on every night, between Alhandra and Lisbon. As soon as the Marques de la Romana’s corps shall be across the Tagus, there will be no occasion for fleets of boats going over; and when they do go, for provisions or other purposes, they should be under the charge of some officer of the police, who should force them to return.

‘ I have received your letter of the ——. In my letter to Dom Miguel Forjaz, which I signed this morning, I intended, and do advert to the conduct of all the militia of Lisbon, as well as to that of Thomar. The conduct of the whole is infamous, and some measures must be adopted to force people who pretend to be soldiers, and receive pay and provisions as such, to do their duty. The Lisbon volunteer chasseurs are as bad as the rest; I do not believe one third of the numbers are here.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance this day. They have certainly one, probably two corps d’armée on this front near Sobral, but not a shot has been fired since

the day before yesterday, excepting from the lines at Alhandra on a reconnaitring party yesterday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ If there should be no provisions in fort S. Filippe or Palmella, some ought to be sent by sea.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ 16th October, 1810. ½ before 1, A.M.

‘ I conclude that you will have heard that the people of Santarem allowed forty large boats to fall into the hands of the enemy !!!

‘ I have written to the Admiral upon the measures to be adopted for the security of your right flank; and Colonel Fletcher writes to Captain Squire to desire him to construct a work in the rear of the right of your line for four heavy guns to command the navigation of the river, and give protection to the gun boats. In the mean time the officer commanding the gun boats should be informed of these circumstances, and should be desired to watch the river above Alhandra closely at night, so that nothing may pass down.

‘ I hope that you received my letter of yesterday morning.

‘ Take care that, if the enemy should make a serious attack upon your post at the church of Alhandra, you shall have it in your power to draw away your guns in time. If you should find that they are advancing upon you seriously to attack you in the lines at Alhandra, which I can hardly believe, you had better bring one of your British brigades from Bucellas to Alverca to give support to the other. It appears to me, however, most likely that, if they wish to carry the lines of Alhandra, they will try your left flank rather than your right, and if so your troops are better stationed at Bucellas and Villa de Rey than at Alverca. Probably one brigade might occupy an intermediate position at the Casa de Portella with advantage. If you should think so, move them.

‘ The 8th corps, and I believe the 6th, are near Sobral. They have made no movement, and not a shot has been fired for these two days, excepting one this morning from one of the redoubts between this and Arruda.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

At the great redoubt of Sobral,
17th October, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 16th. I could see the reconnoissance of yesterday on our right from hence; but I am much obliged to you for the information which your letter contains.

‘ The roads are not yet fit for the march of your guns, and I therefore still keep them here; but I have ordered six Portuguese 3 pounders to S. Ajuda this day, and I beg you to send a person to that place to bring them to you. They are narrower in the axle tree, and lighter than our carriages, and will probably answer your purpose equally well with the 6 pounders, but you shall have the latter as soon as the roads will bear them.

‘ The positions which the enemy have taken up in our front, and the measures which they are adopting to fortify themselves on their right, induce me to believe that their attack will be principally directed upon our right.

‘ I see that they have troops encamped on the heights above Villa Franca; and Hill tells me, in a letter of last night, that there were large fires on the heights near Alhandra, from which his piquets were obliged to withdraw in the evening.

‘ I have brought General Leith's division to the rear of this fort, where part of it is encamped. General Spry's Portuguese brigade will be cantoned this night in a village in the rear of the redoubts Nos. 12 and 13. The Hanoverian legion are in the villages behind No. 11; to all of which the British brigades in General Leith's division will be a reserve.

‘ If the enemy should make his attack between this and Arruda, I think these arrangements will make us tolerably secure, and will give time to make a further movement of troops to the right. On the other hand, if he should make his attack upon the centre or left wing of the army, with all the troops in front of this place, I shall be able to transfer General Leith's division to be the reserve of the right of the centre, for which I originally intended him.

‘ The disposition which I have above described will show

you what line I wish you to take. If the enemy attack Hill's right, and our line to the left of this redoubt, my wish and intention is to employ you in an offensive movement. If they attack Hill's left, by Trancoso or the valley of Calhandriz, and at the same time the ground on the right of this redoubt, I should prefer that you should look to Hill, rather than to the redoubts Nos. 11, 12, and 13. It would be necessary, however, for you to observe the ground between Nos. 10 and 11. All is quiet this morning in the front.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Right Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 17th October, 1810. 8 A.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 14th, and two of the 16th.

‘ As for the prisoners taken from the enemy, whether by Portuguese or English troops, I have hitherto always considered them as English. The Portuguese have no means either of feeding or taking care of them. Indeed I was obliged lately to take off their hands and send to England the prisoners which they had made at Chaves, before we had any English army in the field in Portugal: I do not know, therefore, what prisoners Major Pernet has charge of on board the *Princesa da Beira*.

‘ The way in which the matter is managed here is, that all prisoners taken are sent to the Provost Marshal at headquarters, and are forwarded by him to his assistant at Lisbon. He draws their provisions from the Commissary for them from time to time, and application is then made to you for a passage for them to England, when they are in sufficient numbers to render it worth while to send a ship home with them.

‘ This arrangement answers very well for the present; but if their numbers should increase much, we must appoint an officer or officers to take charge of them, who will perform that duty which is now performed by the Provost Marshal.

‘ I hope that the accounts which you have received of the enemy's having found forty boats at Santarem are not well

founded *, as Hill tells me that when he wanted boats there on the 7th he could find only five; and Beresford had armed parties in all the upper parts of the river, burning all the boats they could find. They went so far as to burn the spare boats belonging to the bridge of Abrantes.

‘ From what I see of the Tagus from hence, I should imagine that no part of it can now be fordable; and, at all events, if the river was fordable, I have no apprehension whatever that any part of the army now in Portugal (excepting parties to get provisions or plunder) will cross the Tagus to carry on an operation on that side. And there is nothing to be apprehended from Mortier’s corps, which by letters from Estremadura of the 11th, received last night, I find had withdrawn towards Seville.

‘ I am concerned to find, however, from your letter of the 16th, that if the enemy should take possession of the ground on the left of the Tagus, extending from Almada to Trafaria, our fleet has increased in size to such a degree, that a great number of the transports would be compelled to put to sea. As I do not think it probable that the enemy has it at all in his power to undertake such an operation at present, this circumstance does not now much signify, but it is one of serious consideration for the British Government, in case of any other invasion of Portugal by a larger force, which should be capable of making an attack upon both sides of the Tagus.

‘ It is quite clear to me that Portugal and England cannot afford a force to do more than defend one side of the river; and if the transports cannot remain in safety, the enemy being in possession of the left bank, the defence of the country ought not to be attempted.

‘ All my measures and arrangements upon this subject have been founded upon your opinions conveyed in your official letter of the 26th of October, in answer to certain queries from me directed to this point; and if you have seen any reason to alter your opinion, I recommend that you should revise it, and state it again in the same form.

‘ I am perfectly aware of the strength of the ground on the left of the Tagus, but unfortunately it would not answer our purpose of saving Lisbon and the Tagus from the

* The accounts were not well founded.

enemy. I have reports and plans for fortifying and occupying it, but I have never thought of carrying the plans into execution for the reasons I have above stated, and it is now too late to think of them.

‘ If the enemy, now in our front, should cross the Tagus with his whole army, which is hardly practicable, I must only do the same with mine; and I agree with you in thinking, not only that I shall be before them, but shall have the best position in the country, although not fortified.

‘ I do not wish the sick men (now ordered to be embarked) to be sent to England. I am firmly of opinion that the enemy cannot succeed; but as I know that their situation is desperate, we must expect that there is no risk they will not incur to attain their object, and I know enough of operations of this kind to be aware that nobody can be certain of their result. My wish therefore is to have embarked in the ships every body who cannot walk down to the beach, because, in case any accident should happen, I know well that, even under the best arrangements, those who must be carried will have but a bad chance of being removed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ The name of the French General killed by the gun boats was St. Croix. He was an excellent officer and much respected.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, Head Quarters, 17th October, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter without date, forwarded by the messenger who brought the mail. I enclose the letter from the Prince Regent, which I beg you to return. I have likewise one from Linhares which I have not yet read.

‘ The Government proceed in their seizures of carriages and mules in so injudicious a manner, that they do us more harm than good. They seized some of the mules and carriages employed by the Commissariat on monthly hire, some of them, I believe, Spaniards. In the same manner the Admiral seized the boats employed by the Commissariat, in order to transport Romana’s army from Aldea Galega.

‘ Then when they have got these mules and carriages they do not employ them, but the animals and people are kept starving and shivering under a guard, while we are wanting provisions, &c., here.

‘ I conclude that they have (as they ought to have) a register of every mule and carriage in and about Lisbon. They should make requisitions for the carriages, and mules, and boats, according to their register, that is to say, the police should send orders to such and such individuals, owners of carriages or mules, to produce them at a named place, where the person requiring them should be ready to receive them, and put them in use. According to this mode every animal produced would be used; and none would be seized of those already in use, because they are not upon the register.

‘ But this requires an attention to system, a regular method of carrying on business; punishments in case those to whom the directions of the police are sent do not produce their carriages or animals when required from them, which are inconsistent with the flighty spirit of the Government of the present day. However, you may depend upon it that what I have above stated is the only mode of doing the business effectually, or indeed without injuring us.

‘ The carriages and mules which bring up our provisions must be sufficient to remove the sick and wounded till there shall be a general engagement, for which there must then be a special arrangement.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 18th October, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th instant, in which you enclosed a copy of your note of the 16th to Dom Miguel Forjaz, and the copy of his answer of the 17th.

‘ I must observe upon the latter, that months have elapsed since I pointed out to the Government the situation in which the country would, sooner or later, be placed by the enemy’s invasion, and recommended the measures to be adopted with a view to alleviate the evil to the inhabitants of the country, and to render difficult and impede the enemy’s progress.

‘ I repeated these warnings and recommendations at different periods, while the enemy was upon the frontier during the summer. Instead of attending to what I recommended, the Government was employed in debating upon the expediency of maintaining the war upon the frontier, upon which, as an abstract proposition, there could be no doubt, but unfortunately we were deficient in means to effect the object.

‘ By a fortunate concurrence of circumstances I was enabled to delay the enemy’s progress very considerably, and nearly three weeks had elapsed from the time he passed the Coa before he passed the Mondego at Coimbra; and still nothing was done by the Government, of all that was recommended to them; and the Secretary of State now says, that the first the Government heard of the retreat of the army from Coimbra was on the 3rd instant. He has not adverted, however, to the fact, that in February last the Government were informed of the line of operations to be carried on, and that since April last, it was obvious that Portugal was to be attacked by a force so large, as to render those operations a measure of necessity; and therefore, that the precautions for the good of the people, and for the annoyance of the enemy, which before April and in the intermediate period were repeatedly recommended, ought to have been adopted before the army even reached Coimbra on its retreat.

‘ There is no doubt of the evacuation of Obidos, or of the cause of that misfortune, as stated by me, viz., the want of provisions which had been ordered for that place weeks before.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 19th October, 1810.

‘ I received your letters of the 17th in the night. With respect to the prisoners of war, I do not conceive that there will be any inconvenience in taking care of them, as we have hitherto, as long as they remain in our hands. When they are handed over to the navy in order to be kept in a prison ship, or to be sent to England, the officers whom you propose to appoint to act for the Transport Board might take charge of them, and make such arrangement as you might

think proper with Major Pernet, with the consent of the Portuguese Government for their subsistence.

‘ I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners whom they take from us, and the Portuguese treat their prisoners exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer any arrangement by which prisoners who have once come into the hands of the Provost Marshal of the British army, should avoid falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese Government. This, however, is entirely a matter for your consideration, with which I have nothing to do.

‘ I am glad to find your opinion continues the same respecting the anchorage in the Tagus. If it should be necessary to occupy that anchorage, which does not appear very probable, I should think that many vessels might be sent out of the river, such as victuallers, store ships, &c., retaining none excepting those necessary to receive the troops, &c.

‘ Brigadier Rosa’s conduct certainly appears extraordinary.

‘ The position of the gun boats is very satisfactory. I learn that the marine battalion attached to the French army has been ordered to the Tagus, it is supposed to construct a bridge. It is possible, however, that it may be to man gun boats. The only improvement which I could suggest in your distribution is, that the advanced flotilla, near Salvaterra, should be strengthened. There would be no risk in this arrangement if the southern channel should be navigable, and it would effectually protect the island of Lyceria.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Right Hon. ———.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 19th October, 1810.

‘ I received your letter, regarding Mr. ———, late Lieutenant of the ——— regiment, and I am much concerned that the conduct of that officer was such as to prevent me from attending to your request.

‘ When in arrest for one crime, he insulted, in the grossest and most wanton manner, another officer ; for which offence he refused to make any apology, although desired to do so by me, and he broke his arrest.

‘ If I were to interfere in favor of those who commit offences of this description, I should give such a blow to the discipline and subordination of the army, that there would very soon be no army remaining.

‘ I am convinced that you will perceive the impossibility of my interfering in any manner in this case.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ The Right Hon. — — —.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose an extract from the General Orders of the army, containing the crimes of Mr. — — —, and the decision of the General Court Martial.’

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 19th October, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th August, directing that I should have inquiries made respecting certain complaints forwarded by Lieut. — — — of the — — — battalion — — — regiment; and as I conceive that the Commander in Chief was not aware that the subject of these complaints had already been under my consideration, and had been inquired into by me, and decided upon, I wish to bring what passed under the view of the Commander in Chief, before I direct any further inquiry, which, if it must take place, must be one into my own conduct.

‘ Lieut. — — — is an officer of whom I do not entertain a very good opinion. When the army was marching into Spain in June, 1809, he endeavored to remain behind his regiment in Portugal upon false and frivolous pretences, and he was afterwards accused and tried by a General Court Martial for striking Lieut. — — —, and for absenting himself from his regiment during the battle of Talavera, of which crimes he was acquitted, as appears by the enclosed extract from the General Orders (A). The principal witnesses against him on this trial were Capt. — — — and Lieut. — — —; and but a few days had elapsed after he was released from his arrest, when he wrote the enclosed letters, No. 1 and No. 2, complaining of the conduct of those officers.

‘ No. 3 and No. 4 are the copies of Capt. — — —’s and Lieut. — — —’s replies to the charges against them, and No. 5 the copy of the draft of a letter written by my directions to

the commanding officer of the ——— battalion ——— regiment, on Lieut. ———'s complaints. Nos. 6, 7, and 8, are the answers received to No. 5, which, in my opinion, completely acquitted Capt. ——— of any corrupt or improper motive in the transaction of which Lieut. ——— accused him; and I therefore wrote the commanding officer of the ——— battalion, ——— regiment, a letter on the 13th of December, of which the enclosed No. 9 is a copy.

'The Commander in Chief will be best able to judge from a perusal of these papers, whether there is any ground for further inquiry. If there is, I would submit that the inquiry ought to begin with myself, as my conduct and former decision upon the same point must be the basis of any inquiry into the complaint by Lieut. ———. If, however, the Commander in Chief should be of opinion that there ought to be no further inquiry into these complaints by Lieut. ———, I would submit that that officer ought to be tried by a General Court Martial, on a charge for forwarding direct to the Secretary at War a complaint of his superior officer, not transmitting it through the commanding officer of his regiment, according to His Majesty's Regulations.

'I have the honor to be, &c.
'Lieut. Colonel Torrens.'

'WELLINGTON.'

To the Earl of Liverpool.

'MY LORD,

'Pero Negro, 19th October, 1810.

'When I was establishing the line of posts to be taken up by the army in this part of the country, I deemed it expedient to provide for the speedy communication of intelligence from one to the other, by the establishment of telegraphs; and I requested Admiral Berkeley to allow officers and seamen belonging to the squadron in the Tagus to go on shore to undertake the management of them. He complied with this request, but, on the 29th August, wrote me the enclosed, No. 1, claiming an extra allowance for the officers and seamen employed on this duty, upon which the correspondence Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 followed.

'As I thought it proper to send my papers away from the army during its retreat, I had not these by me when I received the Admiral's letter of the 12th September, otherwise they should have been laid before your Lordship at an

earlier period; and I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship, if you will give me directions whether I am to give any, and what additional allowance of pay or provisions to the officers and seamen, who are serving on shore with the army, beyond that of *bât* and forage to the officers.

‘ Although the Admiral had withdrawn the officers and seamen from the telegraph stations before the army arrived in this part of the country, he has sent them back to their stations since we have been here.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 20th October, 1810.

‘ I was aware that a register had been made of boats and of means of transport in and about Lisbon; and what I meant was, that the Government should make use of that register in their requisitions for these means, and not proceed to an indiscriminate embargo, with all its evil consequences.

‘ You will receive my dispatch open. Sir Wyndham Dalling is going home, and I mean that he should take it, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give it to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 20th October, 1810.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 13th instant, the enemy have been employed principally in reconnaitring the positions occupied by our troops, and in strengthening their own. In effecting the former object they have skirmished with the troops on our outposts, who have always conducted themselves well.

‘ On the 14th they attacked with infantry, supported by artillery, a small detachment of the 71st regiment, which formed the advanced guard of Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer’s division, near Sobral de Monte agrão, in order to cover one of these reconnaitring parties. This detachment, having the Lieut. Colonel Hon. H. Cadogan and Lieut. Colonel Reynell at their head, charged the enemy in the

most gallant style, and drove them into the town. The whole of the 8th corps d'armée, however, and part of the 6th, arrived on the ground near Sobral, on that evening, and I therefore thought it proper to withdraw Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer's division from the advanced situation which it had occupied, and these troops marched to Zibreira, about one mile in the rear, on the 15th, in the morning.

‘ The gun boats on the Tagus, under Lieut. Berkeley, with which Admiral Berkeley has supported the right of the army near Alhandra, have likewise been engaged with the enemy's reconnaitring parties, and have been of great service to us.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the report which I communicated to you in my last dispatch of the 13th, regarding the march of the detachments of troops under the command of General Bacellar has been confirmed. Colonel Trant arrived near Coimbra on the 7th, and immediately attacked the enemy's outposts, which he cut off from the town, and he then pushed into it, and took possession of it. The resistance made by the enemy did not last long, and he took 80 officers and 5000 men (principally sick and wounded) prisoners.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of his report to Marshal Beresford and of a letter from Marshal Beresford, upon this success. On the following day, Brigadier General Millar and Lieut. Colonel Wilson arrived at Coimbra with their detachments, and they have since taken about 350 prisoners, being soldiers who had straggled from their regiments on the enemy's march, as they say, in search of food. Colonel Wilson has since advanced to Condeixa with an advanced guard of infantry and cavalry, and Brigadier General Millar is at Coimbra. I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford on these transactions.

‘ A detachment from the garrison of Peniche, sent out by Lieut. Colonel Blunt, under Lieut. —, has been successful in a similar manner, and has brought 28 prisoners, made in the rear of the enemy's army, having killed 9; and Lieut. Colonel Waters, who has been employed by me with small detachments of cavalry and infantry, also in the enemy's rear, has taken many prisoners.

‘ The difficulties which the enemy experience in procuring subsistence, owing to their having invaded this country with-

out magazines, and having adopted no measures for the security of their rear, or of their communication with Spain, has rendered it necessary for the soldiers to straggle in search of food, and not a day passes that prisoners and deserters are not sent in.

‘ All remained quiet in the north of Portugal according to the last accounts. Marshal Mortier retired from Zafra and Los Santos on the —th, and according to the last accounts he had arrived at Seville with the troops under his command.

‘ General Ballesteros had followed him to the neighbourhood of Castillo de las Guardias, and the Portuguese and Spanish cavalry had moved on from the Guadiana towards the Sierra Morena. In the mean time the infantry of the Marques de la Romana's corps was put in motion for this quarter on the 8th instant, and the head of it, the division under the command of General O'Donnell, arrived at Cabeça de Montachique yesterday, having crossed the Tagus in the morning. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 4th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I send this dispatch by Lieut. Colonel Sir W. Dal-
ling, of the 3rd Foot Guards, who is obliged to go home on his private affairs, and I beg to refer your Lordship to this officer for any further information that you may require.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 20th October, 1810.

‘ As it is possible that the army may be obliged to make marches during the winter, on which there will be a great consumption of shoes, I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship, to order to Lisbon without loss of time 100,000 pairs of soldiers' shoes of the best quality, and that orders should be given to continue the manufacture of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 21st October, 1810.

‘ I enclose you a newspaper, which contains a paragraph which I have marked, to which I request you to draw the

ing been so much occupied: and I now send you copies of my last dispatches.

‘ I have no idea what the French will, or rather what they can do. I think it is certain that they can do us no mischief, and that they will lose the greatest part of their army if they attack us. They will starve if they stay much longer; and they will experience great difficulty in their retreat.

‘ The head of Romana’s corps has joined the army. All quiet in the north to the 13th instant.

‘ Pray tell General Graham how much I should be pleased to have him here, but I did not consider myself at liberty to call him here; and indeed Lord Liverpool’s letter, in which he allowed me to call for some of the troops, gave me to understand that I must not call for General Graham.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I am apprehensive that the Cortes are becoming a *National Assembly*, and will ruin the cause.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 22nd October, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an account of money advanced by me for the subsistence of the corps under the command of Don Julian Sanchez, which I request you will submit to the Spanish Government, in order that the amount may be repaid to the British Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Redoubt of Sobral, 23rd October, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

7 A.M.

‘ I enclose a memorandum, which goes to settle a point on which General R. Craufurd made a reference to me yesterday evening.

‘ I have spoken to Beresford respecting the relief of Colonel Stewart. He will be relieved this day, and may join the Buffs as soon as relieved.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ Redoubt of Sobral, 23rd October, 1810.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

7 A.M.

‘ I received yesterday evening your letter of the 22nd. I have the same complaints from every brigade in the army, respecting the detention of the soldiers in the hospital at Lisbon; and there is one glaring fact which the gentlemen of the hospital cannot get rid of, and that is, that the military return of sick absent is double that of the number of sick returned by them in the hospital. It is true that there is a depôt of convalescents at Belem, but that establishment cannot account for the difference. I propose to give an order upon the subject this day.

‘ I should be happy to make your division stronger, and I have had in contemplation various modes of effecting that object; but you must see the difficulty which is created by the arrival of General Officers, of rank superior to yours. However, I hope that I shall be able, in some manner, to increase your force.

‘ My intention in bringing up a brigade to St. Jago dos Velhos was, not to limit the space which I wished you to attend to, but to have a body of troops in readiness to throw in upon the ground about Trancoso, and extending from No. 8 to the mills (marked A in your plan), in case the enemy should make a push at the valley of Calhandriz. The guns from the point (B in your plan) in front of Trancoso will be with you probably this day; and I should wish to have them placed in the proper situation, and to have the general charge between General Hill’s left, which extends to No. 8, and the right of General Leith.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I enclose a memorandum, of which a copy will be sent to General Hill, and another to General Lumley.’

*Memorandum for Lieut. General Hill and Brig. General R. Craufurd,
to be also communicated to Major General the Hon. W. Lumley.*

‘ Sobral, 23rd October, 1810.

‘ Lieut. General Hill will adopt such measures as he shall

think necessary for securing the entry of the valley of Calhandriz, by the Quinta de Belaco, upon which he will communicate with Brigadier General Craufurd, who will have a battery placed at the point of the ground extending from the redoubt No. 9, to fire upon the road from Arruda to Alhandra, and to defend the left of the entrance of the valley of Calhandriz.

‘Major General Lumley’s brigade of infantry is stationed at St. Jago dos Velhos as a reserve and point of support to the left of General Hill’s corps, and the right of Brigadier General R. Craufurd’s division.

‘Major General the Hon. W. Lumley will examine all the roads leading from his cantonments to the redoubt No. 8, and to the windmill about 800 yards on the right of that redoubt, in the rear of the Quinta de Belhaco; to the Quinta de Belhaco by those windmills, as well as by Trancoso; to the redoubt No. 9, and the ground extending from the right of No. 9, to the point on which Brigadier General R. Craufurd will have the battery constructed; to the village of Matos.

‘Major General the Hon. W. Lumley will attend to any requisitions he may receive from Brigadier General R. Craufurd for any assistance, if that point of the position should be attacked which extends from Matos to the Quinta de Belhaco.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

SIR,

‘Pero Negro, 23rd October, 1810.

‘All the accounts which I have received of the proceedings of the enemy lead to a belief that they are collecting and making materials to construct a bridge to cross the Tagus.

‘It is impossible for me to say positively whether they will perform this operation, having first endeavored to carry the positions occupied by the army, or without making such an attempt; but, adverting to the numbers with which they entered this country, and to their probable existing force, and to the character and reputation of the General commanding the army, and to the importance of the object to be gained by their forcing our position; and the certain

loss of character, of time, and of all the objects of the campaign, by their retreat without attempting to carry it,—I cannot believe that the attempt will not be made, as soon as the means of passing the Tagus in a retreat in case of failure, shall have been prepared.

‘ Whether the attempt to carry our positions will be made or not, it is obvious that the enemy is constructing this bridge solely with a view to pass into the Alentejo, to which point I beg you to call the serious attention of the Portuguese Government.

‘ First; I recommend to them, without loss of time, to adopt the measures for the removal of persons, valuable property, cattle and grain, which they ought to have adopted at an early period, in the provinces of Beira and Estramadura.

‘ They might move either towards Elvas, towards Lisbon, or towards Setuval, in all of which places they will be secure; or behind the river Alcacer do Sal, or towards the province of Algarve.

‘ Secondly; I recommend that the mills should be rendered useless for the moment, by carrying off the sails and some of the iron pins of the wheels.

‘ Thirdly; it is necessary that the Government should adopt early measures to enable the army to follow the enemy into the province of Alentejo.

‘ The orders should be prepared, directed to the owners of large boats, to attend where they might be required, with boatmen, &c., and measures adopted to ensure obedience to these orders. We shall want to re-establish, immediately, the three bridges, at Punhete over the Zezere, at Abrantes, and at Villa Velha over the Tagus, (for I believe the bridge at Abrantes has been taken up). The Government should therefore immediately prepare the boats and the means of laying three bridges; which might be laid down and used on the lower part of the Tagus for the passage of the army, if that mode of passage should be found preferable to that by boats. It is useless for the Government to point out to me, that it would be desirable to endeavor to prevent the enemy from passing into Alentejo. I am aware of that; but unless I weaken the position on this side of the Tagus, upon which every thing depends, I cannot effect that object. Indeed I

doubt whether I should be able to effect it at all under any circumstances.

‘ I cannot conclude this letter without requesting you to point out to the Government, the inexpediency of giving to the ordenanza of Alentejo the arms which were sent by the British Government, to arm the organized corps of militia; and the folly of sending into the Alentejo two pieces of cannon.

‘ The ordenanza are very capable, if they choose it, of preventing plunderers and marauders from crossing the river, or from plundering, if they should get across; but it must not be expected that they will make any resistance of the description which ought to be made by troops to whom 500 stands of new arms are delivered, or to whom two pieces of artillery are attached; and these arms will be thrown away and be lost to the service, and the cannon will fall into the hands of the enemy, to the disgrace of the Portuguese army. I would observe also, that if it were right to give these arms and cannon to the ordenanza, the military officers of the Government ought to have been consulted upon the subject; but unfortunately the existing Regency cannot avoid interfering with military affairs, with which they have no concern.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 25th October, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st instant. When the Quarter Master General requires boats, or any other means of facilitating the operations of the troops, which would occasion expense, he is obliged, under the regulations of the service, to apply to the Commissary General to hire or purchase them for him. This is the common practice, and there was nothing irregular in Colonel Murray’s application to Mr. Kennedy, or Mr. Dunmore, to procure boats for the transport of the Marques de la Romana’s corps, from the left to the right bank of the Tagus.

‘ I know nothing of Mr. Rawlings’s arrangements; but I am convinced that the Commissary General could not procure a sufficient number of boats for this purpose, in time,

without application to the officer at Lisbon, in charge of the boats in the lower part of the Tagus.

‘ I have not the papers by me at present to enable me to state who this officer is. But about a year has elapsed since, at my recommendation, an arrangement was made for numbering and registering all the boats on the Tagus, and for placing those in each part of the river under the special direction of a particular officer ; I believe the commanding officer at Lisbon was the person who had the direction of the boats below Santarem. Some short time ago, however, an alteration was made in this arrangement ; and a person was specially appointed to perform this duty, to whom the application ought to have been made for the boats required upon this occasion, and by whom they would in course have been supplied.

‘ I have no doubt that you will be able to procure copies of both these regulations at Lisbon. One of the objects of that which I recommended was to be able at all times to command the boats to leave those parts of the river likely to be in the possession of the enemy ; another was, to avoid the system of embargos, than which nothing can be more inconvenient to the public service.

‘ The first object has been tolerably well accomplished ; and till lately, the register has answered the purpose of avoiding the necessity of laying general embargos on the boats in any of the rivers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 25th October, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th with its enclosures, and I am much concerned that the Portuguese Government, instead of giving their own orders immediately for carrying into execution the arrangement recommended to them, should have sent the civil magistrate employed by them to me, to know in what manner he was to perform a duty purely of a civil nature.

‘ I have sent him back to receive the instructions of the

Government; I have none to give excepting what are contained in my letter of the 23rd instant.

‘ In respect to the difficulties attending the measure of evacuating the Alentejo by the inhabitants, stated by Principal Souza, I shall first observe that, since that person has been in the Government, I have not made one proposition of any description in the execution of which he has not thrown difficulties, and has not opposed; but I hope that the time is fast approaching when I shall be relieved from the task of having any business to transact with this gentleman.

‘ In respect to the difficulties and inconveniences stated, if they were greater, I could not prevent the French from crossing the Tagus, without incurring the risk of the defeat of the army and the loss of Lisbon.

‘ Even Principal Souza would probably rather prefer these misfortunes, than suffer the inconveniences of which he has transmitted the exaggerated statement; but these inconveniences and losses will be found either not to exist at all, or to be trifling in degree if the Government, instead of sending the civil magistrate to me for instructions, will perform their duty and instruct him themselves, or give him a copy of my letter to you of the 23rd instant, and send him at once into the province.

‘ If the instructions contained in my letter of the 23rd are not sufficient, or not suitable to the circumstances, the Government should give others without loss of time, and not refer to me again matters in which I can have no concern whatever. The loss and inconvenience resulting from the measure recommended will result from delaying it; there will be none if it is adopted in time.

‘ In respect to the occupation of Almada by the enemy, I think it very unlikely, unless he should receive a very large reinforcement, of which there is no probability. Such a movement would expose the enemy, particularly if my recommendation is followed, to the loss of his whole army.

‘ But I am supposed to know best where to send officers and detachments, and what points to guard, and I am responsible for all my actions. I do not think it necessary to send an officer or troops to Almada; but I beg that the people, and their riches, and the boats, may be moved from the left bank of the river.

‘ I must observe that it is not becoming in members of the Portuguese Government to urge me to weaken the army by detachments, when they know that, owing to the weakness and pusillanimity of their system of Government, nearly two-thirds of the militia are absent without leave, and the military laws have not the power of punishing them; when they know also that throughout the last year in which the works have been constructed, which have saved the country, I was never able to procure a tenth part of the number of workmen required, notwithstanding repeated and earnest representations and remonstrances to the Government; and that the works are consequently not so complete as they ought to have been, and that more men are required for the defence on this side the river, and fewer can be spared for any operation on the left bank.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

Memorandum for Marshal Beresford.

‘ Pero Negro, 26th October, 1810.

‘ In the existing situation of affairs it is desirable that Colonel Wilson’s detachment should be brought down towards Thomar and Torres Novas, so as to confine the enemy’s detachments on that side. It will still be necessary, however, that Colonel Wilson, Brigadier General Millar, and Colonel Trant should advert to the necessity of their keeping up their communication with, and their rear open to, the lower Douro. Accordingly, when Colonel Wilson shall establish himself at Thomar, if he should find that the enemy move upon him in force there, or endeavor to retire by that road, he will send off his infantry by Espinhal and Foz d’Arouce, and across the Mondego, at the Barca de Pena Cova, to the Convent of Busaco, and thence by any road he pleases towards the north. If the enemy should not press him at Thomar by the road of Torres Novas, the infantry might retire from Thomar by the road of Ourem and Leyria, or, if the season should be favorable, direct from Thomar upon Coimbra. His cavalry and any light detachment of infantry might move from Foz d’Arouce upon Ponte da Marçella upon the Alva, and carry into execution the objects of your former instructions. A sketch of the country

from Thomar towards the Mondego and Alva will be sent to you for Colonel Wilson's use.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Pero Negro, 26th October, 1810.

‘I have received your private letters of the 21st, one without date, and one of the 25th this morning. In answer to Lord Wellesley's queries respecting the Portuguese Regency, my opinion is, that the Regency ought to be appointed by the Prince Regent, to act during his pleasure. They ought to have full powers to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws; in short, every power which the Prince himself would possess, if he were on the spot. They ought to report in detail their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The Prince ought to decline receiving any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal, not transmitted through the regular channels of the Government here, and ought to refer all such applications to the consideration of the Regency. He ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal, not recommended by the Regency.

‘The smaller the number of persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is, that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it, excepting Principal Souza, with whom I neither can, nor will have any official intercourse. The Patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence throughout the country, which would increase if he were removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he were not employed. If we should succeed in removing the Principal (which must be done), I think the Patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future.

‘In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency, or any body else. If there is, I can be no longer responsible. If our own Government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Portuguese Regency should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I shall carry them strictly into exe-

cution to the best of my ability, and I shall be responsible for nothing but the execution. But if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion, and no interference on the part of the Regency, or any body else.

‘ I should like to see Principal Souza’s detailed instructions for his *embuscadas* on the left of the Tagus.

‘ If Principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the Government, is inconceivable.

‘ The gentlemen destined for Alentejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th. But, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost, because the Government do not choose to take part in an arrangement, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that sooner or later these persons must and will fly, leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, every thing which can enable the enemy to remain in the country.

‘ In answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz’s note of the 22nd, enclosed in yours (without date), I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army, excepting by the Commissary General; and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese Government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or their regiments, or where they are stationed. But this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them when there are any.

‘ It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel carriages from Lisbon shall not come further than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. Many articles required by the army cannot be carried upon mules, and the carriages must come on with these. In many cases the Portuguese troops, in particular, are ill provided with mules; therefore this must be left to the Commissaries General of the armies, under a recommendation to them, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel carriages beyond the places above mentioned.

‘ I wish in every case that a regulation made should be

observed; and the makers of regulations should take care always so to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 25th, I enclose you the copy of an answer which I gave Mr. Cochrane Johnstone to a similar proposal made to me. I cannot enter into a contract to receive a certain sum of money, at a certain advanced rate of exchange, at a future period. The offer should be conveyed to Government, who alone can decide upon it.

‘ I have now, I believe, answered all your letters excepting one (without date), conveying the paragraph proposed to be published by the Government, respecting the paragraph in the *Sun*. I think they ought to say, not only that we had no share in that proceeding, but no knowledge of it till it was carried into execution. However, I see the subject has got into discussion in England, and I therefore write to the Secretary of State upon it, and send him a copy of my letter to the Portuguese Government.

‘ I have no objection to the publication of Beresford’s letter about Madden, and I shall settle with him about the transmissal of these reports in future.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 26th October, 1810.

‘ The Commissary General having deemed it advisable to endeavor to procure cattle at Oporto for the service of the army, I shall be much obliged to you if you will order 3000 tons of horse transports to proceed there, in order to transport to the Tagus the cattle which Mr. Mackenzie may purchase there.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 26th October, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter (without

date) respecting the request made by Colonel Trant, that tonnage should be provided, to send 3800 French prisoners from Oporto to England.

‘ My opinion is, that it is not expedient to send any of the transports from the Tagus for this service; and that it is desirable that they should be sent in those vessels which you may be able to procure at Oporto; and that those for whom you may not be able to procure tonnage at Oporto, or in the northern ports, should remain at Oporto till means may be found of removing them to England. I do not think it would be proper to remove them to the Bayona Islands.

‘ There are at present at Lisbon twelve French surgeons, whose names I enclose; and as several of the prisoners at Oporto are sick or wounded, I recommend that you should send there six of these gentlemen to attend upon them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 26th October, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 21st and 22nd. I am convinced that the enemy are not yet prepared with means of passing the Tagus with any thing but marauding parties; and the best people to employ against them are the ordenanza, and the irregular horse lately got together.

‘ The swamps on the island of Lyceria would not do your marines and seamen much good; and they are not necessary to keep the enemy’s marauding parties in order.

‘ When they shall have prepared their bridge, the matter will become too serious for any number you could detach from your squadron, and they might experience difficulty in getting away again. I recommend to you, therefore, at present not to make the detachment proposed. Hereafter it might be desirable to station a few men at Alcochete, about a league in front of Aldea Galega.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th instant, regarding the arrival of the Sabrina and convoy with French prisoners from Oporto; and I concur with you in thinking that it is desirable to send them to England, without loss of time, in one of the troop ships, with such a quantity of tonnage as may be sufficient for the purpose of removing them, the whole returning to Lisbon as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th. I mentioned to Mr. Stuart that in case the enemy should retire, we shall want immediately to re-establish the bridges at Punhete and Villa Velha, and at Abrantes, if that should be destroyed, in order that the Government might not cavil at the expense of preparing three bridges, which we shall want, at all events, if we stay in the country.

‘ If the three bridges should be prepared, I should begin by laying them down in some convenient situation above Salvaterra, and pass the army over in three columns.

‘ I am afraid that we should find it inconvenient to cross to the island of Lyceria, as I believe there is no road across the island which an army could use. There is certainly none across the low island opposite Alhandra, which, if the bridge is placed at Alhandra, must be crossed as well as Lyceria.

‘ I cannot find out where the enemy are making their bridge, or where they propose to place it.

‘ From Loison’s movement towards Santarem, and, I believe, even towards Thomar, I should think that they have given up the plan of crossing the Tagus.

‘ Nothing can be worse than Principal Souza. I have written to England about him, and have sent to the Secretary of State my letter to the Portuguese Government dis-

approving of the arrests. I have no doubt that the Portuguese Government circulated the report that I had been the cause of them, and I am strongly inclined to publish at Lisbon my letter to them upon their subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ This was the day of our dispatching the mail for England, otherwise I would have gone to Alhandra to see you and Lady Emily.’

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th September, regarding Colonel Wilson*.

‘ I found this officer doing duty with the Lusitanian Legion when I arrived in Portugal; but I do not know by whose leave or authority; and he has continued in that corps ever since.

‘ He is now confidentially employed by Marshal Beresford and me at the head of the staff attached to the Portuguese General Officer commanding the troops in the northern provinces of this kingdom; which troops are stationed in the enemy’s rear, and acting immediately upon all his communications with Spain. All the arrangements for these operations have been made and carried on through Colonel Wilson, the loss of whose services will be seriously felt by the army in this country.

‘ I venture to delay ordering him to join the Royal York Rangers till the Commander in Chief shall have read this letter, and shall have decided whether it is most important that he should continue where he is, or proceed to join the regiment to which he belongs.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adjutant General
of the Forces.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ When the Marques de la Romana came to my head quarters at Alverca in the month of July last, I arranged

* Major General Sir John Wilson, C.B., commanding in Ceylon.

with him, among other points, that, in case the enemy should move into Portugal to attack this army, he should march to our assistance; and that if he was pressed by the enemy on the side of Estremadura, he was to fall back upon Portugal.

‘ The Marques de la Romana, however, informed me some time ago, that in case of his entry into Portugal to assist the British army, or for his own safety, it was impossible for him to provide for the subsistence of his troops while in this country, and he urged me to request the Portuguese Government to supply him.

‘ I forwarded this request, but the Regency stated that they were unable to comply with it, and I am aware that they are not able to supply with regularity their own troops.

‘ In a subsequent correspondence the Marques de la Romana complained to me that his troops were destitute of pay, clothing, shoes, and every necessary, and that he had no money, and he earnestly entreated me to supply him in case he should march into Portugal.

‘ Under these circumstances, I thought it proper, when I called upon the Marques de la Romana to march into Portugal, and when I was certain of the enemy’s advance after the battle of Busaco, to give him £20,000 sterling on account of the Spanish Government, and 8000 pairs of shoes; and to engage to feed his troops while they should remain in Portugal, also on the account of the Spanish Government, on the same terms as under the arrangement of June, 1809, the Portuguese Government pay for rations received from the British Commissariat for the Portuguese troops. I enclose an extract of a letter written to the Marques de la Romana upon this subject.

‘ I hope that His Majesty’s Government will approve of these arrangements. I did not think myself justified in not bringing into our positions all the force which was at my disposal; and it would have been vain to expect any service from the Spanish troops if they had not been paid, fed, and provided like the other troops with which they were to act; and their march through the country, and their stay in it, would have been worse than the invasion of the enemy.

‘ The Marques de la Romana, even if provided with money, would have experienced difficulty in procuring provisions on his march through Alentejo; and here, unassisted by the

English or Portuguese magazines, he would have found none.

‘ I propose to send to His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz the accounts of the sums which will be due by the Spanish Government for the money, provisions, and necessaries delivered to the Marques de la Romana’s corps.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the originals of two letters for the Prince of Essling, recently intercepted between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, which deserve the attention of His Majesty’s Government.

‘ That from the Prince of Neufchatel, No. 1, shows that the enemy have means of acquiring intelligence in England. The strength of the different divisions of this army quoted in this letter, must have been extracted from the weekly states transmitted home, which alone contain the accounts of the distribution of the army into divisions.

‘ The letter No. 2 shows the source from which Massena may draw his reinforcements; but from the letter No. 1, it is obvious that the reinforcement which it appears has arrived at Vitoria, was not intended for him, and it is possible that it may have been sent to another quarter.

‘ It appears from other letters, intercepted at the same period, that as late as the 8th October, no intelligence had been received at Valladolid of the battle of Busaco, from which Massena would have begun to doubt of the sufficiency of his means to effect his object; and it may therefore be concluded, that even if these fifteen battalions, or if the 9th corps d’armée had not been allotted for service in some other quarter of the Peninsula, they could not have received at Vitoria Massena’s requisition for assistance till the 16th October, and that they cannot be in this neighbourhood till the middle of next month.

‘ All the accounts which I have received of the distresses of the enemy for want of provisions would lead to a belief that their army could not remain long in the position in which it is placed, and it is astonishing that they have been

able to remain here so long. There is no doubt whatever, that no issue of bread or flour has been made to the army since it marched from Almeida, where the soldiers were loaded each with biscuit for fifteen days, which the greater proportion of them being unable to carry, it had thrown away. They have since received meat only, and such vegetables as they could pick up.

‘ As the Portuguese Government neglected to adopt the measures which I had recommended to them, even in this neighbourhood, viz., to prepare the people for withdrawing from those parts of the country into which the enemy should move his army, carrying with them their valuable property, and whatever could tend to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress, driving off their cattle, and rendering useless the mills, it is impossible to form a judgment respecting the quantity of subsistence which the enemy may have found in that part of the country which they occupy with their troops, or to which they may send their detachments. I am convinced, that if the measures which I recommended had been adopted in time, in this neighbourhood, and on the banks of the Tagus, they would have been as successful as they were found to be in the province of Beira, and on the banks of the Coa and the Mondego; and the enemy would have been obliged before now to commence his retreat for the want of provisions to support his army. But it is impossible now to form a judgment of the supply which he has found, or of the length of time which he may be enabled to remain in his position.

‘ This is not the only cause that I have to complain of the recent proceedings of the Portuguese Government, and I beg to assure your Lordship, that if Principal Souza is not removed from the Regency, and even from Portugal; and if the Prince Regent does not give power and authority, and his support and countenance to the Government which he will appoint to conduct his affairs here, it is useless to pretend to carry on military operations on an extensive scale, of which Portugal is to be the basis, or to preserve this country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD, ‘Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘Your Lordship has been apprized of the measures which had been adopted to induce the inhabitants of Portugal to quit that part of the country through which the enemy was likely to pass, or which it was probable would become the seat of his operations, carrying off with them their valuable property, and every thing which could tend to the enemy’s subsistence, or to facilitate his progress. There is no doubt that these inhabitants had sufficient knowledge, from former experience, of the treatment they would receive from the enemy; and there is no instance of those of any town or village having remained, or of their having failed to remove what might be useful to the enemy when they had sufficiently early intimation of the wishes of Government, or of myself, that they should abandon their houses, and carry away their property.

‘All those who are acquainted with the nature of military operations, with their dependence upon the assistance of the country to supply the wants of the army, and particularly with the degree to which the French armies depend upon this assistance, must be aware of the distress which this system has occasioned to the enemy; and the official and private letters which have been intercepted, are filled with complaints of its effects, which have been repeated in the official papers published in the *Moniteur* at Paris.

‘It happened unfortunately, that the Indian corn harvest, which is the principal support of the inhabitants of a large part of Portugal, was on the ground at the moment of the enemy’s invasion. This of course could not be carried off: the enemy’s troops have, as usual, destroyed what they could not move; and nothing remains.

‘If, therefore, the result of the campaign should be to oblige the enemy to withdraw from Portugal, it is much to be apprehended that the greatest distress will be felt in those districts through which the enemy’s troops have passed, which there are no means whatever in this country of relieving.

‘Upon former occasions, the wealthy inhabitants of Great Britain, and of London in particular, have stepped forward

to assist and relieve the distresses of foreign nations, whether suffering under calamities inflicted by Providence, or by a cruel and powerful enemy. This nation has received the benefit of the charitable disposition of His Majesty's subjects, and there never was a case in which their assistance was required in a greater degree, whether the sufferings of the people, or their fidelity to the cause they have espoused, and their attachment to His Majesty's subjects, be considered.

'I declare that I have scarcely known an instance in which any person in Portugal, even of the lowest order, has had communication with the enemy inconsistent with his duty to his own sovereign, or with the orders he had received.

'I would, therefore, beg leave to recommend the unfortunate portion of the inhabitants who have suffered from the enemy's invasion, to your Lordship's protection; and I request you to consider of the mode of recommending them to the benevolent disposition of His Majesty's subjects, at the moment which I hope may be not far distant that the enemy may be under the necessity of evacuating the country.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

To the Earl of Liverpool.

'MY LORD,

'Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

'Having observed that I am supposed to have advised the measures recently adopted by the Regency in Portugal, in respect to certain individuals who have been sent out of the kingdom; and as I know that credit is given to calumnies of this description, and that they are frequently repeated, and brought forward in the shape of charges against those who are serving His Majesty abroad, I am desirous that your Lordship should be informed how this matter really stands.

'The first I heard of the arrest of the persons in question was from public report, and from the Portuguese newspapers. The Secretary of the Regency afterwards sent me a paper upon the subject, of which I enclose a copy, to which I

wrote the answer expressing my disapprobation of the measure, of which I enclose the draft.

‘I am decidedly of opinion that the Portuguese Government had no reason for arresting these individuals, excepting a desire to gratify the populace by an act of vigor against those supposed to be well wishers of, and partisans of the French. It is impossible for me to say whether they are so or not, but I am very certain that they had it not in their power to do any mischief, and that their sudden arrest and transportation for crimes not stated, were calculated to do much injury at the time, by creating general suspicion and mistrust.

‘I am afraid that the Portuguese Government, after they had carried this measure into execution, and had found that commiseration for the sufferings of individuals had excited the disapprobation of many persons in Lisbon of the whole proceedings, gave their sanction to the reports which were circulated by their friends, that it had been adopted at the suggestion of the British authorities, although they had adopted it not only without consulting any of us, but had persevered in carrying it into execution, notwithstanding the remonstrances of His Majesty’s Minister and of the Admiral, and they knew that I disapproved of it entirely.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘I enclose a letter from Lieut. Colonel Fletcher of the Royal Engineers, and a list of Engineer’s stores required for the service in this country. The articles required in former requisitions have not yet arrived, and if they have not yet sailed from England it is desirable that no time should be lost in despatching them.

‘I have also to request your Lordship will give directions that all the articles of camp equipage, provisions, and military stores, and blankets, &c., for the troops, may be sent out as soon as possible.

‘I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will give directions that two brigades of 5½ inch iron howitzers (without chambers), weight 13 cwt., mounted upon heavy

6 pounder travelling carriages, may be sent to the Tagus for the use of this army. It would be very desirable that these carriages should be mounted upon axletrees of the following dimensions, viz.: breadth from wheel to wheel, 4 feet 2½ inches, extremity of the axletree from point to point, 5 feet 1¾ inch. But if there are none of these carriages in the yard, it is better that we should have them of the usual dimensions, than that there should be any delay in the arrival of these pieces of ordnance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ As the troops are liable at this season to complaints in their bowels, which in many instances end fatally, particularly in this country, in which they cannot be prevented from eating grapes and drinking the new wine, I have thought it proper to direct that an issue shall be made to them from the stores of a quantity of rice, not exceeding one pound among eight men each day, which I hope may have the effect of checking the tendency to this disorder, and aid in its cure in cases in which it has been already acquired.

‘ I propose to direct this issue as soon as the troops shall be in a situation to purchase any thing in addition to their rations. I hope that His Majesty’s Government will approve of this arrangement.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ I enclose two letters from Marshal Beresford, with reports from Brigadier General Blunt, of successes against the enemy’s detachments, by parties detached from the garrison of Peniche. The former was mentioned to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 20th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘ I observe that I am accused in the French official paper, the “*Moniteur*” of having promised to endeavor to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and it is stated that my letters to General Herrasti, the late Governor of that fortress, contained that promise; and as the “*Moniteur*” is considered an authority against those serving his Majesty abroad, and the charge is one of a serious nature, I think it proper to transmit to your Lordship extracts of the letters which I wrote to General Herrasti upon the subject of the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the assistance he was to expect from the army under my command.

‘ After the summons of the place by Marshal Ney in the month of February, I placed Brigadier General R. Craufurd’s division within the Spanish territory, between the Coa and the Agueda, in order to be nearer Ciudad Rodrigo, and to prevent the enemy from cutting off the communication with that place.

‘ The Junta of Castille, of which General Herrasti was the head, remonstrated against this disposition, as they said the country could not supply provisions for the troops; and I then wrote them a letter to apprise them of the object I had in view in that disposition, and to inform them that I should alter it, as it did not appear to be satisfactory to them. The Junta of Castille then sent me a deputation of two of their members to Viseu, to request that I would not alter the disposition which I had made, with which request I complied; but in the conversation which I had with these deputies, I pointed out to the Junta that Ciudad Rodrigo was not the only object intrusted to my care; that when that place should be attacked, I must take into consideration, not only the relative strength of the two armies immediately in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, but other operations going on at the same time in other parts of the Peninsula before I should determine whether I could undertake its relief.

‘ Two days afterwards, on the 26th April, the place was invested on the right of the Agueda, by Ney’s corps, but its communication remained open with the country on the left

of that river, in consequence of the position of General Craufurd's division. I found from General Herrasti's letters, that he was inclined to consider that I had entered into a formal engagement to proceed to the relief of the place at all events and at all risks, when it should be attacked, and I therefore wrote him from Celorico a letter, on the 7th May*, of which I enclose an extract, No. 1, in which I stated that the relief to be expected from me depended upon circumstances; and in order that the matter might be more fully explained, and that the whole of the Junta might be informed of what my intentions were, I sent this letter by Colonel O'Lalor, an officer in the service of Spain, who had been for some time attached to the British Head Quarters, who did explain to the Junta that operations of the British army depended upon the strength of the enemy's army by which the place should be attacked, and upon other operations going on in other quarters at the same time.

I repeated the same sentiments in a letter to the Governor, of the 6th June†, of which I enclose the extract.

As your Lordship knows, the place was not completely invested till the 11th June, and after it was invested, I received another letter from General Herrasti, requesting my assistance, to which I wrote the answer No. 3, in which I referred him to my former letters, and to the communication by Colonel O'Lalor.

I do not know whether he ever received this letter, but I thought it proper to use the terms in which that letter is written, because it was not improbable that it might fall into the hands of the enemy, and it was desirable even for Ciudad Rodrigo itself, that they should not be made acquainted with my intentions.

From the perusal of these papers your Lordship will be able to judge whether I deserve the imputation of having deceived General Herrasti with hopes of relief. The only chance of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo was to have made General Hill's corps cross the Tagus in June, and to unite the whole British army in that operation. But this could not be done unless the Marques de la Romana could maintain himself in Estremadura against the 2nd corps of the French

* See p. 94. † See p. 171.

army, after General Hill should have been brought away. I proposed this plan to the Marques de la Romana in the interviews which I had with him at Alverca during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, but he declared that he could not maintain his position in Estremadura if Lieut. General Hill should cross the Tagus, and Regnier should still remain in that province.

I did every thing in my power short of deceiving General Herrasti with hopes of relief at all risks to the army under my command, to induce him to defend the place intrusted to his charge. It is a very convenient doctrine for the French, that a fortified place which is attacked by them and has no hope of relief from an army in the field, ought to surrender without making any defence; but the contrary doctrine is the only one by which they can be effectually opposed. The inhabitants of every town in a state of siege must suffer considerably, but their remaining in it during the period of the siege is a matter of choice, and in the case of Ciudad Rodrigo in particular, was not a matter of necessity; and it would be quite a new principle in war, and a most advantageous one for the French, that every town threatened with a siege of which the inhabitants might feel the inconvenience, and for which there could be no hope of relief by an army in the field, ought to surrender without making any defence.

I have the honor to be, &c.
The Earl of Liverpool. WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

The enemy still occupy the same positions in front of this army which they held when I addressed you on the 20th instant. They have detached some troops towards Santarem, and on the 23rd General Loison marched towards that place with the division under his command, and it appears from accounts from the commanding officer at Abrantes of the 24th, that a body of the enemy's infantry and cavalry had entered Thomar on that day.

The reports which I have received from the prisoners and deserters who have been brought in, concur in the ac-

counts of the distress felt by the enemy for the want of provisions of all descriptions. They state that they are collecting and preparing materials to construct a bridge over the Tagus; but although we have a good view of that river from different parts of the ground occupied by the army, and have officers and others employed on the left of the Tagus to observe the motions of the enemy, I have not been able to discover either where this work is carrying on, or where the bridge is to be placed on the river, if it should be constructed. The enemy appear very anxious to collect boats, and on the 24th endeavored to drive a party of the ordenanza from Chamusca by the fire of their artillery, in order to obtain possession of some which were under that place.

‘Colonel Wilson had been at Leyria with the cavalry attached to General Bacellar’s division, and had proceeded to Ourem. The advance of the infantry was at Pombal.

‘On the side of Obidos and Ramalhal, the British cavalry, and a battalion of Spanish light infantry, and the troops of the garrison of Peniche confine the enemy’s detachments; and they really possess no part of the country excepting that on which their army stands.

‘By the last accounts from General Silveira of the 17th instant, it appears that all was quiet in the north, and he had not received any accounts of the march of troops in Castille. The parties of guerrillas had been more daring than usual, and they had united in the neighbourhood of Valladolid early in the month of October, to the amount of 1500, in order to carry off a convoy of money which had been raised in contributions from the country, in which attempt, however, they failed.

‘According to the accounts of the 21st from Estremadura, it appears that Marshal Mortier’s corps was still at Seville, and General Ballesteros was observing it from Aracena. The second division of the Marques de la Romana’s corps under General Carrera arrived at Lisbon on the 25th, and will be with the army this day. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 4th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’ Besides, Wellington.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY DEAR LORD, ‘Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.

‘My dispatches of this date will give you an idea of our situation, which I hope will be satisfactory to you. In my opinion the enemy ought to retire, for he has no chance of annoying our position; and delay will only aggravate his distress, and make his retreat more difficult.

‘I calculate that a reinforcement of 15,000 men would not give him so good an army as he had at Busaco. He had 2000 men killed there: Trant took 5000 prisoners at Coimbra: above 1000 prisoners have gone through this army: many men have been killed by the peasantry, and in the skirmishes with our different detachments: and they had 200 or 300 men wounded in the affair with our outposts about Sobral. They cannot have less than 4000 sick, after the march they have made, the distress they have suffered, and the weather to which they were exposed. Indeed, the deserters and prisoners tell us that almost every body is sick.

‘From this statement you will judge of the diminution of their numbers, and you will see that I have not much reason to apprehend any thing from the “*quinze beaux bataillons*” which fought at Essling, and which cannot be here before the middle of November. I do not think I have much to apprehend, even if Mortier should be added to them. However, we shall see how that will be.

‘We have an excellent position, which we are improving every day; and the army is in good order and spirits, and not sickly. By the last returns, we had 4200 in hospital, and no serious disorder. We had 8500 sick in the military returns, but these include convalescents at Belem, of whom, I hope, under better regulations, not to have quite so many.

‘I am not quite certain that I ought not to attack the French, particularly as they have detached Loison, either to look for provisions, or to open the road for their retreat; but I think the sure game, and that in which I am likely to lose fewest men, the most consistent with my instructions and the intentions of the King’s Government; and I therefore prefer to wait the attack. Besides, although I have the advantage of numbers, the enemy are in a very good position,

which I could not turn with any large force, without laying open my own rear, and the road to the sea. This is the worst of all these strong countries, that they afford equally good positions to both sides.

‘I beg your Lordship will hurry out our supplies of all kinds, and the horses for the artillery.

‘I hope that Lord Wellesley will relieve me from Principal Souza. I cannot act with that gentleman; and indeed the Portuguese Government must be put on a proper footing, and forced to do its duty.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Pero Negro, 28th October, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 26th instant, and I am much concerned to have to inform you that the cattle and other articles of supply, which the Government have been informed have been removed from the Island of Lyceria, are still on the island; and most probably the Secretary of State, Dom Miguel Forjaz, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the Government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders, and have deceived them by false reports.

‘The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature. First, they are liable to the forfeiture of all their personal property, upon the information that they are absent from their corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion, inflicted by the military tribunals.

‘The first two are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrates; and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the Government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects.

‘I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and

soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia; to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for this shameful desertion of their post in the hour of danger; and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve in any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures, without favor or distinction of any individual, in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bonâ fide* upon this subject, and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country.

‘ But if we are to go on as we have hitherto; if Great Britain is to give large subsidies, and to expend large sums in the support of a cause, in which those most interested sit by and take no part; and those at the head of the Government, with laws and power to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil, but neglect their duty, and omit to put the laws into execution, I must believe their professions to be false; that they look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence.

‘ In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons, who have deserted their duty in these critical times, will be punished as they deserve.

‘ But the Governors of the Kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of Courts Martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Oliveira militia, who behaved ill in action with the enemy at Villa Nova do Foz Coa, in the beginning of August last, and for whose trial a Court Martial was immediately assembled, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will probably not be concluded before Christmas. In like manner the military trial of these deserters of the militia, after assembling officers

and soldiers, at great inconvenience, for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be derived from the example of the punishment of any one, or number of them.

‘ This defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the Government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent, but they will not adopt it ; and it would be much better if there were no laws for the government of the army, than that the existing laws should continue without being executed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 28th October, 1810.

‘ The Marques de la Romana has spoken to me respecting the exportation of Merinos by the Americans from the Portuguese ports. As for my part, I am well convinced that neither Americans nor English will ever derive any general advantage from the Merinos. Rich individuals will keep the breed pure, and will have the power of keeping them warm in winter, and may get a little fine wool from them, but I am inclined to believe that the change of the pasture can alone insure the continuance of the produce and fineness of the wool. However, it would gratify the Spaniards, and probably some persons in England, if the Portuguese Government would prohibit the exportation of Merinos through their ports, excepting probably by British subjects to Great Britain or Ireland, and you might urge this upon them.

‘ I have written you a letter this day, which I wish you to show to the Regency. If the French can feed in the country, (and they will be able to feed, if the resources are not removed out of their reach,) they will stay till they will be reinforced ; for they are still too strong for me to attack them, and they are in as good a position as mine is. The Government and people, therefore, are seriously interested in removing food out of their reach. But if they will not do that, I hope they will take the measures proposed for strengthening the militia. If these corps were complete,

I should be very indifferent about the enemy's reinforcements. Indeed, as it is, I do not care much about them; but 7000 or 8000 men, in which number the militia are deficient, would secure many points for me which are at present but bare.

‘Believe me, &c.’
 ‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘SIR,’ ‘Pero Negro, 28th October, 1810.

‘I have the honor to enclose an estimate for the pay of the corps of cavalry under Don Julian Sanchez, on which I have advanced 4000 dollars, which I request you will submit to the Spanish Government, in order that the money may be repaid by them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.’
 ‘The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘SIR,’ ‘Pero Negro, 28th October, 1810.

‘I enclose a letter to the Secretary of State, conveying a detailed account of the assistance which I had given to the Marques de la Romana for the troops under his command, on their entrance into this country, and of that which they are to receive while here.

‘I request you to receive back from the Spanish Government the sum of £20,000, advanced in money; and I shall hereafter acquaint you with the amount of the value of the shoes and other necessaries, and of the sum to be paid for rations, according to the terms settled in my letter to the Marques de la Romana, enclosed in the dispatch to the Secretary of State.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.’
 ‘The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,’ ‘Pero Negro, 28th October, 1810.

‘I enclose two dispatches, written yesterday, to the Secretary of State, which will explain to you the situation of affairs here.

‘ It is impossible to say what Massena will do. It appears to be imagined in the army that reinforcements are coming ; but I do not think that a reinforcement of 15,000 men will give him back such an army as that which he brought into Portugal ; and I do not think what he had was sufficient to accomplish his object.

‘ It is reported here that Mortier has marched from Seville to join Victor at the Isla. If that be true, I should imagine they are going to try an attack upon that point ; or else the reports of the sickness of the troops before Cadiz are well founded ; and Mortier is gone there to aid in the duties of the siege.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 28th, and I am concerned that an inaccuracy of expression in my letter to Mr. Stuart, respecting your proposal to supply the army with dollars, should have given you the trouble of writing to me on the subject.

‘ The Commissary General is authorised to draw bills upon the Treasury for money, and he has made bargains with individuals for the delivery of money into the military chests, for bills to be drawn at certain rates of exchange. But these bargains have been invariably for money to be delivered within a named, and a very short period of time, which has seldom exceeded a few days ; and in no instance has the period been undetermined.

‘ I doubt that the Commissary General is authorised to make a bargain with any person for the delivery of dollars for the use of the army, at a distant and undetermined period, even at a favorable rate of exchange ; and therefore I would recommend to you to make your offers to the Treasury.

‘ I assure you that it seldom happens to me to give an answer upon a subject of this description, without consulting with the gentlemen at the head of the department to which the consideration of it belongs ; and although I did not consult with Mr. Kennedy upon the offer contained in Mr. Stuart’s letter, I had spoken to him upon a proposition which

you before did me the favor to make to me; and it appeared to me that the same objection rendered it necessary to decline to accept of either.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Hon. A. C. Johnstone.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

Instructions for Captain Wedekind, Royal Engineers.

‘Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

‘Upon the receipt of this letter, you will wait upon his Excellency Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley, and inform him that you are appointed by me to communicate with the officer employed by him to have the boats and other materials, viz., barks, planks, anchors and cables, cordage, &c., prepared for three bridges, one over the Zezere at Punhete, one over the Tagus at Villa Velha, and one over the Tagus at Abrantes.

‘You will receive the Admiral’s commands respecting the officer with whom you are to communicate; and you will immediately wait upon him, and inquire from him what arrangements have been made, and in what state of preparation are these several bridges; what quantities of materials he has in readiness, and what quantities wanting; and what steps have been taken to procure the materials wanting; and you will report the result of your inquiries for my information.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

‘I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th instant, and I am very apprehensive that you will have much trouble with our bridge concerns, which the Government ought not to have imposed upon you. As two of our bridges have been destroyed, and I conceived that that of Abrantes was so likewise, I wished that the Government should make their arrangements, through the bridgemaster (who has always managed these concerns for us), to supply us with boats, &c., for three others; and I proposed to use these to pass the lower Tagus with the British army, when the enemy’s operations should render that measure desirable.

‘I have now sent instructions to an officer of Engineers to

wait on you, upon the subject of these bridges, and I recommend to you to refer him to Colonel Fisher, and to leave to these two officers all the detail of the preparations for these bridges, supplying them from the naval stores with such articles of beams, planks, cordage, anchors, &c., as they may require, and assisting them with your influence over the owners of boats.

‘ From the enclosed extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart on this subject, you will observe that I requested the Government would make all the arrangements for having boats at command to ferry the army over the Tagus, if it should be necessary, as well as boats to be formed into bridges eventually.

‘ The place at which I should fix these bridges in the lower Tagus, if I should ever fix them in this part of the river, and that in which I shall cross the river, if I should ever cross it, must depend upon the enemy’s operations. I think it probable, however, that there is no road across the Island of Lyceria from the proposed landing place opposite Alhandra, and that I should not place any large proportion of the army there.

‘ In respect to the Island of Lyceria, and the left bank of the Tagus, I am apprehensive that we shall get into some little confusion in that quarter, as both the Government and the Governor of Setuval, &c., have made that part of the country the object of their peculiar attention, and I know nothing that is going on there, what troops they have, or what enemy they have to oppose. I heard cannon in that quarter the day before yesterday; and, excepting the two brass three pounders sent over by the Government, I was not aware that they had a gun.

‘ Under such circumstances I never pretend to interfere in any concern. My own opinion is, that the ordenanza cavalry and infantry are fully sufficient to prevent the plunderers of the French army from crossing to do any material mischief, unless the French have means of crossing at a time a much larger body of men than they have yet shown us. If they have those means, I must adopt measures to curb their plunderers on that flank, as I have on the other, which will be more efficient than the efforts of the ordenanza.

‘ In this view of the question, some large boats on the

right of our line at Alhandra would be very useful, particularly if there is any road which troops could use from that end of the Island of Lyceria.

‘ But the best and easiest mode of all, of preventing plunderers from crossing to that side of the Tagus, is to remove out of their reach every thing, to obtain which, they would cross, for it is really out of my power to look after every bullock and pig in the country ; and at all events, while the bishops and priests are carrying on war without quarter, and the Governor of Setuval is co-operating with them contrary to orders, I cannot interfere in any manner, and I have no knowledge on which I could venture to found an order.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send the coppered horse transports to Oporto, in the first instance, for the cattle, and let them be followed by others to the amount of 3000 tons.

‘ I hope that you are right about the quantity of cattle in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, but, if I am not misinformed, you are mistaken ; and I have already begun to give the British army salt provisions during two days in the week.

‘ I have directed the Commissary General to make inquiries respecting the facility of purchasing cattle at Vigo, and we can send there hereafter. In the mean time, I do not believe that there will yet be any difficulty in getting vessels into and out of the Douro.

‘ I shall be very happy to see you and Captain Beresford*.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

‘ I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th, respecting the French prisoners at Oporto, and I beg to acquaint you, that as Colonel Trant has sent the prisoners from Oporto to Lisbon, for the care of whom I had requested you to send to Oporto six French surgeons, by my letter of the 26th ; I now request you to apply these surgeons, as you

* Vice Admiral Sir John Beresford, K.C.B.

may think proper, for the care of such French prisoners as you may send home.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

‘ I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th, respecting the transports wanted for the conveyance of cattle from Oporto, and I request that you will send to Oporto first the fast sailing horse transports, and afterwards any other horse ships that may be necessary to make up 3000 tons. I hope there will be no difficulty as yet in getting across the bar of the Douro.

‘ I fear that you are mistaken in your account of the number of cattle near Lisbon. I cannot request you to send a vessel to Vigo for cattle, until I have sent a Commissary to make inquiries about the practicability of making purchases there.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 29th October, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th instant. I have written to Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who wrote to me about my answer to his offer to supply us with money from America.

‘ I have appointed an officer to look after our bridge affairs.

‘ I do not know whether the paper No. 2 in your letter, strikes you as it does me and Beresford; but if the Government were desirous that any measure which they were forced to adopt should not be carried into execution, it appears to me that this is the kind of instruction they would give. I never saw so cold a performance, or one which shows more clearly, that the measure ordered was not their own, but was pressed upon them by you, and that it might be carried into execution or not. If I did not know that the individuals are afraid, I should swear they were treacherous.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make me acquainted with your opinion upon this paper ; and if it should agree with mine, I shall send it home, and to the Prince Regent, to show him how his Government co-operate with my views for the country. At all events, I should be glad to know who drew it.

‘ I do not know whether they sent you open a dispatch which I wrote to Lord Liverpool on Saturday, to endeavor to prevail upon him to get a subscription in London for the Portuguese, who have suffered by the passage of the French through the country. I propose to have one in the army, and I have no doubt that every soldier will contribute. But besides this measure, we must turn our minds seriously to the introduction of large quantities of grain into the country during the winter. I spoke to Sampayo yesterday upon this subject, and told him that I would lend myself to the accomplishment of any reasonable plan for this purpose.

‘ I have not much leisure to enter deeply into the consideration of details, but I shall be obliged to you if you will consider the subject, and see what it will be best to do, and how to do it, to prevent the people of Upper Beira, in particular, from starving in the winter and spring. The French, it is true, made but a short stay in that province, and the destruction did not spread very wide. But it was complete where they did pass ; and I imagine that the people can now have nothing, excepting what they were able to carry with them. They did carry away a great deal, for they had evacuated their houses nearly a month before the French entered, but still the poor will be in want, and we must endeavor to relieve their distresses.

‘ I hope this rain will set at rest the question of the Alentejo. The reports of the bridge still continue. But I can scarcely believe that the French will be able to manage it, if the river should fill again. However, that which is certain, is, for the people to move out of the way with their property, and I always wish to bring things as near to a certainty as I can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ I return your intercepted letters.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 30th October, 1810.

‘ Referring to the subject of my letter of yesterday, I enclose a paper which I have received regarding supplies which might be procured at Viana.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Pero Negro, 31st October, 1810.

‘ I send you two reports, and a letter showing that the enemy are getting large supplies on that side the country. I should think that General Anson might contrive to intercept these parties between Obidos and Cadaval, having Obidos occupied on one side of him, and Torres Vedras on the other, and it is really very desirable that these supplies should be intercepted.

‘ Pray desire that an effort should be made. The enemy’s force is but very small on that side, and they cannot do you any mischief.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 31st October, 1810.

‘ I shall talk to you about the case of this promotion when I shall see you to-morrow. It would be very desirable that you should hint to Forjaz, that as long as the Government continue to carry on their operations, and to give their orders to officers on the left of the Tagus, it is impossible for us to interfere in any manner. We might possibly, if they were to withdraw, get Fane over with a battalion of Caçadores, and some cavalry, and the ordenanza, and some of Congreve’s rockets, and do something; but till the Government cease their operations, I shall do nothing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 31st October, 1810.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 30th. It is impossible for me to interfere at all in the affairs on the left bank of the Tagus, till the Government shall withdraw from all interference in that concern. I should only render the confusion greater than it is.

‘ If the enemy construct only a raft at Barquinha, it is for the sake of getting plunder. They cannot cross the army by such means. I do not think it quite certain that Loison has marched, or that they have more than two or three battalions up the Tagus with their cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 31st October, 1810.

‘ I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps, as well regarding the provisions in the Alentejo, as the desertion of the militia. The ordenanza artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations, and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops.

‘ Your note, No. 1 of the 29th, is strictly true in all its parts. The French could not have stayed here a week if the provisions had been removed; and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places, from which there existed means of removing every thing, if the quantity had been ten times greater.

‘ They are stopped effectually in front; all the roads are occupied; and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements are useless, if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy.

‘ For aught I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE,

‘ Pero Negro, 1st November, 1810.

‘ You will receive directions from Colonel Murray to march to Lisbon with one brigade of Portuguese cavalry and a battalion of Caçadores from General Hill’s corps, and to cross the Tagus, by boats which will be prepared for you.

‘ Our wish is, if possible, that you should go up with the tide as far as Camora, from whence there is a road of three leagues to Salvaterra ; but you had better communicate with the naval people upon this subject, and go to the place to which the troops can certainly be conveyed in one tide, and at which the horses can certainly land.

‘ The objects in sending you across the Tagus are as follows :

‘ First ; to observe the enemy’s movements on the right of the river, and convey to us some certain information of what they are about.

‘ Secondly ; to prevent them from crossing it, if possible. This of course must depend upon the means they have of making a first establishment on the left bank of the river, compared with those you will have to resist them.

‘ Thirdly ; to endeavor to destroy their establishments of boats, timber, rope, casks, &c., which they have formed, as it is said, at Santarem and Barquinha.

‘ In respect to the first point, we have at present the following intelligence : that the enemy have spread themselves from Santarem to Punhete, along the river. They have some cannon, and about three or four battalions of infantry. The troops they have are, in general, cavalry. Till you would get to Salvaterra, you would not have a view of the main branch of the river ; and you should proceed on to Chamusca.

‘ In respect to the second object, it is impossible for me to form any opinion of the means of passing the river which the enemy possesses, from the contradictory accounts I have received. They talk of their having completed two boats which were on the stocks at Santarem, and of their having three or four more ; but I am not sure what they have.

‘ Besides the Caçadores, you ought to find all the ordenanza of those districts collected under the command of

Lieut. Colonel —, whom you will take under your orders. He has with him two 3 pounders. If you should find that the enemy has means of passing a large body over the river at a time, of which I shall hear from you, I must increase the force there, and adopt other measures.

‘ In respect to the third object, I have to inform you that Brigadier General Rosa has orders to send over the Tagus with you two 12 pounders on travelling carriages and artillerymen. The Governor of Setuval has orders to send to Camora to meet you some 6 pounders, which he had lately brought from Setuval for a warfare which he was carrying on on the left of the Tagus.

‘ If you should find that the means of drawing the 6 pounders are sufficient to draw the 12 pounders, you had better take the latter with you. If they are not, you had better take the 6 pounders. In that case you will send the 12 pounders back to Lisbon in the boats; but if you should take with you the 12 pounders, you will either send the 6 pounders to Setuval, if you can find bullocks to draw them there, or if not, you will send them over to Lisbon in the boats.

‘ Besides this, I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send with you some of Congreve’s rockets, and some officers and seamen who are acquainted with the mode of using them. You will communicate with the Admiral upon this point, and with Brigadier Rosa, the commanding officer of Portuguese artillery, respecting the 12 pounders.

‘ I should hope that between the 12 pounders and the rockets, we shall be able to destroy all their little establishments at Barquinha and Santarem.

‘ The next thing upon which I must instruct you is your retreat, in case the enemy should cross the Tagus in superior strength.

‘ It is not very probable, according to all accounts, that he will attempt it below Santarem. If he should cross above the situation in which you will be, you will retire gradually upon Salvaterra, and from thence to Aldea Galega, giving the Assistant Quarter Master General and me the earliest information of your movements, in order that boats may be prepared to transport you. You will find a good post at Alcochete, about a league in front of Aldea Galega.

‘ If the enemy should cross below you in force, you must in that case retire direct from the river till you shall come upon the great road leading from Monte Mor to Aldea Galega, and thence to that town.

‘ If by any accident you should be cut off from Aldea Galega, which is not very likely, you will retire upon Palmella and Setuval.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Fane.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 1st Nov., 1810.

‘ I have directed Major General Fane to cross the Tagus with a body of troops, with a view to observe the enemy’s movements on the right of the river; and to endeavor to destroy the collection of materials which they have made at Santarem and Barquinha for the purpose of constructing a bridge.

‘ The Quarter Master General will apply to the Commissary General for boats to transport the troops under the command of Major General Fane; and I shall be obliged to you if you will aid him with your influence in procuring them.

‘ Major General Fane might probably derive some advantage from the use of Congreve’s rockets, in the destruction of the enemy’s collection of materials for a bridge at Barquinha and Santarem; and as there are none in the stores of the army, and I understand there are some in the fleet under your command, I shall be much obliged to you if you will send a proportion of Congreve’s rockets with the force under the command of Major General Fane, with an officer and seamen who know how to make use of them. I expect some shortly from England, when those which you will supply to Major General Fane shall be replaced.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 1st Nov., 1810.

‘ I have no doubt that the Government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the

several subjects to which the enclosures relate; but it would be very desirable to know if they state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying these orders.

‘ The fact is, that the Government, after the appointment of Principal Souza to be a member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country; and instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz., that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing with me the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary to the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants.

‘ Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure; and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language; and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent; and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida.

‘ If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco, he must have been in his present situation long before the order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid adopting a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British Government.

‘ I avowed in my Proclamation that I was the author of that measure, and that Government might have sheltered themselves under that authority; but the principle of the Government, lately, has been to seek for popularity, and

they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon.

‘ I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of astonishment by the Secretary of State, that the measures should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in Upper Beira: notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service, not a soul remained; and excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly.

‘ In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to; notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage; notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places, at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks, the inhabitants have fled from their habitations, as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the Government; but they have left behind them every thing which could be useful to the enemy and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched. Accordingly the enemy still remain in our front; and notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain, and with every other military body, if the provisions which they have found should last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain until they shall be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time.

‘ Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the

evil consequences of the ill fated propensity of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity.

‘ In the same manner the other measures since recommended, viz., the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alentejo to places of security has been delayed by every means in the power of the Government, and have been adopted, at last, against their inclination. As usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus; they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ———, to which I propose to draw the attention of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal and of His Majesty’s Government. His Royal Highness and His Majesty’s Government will then see in what manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me.

‘ The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5, in the enclosures from Dom Miguel Forjaz, show the sense which the Regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to the Desembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos.

‘ I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country; and Principal Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops, and of the operations to be carried on, than I am. In this case they should desire His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged; and they know that there is not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of the Government will show what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt, by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their Prince, to co-operate with me by all the means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions.

‘ Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the Government; and I regret

that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent should have been induced to make a change, which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and of the allies.

‘ In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the ordenanza would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the ordenanza would disperse.

‘ The truth is that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the Government, every Portuguese, into whose hand a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the Government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different description of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable if the Government would leave, exclusively, to Marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements.

‘ The conduct of the Governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware, as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval as well as the regiment which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenanza, as usual, dispersed; and the Government will lose their 500 stand of new arms, and if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their three pounders.

‘ These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on.

‘ I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 2nd Nov., 1810.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ultimo, with its enclosures, on the subject of Mr. Kennedy’s representations of the want of sufficient escorts for his stores.

‘ I recollect that the Commissary General mentioned to me, about the period of the date of his letter to the Commissary in Chief, the inconveniences experienced from the deficiencies of stores when they reached the army from the depôts, occasioned, partly by the desertion of the bullock drivers, and partly by robberies committed by the same description of persons, and by the mule drivers. Upon that occasion I pointed out to Mr. Kennedy the inconvenience which would result to the service from giving escorts to every convoy of grain or bread, from the irregularity of the British soldiers when detached from their corps; and the probability that the employment of these escorts would occasion greater inconveniences and deficiencies than were at that moment experienced.

‘ The Spanish muleteers, who perform the greatest part of the transport service of the army, would not submit to the brutal violence of a drunken English soldier, and these people would desert with their mules, if escorted by troops; and I believe that the delays which the drunkenness and irregularity of the troops would have occasioned in the arrival of the stores, and the loss by their own thieving, would have been found still greater than those suffered by the dishonesty of the muleteers.

‘ Another practice very common among the troops, would have been found equally prejudicial to the service in the case of the use of carts. A detachment has scarcely ever gone as an escort with carts, even carrying treasure or sick, that the soldiers have not taken bribes from the drivers to be allowed to quit the convoy with their carts and bullocks.

‘ This practice leads to fresh irregularities of the same description. They must then be employed to press carts in the country to supply the deficiency of transport, occasioned by their own villany and forgetfulness of their duty. This is

always an act of violence; and the inhabitants frequently bribe the soldiers not to press their carriages.

‘ All these circumstances induced me to believe, that it was better to submit to the inconvenience of the loss of some of the stores, than to suffer that inconvenience, with the additional evils which I have above described. I did however make arrangements to have the convoys attended by detachments of the ordenanza, and I believe there was afterwards no positive loss of stores, although the petty robberies of mule and cart drivers still continued.

‘ I do not think that two companies of a veteran battalion would behave better than the other British troops employed on this service. No soldier can withstand the temptation of wine. This is constantly before their eyes in this country, and they are constantly intoxicated when absent from their regiments, and there is no crime which they do not commit to obtain money to purchase it; or if they cannot get money, to obtain it by force.

‘ I believe that the best mode of ensuring the safety and the regular arrival of stores from the depôts to the troops, would be to employ a sufficient number of sober, honest, and steady conductors, to send one at least with each escort; and having thus provided a control over the drivers of bullocks and mules, which would ensure their regular arrival at least, and check their dishonesty, I would recommend that they should be made responsible for the losses and deficiencies in their loads.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ *Pero Negro, 2nd November, 1810.*

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, and to acquaint you that I think it will be advisable, under present circumstances, to detain the troop ships, and to send to England, in transports, the prisoners and enlisted deserters as soon as may be possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd instant, and I am much obliged to you for embarking Major General Fane’s detachment,

‘ It is not necessary that I should enter into any discussion of the comparative merits of Congreve’s rockets and carcasses ; or that I should enter into any defence of the former, of the merits or demerits of which I have no experience, never having seen them used.

‘ I should hope, however, that the Master General of the Ordnance would have urged His Majesty’s Government not to send any to this country, if they are what you describe ; but Captain Beresford having mentioned to me that he had some of them on board the Poictiers, I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will allow some of them, with some seamen of the Poictiers, to be sent over to Major General Fane, in order that they may, at least, be tried against the collection of the enemy’s materials for their bridge at Santarem and Barquinha, as I fear that he will have no opportunity of trying the 24 pound carcasses which you have been so kind as to offer him, since the gun boats, in which the 24 pound guns are, cannot go higher up than Salvaterra ; and there are no means on the left of the river of moving the 24 pounders, even if mounted upon travelling carriages, by land, from Salvaterra to the station at which Major General Fane would have to use them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE,

‘ Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

‘ I cannot be answerable for a madman. We sent the orders to the caçadores as stated to you. — got hold of them ; and you know the consequence.

‘ I wish I had it in my power to give you well clothed troops, or to hang those who ought to have given them their clothing. You must make the best of them, and I shall give you full credit for every thing you do.

‘ I had understood from Beresford that there were some artillery men at Lisbon, and therefore I did not order those from Hill. They went to Lisbon this day with orders to Rosa to send them over to you immediately.

‘ You may desire Major Downman to go to you if you like it. I will speak to General Howorth upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Fane.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

10 A.M.

‘ It gives me the greatest satisfaction to inform you that I have received the King’s commands to invest you with the Order of the Bath, of which I now transmit you the insignia. When we meet, we will settle the period and mode in which I shall invest you; but I rather believe it had better be in the mode in which I invested Sir J. Sherbrooke, in presence of as many officers of the army and other individuals as I can collect at a feast; or if you prefer that mode, on a parade of some of the troops. I likewise send you your medal.

‘ I am just returned from the redoubt of Sobral. One camp, that on the left of the wood, is gone; and I did not see so many men in the others as before, or so many arms piled in front of the camps.

‘ It is possible, however, that the rain may have kept the men in the huts, and that they took their arms with them. The piquets were as usual.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd. If the enemy pass the Tagus in force, the Admiral cannot defend the island of Lyceria with 100 marines and his gun boats; and the communications upon it are so difficult, that I doubt whether we should protect it. In the rear of the lines all is safe, and the army and town of Lisbon have the resources. You will see by my dispatches of this date that

the resources which the enemy will get, and we shall want, are every thing in the contest.

‘The Government are not aware of the difficulties of my situation, or of the orders of the Government, or of the King’s wishes and intentions; and they give me more trouble in writing letters upon their nonsense, and lose more of my time, than can be conceived. I am responsible, and they are not, for the success of our operations; and if they will not do what I advise them, I shall only place their refusal or omission upon the records of the Government, in justification of myself.

‘I did agree to feed the Marques de la Romana’s troops, and fed, and now feed, those of whose march I had any notification. I had no knowledge of Don Carlos de España’s march, and of course made no provision for it; but his numbers are not 1200, and he cannot be very burthensome to any body; and as the Portuguese have a Commissary in that quarter, and we have not, they may as well feed his troops, and I shall pay the expense. Dom Miguel Forjaz is very exact in calling for an explanation upon this subject, but not so much so in inquiring how many of the Portuguese troops are fed, who receive their rations from us. Indeed, the garrison of Abrantes is now subsisting on our stores there, and so is the garrison of Peniche!

‘I think you are quite right about your silence to Government respecting their removal to the north.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

‘I wish it was in my power to give your Lordship an opinion of the probable course of the enemy’s operations, founded upon the existing state of affairs here, considered in a military point of view; but from what I am about to state to your Lordship, you will observe that it is impossible to form such an opinion.

‘The expedition into Portugal was, in my opinion, founded originally upon political and financial, rather than military considerations. It is true, that with a view to the conquest of Spain, there were advantages purely military to

be derived from the removal of the British army from Portugal; but I think I could show that it was not essentially necessary to effect that object, particularly after the door into Castille had been closed upon us, by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

‘The political object, therefore, in removing us from Portugal, which was the effect that our evacuation of the Peninsula would have had upon the inhabitants of Spain in general, and upon those of Cadiz in particular; and the financial object, which was the possession and plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, were the principal motives for the perseverance in the expedition into Portugal. I believe the latter to have been more pressing even than the former.

‘It is impossible to describe to your Lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French armies in the Peninsula. All the troops are months in arrears of pay; they are in general very badly clothed; their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description; their troops subsist solely upon plunder, whether acquired individually, or more regularly by the way of requisition and contribution; they receive no money, or scarcely any, from France; and they realize but little from their pecuniary contributions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered that the expense of the pay and the hospitals alone of the French army in the Peninsula amounts to more than the sum stated in the financial *exposé* as the whole expense of the entire French army.

‘This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the discipline of the army; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army.

‘I have no doubt, therefore, that the desire to relieve this state of distress, and to remove the consequent evils occasioned by it, by the plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal.

‘The expedition, not having been founded upon any military necessity, has been carried on and persevered in against every military principle. We know that Massena could expect no immediate reinforcements; and without adverting to the various errors which I believe he would

acknowledge he had committed in the course of the service, he has persevered in it, after he found that he was unable to force the troops opposed to him when posted in a strong position, and when he knew that they had one still stronger in their rear, to which they were about to retire; and that they were likely to be reinforced, while his army would be still further weakened by sickness, and by the privations to which he knew they must be liable on their march. He knew that the whole country was against him; that a considerable corps was formed upon the Douro, which would immediately operate upon his rear; that at the time of the battle of Busaco he had no longer any communication with Spain; and that every step he took farther in advance was a step towards additional difficulty and inconvenience, from which the retreat would be almost impossible.

‘ If the expedition into Portugal had been founded upon military principle only, it would have ended at Busaco; and I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I expected that Massena would retire from thence, or at all events would not advance beyond the Mondego. But he has continued to advance, contrary to every military principle; and I therefore conclude that the pressure of financial distresses, which was the original motive for the expedition, was that for persevering in it, and may operate upon the measures of the present moment.

‘ In this view of the case, it is probable that Massena may endeavor to maintain his position, as long as he can keep alive any proportion of his troops, being certain that the same difficulties which induced the Emperor to undertake the expedition without any military necessity, would induce him to make every effort to reinforce him at the earliest possible period of time, and therefore that he will remain some time longer where he is.

‘ Your Lordship is already acquainted with the means of reinforcing him. There is no doubt that, by raising the siege of Cadiz, and abandoning other unattainable objects, Massena may be reinforced to a very considerable extent.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of attacking the French army now in my front, before it should be joined by its reinforce-

ments ; and, upon the whole, I am inclined to be of opinion that I ought not to do so.

‘ I enclose your Lordship an account of the number of battalions, squadrons, &c., which entered Portugal with Massena, and I cannot believe that they composed an army of less than 70,000 men at the battle of Busaco. I calculate their loss, including sick, since that time, at 15,000 men, which would leave them with 55,000 men, of which 6000 or 7000 are cavalry, at the present moment.

‘ The effective strength of the British army, according to the last returns, was 29,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres Vedras, which, in the view of the contest, ought not to be taken into the account ; and I enclose a statement of the Portuguese force, according to the last returns.

‘ Besides this force, the Marques de la Romana’s corps consists of about 5000 men ; making a total of 58,615, of which I could command the services, in case I should act offensively against the enemy, of which about — would be cavalry.

‘ Besides these troops, there are different bodies of militia, infantry and artillery, in our positions ; but I should deceive myself if I could expect, and your Lordship if I should state, that any advantage would be derived from their assistance in an offensive operation against the enemy.

‘ Although the enemy’s position is not so strong as that which we occupy, there is no doubt but that it has its advantages ; one of which is, that in attacking it, we could hardly use our artillery. I would also observe, that in every operation of this description by the British army in Portugal, no attempt can be made to manœuvre upon the enemy’s flank or rear ; first, because the enemy show they are indifferent about their flanks or rear, or their communications ; and secondly, because the inevitable consequence of attempting such a manœuvre would be to open some one or other road to Lisbon, and to our shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage to attain his object.

‘ We must carry their positions, therefore, by main force, and consequently with loss ; and, in the course of the operations I must draw the army out of their cantonments ; I

must expose the troops and horses to the inclemencies of the weather at this season of the year, and must look to all the consequences of that measure in increased sickness of the men, and in loss of efficiency and condition in horses.

‘ I observe that, notwithstanding the length of time which has elapsed since the greatest and most efficient part of the French army has been employed against us, there is yet no other military body in the Peninsula which is capable of taking, much less of keeping, the field: and the relief of Cadiz, which appears to me to be a probable consequence of the state of affairs here, would not give us the assistance of an army from that quarter, either in the way of co-operation or of diversion; nor would the removal of Sebastiani from Granada, which would be the consequence of the relief of Cadiz, enable Blake to make any progress beyond the Sierra Morena towards Madrid. We should still stand alone in the Peninsula as an army; and if I should succeed in forcing Massena’s positions, it would become a question whether I should be able to maintain my own, in case the enemy should march another army into this country. But, when I observe how small the superiority of numbers is in my favor, and know that the position will be in favor of the enemy, I cannot but be of opinion that I act in conformity with the instructions and intentions of His Majesty’s Government, in waiting for the result of what is going on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk.

‘ Every day’s delay, at this season of the year, narrows our line of defence, and consequently strengthens it; and when the winter shall have set in, no number, however formidable, can venture to attack it; and the increase of the enemy’s numbers at that period will only add to their distress, and increase the difficulties of their retreat.

‘ I have thought it proper to make your Lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections upon this subject, and my present determination, which I hope will be consistent with the wishes of His Majesty’s Government. Circumstances may change: the enemy’s distresses for provisions, and the operations of our detachments in his rear, may induce him to detach to such a degree, as to render a general attack upon him a measure of positive advantage, in which case I shall alter my determination. But adverting

to the necessity of placing the troops in the field in this season if I should make any attack, the advantage must be very obvious before I adopt a measure which must be attended by the consequence of losing the services of my men by sickness.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 3rd Nov., 1810.

‘ I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the letter which I addressed to you on the 27th June last, and its enclosures, respecting the system of clothing the Portuguese troops ; and to request that if the system recommended by Marshal Beresford should be adopted, the materials should be sent out without loss of time ; or if that system should not be adopted, the clothing should be sent out. I have sent at different times requisitions for several articles of equipments for the troops and military stores, which I have been informed had been embarked long ago, but they have not yet arrived ; and I am apprehensive that the masters of the vessels, in which these articles are embarked, are in the habit of delaying their departure from England long after opportunities of sailing have offered.

‘ It is desirable that some measures should be adopted to ensure their departure from England by the first fair wind, after the vessels shall have been laden.

‘ Blankets for the British, as well as for the Spanish troops, intrenching tools, and all the provisions which have been required, should be sent off as soon as possible.

‘ The service is suffering at present for want of the blankets and intrenching tools.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’ ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810.

‘ I have received an application from his Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon, that I would request you to allow 3000 tons of transports to proceed to Algiers, to bring back to Lisbon

cargoes of corn, for which Mr. Sampayo, the importer of the corn, will pay the usual freight of such a voyage.

‘As I conceive that the transports may be spared for this service, I shall be much obliged to you if you will allow that quantity of transport tonnage to proceed, as stated in the enclosed copy of a letter from Mr. Sampayo, under convoy, if there should not be in the Tagus empty store ships or victuallers, which I should like to have employed on this service.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR, ‘Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810.

‘I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd, and I beg to acquaint you that it is impossible to keep the prisoners of war in this country, and I hope, therefore, that you will send them home according to former arrangements by the earliest opportunity.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810.

‘I propose to invest Marshal Beresford with the Order of the Bath on Wednesday at Mafra, and intend to give a great feast there, at which I hope to have the pleasure of your company, and that of Lady Emily Berkeley and the Miss Berkeleys. I have ordered quarters to be prepared there for you and your family.

‘Will you ask Sir Thomas Williams and Sir Thomas Hardy, and the Captains of the squadron, to favor me with their company at dinner at Mafra on that day; and I shall be very happy to see any of the gentlemen of the squadron who will do me the favor to come in the evening. I propose to invest the Marshal at about five o’clock, and we shall dine afterwards, and then the ball.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ As I do not know the names of the Captains of the squadron, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow one of your clerks to send to them, and to Sir Thomas Williams, invitations to dine in my name. There will be quarters prepared at Mafra for any person who will apply for them to Captain Kelly, the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who will attend there on Wednesday morning.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st October, and my brother will make you acquainted with the state of affairs.

‘ Nothing, I assure you, would give me greater satisfaction than to have the benefit of your assistance here; but I do not consider myself authorised by Government to call you from Cadiz.

‘ In the letter which I wrote to Lord Liverpool on the subject of reinforcements from Cadiz, I said that he ought to allow me to draw you and the greatest part of the garrison from that place: in answer to which, he allowed me to take such a number as, including those which you had before sent, would make 4000 men; but he did not allow me to call for you, and I must, therefore, consider his former directions upon that point to be still binding.

‘ If the siege, or rather the blockade, should be raised, you will, of course, either come round here with the greatest part of the troops, or you will take the field with the Spanish army. I should doubt that the King’s Government would approve of the latter measure; but as you are in correspondence with the Secretary of State, you may be acquainted with his sentiments upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810.

‘ Since I received your letter of the 22nd, I have reflected upon the appointment of a Regency in Spain, which I think is the most important point that can come under the consideration of the Cortes; and their conduct in this business will probably decide the fate of their country.

‘ The natural course of all popular assemblies, of the Spanish Cortes among others, is to adopt democratic principles, and to vest all the powers of the state in their own body; and this assembly must take care that they do not run in this tempting course, as the wishes of the nation are decidedly for a monarchy: by a monarchy alone can it be governed; and their inclination to any other form of government, and their assumption of the power and patronage of the state into their own hands, would immediately deprive them of the confidence of the people; and they would be a worse government, and more impotent, because more numerous than the Central Junta.

‘ Whatever may be their ultimate views, I have no doubt that they will immediately appoint a Regent, or a Council of Regency; but I think that the choice of the Regent will be in some degree influenced by the desire to keep the power of the state in their own hands, and for this reason it is so important.

‘ If the Cortes should choose Romana, or Blake, or O’Donnell, they will have plausible reasons for intrusting to them the smallest quantity of patronage and power that can be required to carry on the Government, and for retaining the largest portion in their own hands. They will say, the throne is Ferdinand’s, and we are the guardians of it; these individuals are military men, and of course ambitious; and if we should intrust them with too much power, they may overturn us and Ferdinand, and erect upon our ruins a military government of their own.

‘ These apprehensions are not ill founded, and may fairly be entertained; but to act upon them, would lead to the formation of a feeble executive government, and to the assumption of the greatest part of the power and patronage of the state by the Cortes, and its committees, to the ruin of the character of that assembly, and the destruction of its real and fair influence in the country, occasioned by the confidence of the inhabitants in its wisdom and justice.

‘ My opinion, therefore, is, that for the sake of the Cortes themselves, they ought not to attempt to make such a selection. In the difficult circumstances in which they are placed, they have no chance, unless they adhere to the ancient laws and constitution of their country. The laws and constitu-

tion of Spain have either pointed out the person who ought to be Regent, in case of the occurrence of such an event as the captivity of the King; or if they have not provided for that precise case, they have provided for others, to which this case would bear sufficient analogy. I should recommend to the Cortes to appoint, or rather recognise, as Regent of the kingdom, with all the regal authorities, whoever would succeed to the office according to the law, as applied to the case upon fair analogy.

‘I acknowledge there may be difficulties and inconveniences in this arrangement, but in what arrangement are there none? If the Princess of Brazils should be the person, the Court will be inundated by intriguers of all nations and descriptions; and the appointment of her may be attended by other evils and inconveniences. But the free constitution of the Cortes will be in some degree a remedy for the first; and as for the last, I conceive that the advantage of having as Regent the person entitled by law to fill the office, will more than counterbalance any other evils which might result from this, or any other appointment.

‘As for all the difficulties of the succession, and of the connexion between Portugal and Spain, they are not to be considered for a moment. Great Britain and Portugal and Spain will settle these questions easily, when the Regent shall be appointed, whoever the person may be.

‘I wish you would turn over in your mind the considerations above referred to, and talk them over with the members of the Cortes, if you think they are of any weight.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’ ‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 3rd, with its enclosures. I have written to the Admiral to request him to send the transports to Algiers for the corn.

‘I do not know how your correspondent could have got the letters from the Emperor to the King, &c. It does not appear, by our accounts from England, that Napoleon is gone to Germany.

I have no doubt that Massena is waiting for reinforcements.

‘Believe me, &c.

Charles Stuart, Esq. **WELLINGTON.**

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

SIR, **‘Pero Negro, 4th Nov., 1810.**

I enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Colonel Peacocke, upon the abuses committed by persons who pretend to import goods for the use of the British army, and who are indulged by the Portuguese Government with the privilege of importing them duty free.

I should wish the Government to place the grant of this indulgence, if after this abuse of it they are so kind as to continue it, under the following regulations:

First. That all applications for the indulgence of importing goods for the British army, duty free, should be accompanied by an exact list of the articles to be imported, stating the quantities of each, and should be countersigned by the Commissary in Chief of the army.

Secondly. That the application should not be granted till the owner shall have entered into a bond to proceed to the head quarters of the British army with the goods in one week from the period of granting permission to import them; and to arrive by marches, calculated at two leagues each day, or to forfeit a sum equal in amount to double the duties on the articles imported.

Thirdly. That the penalty of this bond shall be enforced if, within one fortnight after the expiration of the term at which the owner of the goods ought to arrive at head quarters, he does not transmit to the Secretary of the Government a certificate of the Commandant at head quarters that the goods, of which the detailed list will be transmitted, had been brought to the head quarters of the army to be disposed of.

I request you to return the enclosures, as I propose to have a further inquiry into the conduct of Mr. Berkeley.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Charles Stuart, Esq. **WELLINGTON.**

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 5th Nov., 1810.

‘ When I wrote to you yesterday about the feast, I was guilty of an omission which I fear will not be forgiven. I forgot the whole Rio Mayor family; I shall be obliged to you if you will send invitations to the whole of them, including even old Machado.

‘ La Marqueza de Lourical also, and la Duquesa de Alafões and her sister, I am told, ought to be invited*.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Dr. Frank, Inspector of Hospitals.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 5th Nov., 1810.

‘ I have this day ordered a Board to inquire into the circumstances of the complaint of Lieut. ———, which I have no doubt will end in a manner satisfactory to you. I shall not, however, omit this opportunity of expressing to you how much I feel concerned at the tone and purport of the several letters which I have received from you lately, evidently written under the notion that these complaints were reflections upon you encouraged by me.

‘ A moment’s reflection would point out to you that they are reflections upon me (Lieut. ———’s complaint in particular) much more than upon you; and that, in fact, it matters not upon whom they reflect; it is our duty to attend to them, to investigate their truth, and to prevent, if possible, the recurrence in future of such circumstances, if they ever existed.

‘ We all do the best in our power to carry on the service in a manner that shall be most satisfactory; and I have been much misunderstood by you, and the gentlemen of the medical department, if it is supposed that I have expressed any thing like dissatisfaction with the mode in which its duties have been conducted. But the best arrangements which we may make may fail from the neglect, or omission, or want of experience in those whom we employ to carry

* All the society of Lisbon, and the Officers of the army, not on duty, were present at this ball; but the whole of the Officers were under arms at their posts on the following morning before daylight.

them into execution ; or our orders may be disobeyed, as mine and yours are every day ; and the service may be, by any one of these modes, not carried on as it ought to be ; and it may be necessary to inquire into the causes of these accidents.

‘ These inquiries, it is true, always suppose that there has been some failure ; but, because there has been failure, it does not follow of course that there has been fault, and much less on the part of the head of the department.

‘ I have thought it proper to give you this explanation, as I have really been much concerned to find that you have supposed that there was any disposition to convey any thing but applause on your conduct, and that of your department in general.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Dr. Frank,*

Inspector of Hospitals.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ Pero Negro, 5th Nov., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 P.M.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your kindness to Marshal Beresford and me ; and I enclose a letter from Mr. Deputy Commissary Dunmore, which I hope will provide for you the means of moving what is necessary for Lady Emily, who, I anxiously hope, will not suffer by her desire to favor us with her company. We shall all appear in our best attire, but I fear that, with many, bad is the best ; and we shall be highly flattered by your company, and that of the Captains of the fleet, whether in full or in frock uniforms.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 6th Nov., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of 11 A.M., the 5th instant. I assure you that I am no partisan of Congreve’s rockets, of which I entertain but a bad opinion, from what I recollect of the rockets in the East Indies, of which I believe those of Congreve are an imitation.

‘It is but fair, however, to give every thing a trial, more particularly as I have received the orders of Government to try these machines. I do not think it would answer any purpose to try them here; but I understand that the enemy have seven boats on the square at Villa Franca, which possibly might be reached by the rockets fired from Hill’s advanced piquet, and they might be tried there.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Vice Admiral ‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘à Pero Negro, ce 6 Nov., 1810.

‘MON CHER MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

‘Je suis bien fâché de vous faire savoir que les Officiers Espagnols vont dans le parc du Prince Regent à Mafra, et y tuent les cerfs et autre gibier. Un officier Anglais a fait savoir à un d’eux qu’il était défendu de chasser là, sans la permission du Gouvernement: il lui a répondu qu’il chasserait malgré la défense, ayant la permission de son chef; et, si vous le désirez, je pourrai vous faire savoir le nom de l’officier.

‘Je vous prie, en attendant, de faire donner l’ordre qu’on n’y chasse plus; et d’y envoyer tout de suite un officier de l’Etat Major pour faire sortir du parc tous ceux qui pourraient s’y trouver.

‘Agréez, &c.

‘*Le Marquis de la Romana.* ‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Pero Negro, 6th Nov., 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 5th. I do not know of any objection to sending some of the prisoners to the Cape de Verde Islands; and, if the Government should state none, I have no objection to allow vessels to go with them, as the voyage will not be longer than to England. All I want is to get rid of the prisoners from Lisbon; and, if they cannot be kept in safety out of England, they must go there, notwithstanding the orders of the Admiralty. These orders, after all, are not positive.

‘ In respect to the horses, it must be observed that they are not yet selected and purchased, and some time must elapse before they can be prepared for embarkation. I cannot allow the transports to remain at the Cape de Verde Islands longer than is necessary to land the prisoners and take on board the horses, if they should be ready. As it is probable they will not be ready, it is better that we should send horse transports for the horses at some future period, and confine ourselves at present to the removal of the prisoners to the Cape de Verde Islands, if the Government should see no objection.

‘ At all events, the horses which we should now get at the Cape de Verde Islands would not be fit for the service till next campaign; and if we get rid of the enemy now in our front, we shall have plenty of time to send for them.

‘ I long to see Mascarenhas’ papers. I do not fear 40,000 men, if the town is prepared to hold out in provisions, and the Government will exert themselves to get in every thing they can. I hear from Don Julian Sanchez of the 27th, from Laganilla, that about 4000 or 5000 men had entered Salamanca, including two regiments of dragoons, which I see are those which Massena left with Seras or Kellermann; and that they expected 9000 or 10,000, some from Navarre, and others from the garrisons in Castille. He says that they are preparing to bring into Portugal a large convoy of provisions. I understand from his letter that the whole number they expect at Salamanca is 9000 or 10,000, and not that number in addition to those now arrived.

‘ However, I have no apprehension for the consequences, if the Government will take care to bring all the provisions into the town, and out of the enemy’s way, that they can lay their hands upon.

‘ I do not know where Laganilla is, but I believe not far from Plasencia; and if so, Don Julian would have heard of the march of any troops from Madrid, whether by Plasencia or through Old Castille.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Charles Stuart, Esq.

WELLINGTON.

‘ I think you had better send Mascarenhas up here, that

we may examine him, and all the evidence there may be respecting his having served the enemy, and having had their papers upon him.'

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Pero Negro, 6th Nov., 1810.

' I received yesterday your letter of the 19th of October; and I assure you that I had great satisfaction in doing justice to Mr. Kennedy, and the officers of the Commissariat Department, in my report of recent transactions in this country.

' In respect to Mr. Ogilvie's promotion, nothing that you have written has altered my opinion upon that subject. It may be very proper to frame rules for the conduct of a department, and to conduct a department according to the rules laid down for its government; but that is not the mode in which the service can be carried on; and if the attempt is made and persevered in in the Commissariat with respect to the promotion of the officers, an army will be lost on some fine day on account of the total incapacity of the greater number of the officers, seniors as well as juniors, to perform any duty excepting that which they learn in England, viz., the superintendence of deliveries by a contractor, and to compare his accounts with his vouchers.

' For this reason I contend for it, that when a man like Mr. Ogilvie is found out, who is really capable of being the Commissary General of an army, the rule is a bad one which prevents his immediate promotion.

' I may be wrong, but I have objections to all those rules which prevent the promotion of officers of merit. It is the abuse of the unlimited power of promotion which ought to be prevented; but the power itself ought not to be taken, by regulation, from the crown, or from those who do the business of the crown. By these regulations we are undermining, as fast as possible, the efficiency of the Government. There is no power any where of rewarding extraordinary services, or extraordinary merit; and under circumstances which require unwearied exertion in every branch and department of our military system, we appear to be framing

regulations to prevent ourselves from commanding it by the only stimulus,—the honorable reward of promotion.

‘ These are my decided opinions. They go to the principle of our proceedings, and not to Mr. Ogilvie’s case alone. If Mr. Kennedy was gone to-morrow, Mr. Ogilvie is, I think, the person upon the whole most qualified to fill his situation ; and I should then propose that he should be made a Commissary General. I wish to know whether in any service in the world a man has ever been placed at the head of such a concern as that which I am conducting, without having the power of selecting the person who shall succeed to fill such an office as that which Mr. Kennedy fills ; and whether any minister could show his face to the country, and object that such an appointment is contrary to the regulation. The regulation therefore must be nugatory, and ought not to have been made.

‘ As for the gentleman who would succeed to Mr. Kennedy, he is quite unfit for the situation, and I could not do business with him for an hour.

‘ This is a stronger case than that which exists ; though, by the bye, that is pretty strong. Mr. Ogilvie, an assistant commissary, is found the most capable in the whole department of conducting the business of General Hill’s separate corps, and he cannot be made a deputy commissary because he has not served five years ; and there are other assistants in the army senior to him, who, although very good men, and possibly able to do the duty of assistant commissary, are not able to do the duty which Mr. Ogilvie performs well, and for which he was selected, notwithstanding that there were many deputy commissaries with the army !!

‘ The next thing to do will be to order that the deputy commissaries shall perform these superior duties when there are any with the army ; and then I hope the gentlemen in London will be so kind as to be responsible for all that passes here ; and bear all the abuse, misrepresentation, &c. &c., which he must make up his mind to, who is honored with the command of the British troops on a foreign service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Colonel Gordon.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 8th Nov., 1810.

‘ Adverting to the information which I recently received from your Lordship, that there was a regiment of dragoons in the west of England in readiness to embark for this country, if its services should be required, I have to inform your Lordship that I would rather recommend completing the regiments now in this country with horses or mares of five, six, and seven years of age, to sending out fresh troops. Neither the dragoons nor their horses are capable of performing much service in the first season after their arrival; and many horses are lost, being unaccustomed to the food of the Peninsula, and from the want of experience in the mode of taking care of them.

‘ We have found the British cavalry more efficient in this campaign, and particularly at the close of it, than it was in the last, notwithstanding that in this campaign they have had more hard work. I am therefore of opinion that the best mode of keeping up the cavalry of this army would be to send strong horses of a serviceable age to the regiments now in the country.

‘ I also wish to draw your Lordship’s attention to the wants of the artillery in horses. I should recommend that 500 serviceable horses for the artillery should be sent out at an early period, and it will be necessary hereafter to send from England frequently fresh horses for the artillery.

‘ In the course of this and last year many horses and mules for this branch of the service were purchased in Portugal and Spain. But neither of a sufficient size can now be procured: and I imagine it will be necessary to aid the Portuguese army with some horses of a good size for their artillery.

‘ At all events, as there are horse transports in the service of Government, which might hereafter be employed in transporting the horses from England, it would be cheaper to bring all that are wanted from thence, than to purchase them in this country; and the horses are infinitely better than any that can be procured in the Peninsula.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I have just been informed by Brigadier General Howorth that 500 horses are required for the immediate use of the artillery, besides the 170 now on their passage ; therefore 700 will be wanted in order to give any assistance to the Portuguese artillery.’

To Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE,

‘ Pero Negro, 8th Nov., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th in the evening. I find that the only draught they had for the guns on the left of the Tagus was oxen ; and Beresford has repeated his orders that you should be plentifully supplied with these animals. They will be slow, but very sure.

‘ I have desired General Howorth to send over to you a party of British artillery, with a rocket carriage drawn by horses, and some rockets, the whole lately come from England ; so that you will be able to try these machines very effectually. I also desired Rosa to send you a 5½ inch howitzer, that you might also use the 24 pound carcasses. All this and the caçadores will have arrived some time ago.

‘ The enemy’s movements look like an intention to attack Abrantes, where Colonel Lobo commands, who is doing remarkably well ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let him know how well I am satisfied with him.

‘ On the left of the Tagus is Don Carlos de España with about 1200 Spanish troops, with whom I wish you to communicate by your right, and to keep all matters straight between him and Lobo. Don Carlos I believe to be a very good kind of man, and a good officer.

‘ Lobo has at Abrantes not only the boats of the bridge there, but I believe those of the bridge of Punhete ; and he ought to have those of the bridge of Villa Velha. He has very prudently taken up the bridge of Abrantes ; and since the enemy have appeared in force on the left of the Zezere he has sent the boats over to the left of the Tagus, and has given charge of them to Don Carlos de España.

‘ The order which Lobo has respecting these boats is to have combustibles in each, and every thing prepared to burn them at a short notice, but not to burn them till the last extremity, and till he shall be certain that they will otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate with Don Carlos on this point particularly, and see that he understands exactly what he is to do, and is prepared to do it.

‘ The boats at Abrantes are now more important than ever. First, it is very important that the enemy should not get them ; and secondly, it is very important that we should not lose the use of them, unless absolutely necessary to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy : for if Lobo is to be attacked at Abrantes, I must and will support him from the left of the Tagus, and so I beg you to tell him ; and we shall want the boats there.

‘ Our guns were removed from the neighbourhood of the Zezere, and I believe throughout Lower Beira ; but of this last, although ordered, I am not certain.

‘ Let me hear from you if the caçadores have their clothing.

‘ Believe me, &c. ‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ Major General Fane.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 8th Nov., 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from Fane. Have you had any account of the transactions of the 5th at Abrantes ? Don Carlos de España, in a letter of the 4th to the Marques de la Romana, mentions that the enemy had approached that place on that day with cavalry and infantry, and were at no great distance, as appeared by their fires at night. I should not be surprised if they were to attack Abrantes after all. I must mention to you that the 17^{me} *legère*, which is in Regnier’s division, has, I believe, marched from the neighbourhood of Villa Franca.

‘ If Abrantes is attacked, we must support the place from the left of the river : I would recommend therefore that Lobo should be desired not to destroy all the boats of the bridge, if the enemy should approach him, but to send them to the left of the river, in charge of Don Carlos de España, whom I will put in communication with Fane, and I will direct Fane only to destroy them if it should be found that Don Carlos cannot maintain his post.

‘ Don Carlos says they were sending off baggage by the

road of Villa de Rey. Let me hear from you early what directions you will send Lobo, that I may send others of a corresponding nature to Fane. Tell Lobo that he shall be supported, if attacked.

‘ Believe me, &c. *Marshal* WELLINGTON.
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ I enclose you a report of what passed at Abrantes on the 5th, just now received.’

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD, *Pero Negro, 8th Nov., 1810.*

‘ I enclose the copy of a dispatch from the Prince of Essling to the Prince of Wagram, on the battle of Busaco, and the copy of a paper supposed to be a set of questions to be asked the bearer of the dispatch at Paris and the answers which he was to give. They were taken on a person by the name of Mascarenhas, a Portuguese, who is in the French service, and aide de camp to Junot. This person was on his road through the valley of the Mondego, towards the frontier, in the disguise of a Spanish peasant, and was taken by the ordenanza.

‘ As some doubts are entertained here respecting the proceedings to be adopted in this person’s case, and as I wish to avoid any discussion with the enemy upon it, till the Portuguese Government shall have an opportunity of deciding upon it, it is desirable that this dispatch should not be made public, or at all events that the name of the bearer of it should be kept secret for some time.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that this is the second dispatch which Massena had written since his entering into Portugal, both of which we have got.

‘ In regard to his account of the battle of Busaco, and of the loss sustained by the French army, I would request your Lordship to observe, first, the difference between the account of loss in the dispatch, and that in the officer’s written answer to the supposed question; and, secondly, the immense loss of officers, viz., three colonels killed and several others wounded, which could not have been unattended by a proportionate loss of troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Dunmore, Esq., Deputy Commissary General.

' SIR,

' Pero Negro, 9th Nov., 1810.

' I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will place at the disposition of his Excellency Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley, one of the commissariat waggons drawn by a sufficient number of horses; and such other means of transport as he may require, and as you may have at your disposal at Lisbon; and I shall inform the Commissary General that I have given you these orders.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' J. Dunmore, Esq., WELLINGTON.

Deputy Commissary General.'

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

' Pero Negro, 9th Nov., 1810.

' MY DEAR BERESFORD, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 12 P.M.

' I have not got by me a return of the guns on the Zezere and Lower Beira, but I am afraid there were many more than the officer gives you an account of, for you will observe that he calls them "field pieces." Will you look at your return of them?

' Do you understand by 160 head of cattle, a large part of them bullocks, that those not bullocks were cows or sheep?

' Believe me, &c.

' Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

' MY DEAR BERESFORD, ' Pero Negro, 9th Nov., 1810.

' I had received Silveira's letters, for which I am obliged to you, and return them.

' As we cannot pretend to defend the entrance into Portugal by the road of Celorico, I should prefer to consider Silveira's corps only as one of observation, to retire towards the Douro when the enemy shall move in force, and then to operate upon their flanks and rear, and cut off as much provision and baggage as possible.

' If Bacellar has placed his troops in column on the road from Coimbra to Lamego, he can easily reinforce Silveira, and co-operate with him in effecting these objects. But I

would not allow them to make any attempt to defend the entrance into the country, and in that view I would not reinforce Silveira.

‘In respect to the bridges of the Coa, I am afraid that, at this season of the year, it would be useless to destroy even those on the lower Coa. The upper Coa is no barrier at any season; and the enemy could, from Ciudad Rodrigo, enter by Alfayates and Sabugal, and go thence either to Alverca or Guarda, without difficulty, if all the bridges were destroyed.

‘I hope the intelligence of the destruction of the bridge of Villa Velha will be confirmed; I prefer that they should not cross the Tagus at all. I believe they must now go up as high as Almaraz, and I doubt whether they have boats even there.

‘Upon looking over the returns of the population of the districts of which the enemy have possession, I find that it amounts to 109,000 souls. They cannot exist much longer in that country.

‘Believe me, &c.
 ‘WELLINGTON.
 ‘Marshal
 Sir W. C. Beresford. K.B.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR, Pero Negro, 10th Nov., 1810.

‘The assistance which I have uniformly received from you, not only in those objects to which I have drawn your attention, from time to time, but in others to which you have adverted yourself, induces me to suggest a mode in which the navy might most materially contribute to the success of His Majesty’s arms, and to the salvation of this country.

‘I have long considered that, after occupying the most important points in the position of the army, it was most desirable that I should have a disposable force capable of moving to any point which might be attacked, or of acting offensively against the enemy, if circumstances should render that measure advisable.

‘The strength which I have added to the several positions of the troops has already increased my disposable

force, but it would be increased if we could have the assistance of a brigade of seamen, and of a battalion composed of the marines of the squadron, in a proportion still greater than their numbers would add to the numerical strength of the army.

‘ If you should see no objection to the plan *, I would propose to you to land the seamen and marines whom you should think proper to employ in this manner, and to place them in barracks or cantonments in the first instance, in the neighbourhood of St. Julian, Cascaes, &c., where they might be arranged in companies and battalions, and the officers and petty officers posted to each, where they might be properly equipped for a further advance towards the positions occupied by the army, and might learn some of the most simple and necessary evolutions of the troops, in order that they might execute them with facility, at the moment their services would be required. I would propose to leave them in this situation, till circumstances should render it necessary or desirable to draw some of the troops out of the positions they now occupy, to be disposable for other parts; and I would then move the battalion of marines and the brigade of seamen to occupy the fortified positions from which the troops would have been withdrawn.

‘ When the brigade of seamen and battalion of marines would move into these positions, the Commissary General of the Army would of course provide for their subsistence; in the mean time it might be more convenient that they should be subsisted by the pursers of the ships to which they severally belong. I should wish you however to decide upon these points as you may think best; and if you should prefer that the Commissary General should provide for them, a commissary shall be attached to them immediately, in the same manner as to the other brigades.

‘ If you should approve of this plan, I will send an officer of the Adjutant General’s and one of the Quarter Master General’s department, to Lisbon, to place themselves under the orders of the officer whom you shall appoint to command the brigade. And I will have all the arrangements made

* On reference of this proposition to the Admiralty, the Board would not approve of landing the seamen of the fleet.

for quartering them, as I have above proposed for your consideration.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral* ‘ WELLINGTON.
‘ *the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 10th Nov., 1810.

‘ As the case of Mascarenhas, who is a Lieutenant in the French cavalry and aide de camp to Junot, may involve a question of retaliation, I am anxious, if possible, to have the opinion of His Majesty’s Government before the Portuguese Government shall decide upon it.

‘ When the Prince Regent quitted Portugal in the year 1807, he issued a Proclamation, of which there will be of course a copy in London, in which he directed his subjects whom he left behind, in substance, not to take up arms against the French, and many of them served the French in civil and military capacities. The Portuguese army was marched out of the country, and is still in the service of the French Emperor; and many of the officers who entered the French service during the time that Portugal was in possession of the French, of which number is Mascarenhas, quitted Portugal with Junot. Mascarenhas was Junot’s aide de camp, and he is a Lieutenant of cavalry in the French army.

‘ I had always considered the case of those Portuguese who entered the service of the French in the years 1807 and 1808, as very different from the case of those who entered their service in 1809, when Soult obtained possession of Oporto. In the former period the Sovereign had quitted the country, and although he had not formally relinquished the government, he had left his subjects to take their own course under that of the usurper; and those who entered the French service had to choose between desertion from it, or quitting their native country. In the latter period the legitimate Government of their Prince was in existence in the country, and those who entered the service of the enemies of their country should be considered only as traitors. The mere act of serving the French during the

period of the usurpation has not been considered a crime in Portugal. Many of those who were guilty of it have since been, and are now, employed; and that alone which makes any distinction in Mascarenhas' case is, that he continued in the service of the French, in which he was engaged, after the restoration of the government of his Prince.

'I am inclined to consider him in the light of many of His Majesty's subjects who are serving his enemies under the connivance of Government, contrary to the laws, and to His Majesty's repeated proclamations at the commencement of every war, calling upon his subjects to return to his dominions from the service of foreign powers; and if this view of the case be correct, it is equally unjustifiable to involve the two countries in a question of retaliation (as it may be depended upon that the retaliation will not be confined to Portuguese officers) on this case, as it would be in the case of any one of those individuals who might be taken in arms against His Majesty's Government.

'An example of this description is not necessary in this country. There exists no disposition in any class to favor the French invasion, and it appears, upon the whole, that the best measure to be adopted, in respect to this person, is to send him, after trial, to the Brazils, to be disposed of as the Prince Regent may think proper.

'I have the honor to be, &c. *The Earl of Liverpool.* WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, 'Pero Negro, 10th Nov., 1810.

'Nothing of any importance has occurred, since I addressed you on the 3rd instant. The enemy reconnoitred Abrantes on the 5th instant, and under cover of that operation moved a small body of cavalry and infantry through Lower Beira towards Villa Velha, evidently with an intention of obtaining possession of the bridge on the Tagus at that place. They found it however destroyed, and this detachment returned to Sobreira Formosa.

'The greatest number of the boats which the enemy had been able to collect together are in their bridge on the Zezere, which is a very bad one, and will, I hope, be destroyed by Major General Fane's artillery.

‘ I have a letter from General Silveira of the 3rd instant, from Trancoso. He had his detachments on the Coa, and one of them (consisting of a battalion of the 24th regiment, which had been in garrison at Almeida during the siege, and which Marshal Massena had reported to the Emperor as having voluntarily entered the French service,) had driven in the outposts of the present garrison at Almeida. General Silveira reports that about 5000 French troops were at Salamanca, and in motion on the frontier towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and that these troops were supposed to be intended as a reinforcement to the army in this country. He also mentions that two regiments of infantry had arrived at Valladolid, and were stated to be the advanced guard of a corps, likewise on its march to this country.

‘ By the accounts from Badajoz of the 4th instant, it appears that Mortier’s corps was still at Seville, and the troops very sickly.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the _____.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 11th Nov., 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, and my answer; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will write to him about the hay, to the purport of the paragraph in my letter concerning that article. Take care to specify that the hay shall be of as good quality as the English hay, and pressed; and I think you had better give him a commission upon his purchases for this and every other description of supplies.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.,*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Commissary General.

To the Honorable A. Cochrane Johnstone.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pero Negro, 11th Nov., 1810.

‘ I have only now received your letter of the 9th instant.

‘ The situation of affairs in the Peninsula, and the general tenor of the instructions to the Commissary General, do not

allow of my encouraging contracts for the delivery of articles at distant periods of time, and prices to be fixed upon by me. But I yesterday desired the Commissary General to make an arrangement with you, for the purchase of a quantity of flour to be imported from America; and I now send your letter of the 9th on the subject of hay and horses.

‘ I tell him that I conceive it will be desirable to take advantage of your offer to purchase in America, and import hay for the public service in this country, upon commission, on the terms of landing it at Lisbon, at Gibraltar, or at Cadiz, or in England, as may be deemed expedient, making of course an allowance for the additional freight, if the original destination of the voyage should be altered.

‘ In respect to horses, I imagine that the Government pay for them in England, at present, thirty guineas, of an age fit for immediate service. They are brought to this country in transports, and the expense of their voyage is only their food in their transports. I conceive that the loss of horses on the voyage is trifling.

‘ From this statement, you will be best able to judge whether horses of an equally good description could be got at as cheap a rate in America and landed here. If they could, I should be glad to take them. But as all the horses received for the use of the army must be inspected by a Board of Officers of the Cavalry, or of those belonging to one of the departments to which the horses would be attached, and there may be a difference of opinion about the fitness of the horses for the service between these Boards and the person who may import the horses from America, I should not recommend any speculation in horses to any person in that country.

‘ Indeed, horses can, or ought to be got with facility, to any extent in England, at the price above stated; and the assistance of the resources of America, however desirable in food for man and beast, does not appear to be necessary in horses.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Hon. A. C. Johnstone.*’ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE, ‘ Pero Negro, 11th Nov., 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th. Don Carlos de España is a Frenchman, and I believe I told you in my last, I knew no reason why you should not have a good opinion of him. He is certainly a better officer than the Spanish officers in general are.

‘ In respect to provisions for his troops, I promised the Marques de la Romana that the Spanish troops should be fed by the British Commissariat while in Portugal; but I was not apprized of the arrival of Don Carlos’s troops, which were intended to operate upon another line, and he came to Abrantes of his own accord. No provision was therefore made for them, and it would be very inconvenient to attach a British Commissary to them. I have therefore desired that they might be fed from the Portuguese stores at Abrantes; and so little did I believe that there was any ground of complaint for Don Carlos of the want of provisions, that the Portuguese Government have remonstrated with me on the consumption of provisions which his corps, I believe only 1200 men, has occasioned at Abrantes.

‘ As, however, the quantity of provisions at Abrantes is very large, particularly such belonging to the British army, I request you to desire Lobo to supply Don Carlos with provisions for his troops upon regular requisitions and receipts; and I beg him to report to Marshal Beresford immediately the quantity of provisions of all descriptions in the place, and the rate of daily consumption, including, specifically, Don Carlos’s demand.

‘ In respect to bayonets, desire Don Carlos to send an officer to the Marques de la Romana immediately with a return of the bayonets he wants; and upon the Marques de la Romana’s application they shall be delivered to that officer.

‘ I intended, myself, to give you notice of any danger from the south, and to instruct you upon the occasion. The reason for which I did not advert to that circumstance in the instructions which I gave you before is, that the line which I should wish you to follow in that case would vary according to the course of events here, and to the amount of the

enemy's force approaching by the left of (the Tagus). It is not impossible that I might have it in my power to assemble a corps on the left of the Tagus, which should be superior to any thing which the enemy could bring; and, in this case, the line which I should wish you to adopt would be very different from that which you would adopt in case I should be under the necessity of withdrawing you from that side of the river.

What I have above stated will show you the reasons for still delaying to instruct you in reference to the possible occurrence of the enemy entering the Alentejo from Estremadura; but I see no reason why you should not observe what is passing in that quarter. I beg of you, therefore, to open a correspondence with General Leit , who commands at Elvas, and let him know what is passing upon the Tagus; and request him to let you know, and desire Colonel Brito de Mozinho to let you know what may occur in Estremadura, Andalusia, &c., which may come to their knowledge. Tell him that I ordered you to write to him, and that every thing is going on well here.

I observe that the officer of artillery has taken on more rockets than I intended, and than can be of any use for experiments. I desired that he would take one carriage drawn by four or six horses, and I understand that he has taken four carriages drawn by twenty horses, and twenty loaded mules.

In case it should be necessary to bring you back across the Tagus, it might, in the existing state of the roads, be very difficult to draw off this equipment; and we should then possibly be obliged to leave in the hands of the enemy the means of burning the town of Lisbon. This is a very serious consideration. Accordingly, I request that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will investigate this rocket concern. Send down to Lisbon, by water or otherwise, all the rockets belonging to the Poitiers; and desire the officers of the British artillery in charge of the rockets to keep with you only one carriage, or a few loaded mules sufficient to try the experiment, and to send the remainder of the equipment to the place of embarkation on the left bank of the river, and the horses or mules of the whole equipment (excepting those of the one carriage which will

be kept for trial) across the river to Lisbon. By this arrangement we shall leave none of these machines on the left of the river if I should withdraw you; and, if you should find them useful, and should require more than are contained in the one carriage, or than on the mules which you will detain, you can send the horses down to the embarking place for another carriage, or the mules for an additional load.

‘In answer to your first letter of the 9th, I inform you that I shall speak to Beresford respecting the conduct of the Government regarding the clothing of the Caçadores, which he certainly understood was ready.

‘I shall inquire about the Portuguese artillery going without an officer.

‘I shall send an officer to Chamusca; but Hervey is there for the purpose of acquiring information.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Fane.’ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Pero Negro, 11th Nov., 1810. 10 A.M.

‘I have received your letter of the 9th at night.

‘The bridge at Villa Velha is burnt. The boats of the bridge of Abrantes, and all the materials belonging to it, still exist; the bridge of Punhete was taken up, and I believe the boats were taken up to Abrantes, where they now are.

‘The orders which I have given to Abrantes are at all events to prevent the boats from falling into the hands of the enemy, but not to destroy them till it shall be certain that the enemy must obtain possession of them.

As you say very truly, the anchors of the boats that are burnt must still remain, and will answer for other boats and bridges. Whether the boats of the bridges are destroyed or not, or whatever may become of the anchors now down, it is absolutely necessary that the boats used in bridges, in these torrents, should each have an anchor; and, as an additional security, a rope must be passed across the river, to which each boat should be fastened. The rope alone would be sufficient in the summer season; but, when the torrents come down in the winter, not only are the anchors required

to hold them, but great attention must be paid to the whole machine, otherwise not only the bridge would become impassable, but the boats unserviceable.

‘ I enclose an extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart upon this subject ; likewise a copy of my instructions to Captain Wedekind of the engineers.

‘ All that I wish in respect to the boats for the new bridges is, that we may know where to lay our hands upon them when we shall require them.

‘ In respect to the other materials for the bridges, I wish to have them prepared, and in readiness to be sent up the river when we shall want to use them ; and I have employed Captain Wedekind upon this business, in order that I may know exactly what is prepared, and what is not, when the time shall come when I may have to cross the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ P. S. I observe that I sent you, on the 29th October, the extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart of the 23rd, on the subject of the bridges ; and I therefore do not now trouble you with it again.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Pero Negro, 11th Nov., 1810.

‘ I enclose copies of dispatches to Government, which will make you acquainted with the state of affairs here.

‘ The Marques de la Romana is a good deal distressed by the paragraphs in the Cadiz newspapers respecting his march to this quarter ; and I acknowledge that I am of opinion that neither the public mind in Spain, nor those whose conduct is likely to become the subject of these discussions, are prepared for them.

‘ The freedom of the press is undoubtedly a benefit, and it is difficult possibly to fix the limits beyond which it shall not go. But, if the benefit consists in the information which the press conveys to the nation and the world in general, it appears to be necessary that that information should be founded in fact, and that discussions upon the conduct of military operations, and the characters of officers who carry them on,

should be founded on real knowledge of events, of the true state of affairs, of the character of the troops, and, above all, of the topography of the country which may be the seat of the operations.

‘ I think much mischief is done in England, not only to me personally, but to the character of the army and of the country, by foolish observations upon what passes here, in all the newspapers. But in England we are accustomed to these calumnies, and to read this nonsense, which it is to be hoped makes no real impression, particularly as the same newspaper generally contradicts the first statement, or argues against the first reasoning, in the course of a short time after it has been inserted. But in Spain, a country unaccustomed to these discussions, in which all, even the best men, are objects of suspicion, and every measure is considered the result of a treasonable conspiracy, it is highly dangerous to expose men in the situation of the Marques de la Romana to this description of calumny, and unfair statement and sophistical reasoning on his conduct. And it is particularly hard upon the individual, because, in the present situation of affairs in the Peninsula, neither he, nor his friends, nor the Government, who in this instance have approved of his conduct, can venture to defend him, because, if they do, on real grounds, they must convey information to the enemy.

‘ There is another very forcible objection in my opinion, to subjecting officers in the situation of Romana to this description of discussion, and that is the effect which it may be expected it will have on the officers and soldiers of the armies under their command. The Spanish armies, which are neither fed, nor paid, nor clothed, cannot be kept together by the bonds of discipline, as I keep my troops; but the authority of the General and the operations of the armies depend almost entirely upon the opinion which they entertain of him, and the confidence they repose in him. Both must be shaken by this description of discussion; and I should not be at all surprised, if Romana were to inform me, on some fine day, that the opinion of his army was against his remaining here, and that he must go; as Carrera informed me, during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, that notwithstanding his opinion agreed entirely with mine, and he wished to remain with me during the campaign, the opinion

of his troops would be so much against us, if we did not attempt to relieve the place, that he should be obliged to separate from me, if it should fall; and he actually marched on the evening of the day that the place surrendered. This fact shows what it is to command troops held together solely by opinion, and how dangerous these discussions must be in a country which has only an army of this description.

‘ Romana’s junction with me in this position was founded upon two circumstances. First; the impossibility of his remaining in Estremadura, if I should be obliged to embark; and the expediency of his embarking his troops at the same time, in order to save them for the Spanish nation. Secondly; upon the expediency of increasing, to the utmost extent that was practicable, the disposable force which I should collect in these positions.

‘ In respect to the operations proposed for Romana in these discussions on the enemy’s rear, I would observe, that the enemy have shown in this campaign, and throughout all their operations in Spain, that they are entirely indifferent as to what passes in their rear; and it is a circumstance not generally observed in the French system, and which makes them most formidable as opponents, that they invariably operate upon the flanks and rear of their enemies, but are entirely indifferent as to what passes on their own communications.

‘ We have so much force in their rear at present, that they can have no communication with Spain excepting by large corps; and they have not attempted such a communication. The addition of the Marques de la Romana’s corps to the other troops thus employed would not have increased their difficulties for subsistence, or have enabled us to press closer upon their rear, because, even if the Marques de la Romana could have ventured to place himself on the right of the Tagus, behind the enemy, he could not have ventured to place himself on the right of the Zezere. The enemy must still have had possession of the country along the right bank of the Tagus to that river, and they extend no farther now.

‘ But if the Marques de la Romana had placed himself upon the right of the Upper Tagus by Abrantes, and we had been obliged to embark, what was to become of his

corps? It must have been left behind to the mercy of the enemy, or must have made the best of its way through the mountains to the Mondego, and thence to the north of Portugal. In the mean time, the want of its services and assistance in these positions, by its absence for other objects, in a situation in which it could be of no use, might be the cause of the loss of the whole, and of the misfortune of our being obliged to withdraw.

‘I have written you thus much in order that you may have topics wherewith to remind your friends in the Cortes that they should not always go full gallop; they should pull the bit sometimes, or they will destroy the whole fabric which it is their object to raise, and will lose the confidence of all the wise and thinking men in Europe.’

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Vice Admiral the Right Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th, and I assure you that I shall always be happy to acknowledge the cordial assistance which I have received from you, and from the naval force under your command, since I have had the honor of commanding His Majesty’s troops in this country, of which your immediate attention to the suggestion contained in my letter of the 10th is only an additional instance.

‘Major Marston is the officer of the Quarter Master General’s department directed to conduct the details of quartering the brigade of marines and seamen, and to put himself under the orders of the officer whom you will appoint to command the brigade. He will wait upon you to receive your commands, and to be placed under the orders of that officer. He has likewise been directed to make requisitions for canteens and camp kettles for the men, which will be supplied as to the other troops.

‘I am inclined to be of opinion that the seamen will be of most service if armed with firelocks. As they will be in positions, some time would elapse before they could close with their enemy, and they would be awkwardly situated if

they had no fire-arms in their reach. It is to be observed, also, that the musket and bayonet may be used equally well with the pike, if an opportunity should offer of closing with the enemy.

‘I concur entirely with you that, in case it should be necessary to embark the army, these men must be the first sent to their vessels; and, indeed, the possibility of their services being required in their ships before it should be requisite for me to call for their services on shore, was one of the reasons for which I proposed Fort St. Julian, &c., as the first place of their assembly.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

‘By letters from General Blunt to Sir W. Beresford, I learn that the enemy have strengthened in cavalry their foraging parties on the side of Obidos; and they are now too strong for his parties of recruits and peasants from that garrison.

‘It would be very desirable if you would give them a lesson on that side by cutting up one of their parties.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

‘I have been thinking for some time of reinforcing your division, and you see what I have been able to do in this way this day. The truth is, that if I should make you as strong as I could wish, there will be other claimants for the command of the division; and I think it much better to keep a Portuguese brigade in reserve and unattached, to be attached to you when it is necessary to reinforce you, than to place one permanently under your command which would give claims to others.

‘In the mean time I wish to know from you in what manner you will dispose of the Brunswick Light Infantry be-

tween your brigades, that I may put your distribution of them in orders.

‘ I also wish to attach Colonel Wynch of the 4th to your division, as Colonel on the Staff, and to command Colonel Barclay’s * brigade in his absence, if you have no objection to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Brig. General R. Craufurd. WELLINGTON.

‘ If you could come over here some day, I would show you Massena’s dispatch on Busaco, which I have got, from which it appears that you attacked Loisson *en deux colonnes serrées en masse !!*

Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE,

‘ Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

‘ I enclose a report I have received from Captain Goldfinch, on the line of country from Palmella to the Tagus, in front of Aldea Galega. You will see that the right of the position at Rilvas is not very good; but at the same time it might be advisable to oblige the enemy to go round by the open country between Palmella and the right of the morass, and you might gain time by it: and as it is as well always to be prepared with a measure from which advantage may be derived, I would recommend you to have mines prepared in the bridges and causeways, stated to cross the rivers and morass, the destruction of which would impede the passage. The bridges and causeways will not be the worse for these mines, if we should never blow them.

‘ I rather believe there is some camp equipage belonging to the British army at Abrantes, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Lobo to issue some tents to Don Carlos de España, in order to cover his people from the rain in this terrible weather.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Major General Fane. WELLINGTON.

* Colonel Barclay of the 52nd: he died of the wound he received at the battle of Busaco.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

SIR,

Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

I have received a letter from Marshal Massena, in which he has requested, as a personal favor to himself, that the Marqueza d'Alorna may be allowed to join her husband, and that I will have her escorted to the advanced posts of the French army.

I beg that you will lay this request before the Government. I do not recommend it to their attention, because I can easily conceive that there may be reasons why they should not think proper to comply with this request; and I have nothing to urge in favor of it, excepting the wish to relieve the sufferings of the Marquez d'Alorna. If, however, they should think proper to grant the request, I will take care to have the lady escorted in safety to the advanced posts of the French army; and, at all events, I cannot but recommend to the Governors of the kingdom to adopt measures to have this lady treated with all the attention due to her rank and misfortunes, and provided with all the comforts which circumstances will permit.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Charles Stuart, Esq.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

Since I wrote to you on the 10th respecting Mascarenhas, I have received the enclosed papers from Dom M. de Forjaz, from which it appears that the Government have passed over entirely the point which I referred for consideration, viz., the distinction in the cases of those who entered the service of the French in 1807 and 1808, from the cases of those who entered their service in 1809 during Soult's invasion, because it will have very extensive consequences.

Of course all those who quitted Portugal in 1807 and 1808 will be entitled to the benefit of the same distinction in their cases. You will see also that they are determined to try and execute Mascarenhas, and I believe it is best for me to give no further opinion upon the subject.

It would appear, from the manner in which the enclosed paper is written, that it was drawn by Principal Souza; and

if he is the writer of it, he has altered his opinion probably upon finding that it agreed with mine.

‘ I think it not very important what they do with Mascarenhas, as there is one fact in his case that would justify the putting him to death, whatever might be the decision on the point referred to in my dispatch of the 10th instant; and that is, that being a lieutenant of cavalry in the French service, and aide de camp to Junot, he was taken in the disguise of a Spanish peasant; and upon his first examination by the officer who took him, declared that he was a Spanish peasant. He is therefore liable to be hanged as a spy. I had not seen his examination when I wrote to you on Saturday, and was not certain of this fact.

‘ There is nothing else of importance in his examination, excepting that he says he was desired to ask for a reinforcement of 40,000 men.

‘ There is nothing new since I wrote on Saturday, excepting that the 23rd regiment are arrived, with only twelve sick. The rain has been very heavy for the last three days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

WELLINGTON.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Pero Negro, 12th Nov., 1810.

‘ I enclose the weekly state of the army to the 1st instant. There is no sickness in the army of any importance. The number of men actually in the hospital is below 4000; the others returned sick absent are at the convalescent depôt at Belem. The continued badness of the weather renders it necessary to keep the soldiers, when dismissed from the hospital, rather longer at Belem than it otherwise would be. Your Lordship will be concerned to observe the continued, and I am concerned to add increasing, desertion of British soldiers to the enemy, a crime which, till within the last few years, was almost unknown in the army.

‘ It is difficult to account for the prevalence of this crime, particularly in this army lately. The British soldiers see the deserters from the enemy coming into their lines daily, all with a story of the unparalleled distresses which their army are suffering, and of the loss of all hope of success in the result of their enterprise; at the same time that they

know and feel that they are suffering no hardship or distress ; that there is not an article of food or clothing which can contribute to their health and comfort that is not provided for them ; that they are well lodged and taken care of in every respect, and not fatigued by work or duty ; and having every prospect of success.

‘ The deserters from the British regiments are principally Irishmen ; and I attribute the prevalence of the crime very much to the bad description of men, in all the regiments, which are drafted from the Irish militia ; and also to the irregular habits which many soldiers had acquired, and had communicated to others, in the retreat of the army through the north of Spain in the winter of 1808-9 ; and in their subsequent service in the French army, and in their wandering through the country back again into Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.* ‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Pero Negro, 13th Nov., 1810.

‘ It is very desirable that the French officers and soldiers, prisoners of war, now at Lisbon, should be sent to England in empty store ships and victuallers, or transports, as soon as may be convenient.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral* ‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE, ‘ Pero Negro, 13th Nov., 1810.

‘ I received, in the night, your letter of the 11th at noon. I conclude that the enemy will, by this time, have got back their troops from the left of the Zezere ; but if they should not, and the river should still be full, or if at any time hereafter they should be on the left bank of that river, and the communication cut off, and you think you can strike a blow against them by joining with what you have and Don Carlos de España, the disposable force of the garrison of Abrantes, I have no objection to your making the attempt. Take care, however, to have good information of the amount of the enemy’s force on the left of the Zezere, as I should not like

to lose Abrantes, which might be the consequence of any severe loss in the failure of this attempt.

‘The French have moved a small corps, 3000 men, to Llerena in Estremadura from Andalusia. This appears to be intended only to keep in check the guerrillas and parties on that side.

‘Ballesteros’s division of Spanish infantry, and Madden’s cavalry, and the Spanish cavalry, are in the front of this French division, and had driven in their outposts.

‘By accounts from the south, it appears that Soult is turning his attention to some plan of expedition against Cadiz by sea. He was fitting out boats at San Lucar; and it is said has passed twelve round to Puerto S^{ta} Maria.

‘In respect to your 12 pounders, you must only take care to give them a good start of you when you shall march back. Indeed, unless you should want them for some object of destruction on the right of the river, it would be best to keep them always well upon your left, probably as far down as Salvaterra.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Fane.’ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Pero Negro, 13th Nov., 1810.

‘I am sorry that I was not at home when you called. I have a letter from Silveira, as you will probably likewise. I have also heard from Austin to the 9th. I think you may let the Baron go.

‘If the enemy want ammunition, it is more likely to be powder than ball; and Trant’s report must be nonsense.

‘I enclose Cotton’s letters in answer to mine, respecting the patrols on that side. I hope that Blunt is mistaken; and I think he must be so.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Marshal WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Major General Fane.

‘MY DEAR FANE,’ Pero Negro, 14th Nov., 1810.

‘I received in the night your letter, giving an account of your cannonade upon the boats at Santarem, which I hope

will have had a much better effect than you suppose. There is more ammunition at Camora. I have spoken to Beresford respecting an officer of artillery, and another howitzer for you.

In respect to the depôt of materials at Santarem, I am anxious that an attempt should be made to destroy it, whatever may be the consequence to the town, if you believe it really exists there.

I should be very sorry to destroy the town, or any part of it; but I should never forgive myself if, having it in my power to destroy the means of passing the Tagus, I omitted to make use of it; and the enemy were afterwards to be able, by this depôt, to have a communication with a body of troops, which we must expect they will employ on the left of the river.

I beg you, therefore, to let Lieut. Lindsay make the attempt, if you think the depôt of materials is really there, which I believe there is no reason to doubt.

Believe me, &c.

Major General Fane.

WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Pero Negro, 14th Nov., 1810.

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 A.M.

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

There is not much use in going to Sobral this morning, but I believe I shall go over to Craufurd's in the course of the day, and I will either call or send to you, that we may meet at the fort, if you are for a ride.

I should be glad to see Silveira's enclosures from Salamanca. The question with regard to the directions to be given to Austin is difficult, and I have been turning it over in my mind since yesterday morning.

I send you a letter from Fane. It will be necessary that he should have another howitzer. Would it be possible to send him an officer of artillery? Is the Portuguese artillery axletree worked up in Portugal?

You see what Fane says about the collection of materials at Santarem, and the necessity of incurring the risk of destroying the lower town in order to destroy them. Even if

we do destroy the town, I am afraid we are not certain of effecting our object, but I believe we must attempt it. I desired Fane, in a letter which I wrote him yesterday, to join his force with that of Don Carlos and Lobo, and attack the French on the left of the Zezere, if the communication should continue to be cut off, and he thought he could do it without risk to the disposable force of the garrison.

I wish you would write to Lobo to tell him to give Fane every information of the enemy on the left of the Zezere, and to assist him as far as may be in his power, if Fane should determine to cross the Tagus to attack them.

Believe me, &c. WELLINGTON.

Marshal

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

From an intercepted letter, of the 19th September, from Berthier to Soult, it appears that an *armée du midi* had been formed, and Soult, I believe, appointed to command it; and it was intended to form an *armée du centre*. Soult's authority was confined to the Sierra Morena.

To Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Essling.

Au Quartier Général,

14 Novembre, 1810.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre non-officielle que votre Excellence m'a adressée le dixième de ce mois, et j'ai fait prier les Gouverneurs du Royaume de la part du Ministre de sa Majesté Britannique, qu'ils permettent à la Marquise d'Alorna de quitter Lisbonne pour rejoindre son mari.

C'est avec bien de la peine que je fais savoir à votre Excellence que la Régence a refusé ma demande, et je suis fâché qu'il ne soit pas en mon pouvoir de faire ce qui est agréable à votre Excellence en cette occasion.

Je n'ai nul désir d'entrer en discussion avec votre Excellence sur une affaire sur laquelle nous pourrions avoir une différence d'opinion, sur-tout pas dans une lettre non-officielle : et je ne repèterai pas les raisons que les Gouverneurs du Royaume m'ont données pour le refus : mais votre Excellence doit sentir que le Gouvernement et le peuple du Portugal ont à se plaindre de la conduite du Marquis d'Alorna.

‘En tout cas, les Gouverneurs du Royaume m’ont promis que Madame la Marquise aurait toutes les attentions que demandent son sexe, son rang, et ses malheurs ; et toutes les commodités qui peuvent adoucir son séjour à Lisbonne et son sort.

‘Le Marquis d’Alorna peut être certain qu’elle est en sûreté ; mais s’il le trouve agréable, je crois que je pourrais persuader aux Gouverneurs du Royaume de permettre à Madame la Marquise d’aller en Angleterre, d’où elle pourrait passer en France pour le rejoindre.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘*Le Maréchal Masséna,
Prince d’Essling.*

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Pero Negro, 15th Nov., 1810.’

‘I have perused the correspondence on the charges against Dr. —, and I conceive not only that there is no proof, but there is no matter of charge against Dr. —, excepting in the matter relating to General Blunt, of which there is ample proof. I conceive, however, that Dr. — ought not to be brought to trial on this charge.

‘Upon perusing this correspondence, it naturally occurs that the gentlemen who could find leisure, and could be inclined to write so much about nothing, could have very little to do. The charges and the ground for them, where there is ground, originate in private correspondence ; and Dr. * * * *, instead of acting as a person in his situation ought, viz., when he receives a charge against an officer placed under him, to have it put in the shape of a charge, and, in the hour of enquiry, begins to write other private letters, to other persons, about honor, character, &c. &c. ; and at last they have produced a volume which contains no one point bearing upon the matter.

‘In my opinion, if Dr. — is an improper and dangerous and mischievous person, he ought to be dismissed from his situation, and the Phisico Mor ought to be called upon officially to state whether he has, or not, any charges against Dr. * * * *.

‘ It is curious enough that Dr. ——— should be charged with writing that the Phisico Mor had said that he had charges against Dr. * * * *, and that the question should never have been asked the Phisico Mor.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ On the Hill in front of Sobral, 15th Nov., 1810.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

20 m. past 10 A.M.

‘ You will have observed that the enemy have retired from the ground they occupied with their right, about Sobral, and I think it most probable that they will have retired their whole army towards Santarem.

‘ Sir B. Spencer’s division is now feeling its way on towards Alemquer, and a patrole of our cavalry is just gone to the wood in front of No. 11.

‘ If you should find that the enemy have retired their left, as well as their right, I beg you to cross the river at Arruda, and feel your way on towards Alemquer, by the direct road leading from Arruda.

‘ Send this note on to General Hill, by the direct communication from Arruda to Alhandra. I wish him to feel his way on by the high road of Villa Franca and Castanheira, to Carregado, with the advanced guard of his corps.

‘ I shall soon have some British cavalry at Sobral and Alemquer, and General Hill had better get some of the 13th light dragoons from St. Antonio de Tojal, to observe in his front.

‘ We must make our first movements with caution, as I heard last night that the enemy had a reinforcement on the frontier of Upper Beira on the 9th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ On the Heights in front of Sobral,

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

15 th Nov., 1810. $\frac{1}{2}$ past 10 P.M.

‘ The enemy retired their right in the course of last night, and have probably retired their left from the high road of Villa Franca.

‘ I have sent to Lieut. General Hill to move on, and I think it would be desirable to have some of the boats sent up the river immediately, in case we should have to send more troops across. They might come as far as Alhandra, to which place I shall send them further directions.

‘ I conclude that Lieut. Berkeley will move up the river on General Hill’s flanks.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Vice Admiral

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE,

‘ Pero Negro, 15th November, 1810.

‘ The enemy retreated last night, and their outposts were this evening at Villa Nova. They have all gone to Santarem.

‘ Our advanced guard is this night at Alemquer, they will to-morrow be well on towards Santarem. General Hill will be at Villa Nova, and Sir Brent Spencer at Alemquer.

‘ The enemy intended either to retire across the Zezere, into Spain, or across the Tagus into Spain, or across the Zezere, to attack Abrantes. The last is possible, as I last night received an account, that on the 9th, they had a considerable reinforcement on the frontier of Beira Alta.

‘ I have requested the Admiral to have boats brought up the Tagus, and I propose to pass over General Hill’s corps to Salvaterra, or at least to be in readiness for that movement as soon as possible. This will enable me to prevent the success of an attack upon Abrantes, at all events, and possibly the movement of retreat across the Tagus; and if they retreat across the Zezere, I shall be able to annoy them by passing the river at or above Abrantes.

‘ You must in the first instance rocket Santarem, if you believe that the boats and materials are still there; in the next, you must encourage Lobo at Abrantes to hold out, whatever may be the attack made upon him. If the French should pass the Tagus between you and him, desire him to get his boats over to the right of the Tagus, and let Don Carlos de España pass over to Abrantes, and tell him that, in this case, Abrantes cannot be attacked. You will in that case take care of yourself, by withdrawing down the river.

'If you find that they are using their materials in constructing a bridge over the Zezere, move your cavalry opposite to Abrantes; make a great show there; throw the bridge over the Tagus, with the exception of three or four boats on the other side (the right), and have every thing in readiness for a complete bridge for you and Hill to cross, either to pursue the enemy through Beira Alta, or to oppose the enemy in his attack upon Abrantes. In this case (of their using their materials to make a bridge over the Zezere), I think it probable that you will have your caçadores and rockets and artillery still opposite Santarem; but if you should have reason to believe that the whole have been taken from Santarem, or that the design to cross the Zezere is manifest, move your whole force opposite to Abrantes, and encourage Lobo and the garrison by all the means in your power.

There is still a chance that the enemy may take up and try to keep a position at Santarem, endeavoring to keep his rear open, and his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo across the Zezere. However, this ought not to alter your measures. As soon as you are certain that they are using their materials to cross the Zezere instead of the Tagus, make the communication with Lobo your object, still holding your communication with the right of the army, and rocketing Santarem, if you should think there is any thing there to be destroyed.

Believe me, &c.

Major General Fane. WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

Heights above Alemquer.

MY DEAR GENERAL, 15th November, 1810. $\frac{1}{2}$ past 3 P.M.

'I enclose a letter in triplicate, which I wrote you this morning, and I hope that somebody at Arruda will have opened it, and will have acted upon it in your absence. You see the enemy at Villa Nova, I conclude, and I request you to communicate with the officer in command of General Hill's outposts, who will, I hope, be this night at Carregado. In the morning I wish you to feel your way cautiously to Villa Nova, and thence on the road to Santarem.

‘ I shall move General Spencer’s division in the morning to Alemquer, and General Hill’s corps I shall close up on the high road along the Tagus. I shall be up here very early in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th Nov., 1810.

‘ The enemy are still too strong for us this day at Santarem, and I have delayed the attack upon them till to-morrow morning, in order to have the assistance of the 1st division. If they stay, we shall then attack them.

‘ I enclose my letter of the 15th to Fane, which I believe you have already seen. I beg that you will instruct him to cross the Tagus to Abrantes immediately with his cavalry, light infantry, and Don Carlos de España’s brigade, if he should find that the enemy are retiring from the Zezere through Lower Beira, and to annoy them as much as he can, still keeping his communication with Abrantes. He may take some troops from Abrantes if he wants them.

‘ Let your troops move on by the usual stages on the left of the Tagus, as soon as they shall have crossed the river. When you will arrive opposite to Abrantes, you will follow the instructions above given to Fane, with this difference, that you may be able to cut off the rear of the enemy entirely, when your corps shall be up; or if the whole rear should have passed Abrantes before you shall have arrived there, you will push it as hard as you can with safety till you arrive yourself upon the Ponsul.

‘ I shall follow the enemy to the Zezere, where I shall endeavor to get the light division over the river to join you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th Nov., 1810. 5 P.M.

‘ I have received Fane’s letter of last night from Abrantes, which almost induces me to believe that I have made a mistake in sending you over the Tagus at all; and I am certain

that you should proceed no further up the river than Chamusca at present with the head of your corps; that General Lumley's brigade should remain at Almeirim, and the Portuguese troops at Salvaterra. The cavalry might go up to Chamusca. You should not go any farther till you shall find that the enemy have decidedly passed, or are passing, the Zezere.

‘ In order to be in time for Major General Lumley, I send him orders to halt at Almeirim, and the Portuguese to halt at Salvaterra, but for the cavalry to go to Chamusca.

‘ I did not attack Santarem this morning, as the artillery intended for the left missed its way; and I am rather glad that I did not make the attack, as the enemy have there undoubtedly a very strong post, which we must endeavor to turn; or, if they have not retired across the Zezere, or towards the Alva, they must be too strong for us here. I believe, however, I shall attack them to-morrow.

‘ Pray let the river be watched at Chamusca, as well as at Almeirim, and let me know every thing that passes on this side.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 21st Nov., 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Mr. Kennedy, relative to the freight for treasure carried in His Majesty's ships.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Lumley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 21st Nov., 1810.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 20th, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will continue to observe the enemy's movements on the right of the Tagus, and keep me informed of them. The officer who will take this to you will point out the place at which the boat of communication is stationed.

‘Endeavor to see the road from Santarem to Torres Novas, as well as that to Golegão. Possibly it may be seen from the steeple of the church, or some other high building at Almeirim.

‘Tell General Hill that the rain has destroyed the roads, and filled the rivulets to such a degree, that I am obliged to delay the movements on the enemy’s right, which I had intended to make yesterday with a view to dislodge him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. W. Lumley.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Cartaxo, 21st Nov., 1810.

‘I have received your letters of the 1st and of the 10th, and I now enclose the copy of my dispatch to Government of this day.

‘I have not got by me a copy of a letter to Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, but, as well as I recollect, I gave no opinion upon his plan. I refused to give him any officers, and I referred him to you.

‘In respect to the Princess of Brazils, I acknowledge that my opinion has been changed in consequence of my apprehensions of the democracy of the Cortes, and of their desire to take into their own hands the patronage and the exercise of the power of the executive Government.

‘The French have a position at Santarem, compared with which Busaco is nothing. However, when it shall be fair weather, and the roads passable, I hope to dislodge them by moving on their flanks.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘The Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 21st Nov., 1810.

‘I enclose my dispatch to Government, which I beg you to send home, and to let the packet sail. The enemy have a position stronger than Busaco or Sobral, and the rain, which is destroying them, enables them to maintain it. One of our brigades could not march two miles yesterday in less time than three hours. It did not get in till two o’clock.

This day we are at a stand still; and if the weather shall clear up, I hope to be able to dislodge them by movement.

‘Let the Government do what they please with the Deputies arrived, or expected to arrive, from France.

‘I think that Austin’s quarantine ought to be stopped, as the yellow fever is disappearing at Cadiz.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 21st Nov., 1810.

‘The enemy retired from the position which they had held for the last month, with their right at Sobral and their left resting upon the Tagus, in the night of the 14th instant, and went by the road of Alemquer towards Alcoentre with their right, and Villa Nova with their left. They continued their retreat towards Santarem on the following days.

‘The allied army broke up from their position on the morning of the 15th, and followed the march of the enemy, and the advanced guard was at Alemquer, and the British cavalry and the advanced guard at Azambuja and Alcoentre on the 16th, and at this place on the 17th. In these movements they have made about 400 prisoners.

‘These troops have been followed in their march by Sir Brent Spencer’s and the 5th division of infantry, under Major General Leith.

‘On the 17th I received accounts from Major General Fane, from the left of the Tagus, that the enemy had constructed another bridge on the Zezere; that which had been first thrown over that river having been carried away by the floods; and that they had on that day marched a large body of troops from Santarem towards Golegão, and I immediately passed Lieut. General Hill’s corps across the Tagus at Valada in boats, which Admiral Berkeley had been so kind as to send up the river to aid and facilitate the operations of the army. The object of this movement was that Lieut. General Hill might give countenance and assistance to Abrantes, in case the enemy should attack that place; or, that if they should retire from Portugal through Lower Beira, he might annoy them on their retreat.

‘On the 18th the British cavalry and the advanced guard found the enemy’s rear guard so strongly posted in front of Santarem, that it was impossible to attack them with any prospect of success; and although my posts on the left of the Tagus have informed me that the enemy continue to send troops and baggage along the road on the right bank towards the Zezere, their rear guard have still maintained their post; and they have evidently in that post, and in Santarem, a sufficient body of troops to enable them to hold the strong position of Santarem against any attack which I might make on its front.

‘At the same time, the rain, which has been so very heavy since the 15th, has so completely destroyed the roads and filled the rivulets, that I have hitherto found it impossible to dislodge the enemy from his position at Santarem, by movements through the hills on his right flank. The bad state of the roads has also possibly been the cause of the enemy remaining at Santarem so long.

‘Although the enemy have moved large bodies of troops to the eastward from Santarem, I have not yet heard that any large numbers have crossed the Zezere. I cannot be certain, therefore, that their intention is to retire from Portugal entirely. Their army being collected between Santarem and the Zezere, they are in a situation to be able, and they may endeavor to maintain themselves in that strong position till the reinforcements, which I know are on the frontier, can join them; and for this reason, and because I was unwilling to expose to the inclemencies of the weather a larger body of troops than it was absolutely necessary to employ to press upon the enemy’s rear, and to support the advanced guard, I have kept in reserve a considerable proportion of the allied army, some of them still in the cantonments in the line of our fortified positions.

‘I have also ordered General Hill to halt the head of his corps at Chamusca, on the left of the Tagus, till the enemy’s movement shall have been decided.

‘I have not heard from General Silveira, who is on the frontier of Upper Beira, since the 9th instant, and he then informed me of the movements of different bodies of troops, which I suppose to be 20,000 men in Castille, apparently levying contributions of provisions, &c., for the army in

Portugal. These accounts have been confirmed by others of a later date, the 13th instant, from Salamanca.

‘ Having advanced from the positions in which I was enabled to bring the enemy to a stand, and to oblige them to retire without venturing upon any attack, it is but justice to Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, and the officers of the Royal Engineers, to draw your Lordship’s attention to the ability and diligence with which they have executed the works by which these positions have been strengthened, to such a degree, as to render any attack upon that line occupied by the allied army very doubtful, if not entirely hopeless. The enemy’s army may be reinforced, and they may again induce me to think it expedient, in the existing state of affairs in the Peninsula, to resume these positions; but I do not believe they have it in their power to bring such a force against us as to render the contest a matter of doubt. We are indebted for these advantages to Lieut. Colonel Fletcher and the officers of the Royal Engineers, among whom I must particularly mention Captain Chapman, who has given me great assistance upon various occasions.

‘ Your Lordship will have observed how much the effective strength of the army in proportion to its total numbers has increased lately. There is no sickness in the army of any importance; and above one half of those returned as sick in the military returns are convalescents, who are retained at Belem till they shall have gained sufficient strength to bear the fatigues of marching, and of their duty in the field.

‘ Besides the allied army, I enclose the copies of a correspondence which I have had with Admiral Berkeley, from which your Lordship will observe that an additional force had been provided from the fleet; and I take this occasion of informing your Lordship, that in every instance I have received the most cordial and friendly assistance from Admiral Berkeley and the officers and men of the squadron under his command. Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Williams has even done me the favor to come up the Tagus to superintend the passage of General Hill’s corps over the river.

‘ In my dispatch of the 20th October, I informed your Lordship that the Marques de la Romana had joined the

allied army in their positions in front of Lisbon, with a considerable detachment of the Spanish army under his command. He still continues with us; and I receive from him much valuable advice and assistance.

Throughout the period during which we occupied those positions, every thing went on with the utmost regularity, and to my satisfaction, notwithstanding that the force was composed of troops of various descriptions and of different nations; and I attribute these advantages entirely to the zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and the conciliatory disposition of the chiefs and General officers of the armies of the different nations; and I have no doubt that the same cordiality will prevail as long as it may be expedient that the armies should continue united.

‘Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, and the officers of the General Staff of the army, have continued to give me every assistance in their power.

‘My last dispatches from Cadiz are dated the 9th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 21st Nov., 1810.

‘My dispatch will give you a tolerably correct notion of the state of affairs here. At first I thought the enemy were off, and I am not certain yet that they are not going. They had certainly made no preparations for holding the position at Santarem; and if they do not propose to stay, they hold it only till the state of the roads will allow them to continue their retreat. If they do propose to stay, and to hold this position as a *tête de cantonnement*, they must have received orders to do so from Paris, since they began to retreat.

‘This is possible, nay it is probable, that if they have had any communication with the frontier, they have received orders not to quit the country, as the political effect of their retreat will be great. But whatever may be the political effect of their retreat, I am convinced there is no man in his senses who had ever passed a winter in Portugal who would

not recommend to them to go, rather than endeavor to maintain themselves upon the Zezere during the winter, or than attack our position, whatever may be the strength of their reinforcements.

However, it is probable that we shall have another campaign in the Peninsula, and your Lordship will probably have turned your mind to some measure for the reinforcement of the numbers of the army in general. Whatever may be your measure, I earnestly recommend to you to bring it forward at the commencement of the session, as you will then enjoy the benefit of it early in the campaign; whereas, if you bring it forward after, or allow it to be deferred till the Easter holidays, you will not get your men to their corps till July and August, nor to the army till September or October.

Believe me, &c. **WELLINGTON.**
The Earl of Liverpool.

My last dispatches from Cadix are dated the 9th instant. I have the honor to be, &c.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,
 My dispatch will give you a tolerably correct notion of the state of affairs here. I am not certain yet that they are not going. They had certainly made no preparations for holding the position at Santarem; and if they do not propose to stay, they hold it only till the state of the roads will allow them to continue their retreat. If they do propose to stay, and to hold this position as a tête de cantonnement, they must have received orders to do so from Paris, since they began to retreat. This is possible, nay it is probable, that if they have had any communication with the frontier, they have received orders not to quit the country, as the political effect of their retreat will be great. But whatever may be the political effect of their retreat, I am convinced there is no man in his senses who had ever passed a winter in Portugal who would

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

END OF VOLUME VI.

LONDON:
Printed by W. Clowes and Sons,
St. Martin's Lane.

My dear Mr. [Name]

I have just received your letter of the 11th. I am very glad to hear from you and to hear that you are well. I am also very glad to hear that you are enjoying your journey. I hope you will have a very successful one.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I have just received your letter of the 11th. I am very glad to hear from you and to hear that you are well. I am also very glad to hear that you are enjoying your journey. I hope you will have a very successful one.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

I am sure you will find everything very interesting. I am sure you will find the people very friendly. I am sure you will find the scenery very beautiful. I am sure you will find the food very good. I am sure you will find the climate very pleasant.

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley

The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K. G. during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries and France from 1799 to 1818

Bd.: 6

London 1838

Brit. 551 t-6

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10282267-7